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 It may seem self-evident that employment is 
crucial to a happy life and that job creation is a 
central societal concern. However, this dissertation 
suggests that work is neutralized when it is un-
derstood simply as a valuable societal asset, while 
its concrete significance in a specific life situation 
is ignored. One example of such neutralization is 
when the importance of work is reduced to the 
importance of “having a job”, whatever its practical 
content or purposes. To challenge such neutrali-
zations, the author looks at the tension within the 
conceptions of work which underlie them. The 
danger of such neutralization is that political and 
existential worries are swept under the rug. The 
book aims to repoliticize work by looking at it as an 
essentially contested concept. The author suggests 
that important aspects of work are revealed within 
such contestations of the role of work in our lives. 
All chapters are structured around dialogues with 
critical accounts of work, including those of Han-
nah Arendt, André Gorz, Kathi Weeks, Simone Weil, 
Karl Marx and Richard Sennett. What does it mean 
to say that society has been invaded by necessity? 
What does it mean to imagine a society beyond 
wage labor? Is it a utopia or a dystopia to think 
about work as a limitless activity? What is at stake 
when work becomes a commodity on the market? 
What are the hazards of fragmentation of work?
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Introduction 
In Ermanno Olmi’s film Il posto (1961) a young man, 
Domenico, looks for a job in a big bureaucratic organization. 
The story is set in postwar Milan. We know nothing about this 
organization except that it is huge and that it contains many 
departments. Reluctantly, the boy attends an aptitude test 
with several others. The test comprises a math examination 
and an absurd interview. Domenico talks to a girl who also 
takes the test. He confides to her that his father has told him 
that this job is not well paid but that it is a secure job one has 
for life. His parents stress the urgency of getting a job. For 
economic reasons, getting an education isn’t an option. He is 
just another kid who goes to town to work. Domenico is hired, 
but not as a clerk. There is no spot for him at the moment. For 
a while, he spends idle days as a messenger together with a 
bored man who browses through the mail. When the young 
man is finally assigned a task, his colleague bitterly tells him 
not to hurry, ‘let them wait’. Time is suspended in 
meaningless moments of waiting, enforced inactivity. One of 
the clerks passes away, and a spot is finally opened. The 
young man enters the clerks’ office and sits down at a desk in 
the rear. His colleagues, whom we have seen earlier in states 
of agony and boredom, are upset: the young man sat down at 
the best table, the table reserved for senior employees. The kid 
has to move. The last scenes of the film substantiate what we 
have seen throughout: the organization makes young people 
old. Older employees have grown into the job to such an 
extent that they invest themselves in petty fights about the 
best desk to sit at. We hear the intense rattling sound of a 
mimeograph. The young man gazes hopelessly into a lamp, a 
lamp which is said to be straining on the eyes. He has finally 
attained his secure spot, he is finally about to grow up. The 
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general atmosphere of the film is not that of cynical disclosion. 
What we see is rather a familiar story about growing up and 
getting by. The film shows people submitting to enforced 
idleness and petty competition but we also see sparks of life. 
Rather than making a claim about what life must always be, Il 
posto poses a question: is this what life should and must be? 
Il posto is set in a time of economic changes, a time in which 
wage labor enters into people’s lives as the only source of 
subsistence. Italians migrated within the country to get a job. 
The film presents the young man’s wide-eyed fascination with 
urban life. The story also explores the connection between 
work and adulthood, a process requiring a lot of adaptation, 
mimicking even. We see the young boy’s helplessness within 
the gigantic organization, but not even the more experienced 
workers seem to thrive there. Olmi’s point appears to be that 
this is not an environment in which anyone can live well. The 
last images of Il posto presents the world of work as a world of 
anxieties comprising its own forms of infantile outbursts. We 
see the clerks scrambling to reach the front row of the drab 
office: the ultimate success. The mind-numbing work is 
portrayed as the fate not only of this young, unfortunate man, 
but also of many people whose only choice is to accept a job, 
any job. The corporation in the film is a sterile, eerie place. The 
people there learn to cope with their colleagues and their 
boring jobs – they learn to demand very little of life. The film 
illustrates the existential hazards of normalizing wage labor as 
the core of people’s lives, and this point is, I think, more 
important now than ever. What does it mean that we all must 
work? Which implications does it have to think about one’s 
life as a process of ‘getting by’? In this thesis I will explore 
tensions in our relations to work that can be seen in a society 
in which work has an extremely important place but where 
the role of work is simultaneously surrounded by ambiguities, 
disagreement and controversies.  
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Work and clichés 
What is work? This may seem like a metaphysical question 
with a marginal bearing on contemporary debates and 
political struggles. I disagree. In many present debates work 
figures as an unremarkable and quotidian concept. Work is 
treated as a societal and economic asset the importance of 
which most political parties recognize: of course everyone 
wants to land a job they like and have aptitude for, of course 
society needs work (and tax incomes), and of course companies 
need to be supported by sound economic policies so that they 
can offer as many jobs as possible to the citizens in, say, 
Finland. In spite of, or perhaps because of, challenging 
economic times work is often considered a basically 
unproblematic issue: everybody needs a job, now more than 
ever. In some ways, the present economic crisis has 
strengthened the tendency to portray work as a common load 
we all have to bear as good citizens, while the task of 
politicians is to create policies that preserve and create new 
jobs and prepare the way for entrepreneurship. This view of 
work is frequently presented as the fundament of responsible 
politics: the economic crisis has put us in a precarious 
situation and this makes it all the more important to stick 
together and roll up our sleeves as a small and struggling 
nation of highly educated, working people (to paraphrase the 
rhetoric as it appears in Finland at present). To continue with 
such heavily circulated ideas about work: the best would be 
full employment; one of the most challenging things for a 
young person is to find a job; we value hard work; it is vital to 
rest now and then so that one can work diligently later on; one 
sometimes has to sacrifice oneself for a job opportunity; few 
things are as valuable as a secure job.  
Even though work stands at the fore of political 
consciousness, it is as if questions about what work means in 
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our lives tend to remain untouched when this level of 
ostensible common sense is maintained. I would go as far as to 
say that what characterizes many political discourses about 
work today is a form of obsession with work but also an eerie 
sense in which work is present and absent in these discussions 
about employment, global structures and well-being at work. 
By it being ‘absent’ I mean that questions about work are 
treated in such a way that they end up being what can be seen 
as clichés so that many problems in our relations to wage 
labor and the labor market remain untouched and even swept 
under the rug. Even so, it is a real challenge to expose this way 
of talking as clichés or to judge whether such ways of speaking 
really can be said to be questionable forms of common sense 
that obfuscate problems. As the sociologist P.D. Anthony 
writes in his book about ideologies of work: the meaning of 
work has not received much attention, “Perhaps it is because 
work is so general and commonplace that we believe it to be a 
matter of common sense and general agreement; our 
assumptions about it are so basic that we do not even 
recognize them as assumptions” (1977, 4). 
The following dichotomy indicates how an appearance of 
consensus is upheld. Either, work is analyzed from a 
perspective of economic efficiency. How should the welfare 
state be restructured when a large portion of the population is 
about to retire? How could employment relations become 
more flexible? How can the incentives for firms to employ 
people be increased? Or, work is dealt with from an 
individual, psychological or preferential perspective. One 
example of the latter tendency is the debate about the so called 
‘work-family balance’, where the goal is a sustainable 
individual solution to the problem of conflicting demands. 
Another example of this perspective is the idea that the 
individual is to optimize hir employability by making the 
right life choices: getting an education that matches the 
9 
 
demand of the labor market, taking care not to become 
pregnant at the wrong moment, being ‘presentable’ at all 
times etc.1 This dichotomy between work as an economic asset 
and work as an individual concern seems to have the function 
of eliminating or concealing work-related controversies. The 
contention that ‘we all need a job to support us’ appears 
frequently in such contexts. Throughout the thesis, I will give 
examples of discussions about work that do not fit into a neat 
dichotomy consisting of either the societal perspective of 
efficiency or the individual’s preferential relation to hir job.  
Questioning this dichotomy goes hand in hand with one of 
the most important strands in the thesis. It is typical of many 
political debates about work that the concept of work slides 
between what I will moralization and neutralization.  
Work is neutralized when it is described as a commodity, 
labor power, in terms of supply and demand on the labor 
market or in terms of an economic asset. Such neutralization 
appears in policy proposals about an optimal reorganization 
of the labor market that keeps work intact as a frictionless 
piece in the societal machinery, for example so that unions 
make no unreasonable demands. Neutralization is also all-
present in the political aim of job creation: all jobs are 
commensurable in the sense that they provide an income for 
the employees, the companies extract profits from them and 
they generate tax incomes for the state. Neutralization –
normalization and naturalization – here means that tensions and 
controversies are eliminated or obscured. In other words, I 
talk about neutralization to show how political, ethical and 
existential dimensions of the world of work are displaced or 
decentralized.  
                                                          
1 Instead of using obnoxious expressions like ‘he and she’, ‘his and her’ I use 
the gender-neutral pronoun s/he, hir and hirself in example and other cases in 
which ‘he and she’ are typically used. 
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By moralization, I mean the elevation of the value of all 
work and the idea that work as such is good and praiseworthy, 
‘society needs working adults’. Wage labor as such contributes 
to societal wealth and all work (work in a much looser sense) 
is a source of personal self-realization, autonomy and societal 
social integration. This view surfaces in activation programs 
for the unemployed, in which the idea is that all forms of wage 
labor (or forms of work that resemble wage labor) spur 
independence and health. Such moralization can also be 
detected in the insistence that work is the main way in which 
we contribute to society. However, the term moralization 
should be used with caution considering that one of the aims 
of the thesis is to re-introduce ethical questions about the 
purposes work serves. By ‘moralization’, I mean a quasi-moral 
language that more or less excludes ethical arguments.  
Neutralization and moralization are not opposites. Often, 
they go hand in hand, or exist in a complex internal relation 
that mollifies, takes the edge off, debates about work and 
displaces the specific purposes and circumstances of working 
activities. 
Many writers (Shershow 2005, Paulsen 2010, Weeks 2011) 
have criticized both of these tendencies, the neutralization and 
moralization of work. The oscillation them re-emerges in the 
chapters in connection with specific themes such as an 
investigation of necessity and work (chapter 1), work as a cog 
in the societal machinery (chapter 2), the relation between a 
work ethic of ‘hard work’ and a work ethic of self-realization 
(chapter 3), the contrast between work and mere functions 
(chapter 4), work as labor power (chapter 5) and the 
fragmentation of work (chapter 6).  
By means of encounters with critical texts about work my 
aim is to shed light on the urge to neutralize or moralize work. 
What I thus want to do in this thesis is to look at work from a 
perspective that does not take these cultural clichés – ‘all forms 
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of work are important’, ‘we all want rewarding jobs’, ‘work is 
our shared condition’ – for granted. In other words, the aim is 
to re-politicize the concept of work. Fundamental questions 
thereby come to the fore. How are the purposes of work 
understood? Why is it so tempting to relegate work to the 
level of compulsion, individual and societal reproduction or a 
completely individualized project of self-realization? The 
focus in the present thesis is wage labor (of which salaried 
work is a form). Paid work dominates the present society, 
even though the forms differ: most of us have no choice but to 
make ourselves available to the labor market. The thesis tracks 
the tensions that this situation engenders. One dimension of 
wage labor is important to take note of: it is formally free in the 
sense that one is in principle free to choose one’s occupation. 
Employment contracts are built around formal freedom: the 
employer does not own the employee (deviations, sadly, 
proliferate). I seek to show that the formal freedom of wage 
labor need not settle the discussion: we look for good jobs, we 
delve into careers, we find ourselves in a situation in which 
we are ready to accept any job, we are worried about the effect 
the job has on us, we fear that things that need to get done are 
neglected in the jobs that we are paid to do. Are there ways in 
which the emphasis of work as ‘jobs’ inhibit ways of thinking 
about responsibility and complicity? This is one of the main 
worries I articulate through what I call a moralization and a 
neutralization of work. 
A philosophy of tensions  
Several books have been written about the historical 
development of ideologies of work and about the changes in 
how work is conceptualized (Applebaum 1992). This thesis 
will not be a contribution to this genre of writings, even 
though I will refer to classical accounts of work and even 
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though conceptions about work will be situated in their 
historical surroundings. The aim of the thesis is to shed light 
on contemporary debates about work, but I will at times draw 
on sources that describe waged work in a historical situation 
different from our own, because I think these writings provide 
a fruitful vocabulary by means of which present debates about 
work can be scrutinized. The topic of the thesis is paid work 
(roughly: in a Western context) and tensions that arise within 
the world of wage labor. As far as I know, this emphasis is 
rarely brought to the surface even if it appears in Marxist 
understandings of work in a society torn by contradictions. I 
will attempt to show how one of the major inclinations within 
contemporary critical writings on work is to view wage labor 
as a coherent and clear-cut phenomenon, and that writers for 
this reason make problematic statements about what work has 
to be – even what work will always be. I do not think that these 
statements are unintelligible (nor are they mere theoretical 
mistakes). They often have a political aim. However, it is 
possible to criticize them if they obfuscate the different roles 
work plays in human life – something which is important to 
hold on to in the face of the neutralization of work. For this 
reason, my approach to these texts could be characterized as 
encounters: I try to read a specific writer as charitably as I can, 
while at the same time trying to extract the critical potential of 
the project.  
More specifically, I will look at the tensions that stem from 
neutralizations that turn work into the condition of life, a mere 
function, labor power or a personal project of self-realization. 
Such generalized and practically operating images of work 
can be spotted in the widespread jargon about job creation or 
preserving jobs. What these jobs consist in is not always 
specified. Controversies make such neutralization of work – 
neutralization as a response to critique – very obvious. This is 
what goes on for instance when critique directed at the 
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existence of a certain branch of industry (in Finland this has 
concerned the mining and fur industries) is dismissed by 
appeals to incomes and job creation. Such controversies 
indicate dimensions of work ˗ the ethical meaning of work 
versus wok as employment and tax money ˗ that stand in a 
genuine relation of tension. As those controversies also show, 
the reduction of work to job creation and sustenance is by no 
means restricted to the rhetorical level: the activity is reduced 
to sustenance with regard to what a job comes to be when it is 
arranged so as to maximize productivity, etc. One of the most 
significant aims of this thesis is to give an account of how 
hegemonic conceptions of work can be discerned in what 
work is or comes to be in a certain setting. There is a parallel 
here with what I said about clichés and common sense above. 
To talk about tensions and clichés should not be done in a 
spirit that assumes that it is immediately clear to everybody 
what can be seen as a tension or as a cliché. The philosophical 
work consists in treading carefully by keeping in mind that 
one aspect of challenging the neutralization and moralization 
of work is precisely not to be hasty in settling the character of 
a specific tension. The philosophical work does thus not 
consist in establishing that there are a number of tensions, but 
rather to open up a perspective in which it is important to 
articulate tensions against the inclination to neutralize and 
moralize work.  
Some philosophers maintain that philosophy is more about 
elaborating and understanding tensions than presenting 
overarching models or theories. The philosopher Hanna 
Fenichel Pitkin clarifies what this means in her book about 
Hannah Arendt’s thinking, a philosopher known for her 
contradictory philosophy. Towards the end of the book, Pitkin 
takes a few steps back and reflects more generally on what 
philosophy is. Appealing to Wittgenstein, she first talks about 
a perspicuous representation of how we use words and draw 
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distinctions – how we ordinarily talk in contrast to 
philosophical attempts to pin down what reality is ‘strictly 
speaking’. She connects this to dialectical thinking:  
By dialectical thinking I mean a way of living with ambiguity and 
inconsistency that permits intellectual comprehension and 
mastery without resolving the tensions. […] The difficulty is to 
distinguish this necessary and desirable sort of living with 
contradiction from common confusion and incoherence, 
thoughtlessness, vacillation, and unwillingness to commit oneself 
in action (Pitkin 1998, 247-8). 
I agree with Pitkin that living with tensions does not 
necessarily imply philosophical sloppiness, constant 
vacillation or a readiness to succumb to such tensions. As I 
interpret Pitkin, she means that tensions are a point of 
departure and that there is no strict distinction between living 
with and thinking about tensions. My contention is this: to 
scrutinize tensions is fruitful because that approach opens up 
a conceptual space for change and transformation in the sense 
that an articulation of tensions (for example between work as 
a commodity and what I will call work as a life situation) calls 
for lucidity with regard to the specific worry at hand. As I will 
try to spell out, articulating such worries is most of all to be 
interpreted as a concern about the future. When tensions, 
rather than a seemingly neutral image of work as the core of 
life or the central interest of society, appear, the question ‘how 
are we to live’ arises as a central and acute concern. In the 
Republic Socrates alerted his interlocutors to the – he stresses 
that it is not trivial – question: how should one live? (Republic 
352d5-6) Tensions can thus function as a lever by means of 
which aspects of how we live and think appear. The power of 
neutralizations is that they make it hard even to recognize 
something as thinkable (cf. Eagleton 2007, 58). In this light, 
tensions help us scrutinize everyday life. Pitkin expresses a 
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similar thought, suggesting that theorizing is a form of 
reconceptualization “questioning the existing framework of 
assumptions so that new possibilities appear” (1998, 248). This 
is exactly how I think about my own approach as well and this 
is what I hope the thesis will achieve, even though it will 
contain no set of ideals or programs for political policy 
changes. What I hope to be doing is instead to open up a field of 
discussion. This goes together with another crucial aspect of the 
thesis – the notion that work can be described as what W.B. 
Gallie (1956) called an essentially contested concept.  
My treatment of tensions should not be read in a traditional 
Marxist vein, such that there is, supposedly, a fundamental 
conflict in capitalism that reigns between labor and capital. 
There has been an ongoing debate about this conflict and there 
has been disagreement about whether it gives a false image of 
work as a clear-cut opposite of capital (cf. Weeks 2011). 
Nonetheless, the relation between Marxist ideas about 
contradictions and my own view merits a short comment. Not 
all Marxists subscribe to the idea that history progresses 
steadily towards a final end in a determinist fashion, nor do all 
Marxists claim that the history of capitalism is shaped by one 
overarching contradiction.2 The Hegelian legacy in the widest 
sense that can be traced in many Marxist writings is expressed 
in the articulation of capitalism as an evolving process of 
contradictions (cf. Avineri 1968, 84). This is what is often 
called the dialectical side of Marxist thinking: as David 
Harvey writes, it takes account of “the unfolding and dynamic 
relations between elements within a capitalist system” (2010, 
11-2). This system is not static, but always moving, changing, 
expanding. I think this description of capitalism as a dynamic 
set of evolving relations is very important and this perspective 
has a central role in this thesis. However, I do not set out to 
                                                          
2 For a discussion about this, cf. Read 2003, 34.  
16 
 
provide a theoretical analysis of the functioning of the 
economic system.  
To look at these tensions and diverse, but not isolated, roles 
of work is to remind oneself that wage labor is not a uniform 
system and that no philosophical claims about what work 
must be or what it has always been can be made. To evoke 
these tensions is to counteract the tendency to think about 
work as a given and natural system, a necessary web of 
relations around which our lives are structured. This stance 
reveals the need to articulate what good or meaningful work 
could be. This is not synonymous with looking for an ideal, 
which would mean that a fixed concept of work would make 
up my starting point and that the subsequent task would be to 
distill features of work that ‘good work’ encompasses. If an 
ideal of work is settled, it is also be clear that the question 
about how we are to live is a shared and continuous life 
concern. Rather, the aim is to get clear about what is at stake 
when people talk about good and meaningful work and which 
concepts of work figure in such discussions.  
My discussion about the contested and open-ended nature 
of the concept of work can be linked to a wider debate in the 
social sciences about the use of concepts. Some writers have 
pointed to the difference between the social sciences and the 
humanities on the one hand, and the natural sciences on the 
other, by referring to the different role concepts have in these 
fields. What characterizes the former fields is that their use of 
concepts is related to and – to some extent – dependent on 
people’s self-understanding. For this reason there can be no 
such thing as an investigation about democracy without at 
least some attention to what people mean by democracy and 
similar words; if there were no such grounding of the concepts 
used in social sciences, one could wonder what the 
investigation aspires to describe and what it sets out to 
understand and make sense of. This perspective is advanced 
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in the philosopher Peter Winch’s The Idea of a Social Science and 
its Relation to Philosophy (cf. Winch 2007, 21-2, 44, 83-4). 
[Although] the reflective student of society, or of a particular 
mode of social life, may find it necessary to use concepts which 
are not taken from the forms of activity which he is investigating, 
but which are taken rather from the context of his own 
investigation, still these technical concepts of his will imply a 
previous understanding of those other concepts which belong to 
the activities under investigation (2007, 81). 
My own impression is that Winch’s remarks allow for 
contestation of the concepts employed in these types of 
scientific fields, which is not to say that there is no openness in 
other sciences, just that the stakes are different. Naturally, 
social scientists as well as people in general, often agree about 
how concepts are used. However, if one takes to heart Winch’s 
emphasis on the investigation’s dependence on people’s 
understanding of what they are doing, contestability could 
even be said to be a constitutive aspect of understanding within 
such scientific work. As the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre 
writes:  
We do not know how to decide whether a given alleged instance 
of a phenomenon is to be treated as a counter-example to a 
proposed generalization or as not an example of the phenomenon 
at all, because debate remains open about which the central, 
standard, and paradigmatic instances of the phenomenon are 
(1973, 2).  
There is a further point to make that has to do with my project. 
MacIntyre goes on to talk about an essential contestability of 
concepts within the social sciences. Whereas some areas of 
social life are characterized by a certain level of agreement, 
other social contexts contain rivaling concepts and rivaling 
comprehensions. MacIntyre takes political parties as an 
example: there may be disagreement about what a party is or 
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should be. This implies that the application of a certain 
concept in the social sciences is predicated on the drastic 
changes that concepts go through (1973, 4).  
Above, I said that my own project links critical texts about 
work to contemporary debates. I think MacIntyre is right 
when he writes that the open-endedness characterizing the 
conceptual framework of the scientific study of society is 
related to the conceptual openness of social life itself. He takes 
the example of ruminating on whether Sinn Fein was a 
political party in 1910. The answer will depend on how 
continuity is seen and the answer cannot be disconnected from 
the debates within and around Sinn Fein. Debates about a 
specific field cannot, in these cases, be completely 
disconnected from the debates going on within that field (1973, 
6-7). There is no neutral stance from which social science is 
conducted. The point is not that contestability is somehow 
generally desirable, but, rather that it is difficult to imagine the 
social sciences without such dimensions. Furthermore, the 
recognition of the contestability of a particular concept may 
enhance the self-consciousness of those contributing to a 
scientific debate and increase the awareness of what is at stake 
in a debate that goes on in the scientific field.3 One could even 
say that contestability is a condition of understanding in the 
social sciences. For this reason there is no constant need to 
‘resolve’ these contestations by, for example, stipulating a 
concept (in definition x, Sinn Fein is a party, in definition y, it 
is not). My own project is to keep these contestations alive. 
Throughout the thesis, I highlight the dangers of losing the 
sense of what is at stake in a debate. A point of reference here 
                                                          
3 There are no waterproof limits between contestable and non-contestable 
concepts. By this I don’t mean to stir up a conceptual skepticism but rather to 
point out the normativity that surrounds the uses of concepts within the social 
sciences. As Garver writes: “Partisans, not theorists, determine whether a 
conflict involves an essentially contested concept” (1990, 258). 
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is the social scientist Gavin Kitching’s Wittgenstein-inspired 
reading of Marx in which he goes to some length to stress that 
advancing a certain view also means that one has a certain 
idea about the difference it makes whether this view is true. In 
other words, an important question when evaluating a 
description is to ask what purpose it serves. Knowing that a 
description serves a certain purpose will influence what one 
takes to be a true or fruitful description. It makes no clear 
sense to say that the world could simply be ‘described’: it 
makes no sense to imagine that one could describe the world 
without having the least idea what such descriptions would be 
used for (this point is informed by Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations, cf. § 291). Kitching contends that this is not only 
a way to highlight the political aims of certain ideas, but it is 
also to reflect on the logical status of a certain description. In 
this way one gets a clearer grasp of what kind of point 
something is. To take one example that will be relevant later 
on: when reading Marx it is easy to lose oneself in the details 
of the argument. Unsurprisingly, interpreters have tried to 
apply the concept of abstract labor and the labor theory of 
value as a basis for an empirical account of the development of 
capitalism, for example whether it can be shown that the 
exploitation rate keeps growing. The problem with this 
approach is that it isolates Marx’s concepts from the concern 
he addresses, that is, (among other things) the concern about 
how value is generated and what value is. When this is kept in 
mind, one is no longer equally inclined to treat his concepts as 
the building blocks for a general empirical theory. As Kitching 
observes, if one does not read Marx as providing an 
empirically applicable theory about values, then this will 
drastically influence what one will take to be a genuine 
objection to his view (Kitching 1988, 33-5; 94-5, 169). The 
central question is: what concern is a thinker grappling with?  
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One of the primary objectives of this thesis is to look at 
critical accounts of work and how tensions related to work are 
dealt with within these texts in ways which inadvertently 
reproduces a neutralization of work that they seek to question 
(chapter 5 falls outside this pattern). Each chapter focuses on a 
specific theme and in each chapter I try to articulate which 
tensions one comes across in a specific discussion about work. 
What I treasure from the writers I discuss is the political 
urgency to rethink work they all pronounce. This goes against 
the grain of a tendency to moralize and neutralize work, even 
though many of them end up with their own versions of 
moralization or neutralization. As I have said, my attention is 
directed at the tensions within the critical literature on work 
and within political debates about work. The focus is steered 
towards our own relations to work: our fears, hopes and 
struggles. I explore several descriptions of how work-related 
existential problems are enmeshed and entangled with 
structural dimensions. I suggest that if we want to get a clearer 
grasp of fears and hopes within the world of work, trying to 
catch sight of and articulate tensions offers both a way to 
recognize people’s activity and resistance while at the same 
time acknowledging the relational framework of such 
resistance. My conceptual interest is thus different from 
attempts to settle an ontological or empirically useful concept of 
work – this is in line with what I said about Winch above. The 
procedure in this thesis is thus very far from the following 
view: “The delimitation [of ‘work’] should be done objectively, 
that is, independently of everyday conceptualizations of work 
and the emotions of workers connected with the activities” 
(Karlsson 2004, 107). 
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Tensions versus mere ambiguities 
The concept of bank can be used both in talking about the 
institution of banking and in talking about riverbanks. Here, 
one could say that there are several uses of the word ‘bank’ 
and that the word has meaning only in so far as it is used in a 
specific context. However, it would be strange to say that the 
use of the word ‘bank’ when criticizing greedy Wall Street 
giants and recalling a beautiful landscape stand in a relation of 
tension. They are simply different uses of a word. However, 
some words – intention, meaning, thought, will – have 
generated much philosophical confusion stemming from an 
inability to take specific uses of the word into account. 
When I talk about tensions in our relations to work the 
main conclusion is not that the word work is used in multiple 
ways; to talk about employment relations, chores in the 
household or the responsibilities of a doctor or a plumber. The 
tensions I highlight – the tension between commodification of 
work and work as a life situation to mention one example – 
are not tensions that ultimately concern a word or a concept. 
The tensions that the chapters take issue with are, to put it 
bluntly, tensions in society – tension in our lives. To say that 
these tensions are primarily located in the concept of work 
would presuppose that I am assuming that there, somehow, is 
one concept of work, and that it is in this concept that the 
tensions are located. When I discuss the tension between work 
as a commodity and a life situation, or the tension within the 
idea of work as self-realization, it will be apparent that 
tensions emerge as a way of tentatively trying to characterize 
the damaging role of a neutralization or a moralization of 
work. One needs to navigate carefully: it would be wrong to 
think that ‘tensions’ is a mere description, a mere articulation, 
but, as I already said, it would be equally wrong to assume that 
society consists of a set of underlying tensions. A continuous, 
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open-ended discussion in the thesis will be what it means to 
talk about tensions. 
One may also want to ask whether my aim is to criticize 
one image of work, and replace it with another, better image 
of ‘work’ that would not be surrounded by tensions. A general 
concept of work would then still be retained, and it would just 
be filled with a new content. So, would I then like to talk about 
tensions between pictures? Or am I offering a much wider 
claim about tensions in work itself? If the first option were 
true, it would seem as if I am explicating a multitude of 
meanings. The solution would be to clearly define distinctive 
uses and to abstain from generalizations. When I criticize 
generalized theories of work, my project is not to reject one 
generalized image and suggest new, more particularistic 
images. The reason why generalized accounts trouble me in 
the first place is that they are manifestations of what I have 
called a practically operating neutralization or moralization of 
work. If, on the other hand, I purport to say that tensions reside 
in work itself, then a concept of work would, as I said, already 
be assumed. Expressed in a rather different way: do tensions 
reside in how we think about work so that the solution is 
clearer and more context-sensitive thinking, or are they 
inherent in work? My answer is that my aim is to look at the 
dynamic relation between how we think about work and work 
as institutions, jobs and life patterns. Dynamic, as we will see, 
indicates that there are things to be said about this relation: 
ways in which thinking obscures practices in ideological ways 
of speaking, for example, but also ways in which an 
ambiguous way of thinking can be said to be intelligible given 
a certain practice.  
One may still want to ask whether I am nonetheless 
presupposing a unified concept of work, despite the project of 
attacking theoretical generalizations. Am I not, after all, 
talking about tensions related to work? Mustn’t there be some 
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unity between the chapters, some unity that warrants my 
discussions about tensions? Think about these 
characterizations: (1) Work as exertion. (2) Work as 
occupation. (3) Work as labor power. (4) Work as process. (5) 
Work as task. (6) Work as service. (7) Work as employment. (8) 
Work as production. (9) Work as product. (10) Work as result. 
This list is not exhaustive and it cannot be; no list can be. Work 
is conceptually interesting as it is a concept with a tangle of 
uses immersed in historical situations, political debates and 
existential situations. In all of these settings, there have been 
strong inclinations to lay claims on what ‘work’ really means – 
and it turns out that these claims are just as contextually 
situated. I will look at the entangled nature of concepts of 
work and my task is to re-entangle uses of ‘work’. 
The main contention is that people do in fact use the 
concept of work. It is difficult to deny that work is a central 
topic in present societal debates. In the specific chapters, I am 
always writing about the things people try to say when they 
criticize what they call ‘work’ or when they talk about what 
‘work’ should or could be. What is going on when writers 
emphasize that this particular activity is work, rather than…? 
Or, that it is not work, but rather….? These dialogues with 
other critical writers are couched within my contention about 
neutralization and moralization: so one way to assess whether 
my approach is fruitful is to ask whether my articulations 
catch sight of political and existential sore points. In the end, it 
is up to the reader to judge whether they resonate with 
problems, hopes and fears. There is thus no covert unity, no 
historically general concept of work that I take as a point of 
departure. For my own part, I am interested in generalizations 
of ‘work’ as they occur in the course of real and contemporary 
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examples.4 As I said, my thesis focuses on contestations. The 
chapters all start from what a particular writer means when 
s/he criticizes and talks about work. The writers I discuss 
engage in controversies in which they give their own accounts 
of the relation between work and society or the meaning work 
has in human life.  
Something similar can be said about what I talk about as 
tensions. At what level can these tensions be detected? 
Tensions between what? The writers I discuss direct our 
attention to present controversies about work. What role does 
necessity have? What is the relation between work and 
leisure? Can work as a vocation be distinguished from 
professionalism? What is suppressed when human activities 
are transformed into labor power, a commodity? The tensions 
I am talking about are expressed in neutralizations and 
moralizations of work. Tensions can thus be seen in the 
relation between neutralizations and moralizations on the one 
hand and what is glossed over or put to the side on the other 
hand – moral and political hopes, worries and discontent. 
From this, it is evident that an attempt to describe tensions 
must also be a political and ethical project.  
Work and critique 
A point that will recur is that new aspects and concepts of 
work keep appearing, but this cannot be reduced to material 
changes in the form of production – I mean, so that the 
technical development would somehow force a specific 
concept of work upon us. My idea is instead that people draw 
                                                          
4 Many writers have restricted the concept of work to the world of capitalism 
(cf. Jappe 2005, 99). One argument is that there is no general word for ‘work’ 
in, say, Antiquity. What mattered were the specific activities: the priest, the 
merchant and the cook did not have ‘work’ in common. This is a noteworthy 
observation. 
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different conclusions about what a development means and 
what it is related to. New articulations appear in political 
controversies where aspects of work are interrogated. This 
means that conceptual renderings often have a political and 
moral impact. Throughout the thesis I will give examples of 
such articulations. One side of this is that such articulations 
call attention to shifts in how work is considered. 
I could mention one such example already at this point. 
Recently, a slew of books have been written on the topic of 
craft work. In these books, crafts (in a wide sense) are seen as a 
potential counterweight to the bureaucratization and 
fragmentation of work. I think what these writers are doing 
must be seen as a historically specific articulation of craft 
work, different from for example the arts & crafts movement 
in the late 19th and early 20th century5 or medieval concepts of 
crafts, along with just as historically specific concepts of skills 
and knowledge. These books try to substantiate what the 
content of craft work in a wide sense (comprising the 
professional skills of nurses as well as car mechanics) can be 
considered to be now, and what kinds of situations call for 
recognition of the importance of work as a craft (cf. Sennett 
2008, Crawford 2010, Tesfaye 2013). This goes together with 
what I have said about tensions: a clarification of a tension is 
an articulation, an attempt to characterize change. A central 
ambition of the thesis is to dispel neutralizing generalizations 
about work, but an equally important task is to trace what is at 
stake in the critical texts about work I discuss; what is the 
problem to which these texts respond? To take but one 
example, in chapter 5 I try to illuminate what kind of concern 
                                                          
5 The arts & crafts movement was a reaction against mass production and new 
ways of making. Art and the artwork were the main preoccupation in this 19th 
century discussion (For one treatment of the background of this movement, cf. 
Sennett 2008, 108-112). 
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Marx addressed with the concept of abstract labor. I situate 
this concept within a story about commodification: capitalism 
is a process in which work turns into a commodity. The 
challenge is to elucidate in what sense Marx’s concept, for all 
the historical differences between the situation now and the 
times in which his writings appeared, opens up a tangible 
understanding that helps us shed light on present discourses 
and practices in which work is treated as labor power.  
In this sense the concept of work has a lot in common with 
the concept of economy. The concept of economy is equally 
contested, and also there, the contestations reveal political 
disagreements. Economy has often been defined as a rule-
governed structure where the rules originate from human 
rationality itself. Economy has, in contrast to these idea about 
universal rationality, also been described as immersed in 
forms of life, specific ways of organizing life for example in 
terms of an economy being one particular institution or 
particular set of relations (cf. Wolgast 1995). In his thesis the 
sociologist Patrick Cockburn suggests that new images of 
economy crop up when economic phenomena are debated 
(2011, 15, 18), which makes it questionable to think that one 
should always start an investigation with a strict definition. As 
he writes: when what counts as an economic phenomenon – 
such as homeless people selling newspapers – is studied, 
significant disagreements surface. An acknowledgement of 
such disagreements invites a sense of hope, Cockburn notes. 
When disagreement is highlighted, so is also the need for 
justification (2011, 6). “[In] every configuration of socio-
economic activity there exist relationships of power that can 
develop into tensions and then cracks in the current order.” 
(2011, 25) This point can be applied to work and the approach 
I have chosen, a choice that is a reaction to the apparent 
consensus about work. To resist such consensus is also to 
direct one’s attention to dimensions of work that are rarely seen in 
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the kind of surrounding where work is taken for granted as 
employment for the individual and a source of wealth for 
society (neutralization) or where work is praised as being 
valuable in itself (moralization).  
To philosophize is often, as Wittgenstein writes: “[to] 
descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there” 
(Wittgenstein 1980, 65e). It is impossible to decide beforehand 
where one is heading. Pondering on philosophical problems – 
work, mathematics, love, intentions, thinking, justice, film and 
religion – requires that one’s attention is directed at the 
specific character of the question. Every philosophical 
investigation presupposes renewed attention to philosophy as 
an activity. So the question remains: what kind of 
philosophical investigation is this? As I said, my project is not 
meant to present a perspicuous representation of the myriad 
uses of the concept of work. Instead, my project could 
tentatively be called a form of critique of work. Basically, what I 
mean by this is an interrogation of that which appears to be 
self-evident. The critique of this naturalization and 
normalization of work cannot, as will be clear, be reduced to a 
critique of ideology. Instead, with Henri Lefebvre and Ernst 
Bloch I would like to talk about critique of everyday life and like 
these thinkers, I would say that a critique of work always 
expresses the hope of a better world.  
To take one example of critique of work: work is elevated 
for providing people with a source of self-realization. What 
does it mean to speak this way? Why is this image so tempting 
and why does it appear to be so innocent? Normative 
conceptions revolving around self-realization and 
meaningfulness abound: we are to lead meaningful lives and 
as philosophers like Charles Taylor have pointed out, I am to 
find a life that is completely my own. This is a life where 
originality is connected with an inner searching for what it is 
to be true to oneself (cf. Taylor 1991). On the other hand, (as 
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Taylor perhaps does not pay enough attention to) this 
individualization of work is ambiguous, which is evident in the 
rhetoric of job application that brings up ‘personality’ as 
something to be used, something one has and something one 
fulfills – not to forget something one is expected/required to 
have. The idea of work as self-realization is historically 
situated and it can be placed within an institutional and 
normative context of waged work, the labor market, 
competition, the possibility to make a career change, but also a 
number of norms surrounding ‘a worthy career’. What role 
does the ideal of self-realization play in society? What 
happens when one’s own person starts to appear as something 
that one can and should use? I will argue that an important 
aspect of a critique of work is to articulate tensions from a 
position where existential and structural dimensions intersect, 
and that this goes against a tendency to detach reflection on 
work from the life setting in which tensions figure. 
A Wittgensteinian legacy is present in the thesis in the 
sense that I try to keep alive the complex entanglement of 
language and action. This is important given my interest in the 
tensions in how ‘work’ appears in rhetorical settings that are 
operative in various practices. Wittgenstein is sometimes 
(wrongly, I think) thought to have viewed the ordinary as a 
self-evident level to which philosophy can always return.6  
The tensions I investigate can be said to be perfectly 
‘ordinary’. ‘To work is to realize one’s unique individuality’ is 
a case in point. One aspect of critique of work is to examine 
                                                          
6 Invoking ordinary language cannot be a method. Ordinary language is no 
absolutely neutral something that philosophy can appeal to in order to 
dissolve metaphysical castles in the sky. Nor can ordinary language be 
grasped as a specific type of language use. When philosophers make 
references to ‘how we talk’, this includes the language of science, politics, 
religion, engineering or poetry. The good contrast to ordinary language is 
metaphysics, language that has gone on holiday (Wittgenstein 2009, § 38).  
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how descriptions appear to be self-evident, necessary or 
natural, while they could also be said to express and be 
immersed in relations of power and dependence. This explains 
what I take neutralization to be. The hazard of neutralizations 
is what is distorted or eclipsed. My project does thus not 
consist in reminding the reader that every use of ‘work’ is non-
neutral (that would be a rather empty gesture); the aim is 
rather to give an outline of processes of neutralization – a 
process which can hardly be derived from individual people’s 
conscious intentions. In other words: the central challenge is to 
understand how neutralizations operate. In that sense, de-
naturalization necessarily remains inconclusive: my thesis will 
not try to draw a contrast between appearance and reality. 
Such contrasts are instead problematized.  
The implication of this, along with my emphasis on the 
relation between the existential and the structural is that many 
images of work cannot be reduced to distortions of how we 
really or truly think and live. Think about the following 
contention in which work appears as a mere means: ‘We work 
in order to make a living, but it is for leisure we live.’ This 
remark does not only reflect a misunderstanding or a skewed 
image – it forms a part of what work, economy, businesses 
have been transformed into. One can easily think of societal 
practices expressing the idea that freedom is the absence of 
work. An entire recreation industry is built around the image 
that we need to take a break from work to spend some 
precious hours in the kingdom of freedom, just to, a few days 
later, step back into land of necessity. But friction between how 
we think and live remains nonetheless. When I talk about 
work as a way for me to earn enough money to go on holiday, 
somebody may ask me if I truly stand behind this, day in and 
day out. And if I do stand behind it, what is it like to live this 
way and to think this way about my job? So – even if these 
neutralizations are operative, tensions exist. To sum up: in this 
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way, critique of work in the sense I have in mind offers no 
unambiguous route from a supposed level of distortions and 
metaphysical castles in the sky to the Ordinary. 
Overview 
Necessity and freedom are two concepts that are both 
intimately associated with work. Deep tensions are uncovered 
when one looks at what thinkers have said about the relation 
between them. In the first chapter, I discuss necessity and 
work in relation to Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition. 
Arendt considers necessity to be a realm that threatens to 
colonize other spheres of human life, and the political life in 
particular. Necessity, for her, represents sheer life functions. 
Even though her investigation has critical potential, the 
concept of necessity is steeped in confusion. I argue that 
thinking about wage labor in connection with necessity cannot 
be done without looking at a specific historical situation. It 
turns out that to a great extent she grapples with her own 
time, and that her concepts of labor and work do not always 
succeed in making clear what exactly her worries amount to, 
what kind of societal affliction she is trying to dissect when she 
formulates a critique of expanding necessity. My reading is 
influenced by Hanna Pitkin and her investigation of Arendt’s 
line of social critique. The chapter contains an overview of 
Arendt’s concepts of labor, work and action. My own critical 
remarks about Arendt’s approach lead up to themes in the rest 
of the thesis: wage labor as an integral aspect of (capitalist) 
society, all too convincing forms of common sense and 
generalized moralization that makes it hard to connect work 
to its purposes and the world in which it is situated. 
In the second chapter, the concepts of work and freedom 
resurface, now in dialogue with Herbert Marcuse and André 
Gorz, who both analyze the possibility of freedom from a 
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society revolving around work shaped by capitalism. Even 
though freedom is lauded as the primary virtue of 
contemporary society, Marcuse and Gorz are convinced that 
this is a very one-sided image. They seek to stake out an 
alternative and this is done by articulating what makes the 
present system of wage labor destructive and what freedom 
from it would mean. At best, their analyses encourage 
attention to the changing roles of wage labor and leisure in 
our lives. However, their ideas are at times presented in a way 
that prevents the reader from seeing their political driving 
force. Generalizations cloud the political critique while also 
threatening to engender a much too simple view of work that 
fails to address the mixed reality of present-day wage labor. 
One such generalization concerns functionality. I will reflect 
on why it seems untenable for Marcuse and Gorz to argue that 
the fundamental problem of contemporary waged work is that 
it reduces work to functionality. Conceptions of division of 
labor, homogenization and specialization are discussed, and 
so, once again, is the societal dimension of work: both Gorz 
and Marcuse argue that work is a part of a gigantic societal 
machinery. What are the philosophical and political relevance 
of the perspectives of Marcuse and Gorz? I try to illustrate 
what I see as the political core of their discussion about work, 
society and freedom by reflecting on various hopes and fears 
related to the proposition of a general income. 
The relation between work and life is the theme of chapters 
three and four. A common view in recent writings is that work 
– emotional work, immaterial work, precarious work – to an 
increasing extent colonizes our lives by becoming a seemingly 
boundless activity and that this risks making us unable to 
think about what is meaningful and worthy beyond work and 
productivity. These writers follow in the steps of Marcuse and 
Gorz in so far as they scrutinize the ways tendencies in the 
world of work are hazardous to fundamental aspects of our 
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lives, while also trying to look beyond that system of work. 
Kathi Weeks’ recent book The Problem with Work (2011) 
receives special attention in chapter three. Weeks highlights 
the ambiguities and contradictions hidden within the 
seemingly self-evident role of work as the basis of societal 
wealth and as a source of creativity for the individual. I enter 
into a critical dialogue with her view on what she calls ‘the 
work ethic’, a tenuous but fragile form of dedication to work 
fraught with tensions. The question that runs through the 
chapter is: what does it mean to talk about a ‘work ethic’, what 
sort of challenge do writers like Weeks strive to pose? I will 
give an outline of Weeks’ project, but I will also look at what 
her critical conception of waged work and life risks 
overlooking. I argue that her argument does not leave room for 
asking what the existential pull of what she calls the work 
ethic consists in.  
In the fourth chapter, I scrutinize the relation between work 
and life from a perspective rarely focused on among authors 
who set out to deconstruct suspect forms of dedication to 
work. I argue that it is possible to talk about good work 
without falling into the ambiguities of the work ethic which 
Weeks so aptly dissects. I draw on the philosopher Raimond 
Gaita’s conception of vocation, while distancing myself from 
some of its other uses. The concept of a vocation is employed 
as a tool in my exploration of how we talk about meaningful 
work and commitment. Through a discussion about Simone 
Weil, I argue against the idea that one can say, in general, that 
the nature of some occupations is such that they can be 
vocations in the sense that they contain a form of deepening, 
while some other occupations cannot contain such deepening. 
A point that recurs in the thesis (cf. chapter 1 and 2): jobs can 
be reduced into mere functions; jobs can be de-skilled and 
routinized, but to see why these occupations have this 
character requires an intricate account of a transformation of 
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work into functions or execution, and the suppression of good 
possibilities. The discussion hinges on how an occupation is 
described. The chapter concludes with remarks related to the 
stakes involved in talking about and disagreeing about good 
work. My contention is that a generalized account of work will 
lose sight of these stakes. 
In the fifth chapter I continue to reflect on transformations 
of work. I discuss the morally and politically charged 
circumstances around work transformed into labor power, a 
commodity that is first of all a specific form of relation. One 
aim of the chapter is to show how work in the shape of labor 
power is a seemingly neutral resource and that this threatens 
to make what I call work as a life situation inconspicuous and 
that this is connected with a depoliticization of work – that is, 
yet another form of neutralization in which political 
controversies are glossed over. When work turns into labor 
power, it is possible to disengage it from purposes and the 
concrete life activity that jobs after all consist in. The 
neutralization of work in the form of labor power is analyzed 
by means of Marx’s concept of abstract labor: when work is 
transformed into labor power it is at the same time abstracted. 
The problem is not abstraction as such, but rather the way the 
language and praxis of labor power make work appear as a 
neutral resource, while existential and political dimensions of 
work are suppressed. I am not saying that the problem is that 
concrete work has been made invisible and that the task is to 
return to such concrete work. Instead, one of my aims is to 
show how the abstraction of work is a relation that changes 
how we perceive work. For this reason, it is crucial to take 
account of controversies and struggles about work. I provide 
an example of this taken from the Swedish debate about tax 
deductions for domestic service work. I have chosen this 
example because it concerns both what I have called the 
neutralization and the moralization of work. 
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I continue the examination of work as labor power in the 
sixth chapter, now attending to a more existential dimension. 
In his well-known books on work, the sociologist Richard 
Sennett has analyzed how commitment and care are 
undermined in what he calls ‘the new capitalism’, a condition 
of insecure jobs and idealization of flexibility. According to 
Sennett, this situation elicits a fear of obsolescence; people 
worry about not being needed, about being out of the loop. I 
suggest that for all the good observations, his argument is 
compromised by a nostalgic yearning for past stability along 
with a preoccupation with charting trends that leads to 
confusion concerning what kind of troubling predicament 
Sennett sets out to portray. His lucid questions ˗ which I 
appreciate more than the answers and analyses he offers ˗ 
incite an open-ended inquiry about work and the fear of 
obsolescence. I turn to a discussion about how this fear could 
be interpreted, how it is to be framed. What does it mean to 
think clearly about work when we have no choice but to 
position ourselves on the labor market, in its competitive 
relations and structures?  
A note on vocabulary 
As this Introduction has made clear, the aim of the thesis is to 
take note of different uses of ‘work’, and often this is done so 
as to go against a tendency to neutralize work. My strategy is 
to talk about waged and salaried work, work as employment 
or work as a job, as – simply – work. The aspect of waged or 
paid work will be emphasized. I will thus talk about ‘work’ 
whenever I refer to working activities that could be described 
as an economic process, a contractual relation or a specific 
type of task or effort. In the chapters, a variety of concepts 
appear as I seek to bring out specific aspects of work. Some 
linguistic flexibility is thus required.  
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Even in my discussion of Arendt’s perspective, I express 
my own hesitation about the concept of labor, one of the 
reasons being that ‘labor’ is often used to point to a distilled 
image of the working activity. That this hunch (labor is a 
distilled concept of work) has some resonance with how the 
concepts are employed by other writers is exemplified in a 
footnote of the Capital in which Engels adds a remark to 
Marx’s text. Engels comments on the English terminology: 
“Labor which creates use-values and is qualitatively 
determined is called ‘work’ as opposed to ‘labor’; labor which 
creates value and is only measured quantitatively is called 
‘labor’, as opposed to ‘work’” (1990, 138n). I don’t mean to 
treat Engels’ definition as the true one, just that one often finds 
similar ones. My own choice, however, is to talk about ‘work’ 
also when the working activity has been, or is, under threat of 
being reduced in various ways. The reason why will be the 
explained in chapter 5, where I also elaborate on Marx’s 
concept of abstract labor. In that chapter, I will point out the 
dangers of a conception of work and the importance of 
keeping in mind that even though it may be reduced into a 
force of production or an economic asset, the aspect of work as 
a life situation unavoidably remains. To sum up, it can be said 
that the concepts of work and labor are used in different and 
sometimes contradictory ways. At times ‘work’ and ‘labor’ are 
treated as completely interchangeable. My intention is thus 
not to make a normative distinction between ‘work’ and 
‘labor’, as has sometimes been done by authors critical of 
reduction of the working activity. Some writers use ‘work’ 
when they talk about an activity that involves creativity and 
‘labor’ when they refer to ‘heavy, onerous activity’ and for 
some of these, work is the ideal while labor is the degradation 
of work (cf. Arendt 1998, Standing 1999, 3-4).  
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On ‘methods’ 
The historical dimension is impossible to ignore when we talk 
about work. Can a distinction be upheld between 
understanding work philosophically and diagnosing society? A 
diagnostic route is common: tendencies are charted. Allegedly, 
work has become more and more feminized, flexible and 
fragmented. There is much to be praised in this approach: 
connections that are not always obvious are spelled out. Even 
so, the point of my thesis is not to survey trends. Of course, 
empirical material could undoubtedly be an important 
contribution to the present project. However, even though I 
take note of empirically grounded research, my interest has 
another character. The critique is directed against attempts to 
diagnose the state of the world of work in ways that get ahead 
of things so that conclusions are drawn in a hasty and 
generalizing way. I will ask what kinds of claims an author is 
making: is it a conceptual claim or an empirical claim? As I 
said, I will try to be very explicit about the nature of the 
commitment of a particular writer. This is in itself a vital 
aspect of my project – the aim is to express the stakes involved 
in a particular discussion and to look at the ways in which 
stakes are forgotten. The task is to articulate the kind of 
discussion a particular text engages in, rather than to stay true 
to the strictures of academic disciplines. My approach crosses 
disciplines in the sense that the authors I go into dialogue with 
have their homes in sociology, political theory and gender 
studies. The choice of discussion partners may appear 
idiosyncratic, but the intention is to gather critical voices into a 
conversation about our relation to wage labor. I hope that such 
crisscrossing brings new connections into view and that it will 
prevent me from falling into the trap of contributing to a 
debate in which the conceptual frames have already been 
settled.  
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Chapter 1: Arendt on labor, work, and 
politics 
Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized 
codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized 
function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim 
on our thinking attention which all events and facts arouse by 
virtue of their existence (Arendt 2003, 160). 
The illumination of incongruities is not tantamount to the 
solution of problems arising from a relatively closed conceptual 
and empirical context. […] We must let the contradictions stand 
as what they are, make them understood as contradictions, and 
grasp what lies beneath them (Arendt 1996, 7). 
1.1 Introduction 
A thinker hard to pin down into familiar political camps, and 
also a thinker reluctant to label herself according to 
conventional academic disciplines, methods and themes, 
Hannah Arendt’s ideas pose a refreshing challenge. It is 
revealing that those who have been influenced by her ideas do 
not belong to any specific philosophical tradition.  If Arendt’s 
philosophy is impossible to situate in a particular political 
corner, the same goes for her approach to philosophy. She 
may be most famous for her analysis of bureaucracy and 
totalitarianism in her book about the Eichmann trial and in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism and she is also known for her account 
of politics in various books and essays. Here I will focus on 
her social philosophy. More specifically, I will zone in on what 
she has to say about the world of work and I will suggest that 
the tensions that her own thinking reveals offer a good lever 
for questioning clichés about work. The most glaring tension 
of her thinking is a conceptual one: Arendt can be said to 
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engage in a critical project, but at the same time she advances 
generalized concepts. More specifically, this tension is 
revealed in how she talks about necessity. 
The Human Condition, published in 1958, can be called a 
philosophical diagnosis of post-war USA (and also Europe to 
some extent).7 Arendt reacts against what she sees as a decline 
of the political, a decline that according to her is expressed in 
bureaucratization. The analysis takes its departure from a 
society in which people don’t see in what way they are 
politically responsible. Arendt evokes the image of a society 
that has shut itself off from politics, a society that for all its 
frenzied activity is characterized by political inertia. Political 
institutions have not disappeared, but the political has almost 
vanished. By the ‘political’ she means a mode of human 
togetherness: the capacity to act in concert and the capacity to 
begin. Her book traces what she sees as a reduction of human 
activity but in doing this, it affirms what she holds to be a 
capacity that has not been altogether extinguished: the 
capacity for new beginnings, and the capacity for human 
togetherness. For Arendt, society is characterized by 
conformism and the conviction that society is dominated by 
one single interest: sustenance. Technology and capitalism 
thrive, but people don’t – they withdraw from the possibility 
of politics, the possibility of plurality and responsibility. 
Society is construed as a scientific or capitalist striving for 
endless expansion, while individuals dedicate themselves to 
personal projects of enhancing private experiences. What 
Arendt describes seems to be the threat of societal atrophy. Our 
society, Arendt writes, has the potential of freedom (I will go 
on to say more about what freedom means to her), but this 
                                                          
7 She mentions life in the Soviet Union only in passing: there are many hints 
about how consumer society resembles totalitarian societies, of which she 
writes in Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). 
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potential is displaced so that people’s relation to the world is 
characterized by powerlessness. So what has made us 
powerless? By means of genealogical analysis and conceptual 
investigation, The Human Condition seeks to offer an 
alternative to conformism, bureaucratization and social 
engineering. 
In the book, Arendt formulates her own view of the history 
of philosophy. The Human Condition is an attempt to articulate 
the complexities of the vita activa and the distinction between 
the contemplative and the active is the one of the most central 
ones in the book. A deeply rooted philosophical attitude in 
which contemplation is ranked higher than the active life is 
questioned. Greek thinkers like Aristotle had a complex view 
of the active life. For Arendt it is important that Aristotle 
conceived the active life as part of the good life if and only if it 
was concerned with politics. The Medieval Christian thinkers 
are charged with turning the active life into an all-
encompassing category pitted against the stillness of the 
contemplative life: from this period onwards, all distinctions 
within the active life have been blurred even though, as she 
writes, the hierarchical order has been reversed so that the 
contemplative is now overshadowed by the active life (1998, 
11-17). Modern thinkers have detached themselves from the 
elevation of contemplation, but their (Marx is her main target) 
confused understanding of the active life reflects a society 
without appreciation for the plural forms of human activity. 
Describing a society that has turned towards conformism, 
expansion and private satisfaction, she sets out to map what 
has been lost but also what could be retained. So, when 
Arendt speaks about loss, she does not speak in absolute 
terms. The losses are never points of no return; historical 
openness is stressed. In The Human Condition, the character of 
politics is analyzed by means of a phenomenological and 
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genealogical exposition of life as changing and as having 
certain conditions. 
The loss of politics and action is defined as the loss of the 
public sphere. Human beings now inhabit an in-between zone 
which Arendt refers to as the social and behavior. The latter 
concept is used in contrast with action. This in-between, the 
social, is comfortable, innovative – but strangely devoid of life, 
difference and dialogue. The critique of modern capitalist 
society in The Human Condition is a critique both of our lives as 
what she calls ‘jobholders’ and as consumers: in neither 
capacity is there room for acting in the sense of grappling with 
the openness of the future. She concludes that society has 
transmuted into a jobholder society and in this sense she is a 
forerunner of later critics of work like André Gorz and 
Herbert Marcuse. The productivity of manufacturing has 
increased and automation has made many types of work 
redundant. This bears the promise of freedom, but we have 
not become free. Rather than our dedicating a lessened portion 
of our lives to work, what she calls labor is elevated as the core 
of humanity, the activity that makes us human. Oddly, at the 
same time, a rather unflattering view of jobs as subsistence is 
upheld in the jobholder society: 
Even presidents, kings, and prime ministers think of their offices 
in terms of a job necessary for the life of society, and among the 
intellectuals, only solitary individuals are left who consider what 
they are doing in terms of work and not in terms of making a 
living. What we are confronted with is the prospect of a society of 
laborers without labor, that is, without the only activity left to 
them. Surely, nothing could be worse (1998, 5).  
Arendt’s diagnosis is that we have reduced ourselves into 
functionaries of a society geared towards maintenance and 
expansion. Everything is seen under the same aspect: the 
‘necessities’ of the life of society. 
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This chapter primarily deals with Arendt’s distinction 
between ‘labor’ and ‘work’. Even though that distinction is an 
aspect of her thinking that has been attacked by many (cf. 
Benhabib 1996, 130), I haven’t found many studies that link 
her concepts to a wider discussion about the jobholder society. 
For Arendt, ‘labor’ is a circular activity attached to the 
biological process of life, whereas ‘work’ refers to the 
manufacture of an object. This unusual distinction is 
embedded within key topoi in Arendt’s philosophy. In my 
reading, the discussion about labor and work in The Human 
Condition is aimed at showing how the political vanishes if 
necessity colonizes human togetherness: life is colonized by 
subsistence and expansion.  
As we go along, it will be apparent that necessity is an 
extremely important, yet elusive, concept in the book. Even 
though I try to read Arendt charitably, there are irresolvable 
problems with her conception of necessity that cannot simply 
be explained away by pointing to the non-systematic character 
of her philosophy. As we will see, the concepts of labor and 
necessity are closely related. Labor is “connected with the life 
process in its most elementary, biological sense” (1998, 46), but 
this is far from being a straightforward conceptual move. I 
will argue that some of the confusion surrounding her concept 
of labor stems from her ambivalent ideas about necessity. 
According to Arendt, something is awry when we start to 
consider our lives under the aspect of sustenance. The human 
condition, she writes, includes labor, and it will always be like 
that, but when labor usurps spheres of life to which it does not 
belong, it emerges as a destructive force. At best, Arendt’s 
exploration of labor as necessity could be understood as an 
attempt to expose the development that has lead up to society 
in totalitarian states and consumerist societies: in this way, her 
views can be read as a reaction to a historical situation in which 
even society appears to be a process to be upheld. The concept 
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of process is a central element of Arendt’s thinking. 
Throughout the book, she shows how nature, labor and even 
action can legitimately be described as a process. However, a 
harmful development has transformed togetherness, science, 
knowledge and history into processes in a very special sense: 
‘why’ has been replaced with ‘how’ (1998, 105, 230-2, 296). In 
other words, people are degraded into taking part in a 
bureaucratized society in which public affairs have been 
reduced to technical management. This is seen as a mark of 
our inability to live with the frailty of human togetherness. 
However, as I will go on to show, much of what Arendt 
says about necessity and labor – her worry about expansion of 
necessity, for example – seems to lead in other directions than 
these intelligible historically situated reactions. The 
questionable point she makes is that labor is and will always be 
‘sheer life’. Sheer life, according to Arendt, does not belong in 
what she sees as politics and the public realm (1998, 100-1). If 
labor is politicized, or politics laborized, a distortion has taken 
place, she claims. Politics should not be controlled by 
necessity; labor should remain a private concern, not the 
primary interest of society. When labor and necessity enter the 
realm of public affairs, human commonality itself seems 
dangerously displaced – the public sphere is corroded:  
Marx predicted correctly, though with an unjustified glee, “the 
withering away” of the public realm under conditions of 
unhampered development of the “productive forces of society,” 
and he was equally right, that is, consistent with his conception of 
man as an animal laborans, when he foresaw that “socialized men” 
would spend their freedom from laboring in those strictly private 
and essentially worldless activities that we now call “hobbies” 
(1998, 117-8).  
The threat she evokes, socialized man and the expansion of 
animal laborans, can be grasped in the light of her very original 
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concept of the political as plurality and self-expression, a 
concept that differs from what many political philosophers 
would assume it to be: government. When read this way, her 
worries about necessity are plausible. 
In what follows I will critically assess Arendt’s 
conceptualization of labor and work in relation to politics. It is 
important to keep in mind that her main interest in The Human 
Condition is the disappearance of the political. The reason why 
I start the thesis with a discussion of this book is that I see her 
explication of labor, work and necessity as symptomatic. An 
unresolved problem in her thinking is that labor and work are 
placed outside the realm of politics. Labor is reduced to 
necessity, which is portrayed as essentially unchanging, even 
though for Arendt the scope of necessity undergoes crucial 
changes. She represents a striking position in maintaining that 
labor is only a background structure and that this background 
structure can be separated from other aspects of life within 
human communities, as if labor is not part of the life of the 
community in any other way than as maintenance. This is 
what I will mainly criticize. Although it was not Arendt’s 
intention to deliver definitions of labor, work and action, a 
tension in the book, as I see it, is that she (perhaps 
inadvertently) evokes images of labor as a process that 
sustains life: necessity. But it is never clear whether necessity, 
for her, is a critical concept by means of which she takes a 
stand against the quasi-necessity invading her own society, or 
whether necessity is an ontological concept that somehow 
essentially has its given place.  
As I said in the Introduction, one aim in the thesis is to 
showcase examples of patterns of thinking that short-circuit 
the reflection on the meaning and purposes of wage labor. The 
Human Condition provides us with precisely such an example, 
while I would at the same time say that the text draws our 
attention to significant tensions related to the roles of working 
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activities – I already mentioned the glaring shift between 
elevating the working activity as the core of humanity and 
treating it as mere sustenance. Another aim of this chapter is 
to show why Arendt’s exposé of labor/work is symptomatic 
with respect to the image of necessity as a burden. She aptly 
questions a sustenance view of life and society, but her 
argument trails off into depicting necessity as a burden in 
itself. Against Arendt I will suggest that ‘necessity’ cannot be 
understood as an autonomous, self-contained sphere of life. 
As I said, the chapter progresses in accordance with the main 
concepts in the book: labor, work and action. My exposition of 
the two other concepts will be tightly anchored to the first, 
labor. Towards the end of the chapter, in which I reflect on 
Arendt’s presentation of a jobholder society, I open up for 
questions dealt with in the two following chapters. 
1.2 Animal laborans, life and nature 
The only activity which corresponds strictly to the experience of 
worldlessness […] is laboring, where the human body, its activity 
notwithstanding, is also thrown back upon itself, concentrates 
upon nothing but its own being alive, and remains imprisoned in 
its metabolism with nature without ever transcending or freeing 
itself from the recurring cycle of its own functioning (1998, 115).  
Arendt’s ambition in The Human Condition is huge: she wants 
to call us back to human existence. The book is a critique of 
tendencies in modern life that express an alienation from the 
human condition. She argues that people are preoccupied 
with the infrastructure of life or with private experiences. She 
sees this as an alienation from a human world. Of course she is 
not alone in this sort of envisioning. Adorno, Heidegger and 
others have ventured into similar forms of Kulturkritik.  So, to 
what are people called back, what is the human condition, 
what role does it play in Arendt’s philosophy? The human 
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condition is presented as historical, rather than a fixed state of 
affairs or a fixed framework. Through this notion the 
disappearance of the political and the colonization of life by 
necessity are articulated. Thus, the human condition appears 
both as a predicament and a possibility, a framework for what 
life could be but also what it always will be. Arendt writes 
about conditioning not as a causal restraint, but as a dynamic 
relation (Arendt 1998, 11). The human condition, then, is not 
to be translated into human nature. The philosophical move 
Arendt seems to make with this notion is to highlight certain 
ineluctable dimensions of life. The human condition she 
describes has action as its core; that is, creating something new. 
This explains why what she calls the human condition does 
not settle any questions about who we are or what is 
important, but the answer cannot ignore the primary 
conditions of life. If it does, something has gone awry. Given a 
certain philosophical tradition’s assessment of human life as 
rationality, from the detached point of view of which there is 
no grasp of human life as relational, fragile or limited, this is a 
fruitful approach. However, it turns out that there is more to 
say about how Arendt perceives the human condition, and 
this has to do with nature, and it is here I will start my 
investigation of Arendt’s concept of labor, which will be 
explored aspect by aspect. 
Arendt describes three modes of being in the world – labor, 
work and action. Her view is that the human condition partly 
transcends nature, but the umbilical cord with nature can 
never be cut off. Survival and the birth of new generations 
remind us of our dependence on nature and it is also here that 
labor enters the story, as this concept for Arendt expresses the 
inevitable bond with nature that she often labels with the 
word ‘necessity’. Interestingly, this relation has two strikingly 
different aspects: nature is both vitality (primitive joy) and 
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compulsion (1998, 120). Clearly, it is not free. Arendt renders 
labor as imprisonment within the body:  
The animal laborans, driven by the need of its body, does not use 
this body freely as homo faber uses his hands, his primordial tools, 
which is why Plato suggested that laborers and slaves were not 
only subject to necessity and incapable of freedom but also unable 
to rule the “animal” part within them. [….] [He] is imprisoned in 
the privacy of his own body, caught in the fulfillment of needs in 
which nobody can share and which nobody can fully 
communicate (1998, 118-9). 
Nature, for Arendt, represents an unconditional way in which 
we are bound or driven. In other words, she portrays labor as a 
burden, driven by the compulsion of necessity. This has 
implications for how she perceives labor, which according to 
her is a life process. There is no sense in which the burden of 
labor goes away, even though there are ways to make it easier 
to carry. Modern life has this potential because of the huge 
increase in productivity of labor, but we are not, and cannot be, 
fully liberated from labor, nature and necessity.  
The view of nature as a burden seems to entail the idea that 
nature should be mastered, overcome and overpowered (1998, 
31, cf. O’brien 1981, 101).8 Nature is seen as possessing an 
elusive and disturbing force, an unnerving alliance with 
necessity and sameness. For Arendt, sameness is a contrast to 
                                                          
8 In this passage, and in many others, Arendt elaborates an overview of how 
one pattern of concepts is displaced by another. Very often, she does this by 
referring to a specific historical situation that represents a different view of life 
than the present society. It is, I would say, easy to see where Arendt’s 
sympathies lay; she is not making a mere historical observation about 
conceptual change. My reading is based on what I take to be Arendt’s use of 
historical examples, by means of which she elaborates her own views. I agree 
with Seyla Benhabib: the reader encounters the challenge to decide on what 
level one should read her arguments, whether something is to be taken as a 
conceptual distinction or as a historical observation (1996, 124). 
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action, plurality and change. This is relevant in a reading of 
The Human Condition because of Arendt’s peculiar concept of 
labor. Labor is connected with fertility which is tied to joyous 
femininity (1998, 107) and what she sees as the natural 
productivity of labor. There is also a darker side of fertility: it is 
said to possess a voracious appetite that threatens other 
dimensions of human life – the reality of action and politics 
(1998, 98, 100). Arendt repeatedly talks about the realm of 
necessity (labor) as ‘devouring’ something. It is significant – 
one of the deeply puzzling aspects of The Human Condition! – 
that very similar language is used when she talks about the 
expansion of society as a sphere with its own tendency to grow 
and devour the political, a strange process in which the life 
processes grow unnaturally:  
The social realm, where the life process has established its own 
public domain, has let loose an unnatural growth, so to speak, of 
the natural; and it is against this growth, not merely against 
society but against a constantly growing social realm, that the 
private and intimate, on the one hand, and the political (in the 
narrower sense of the word), on the other, have proved incapable 
of defending themselves (1998, 47, cf. 45, my emphasis). 
The dark side of this perspective on nature – which, as we will 
see, intersects with Arendt’s critique of the social in a most 
curious way – is thus the rapacious expansiveness, futility and 
repetitiveness ascribed to it. The urgency of necessity 
threatens to swallow up what makes human life more than 
day-to-day, laborious toil – what makes life human. I will 
continue to unpack the meaning of Arendt’s concept of labor 
and these dark elements of ‘necessity’ will then be linked to 
the wider frame of Arendt’s thinking. 
So what does Arendt say about labor, more specifically? 
Labor is based on the urgency of life itself. It is repetitive and 
ephemeral and its products are consumed so that its traces 
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soon vanish (1998, 87). She refers to Marx, whom she, for all 
her polemical remarks, admires. She quotes the passages in 
which he talks about labor as life’s metabolism. Arendt agrees 
with this even though she is fiercely critical of what she takes 
to be Marx’s idea that it is primarily labor that characterizes a 
human being as an active being.9 In the book, Marx figures as 
the thinker who is guilty of conflating and levelling the work 
as fabrication and making on the one hand and labor as an 
endless process on the other hand. She accuses him of basing 
an image of the human being on both the idea of fabrication 
and the idea of labor power without distinguishing between 
these sides. Most of all, Marx epitomizes the tendency to think 
of human activity and emancipation in terms of labor (cf. 
Canovan 1995, 72-5). Let us start with the latter aspect. Arendt 
sees Marx’s thinking as an expression of societal changes: the 
concept of labor that his thinking builds on (according to her) 
reveals a tendency in modernity. For Arendt Marx is a 
spokesperson for the voracious life processes and their 
liberation: history and human life are rendered into hopes 
about realizing the potential of self-realization through labor. 
However, beyond his dangerous conflation of labor and work, 
Marx has realized something important, she claims: he 
                                                          
9 Arendt seems to draw on what Marx writes in his early work, especially how 
he, when elucidating the alienation of the worker, talks about work as a ‘vital 
activity’ (Marx 1992a, 328). Arendt may also have read the section in The 
German Ideology in which Marx writes about production and creativity: “As 
individuals express their life, so they are. What they are therefore coincides 
with their production, both of what they produce and with how they produce. 
The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions 
determining their production” (1970, 42). Even though I agree with Arendt 
that at times, Marx speaks about human life as coinciding with the productive 
activity, I would also read such sections in their context. One may stress that 
Marx sets out to clarify what is problematic about capitalism and the kind of 
transformation work goes through when it is reduced to a commodity.  
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revealed the dimension of labor in all its uncontrollable 
process-like qualities. She writes:  
Whatever labor produces is meant to be fed into the human life 
process almost immediately, and this consumption, regenerating 
the life process, produces – or, rather, reproduces – new “labor 
power,” needed for the further sustenance of the body (1998, 99). 
Even though this account of labor power is set within a larger 
narrative about mobile wealth and, as we saw, the rise of the 
social, the historically specific situation of the labourer who 
has nothing to sell but hir labor on which Marx draws is 
rendered into a general image of labor as a private, bodily 
activity (1998, 108, 111). In the midst of historical images of 
expropriation and property, Arendt invokes this elusive and 
accelerating life process, this power of labor which Marx 
allegedly celebrated. Despite some significant changes ˗ the 
content and extension of labor ˗ labor and labor power are 
described as remaining essentially the same. What she calls 
the life process – a concept very closely connected to necessity – 
is unchanged by automation, division of labor or, as Margaret 
Canovan writes, these changes subject our lives to the life 
processes even more strongly than before (1995, 83). The only 
signification change is thus that the life process “becomes 
more deadly”, as it is allowed a greater place in the public 
realm and even shapes what the public realm is (1998, 132).  
This is an instance where Arendt’s perspective on necessity 
can be detected in her more particular remarks, in this case 
about labor power. I would say that it is this general 
perspective that gives rise to her understanding of labor as a 
life process. It can be noted that Arendt’s description of the 
expansion and deadly force of the life process bears some 
resemblance to the rather common idea that capitalism is a 
life-threatening reduction of human existence: this is a claim 
that Marx makes in his famous “Economic and Philosophic 
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Manuscripts”. Arendt’s idiosyncratic emphasis is, however, 
that this reduction of human life that threatens the capacity of 
action and politics entails an expansion of the life process. 
Canovan writes:  
The human condition has always left man at the mercy of nature 
in the sense of being subject to nature’s cyclic processes of 
production and consumption, growth and decay, birth and death; 
but only in modern times have men released such natural 
processes from their cyclic repetition and let them loose on 
trajectories that are not cyclical but unlimited (1995, 84) 
One way to assess the image of the life processes is to return to 
her interpretation of Marx whom she reads as a writer who 
expresses the reduction of human life into the life process in a 
dangerous but symptomatic way. What Arendt doesn’t pay 
enough attention to is that most often Marx talks about 
reproduction of labor power, a value-creating resource. He 
connects the working process with survival but how this 
specific connection operates varies in accordance with 
historical situations. In a capitalist society survival, from the 
point of view of the capitalist, means something to the effect of 
‘the promise of labor power’: a living human being can work, 
can produce value for the capitalist beyond the costs of wages. 
Labor power (wage labor) exists only in capitalism. The 
reproduction of labor power is a condition of economic value. 
Labor power needs to be reproduced but the process of 
production would go nowhere if people did not work more 
than what survival requires. In addition to this, Marx argues 
that the specific content of reproduction varies according to 
the historical situation (Marx 1992a, 325; 1990, 341-2, 344-5). 
What Arendt refers to as “the necessity of subsistence” (1998, 
100) is a historically diverse phenomenon for Marx, who devoted 
his thinking to the changes that work undergoes through 
history. He is aware of the fact that the content of survival and 
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of working is not the same in Germany during the 19th 
century as in a village in India in the year 1314. What counts 
as survival is historically contingent (what is counted as a 
basic level of subsistence varies) but it can also be said that the 
role survival and subsistence has is equally historically 
relative. For this reason, it is misleading to assume some 
primordial ‘life process’ along with a trans-historical concept 
of productive labor power. 
My own point is that Marx’s insight has a bearing on a 
critical conceptualization of survival and subsistence. To talk 
about ‘work as subsistence’ in Finland in 2015 we need to tell a 
long story about companies, the welfare state, taxes and the 
labor market and we also need to say something about the 
kind of services and commodities people perceive as 
fundamental for their daily lives. This is important to keep in 
mind for a reason Arendt herself would strongly embrace: 
there is a risk that we deceive ourselves about what it means that 
the present world of work is about subsistence, or that society itself 
is a form of subsistence. One form of such alluring ideas is that 
each worker takes part in a common societal project, the 
project of subsistence. This image looks away from the 
different roles the work of a cleaner, a lawyer, a librarian and a 
builder have. To say that they contribute to a clear-cut level of 
common societal subsistence is one of the clichés that I 
mentioned in the Introduction and Arendt herself would say 
that this idea of societal subsistence expresses a fatal 
development that has put all activities on the same level, 
which she calls a society of ‘jobholders’. Later on, I will say 
more about how Arendt opens the door for dissecting 
concepts (like she does with subsistence), only to present a 
generalized image in the next moment (an idea about trans-
historical productive labor power or a primordial life-process 
that has the strange ability to ‘expand’).  
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1.3 Labor as a necessity to be kept in its place? 
I do not think it is very fruitful to separate what Marx says 
about excess and the productivity of labor from what he says 
about the historical emergence of labor power. There is no 
trans-historical meaning of the productive power, the 
‘surplus’, of labor. Rather: in its darkest aspects of a pursuit of 
efficiency and intensification of work, wage labor is reduced to 
how much people can work. As Marx observes, in other 
economies, ‘surplus labor’ – as he calls it ˗ beyond what is 
needed for the worker’s own subsistence may exist, but it will 
be limited to quite specific needs (1992a, 345). The difference 
between Arendt and Marx is then that the latter talks about a 
reduction that gives rise to ‘labor power’ (I will talk about this 
in chapter 5), while Arendt’s concept of labor – the circular, 
natural and necessary activity – is seemingly posited as a 
trans-historical category that is dangerous in so far as it 
expands. Marx has (or seems to have, at least in his earlier 
writings) an idea about what the working activity could be; it 
could be something other than a value-creating resource of 
capitalism or a process over which the worker has no control. 
He tries to illuminate what labor has been reduced to, and that 
this reduction reduces the worker’s life to a process of 
maintenance – a point strikingly similar to Arendt’s.  
[The] laborer regards the maintenance of his individual existence 
as the aim of his activity; his actual labors serve only as a means to 
this end. He thus activates his life to acquire the means of life 
(1990, 269). 
The working activity could play a different role in human life 
– Marx constantly asserts that the human being is an active 
being, and that the destructive side of capitalism is also a 
degradation of this primary and necessary aspect of life. 
Arendt agrees with this in so far as one of her main objectives 
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in The Human Condition seems to be to give an outline of an 
impoverishment of human activity. As we will see, one of her 
points in The Human Condition is that work – making – has 
been reduced to labor. If one holds on to this strand, a reading 
of Arendt could be that she does not at all posit labor as a 
changeless category, but rather as a state of reduction. At this 
point, one may want to ask whether Arendt has specific 
activities in mind when she talks about labor: what would an 
example look like? The answer seems to be that very different 
activities could be instances of ‘labor’ in her sense. What is 
important is that labor does not produce anything lasting, but 
only reproduces human life. The labor of the independent 
farmer, the cleaner and the labor of the industry worker 
contribute to the same force, the force of life itself. “The 
human condition of labor is life itself.” (1998, 7) The lack of 
examples makes Arendt’s text obscure. Even so, I can surely 
embrace the following point: in this society, even teachers, 
executives and priests could be considered to be laborers, 
people ‘making a living’ – this is because of how she thinks 
about the changing role of labor, which, she seems to say, has 
now taken on the role of ‘jobholder’, a position which could be 
anything, and a position that thrusts people – even priests, 
executives and teachers, I assume – a tranquilized state of 
“sheer automatic functioning” that doesn’t allow for 
individuality (1998, 126-7, 322).  
This manifests an unresolved tension in her thinking. On 
the one hand, Arendt critically dissects the expansion of labor 
and a reduction of making into labor, necessity and futility. 
Here, it seems that she talks about an aspect of our lives in the 
contemporary society: society has been laborized and almost 
all activities are treated as labor. This would be a critical point 
that, as I will show, calls for a distinction between necessity 
and quasi-necessity. In this reading, it would be important for 
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Arendt to spell out what bearing the following quote has on 
this distinction:  
Of all human activities, only labor, and neither action nor work, is 
unending, progressing automatically in accordance with life itself 
and outside the range of willful decision or humanly meaningful 
purposes (Arendt 1998, 106). 
On the other hand, unlike Marx, Arendt evokes what seems like 
a timeless condition of labor. She talks about “the essential 
worldly futility of the life process” and the “devouring 
character of biological life” that this society has not removed 
(1998, 130-2). She also maintains that no technical or social re-
organization of labor – “neither the enormous increase in 
fertility nor the socialization of the process” – changes the 
fundamental fact that labor can never establish a common 
world (1998, 117).  
The concept of labor is often used in her text to point out 
what life is always like, despite our illusions about limitless 
freedom. Natural necessity will always be a constraint on life. 
By adding ‘natural’ to necessity, Arendt evokes the image of a 
ground level of necessity rooted in nature that will always 
make up a dimension of human existence. The contemporary 
illusion is that there could be a world without labor in this 
sense (1998, 48; 120-1). She holds Marx accountable for 
upholding such an illusion. The background for this is that the 
image of cyclical labor, without beginning and end, has been 
particularly hard to accept for modern writers, even for Marx, 
who, despite his image of metabolism, was prone to describe 
labor as work, as primarily productive (while despising 
unproductive labor), as making. But he also, Arendt complains, 
treats productivity (work) as labor, as a life force. This critique 
of Marx entails that Arendt is arguing that counteracting the 
illusion of freedom would not consist in reminding ourselves 
of the multiple roles of necessity in human life, but, rather, 
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reminding ourselves of necessity as a life force, as a changeless 
truth about a fundamental immutable level of human life. But 
as we will see, all of this is very complicated. 
What does Arendt see as an illusion? She mainly criticizes 
Marx for holding the view that labor can be turned into work 
so that necessity disappears (1998, 86-9, 104-5). Even though she 
is right in claiming that a form of necessity is easily forgotten 
in optimistic images of technology and productivity ˗ this 
would be the exaggerated images of a ‘jobless future’ ˗ my aim 
in these sections has been to show that her thesis that labor 
creates a natural surplus that forms the basis of the expansion 
of labor does not help us understand the inclination to regard 
the productivity of labor as a source for freedom and 
liberation.  
Adding to the image of nature as survival, as compulsion 
and necessity, for Arendt nature (and thus labor) indicates the 
limits of what can be talked about as ‘meaningful’.10 I suspect 
she suggests that it is impossible to say anything more about 
why humans work (in a wide sense) than: we have to, it is life.  
In other words, the distinction between productive and 
unproductive labor contains, albeit in a prejudicial manner, the 
more fundamental distinction between work and labor. It is 
indeed the mark of all laboring that it leaves nothing behind, that 
the result of its effort is almost as quickly consumed as the effort 
is spent. And yet this effort, despite its futility, is born of a great 
urgency and motivated by a more powerful drive than anything 
else, because life itself depends on it (1998, 87). 
                                                          
10 Is it clear how Arendt perceives meaning? Sometimes she emphasizes 
meaning as narration, i.e. storytelling (cf. 1998, 97). At other times 
meaningfulness seems to be related to shared forms of making sense of the 
world that have no particular form (cf. 2006a, 88-9). Perhaps these two aspects 
are situated in different temporal perspectives: Arendt links narratives to 
memory and shared agency to what it means that human community is 
future-directed. 
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Whereas politics is important in so far as it takes place 
between people and expresses their particular being, labor has 
the opposite character: it is not, and should not be, 
conspicuous – it takes place within the darkness of the private 
sphere. As usual with Arendt, she paints a historical image 
while at the same time hinting at a more authentic order:  
[It] is striking that from the beginning of history to our own time 
it has always been the bodily part of human existence that needed 
to be hidden in privacy, all things connected with the necessity of 
the life process itself, which prior to the modern age comprehend 
all activities serving the subsistence of the individual and the 
survival of the species. Hidden away were the laborers who “with 
their bodies minister to the [bodily] needs of life,” and the women 
who with their bodies guarantee the physical survival of the 
species (1998, 72). 
Arendt’s contention is that leading an entirely private life is to 
lead a life of privation, a life deprived of what really matters, 
what makes us truly human. However, in a mass society, not 
even the private sphere, which in its own way is an important 
side of human life, is truly private (1998, 58, 61). In the 
tendency of modern life Arendt charts, the character of labor is 
displaced as it goes from being a concern of the household to 
being the foremost interest of the state and politics (1998, 44-5; 
117-8). This change is then, it seems, criticized according to an 
idea about what labor should be: hidden away, private. Labor 
is oblivious to the world and the conclusion seems to be that it 
is quite understandable that, in ancient Greece, slaves and 
women ‘were hidden away’. She maintains that labor is 
‘worldless’, and by this she means that it is not shaped by 
human plurality and human interaction.11  
                                                          
11 Arendt does not say that worldlessness in itself is negative – she says that 
love is worldless because it is destroyed when it appears in the public realm 
and she says the same thing about goodness (1998, 51-2, 75-6). 
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Does she really mean that the problematic status of labor 
can be traced to such a displacement? In other words: does she 
presuppose an essence of labor with which some historical 
periods have lost contact? What is obvious is that she does talk 
about change: labor is no longer kept in its place as one of the 
most important aspects of the present is the emergence of 
society as a sphere of common interests. So in this sense there 
is change. Even so, she also seems to think that there are 
significant aspects of labor that are always present. In one 
place, she says explicitly that even in this society, where labor 
is more efficient than before, and where it has been socialized, 
it has not stopped being “strict and even cruel privacy” (1998, 
117).12 My impression remains that Arendt, especially when 
she is talking about how economy has become a common 
interest, makes rather rigid claims about what her 
contemporary culture has ‘lost contact with’: labor as a private 
sphere and necessity as an ineluctable but burdensome 
dimension of human life. What remains troubling is that her 
interesting and valuable reflections about what I called a 
reduction of human life – which is especially an elimination of 
politics – presupposes the very questionable idea that there is 
a dimension of life – she calls it necessity and labor – that 
should be kept in its proper place.  
1.4.1 Arendt and necessity 
The bonds of necessity need not be of iron, they can be made of 
silk (Arendt 1998, 139). 
Above, I pointed to some of the most striking contradictions 
and tensions in how Arendt thinks about nature. Some of 
these contradictions will reappear here. The foremost tension I 
will look at is Arendt’s contention that necessity has an 
                                                          
12 For a similar interpretation of Arendt’s concept of labor, cf. Parekh 1981.  
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enslaving character, while she also argues that necessity has a 
proper place in human life. The question that arises here is 
what it means to perceive necessity as something that in itself 
constrains human life, the essence of which is considered to be 
freedom. It would then not be far-fetched to draw the 
conclusion that Arendt views necessity as an urgency that 
human existence is subjected to. She follows the tradition from 
Aristotle, a tradition that has made its mark upon the history 
of philosophy in many different ways: the kingdom of 
necessity is contrasted with the kingdom of freedom (Cf. 
Politics 1254b25, 1258b35ff, 1332b2). As we saw above in 
connection with Arendt’s image of nature, this force – 
necessity as the life processes in Arendt’s peculiar sense – 
must be guarded so that it does not usurp the realm of 
freedom. Again, the strange idea Arendt holds on to is that 
necessity has now expanded enormously beyond its essential 
character of ‘natural’ and ‘unavoidable’ necessity – the 
urgency of life itself. In On Revolution, the view of necessity as 
urgency is boldly stated: 
The most powerful necessity of which we are aware in self-
introspection is the life process which permeates our bodies and 
keeps them in a constant state of a change whose movements are 
automatic, independent of our own activities, and irresistible – i.e. 
of an overwhelming urgency (2006c, 51). 
Would Arendt say that necessity is enslaving only when it 
takes a specific form? As I said above, it appears that she 
would argue that even though labor has mutated into a 
dominant aspect of shared life and the major interest of 
society, the primary aspect of labor – reproduction of the life 
process – has not changed. Labor has been ‘let loose’ from the 
private sphere and Arendt abhors the suggestion that this 
development should be perceived as progress. The significant 
change, for her, is that now the entire human life is interpreted 
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in terms of labor and work (1998, 46-8; 322). She wants to say 
that something important happens when labor, the laboring 
activity itself, is emancipated. All human activities have been 
levelled:  
The point is not that for the first time in history laborers were 
admitted and given equal rights in the public realm, but that we 
have almost succeeded in leveling all human activities to the 
common denominator of securing the necessities of life and 
providing for their abundance. (1998, 126)  
Read charitably, Arendt’s exposition of necessity highlights 
tensions in the way work (in a general sense) becomes a public 
concern. For example, work is frequently seen as relieving the 
human condition, making life comfortable, more individual.13 
At the same time, this sense of comfort can make the purpose of 
work obscure: work starts to appear as an end in itself, an 
endless project that makes human life worthwhile and inserts 
it into a web of relations that induces our lives with a larger 
meaning. Such images of work as ‘relieving the human 
condition’, making life more comfortable, are frequently 
intertwined with an image of work as productive and culture-
building. Work is thought to create a world of technology, 
institutions and habits that give rise to new possibilities, new 
forms of life. What Arendt helpfully tries to articulate is how 
the modern conception of work and progress contains a 
conflation of or confusion about exactly which aspects of work 
are seen to be progressive, productive or emancipatory. This is 
one reason why she introduces the concepts of labor and work 
– to better understand different aspects. An example of this is 
how work can be praised as being individualizing (when it is 
                                                          
13 I have in mind the typical idea about progress which is often labeled as the 
Enlightenment story: civilization has now reached a stage where we are free 
from the most grueling forms of toil. People are no longer animal-like 
laborers; they are, at least potentially, free and differentiated human beings. 
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said that work is important for individual growth) while 
simultaneously being described in the language of labor power, 
a process that has little to do with aims or concrete senses of 
progress. One of Arendt’s most striking points is that society is 
built around laboring and consuming, but it is not at all clear 
what this society-building laboring amounts to, what it means 
that labor is the core of societal life. As she would say: could it 
be that we are holding on to the idea about a society revolving 
around labor without wanting to be honest about what this idea 
entails, that it for example may mean that some forms of work 
are degraded or that work is reduced to execution? 
1.4.2. Necessity as a ‘blob’? 
There are things that must be done and as I said Arendt is 
right in pointing out that overly optimistic images of ‘the 
jobless future’, a future without necessity, are illusory. In other 
words: talking about chores that are part of the maintenance 
of life itself need not be misleading. We need food to eat, the 
sick need treatment and buildings have to be repaired. The 
problematic step in Arendt’s thinking is taken when necessity 
is a link in her overall critique of society. Let me explain this. 
In her book The Social Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social 
Hanna Pitkin scrutinizes Arendt’s image of society and 
necessity. She tracks Arendt’s concept(s) of the social, a force 
that is described as expanding and devouring all forms of 
human togetherness that have the potentiality of action and 
politics in Arendt’s sense. The social, for Arendt, is a fluid 
zone that has taken over what was once either private or 
public. Human life now exists in a state where neither the 
private nor the public is clearly designated. In many of her 
writings (especially The Human Condition), Pitkin argues, 
Arendt is prone to view society – which for her is synonymous 
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with ‘the social’ – as a ‘blob’14, a monstrous creature taking 
charge of our lives, without, however, having any connection 
with what we do to ourselves or what we omit to do. The blob 
is attacking us as it were from the outside (Pitkin 2000). It is 
passages like this that cause Pitkin’s puzzlement:  
The point is that now even the last trace of action in what men 
were doing, the motive implied in self-interest, disappeared. 
What was left was a “natural force”, the force of the life process 
itself, to which all men and all human activities were equally 
submitted… (1998, 321) 
As I said, Arendt fruitfully advances the idea that our lives 
have taken the shape of necessity, society has become a 
monolithic unity, or it appears to be a unity, but when she 
gives an account of what this amounts to, it seems as if 
necessity has invaded or imposed itself on human life.  
[The] notion of people somehow letting natural necessity or 
biological processes into some space or realm from which these 
were previously excluded is not easy to translate into less 
metaphysical terms (Pitkin 2000, 190).  
In The Human Condition, the social, ‘necessity’, is often 
presented as doing things to us (rather than we doing things to 
ourselves) in the sense that necessity or biological processes are 
thought to have an elusive power to expand, if given the 
opportunity. How can this feature of Arendt’s philosophy be 
squared with her ideas about our inclination to turn ourselves 
into nobodies, ‘tranquilized functionaries’ fleeing from the 
responsibility to act? It is crucial to be a patient reader of 
Arendt. The merit of her thinking is that she shows how 
people flee from action, turning themselves into tranquilized 
functionaries. The description that we ‘let’ things happens is 
                                                          
14 Pitkin uses the image of the Blob as it appears in science fiction B-movies 
from the fifties. 
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an apt way of putting into words the strange process of 
abstaining from acting. The ‘social’ seems to epitomize this 
‘letting things happen’. One form such omitting of action takes 
is the idea that common affairs concern us only to the extent 
that they are related to our private interests. Why should I 
intervene in things that are not my business? It is just as easy 
to imagine a process of ‘letting things happen’ in the form of 
voiced legitimizations of what exactly the common interests of 
society should (and should not) amount to, as it is to imagine 
omitting to act as a quiet and half-conscious reliance on 
experts who tend to the business of society.  
However, a real tension in Arendt’s concept of the social is 
that she uses it to talk about conformism but also to describe 
the expansion of necessity and nature. When this concept of 
necessity is filled with societal content it is hard to discern the 
shift between a critique of irresponsibility and quasi-necessity 
and her ontological claims about necessity as a voracious force, 
a life process, the elementary level of subsistence that expands 
and devours.  
Let me take one example of this difficulty. In one passage 
(1998, 105-6) the language of endless natural cycles and the 
natural fertility of life is said to be a metaphor coined by 
political theorists of the 16th century. Arendt concludes that 
this metaphor makes certain modern superstitions, such as the 
idea that money begets money, intelligible. One would then 
think that she is talking about the intelligibility of an image 
rooted in conceptions of work, progress and wealth (the 
subject about which she is talking in this section). One could 
even interpret her as saying that this metaphor becomes real 
in the sense that we start to think about our lives in this way, 
so that we think that all forms of economic activity and work 
expresses ‘the natural fertility of life’, that economy is always 
based in the endless process of life itself. (Later, I will turn to 
one such example where Arendt shows how metaphors 
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become operative – behaviorism). However, in the next 
sentence she goes on to say that labor is the only activity that 
has this unending character, and then she does not seem to be 
talking about metaphors or even a reality shaped by 
metaphors anymore. The impression one gets is that she has 
moved to an ontological level, from where she goes on to 
point out in which ways some of Marx’s remarks about 
fertility and labor “sounded a depth of experience” and 
“squared his theory, the theory of the modern age, with the 
oldest and most insistent insights into the nature of labor” (1998, 
105, my emphasis). This is one textual example of how 
Arendt’s concepts seem to shift meaning in the middle of an 
argument in which the nature of labor is suddenly appealed to: 
critical analysis blends into an ontological explication of what 
labor always is. When I interpret Arendt as saying that labor is 
an unchanging dimension of human life it is passages like this 
I have in mind, in which Arendt says that labor “obeys no 
other law and is subject to no other necessity” than fertility 
(1998, 106).  
Pitkin suggests that Arendt’s ideas about labor and 
necessity are difficult to understand precisely because the 
static view of necessity undermines the critical project of 
articulating the fear that society has become a place where 
there is no room for people to form genuine political 
communities. As I have strongly emphasized, the most 
significant ambition in The Human Condition is to spell out the 
possibility of politics, the impoverishment of shared human 
life and a displacement and reduction of public concerns.  
Talking about an overwhelming system is not in itself 
confused, as I think Marx shows. His description of capitalism 
as an alien force confronting us acknowledges the dynamic 
between capitalism appearing like an alien force which is not 
imposed by some specific groups of people and its being 
something we sustain ourselves, as daily praxis, as system (cf. 
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chapter 5). Capitalism is real, but it is not inevitable, nor is it 
all-encompassing. The problem with Arendt is that she fails to 
provide nuanced descriptions of the power mechanisms, the 
specific delusions and the social dynamics that construct a 
society where everything appears to be driven by grim 
necessity. Her account is but hints: individuals act in an 
atomized way and joint action is lacking – economic structures 
that appear unstructured strengthen the tendency to think of 
ourselves as isolated atoms:  
In this sense, the social is a particular mode of interrelationship 
among people, a form of togetherness in which each thinks 
himself an isolated atom, and behaves accordingly, but they 
[people caught up ‘in the social’] in fact generate collective results 
that include the continual enforcement of such thinking and 
behavior on each other, and thus their ‘normalization’ into 
homogeneity. That is why Arendt speaks of them both as isolated 
atoms and also as congealed together too tightly, into a mass 
(Pitkin 2000, 194).  
This is only part of the story. As we have seen, necessity and 
the realm of the social are endowed with an eerie activity of 
their own in Arendt’s texts. Necessity is evoked as a force that 
is both inside and outside of us, a force that invades and a 
force we expand, but also a force that has its own elusive 
tendency to usurp other realms of life. To bring out the critical 
project Arendt engages in the concept of necessity should be 
scrutinized.  
Pitkin notes that the concept is used in two different ways: 
we talk about necessity referring to what is needed but also in 
contexts where inevitability is pointed to (2000, 190-2). The 
latter sense has sometimes been rendered into elusive causal 
chains (which can be seen in the huge philosophical debates 
about freedom of the will). Even so, in real examples, 
inevitability is a perspective that arises in contexts in which it 
is important to point out physical or biological limitations. 
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‘Humans need nutrition to survive’ is one example of 
necessity in this sense. The second use Pitkin has in mind 
connects necessity with normative claims, in which necessity 
appears in connection with an appeal to the seriousness of a 
specific matter. In this kind of case, necessity is not 
inevitability in a causal sense, or can’t be reduced to that; here, 
talking about necessity is talking about ethically binding 
needs. We frequently talk about necessity in order to highlight 
a need, where we underline that the need is an acute one. Such 
statements have the role of urgings: something must be done! 
However, as Pitkin says (ibid.), such normative moves can be 
resisted, the appeal to needs can be ignored. This then is 
necessity in a different sense than inevitability that cannot be 
intelligibly resisted: if we do not get nutrition, we die. In 
addition to these two uses of ‘necessity’, there are of course 
many other linguistic moves that are made with this concept. 
My point here is that it is unclear what it would mean to refer 
to necessity beyond the language games in which the concept 
of necessity is used: the word necessity is used to say 
something about what we need or why something cannot be 
done. It is as if Arendt moves onto a very unclear level when 
she talks about the compelling force of necessity. And I would 
say that it is not only an unclear use of ‘necessity’: the idea 
that necessity is a burden, that it compels and drives human 
life and that it should therefore be limited, neutralizes the 
linguistic moves people in fact do when they talk about 
something as necessary. Necessity is relegated to the 
background, as a mute condition of life. 
As we saw, the concept of necessity has a prominent 
position in The Human Condition and as Pitkin aptly shows in 
her book the use of it is highly ambiguous.15 To mention one 
                                                          
15 Necessity’ according to Arendt is not only the voracious force described 
above – in several sections, she talks about labor as keeping up the world, as 
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such ambiguity that has a bearing on her critical project: 
Arendt continuously drapes necessity in the language of what 
drives human beings. In these sections, the image of voracious 
nature or the expansive field of labor is evoked. Arendt writes, 
for example, that it may be true that humane conditions for 
the ‘laboring classes’ meant that a certain form of violence and 
oppression has disappeared. However, the emancipation of 
labor, as she calls it, is rendered with an ominous tone: “No 
man-exerted violence, except for the violence used in torture, 
can match the natural force with which necessity itself compels” 
(1998, 129, my emphasis). In other words, labor is a natural 
force that keeps compelling and keeps driving. In her view, 
the emancipation of labor – which in itself is a very puzzling 
description – strengthens the hold of necessity. As I will go on 
to show, this description has troubling consequences for how 
she thinks about poverty and the role of labor in the sphere of 
what she calls politics. 
So, her ideas about necessity that has been ‘let loose’ are 
mystifying. But for all the ambiguity surrounding the concept 
of necessity, for Arendt it simply cannot be true that people are 
truly conditioned by necessity – after all, the entire project of 
The Human Condition consists in calling people back to the 
                                                                                                               
saving it from decay (Arendt 1998, 100-101; 120-1). Labor is seen as a process 
in which the human being is in a certain sense worn out; labor takes its toll. 
What I have not emphasized enough is that Arendt’s image of labor is not an 
exclusively derogatory one. In fact, she connects this image of labor as toil 
with a sense of vitality. Labor is an inescapable aspect of what it is to be alive, 
and there is also a dimension of joy in that experience. It is interesting to note 
that Arendt doesn’t only talk about losing contact with politics and action. She 
also talks about a society in which automation and other technical innovations 
have made labor less conspicuous; she argues that there is a danger that 
people lose contact with this dimension of life and this has a bearing both on 
necessity and freedom: all alternatives are reduced to productive slavery or 
unproductive freedom (1998, 105). She goes as far as saying that the image of 
freedom is dangerous if it is disconnected from necessity. 
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political realm and calling people back to the – in a certain 
sense – unconditioned nature of action (Pitkin 1998, 191). When 
one reads the sections on politics and making Arendt 
provides, as we will soon see, several different views on what 
it means for something to be ‘conditioned’. After all – the 
question I started out with was what Arendt takes ‘the human 
condition’ to mean. My reading of it is that the human 
condition is a framework, rather than something that compels, 
but when one reads the sections on necessity, and how it 
appears as a force to be kept in place, it is clear that tensions 
emerge.  
A reason why I think it is worth looking into these tensions 
is that one could say that the ambiguity in Arendt’s use of 
‘necessity’ mirrors the ambiguity ordinary uses often display: 
there is a multitude of distinctions between necessity, false 
necessity and quasi-necessity ˗ along with distinctions between 
vital needs and false needs. These distinctions are an aspect of 
the language games in which ‘necessity’ figures. Arendt’s own 
philosophy contains an obvious opening towards this 
observation. More generally, I think it is fair to say that her 
target seems to be the domination of quasi-necessity in our 
own culture, in our own ways of relating to society and public 
concerns. The following quote illuminates both her tendency 
to think of labor as something that should be kept in place and 
something that has transmuted into quasi-necessity. The 
context of the quote is a discussion of the impossibility of 
overcoming necessity, and the general unhappiness such 
attempts to liberate humanity from necessity breed. Note that 
Arendt herself expresses a certain hesitation when she writes 
that this truth is ‘uncomfortable’: 
The rather uncomfortable truth of the matter is that the triumph 
the modern world has achieved over necessity is due to the 
emancipation of labor, that is, to the fact that the animal laborans 
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was permitted to occupy the public realm; and yet, as long as the 
animal laborans remains in possession of it, there can be no true 
public realm, but only private activities displayed in the open 
(1998, 133-4). 
In this passage, where necessity is both a force that humanity 
has triumphed over and a realm that we cling to and uphold, 
one can find what Pitkin sees as a third use related to the 
second image of ‘necessity’ (necessity as an appeal to needs). 
Here, necessity takes the form of spurious naturalization, false 
necessity and pretended inevitability (Pitkin 2000, 191-2, 322). 
In many passages ‘necessity’ is something human life is 
reduced to when predictability, efficiency and labor become all-
encompassing ideals. This makes it all the more difficult to see 
(and all the more important to stake out) what a contrast could 
be – what subsistence is and what our lives depends on. It 
makes sense to talk about false necessity in a society in which 
for example the present level of consumption appears as 
‘necessary’, along with the idea that this level of consumption 
must be upheld if the economy is not to plunge into crisis. The 
more widely the role of necessity spreads, Arendt argues, the 
harder it is to spell out true limitations. 
Arendt writes about how action has been substituted for 
behavior, a tendency expressed in the behavioral sciences the 
aim of which is to “reduce man as a whole, in all his activities, 
to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal. […] [Social 
behavior] has become the standard for all regions of life” 
(1998, 45). When she talks about behaviorism, she showcases 
what I take to be an exemplary sensitivity for the difficulty of 
describing what is going on. Behaviorism is a deliberate 
project of reducing people to behavior; predictable ‘behavior’ 
becomes an ideal. At the same time behaviorism is an operative 
movement that transforms society: we start to think of 
ourselves in terms of behavior. This is one example where I (in 
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contrast to Pitkin, as a matter of fact, cf. Pitkin 2000, 191), 
regard Arendt’s account to be very clear. Here she lucidly 
presents an instance of human beings repressing their own 
capacity for action. At best, Arendt is a thinker who makes us 
see this kind of ambiguity in our own lives: in behaviorism 
(and similar ideologies and schools) our own sense of 
powerlessness is transported and externalized as a (scientific) 
truth.  
The main refrain of this section has been to show that 
considering that Arendt’s most essential mission seems to be 
to formulate the role of false necessities or a problematic 
levelling of activities, it is confusing that she also talks about 
necessity as a force that has been ‘let loose’. The striking 
ambiguity is, as I see it, that either ‘necessity’ is (1) appealed to 
in order to invoke a critical perspective on something (a 
displacement and impoverishment of action), or (2) is referred 
to as imposing itself on, or even driving, human life as an 
external force. Of course it need not be mystifying to talk 
about things that bind us or make us helpless, but her use of 
‘necessary’ often makes it difficult to gasp the character of the 
urgency of necessity, and as I said, this ambiguity stems from 
Arendt’s conflation of critique and ontological exploration of 
fundamental concepts. I agree with Pitkin that these features 
of her thinking easily overshadow another point: it is the 
generalization of and reductions of human life into ‘necessity’ 
that is dangerous, not labor or necessity in themselves. When 
reading her, one question becomes acute: what, exactly, is the 
animal laborans? It is clear that this concept is not tantamount to 
a specific group of people. In what sense does animal laborans 
pose a threat to the public sphere and the transformation of 
agents into functionaries; in what sense is this connected with 
necessity? It is here that her metaphors (are they metaphors?) 
about the voracious life process lead astray. 
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Read charitably, Arendt can be said to attend to a crucial 
question, namely the way people are rendered helpless, 
unable to see themselves as responsible for the future (Pitkin 
2000, 192). I would even say that paradoxically, here Arendt 
excels in her critical use of concepts. But I would also agree 
with Pitkin that these tensions are symptomatic of problems 
within many kinds of political theory: theorists are often so 
enchanted by a certain way of talking and describing that they 
“depict human beings as helpless just when these theorists 
want to stress agency and freedom” (2000, 6). Several of the 
following chapters will highlight this inclination among 
theorists. Next, I will turn to what Arendt has to say about the 
institutional side of such helplessness.  
1.5 Fabrication and durability 
Arendt’s critical concept of alienation differs from the views in 
which ‘alienation’ primarily designates relations to work. She 
maintains that human beings have become alienated from the 
world. For her, the world is a shared human place. One of the 
most intriguing aspects of Arendt’s conception of the world as 
a shared realm is her conjecture that the world brings people 
together but “prevents our falling all over each other, so to 
speak” (1998, 52). For her, ‘world’ implies a certain level of 
distance between people; I take it that she means that the 
world functions as a sort of mediation. 
The term ‘public’ signifies the world itself, in so far as it is 
common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned 
place in it. This world, however, is not identical with the earth or 
with nature, as the limited space for the movement of men and 
the general condition of organic life. It is related, rather, to the 
human artifice, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to 
affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made 
world together (1998, 52).  
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When the concept of world appears in Arendt’s text, it is 
usually not the earth, or nature, she has in mind. One way of 
explaining the rather elusive concept would be to say that it 
refers to care for shared matters – the world is between people 
and it is constituted by its being shared. World alienation 
signifies loss or withdrawal from relations, both to other 
people and to the material world of produced things and the 
world of institutions. Arendt claims that the ultimate 
expression of this withdrawal is a preoccupation with or a 
fixation on life itself, a preoccupation with consumption and 
introspection. At the core is a critique of consumer society, a 
society that devours the world (1998, 307-12). Arendt’s 
analysis resembles classical notions of alienation (cf. Schacht 
1970) in one important respect: she talks about atomization 
and the loss of community, and she also writes about people 
having withdrawn into an inner, private sphere that thwarts a 
common or shared sphere of meaning – the inner becomes 
disconnected from everything else. Like other writers of the 
same period (Whyte 1957, Canetti 1984, Adorno 2001), she 
criticizes mass society. What makes her analysis exceptional is 
that the target is both competitive individualism and 
collectivism. Arendt is one of few philosophers who view 
collectivity and individualism as two sides of the same coin.16 
Arendt is mainly preoccupied with one aspect when she 
talks about work: durability.17 The world (in her sense) 
presupposes permanence and stability, and that is what work 
offers: things (and what she calls ‘the thing-character’ of the 
                                                          
16 Heidegger’s approach (1996) exhibits a similar approach to individualism 
and collectivity. 
17 In this emphasis on durability, stability and the world as ‘a point of 
reference’ that we have in common, one may trace a leaning towards 
conservative thinking (she often talks about ‘losing contact’). However, she is 
a complex thinker for whom the ideal about stability stands in relation to 
what she says about the new, an open future.  
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world) are the cornerstones of durability. Durability stands in 
contrast to the futility and circularity of labor, but also to the 
openness and unpredictable character of action. She argues 
that work contributes not to the sphere of natural needs, but to 
an artificial world, a man-made world: unlike nature, the 
artificial world is intersubjective, shared and durable (1998, 
137-8). As I will explain, I think her emphasis on durability 
can be read as a historically situated reaction. Nonetheless, the 
fundamental contrasts Arendt employs (the political and the 
conditions of politics) remain problematic, and her concept of 
durability reveals those problems.  
Viewed as part of the world, the products of work – and not the 
products of labor – guarantee the permanence and durability 
without which a world would not be possible at all. It is within 
this world of durable things that we find the consumer goods 
through which life assures the means of its own survival. Needed 
by our bodies and produced by its laboring, but without stability 
of their own, these things for incessant consumption appear and 
disappear in an environment of things that are not consumed but 
used, and to which, as we use them, we become used and 
accustomed (1998, 94).  
It is tempting to assume that Arendt sketches two different 
forms of activities, work and labor, under which any type of 
job could be sorted. At best (as I said: tensions abound), her 
concepts seem to be instruments for illustrating what she sees 
as a worrying tendency – the erosion of the public sphere.18 
She remarks, for example, that from a certain perspective, the 
                                                          
18 A side of her thinking hard to dismiss as irrelevant for her project is her 
attempt to dig out primordial concepts purged of the confusion of modernity, 
a task which for her is related to treasuring the fragments of the past that 
make us look at our own world with new eyes so as to come to terms with the 
brokenness of the present. However, Arendt strongly distances herself from 
the idea that we have direct access to the tradition. For a discussion of this 
aspect, cf. D’Entrèves 1993, 31-3. 
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difference between the baker and the table maker is a matter 
of degrees, they both ‘make’. From another perspective, if we 
look at the world of things, these activities are different – the 
table maker contributes to a world of durability (1998, 94). 
What does she then consider ‘making’ to be? Does a person 
who installs elevators in houses ‘make’ or does s/he contribute 
to consumption? Does an expert on jurisprudence ‘make’ in 
the sense of bringing about institutional changes? Does a 
plumber ‘make’ or does s/he merely restore the world of 
things? Yet, her approach does not invite a reading according 
to which ‘labor’, ‘work’ and ‘action’ can be easily elucidated 
with real-life examples of specific activities, so that for all 
concrete tasks, we could decide whether they are ‘labor’ or 
‘work’ in Arendt’s sense. One has to look at how she 
characterizes the aspect of ‘work’, which, for her, is a 
historically changing sphere that seems to have an ontological 
core: durability.  
 I will now go into the details of Arendt’s homo faber. In the 
book, work is described as being directed at a result, a product 
that has another type of life-cycle than what she conceives as 
the mere consumption product. She considers ‘work’ to be the 
realization of a model, a project that goes from idea to the 
alteration of physical stuff. The focus is on physical products 
but the concept of work seems to have a wider meaning as 
progress from idea to actualization. In contrast to labor, the 
working process has a specific end, a point where it ends 
(1998, 140; 143). The craftsman exerts control over the process 
and its goals. Despite all this, not even homo faber is actively 
engaged in a shared world. In work, there is specialization 
and knowledge, but it is a solitary project, even though this 
lack of mutuality is not the same as in labor. Arendt paints an 
image of the laborer as always alone in hir labor, alone with 
necessity: labor “is an activity in which man is neither together 
with the world nor with other people, but alone with his body, 
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facing the naked necessity to keep himself alive” (1998, 212). 
The seclusion of the craftsman is different. S/he needs peace 
and quiet; work is creative solitude rather than the community 
of medieval craftsmen. It is only through trade and the 
circulation of commodities that homo faber comes into contact 
with other people (1998, 160-4).  
At the same time Arendt conceives of work as the 
presupposition of political action – work in the sense of 
production of world is a guarantee of shared, intersubjective 
experience. When she makes this point, ‘work’ seems to be 
more than production of physical things; the concept seems to 
encompass traditions, laws and institutions (1998, 95, 137, 173, 
191). This is far from clear, however: in some sections, she 
literally rejects the idea that institutions could be thought of as 
‘made’. Perhaps she means that institutions are not ‘made’ by 
particular human beings. In the following quote Arendt 
dismisses the idea that the realm of action could exist in 
isolation. Such isolation brings with it a dangerous 
idealization of making:  
This popular belief in a ‘strong man’ who, isolated against others, 
owes his strength to his being alone is either sheer superstition, 
based on the delusion that we can “make” something in the realm 
of human affairs – “make” institutions or laws, for instance, as we 
make tables and chairs, or make men “better” or “worse” – or it is 
conscious despair of all action, political and non-political, coupled 
with the utopian hope that it may be possible to treat men as one 
treats other “material” (1998, 188).  
The fear Arendt seems to harbor, besides the fear of an 
idealization of ‘strong men’, is that politics is rendered futile, 
that it ends up being mere words or a series of futile changes. 
This seems to lead her to say that politics needs a basis or a 
supportive structure that stabilizes it, renders it into a shared 
reality (cf. 1998, 173). This is the point where durability enters 
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the picture: work creates a possibility or space for politics in 
its creation of durability, a counterweight to futility of labor 
and action and what she sees as the deeply unpredictable 
character of politics. 
For my own part, I would stress that very different 
distinctions as to how the working activity is related to society 
are constantly made. The terms shaping the discussion reflect 
people’s understanding of certain forms of work and it also 
brings various conceptions of society to the surface. Let me 
take a few examples. (1) It is often said that society needs care 
workers, not computer programmers. This assertion can be 
made as a remark about supply/demand of labor power, but it 
can also exhibit a worry about primary needs being neglected 
in a world where work is defined in terms of wage labor, 
which leads to situations in which some tasks are recognized 
as important, but nobody are willing to pay for them being 
done. (2) The need for successful companies that secure a 
higher rate of export is frequently appealed to so that the 
‘interests’ of society appear to be self-evident: society must 
support these companies. In this case, ‘society’ boils down to 
what Arendt describes as a reduction to one interest; society, 
economy and work are seen as seamlessly knit together in the 
project of maintenance and expansion. (3) In a crisis situation, 
basic infrastructure can be said to hold society together. We 
can imagine such a reminder about what holds society 
together after a hurricane where central parts of the 
infrastructure have broken down and reparation work is 
underway: to talk about society and work in this context may 
highlight a sense of solidarity and care for the victims of the 
situation. What I think such examples as these three reveal is 
that there is no given level on which to talk about work and 
society: the problem is often that it seems all too clear – and 
here I agree with Arendt – what the interest of ‘society’ is. This 
theme runs through the thesis.  
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In what way is erecting a human world of permanence 
different from sustaining the life process? We already know 
how Arendt thinks about life processes. Like Aristotle (Politics, 
1253b23), Arendt would say that both labor and work are 
necessary for the existence of politics. Aristotle talks about “a 
certain minimum supply of the necessities” – this is the 
notorious passage in which he talks about animate and 
inanimate tools. One should note that when he is talking about 
this minimum, he is not talking about what is a minimum of 
necessities for the slaves. For Arendt it is important to separate 
making from acting, but it is just as important to separate 
making from laboring. Again, she criticizes the transformation 
of work into labor (even though she also rejects the tendency 
to give what is essentially labor the status of productive work, 
as we saw in her discussion of Marx). Labor is thus not only 
threatening to swallow up the realm of politics, but also the 
realm of making. 
In other words, homo faber, the toolmaker, invented tools and 
implements in order to erect a world, not – at least, not primarily 
– to help the human life process (1998, 151).  
The distinction between work and labor is that work is a 
unique procedure of making, whereas labor is recurring, 
reproduction of life (1998, 94). Arendt asserts that work is a 
presupposition of politics in a different way than labor is, even 
though labor, too, is a part of the human condition. The world 
produced by work is a frame that makes life more than a 
biological process: work is culture- and civilization-building, a 
frame for politics. We are born into a world that pre-exists, a 
world of things and institutions. She is of course not the only 
philosopher to have defined the character of a specifically 
unique life surrounding for humans. Kosik (1976) is another 
thinker whose ontological view on work stresses its aspect of 
humanizing nature. Nonetheless, a troubling element of 
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Arendt’s argument is that the world of familiarity and 
durability figures only as a background condition. Taking into 
account that The Human Condition, along with other of her 
books and essays, express an outrage against what she 
perceives as a functionalized, bureaucratic form of life this 
might not be that surprising, but even if that intelligibility is 
appreciated, what I see as a major flaw in Arendt’s thinking is 
the way her thinking builds on the idea that life can be 
divided into background structures and the core of the human 
life.  
To expand on what strikes me as historically situated 
experiences that can help us read Arendt: the preoccupation 
with permanence and durability may seem idiosyncratic, but 
can – beyond what I have said about politics and institutions – 
be explained in terms of Arendt’s worry about subjectivism, 
that the human world shrinks to consumption and 
subsistence, where the horizon of common affairs has been 
put to the side (cf. 1998, 141, 172-3). For her, ‘subjective’ is 
synonymous with a lack of plurality (intersubjectivity): the 
subjective is deprived and insulated but thinks of itself as self-
sufficient and autonomous. It is important for her that work 
produces a world that is not subjective. One may not agree 
with the structure of the distinction between work and labor, 
but when work is portrayed like this, it is more intelligible 
why Arendt considers the transformation of work into labor 
such a threat – a world we share becomes a private world, a 
world in which jobholders are enclosed in a process that has 
no purpose other than functioning: making is reduced to 
repetitive, expansive production aimed at repetitive, 
expansive consumption. I think the link she perceives between 
privatization and subsistence is basically sound if ‘subsistence’ 
is understood as a critical concept – i.e. what role does 
‘subsistence’ play when it is an aspect of privatization or 
bureaucratization? – rather than an anti-political category that 
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poses survival as a necessary but essentially static dimension 
of life. 
What does it mean that the horizon of common affairs has 
been put to the side? Arendt claims that a human world 
contains concepts of the new, the better and the suitable (cf. 
1998, 97; 151-3). She also writes that the common world ends 
“when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to 
present itself in only one perspective” (1998, 58). In my 
opinion, the stress in these sections lies not primarily on 
permanence or durability but rather on Arendt’s indictment of 
the consumer society. The expansion of the laboring society is 
worrisome, she argues, because our daily existence is 
dominated by futility, expansion and waste (1998, 134).19  
The idea can be developed by looking at images of 
economy as endless ‘production’ of profits, an endless process 
of growth. There is no substance in this prospect: it contains 
no ideas about the good, the useful and so on. Such 
conceptions of economy revolve exclusively around expansion 
or obstacles to expansion; the aspect of usefulness, beauty or 
goodness is put to the side. This is one of the instances when 
Arendt’s argument highlights tensions in our own lives: she 
locates the damaging effects of a reduction of life and human 
togetherness. She helps us see the fatality of purposes being 
bracketed. In the next chapter, we will see André Gorz’s 
version of a very similar argument. 
 
                                                          
19 Arendt’s concept of futility easily gives rise to confused dichotomized 
thinking. If human existence is not to be futile, and if immortality is no longer 
part of our understanding (as she claims), then we must stick to some sort of 
durability. I don’t see what leads Arendt to worry so much about futility. What 
exactly is the threat she worries about when she talks about the risk of human 
communities transforming into futile labor? Should durability be accepted as 
a counterweight? 
79 
 
1.6 The ambiguity of the worker 
As we saw, Arendt’s relation to stable institutions is 
ambiguous. She also ascribes an ambiguous role to the worker. 
Just as the laborer appears both in negative and positive 
terms, the worker is an equally two-sided figure. Arendt’s 
worker is a non-political figure as she regards the political as 
not being concerned with productive efficiency (1998, 208). 
The risk when politics is seen from the point of view of 
productivity is a form of nihilism, where society and history 
are perceived as a product of making, an idea she attributes to 
Marx: we make our history (cf. Arendt 2006a). Nihilism here 
means that all differences are eliminated because of the 
erosion of the political realm, and in its stead we have what 
seems to be a limitless capacity of human activity, a world of 
endless possibilities – anything is possible! – but according to 
Arendt, this is activity in an impoverished sense, in the form 
of power and making.  
In order to illuminate why homo faber appears as an 
ambiguous figure, we need to look at the danger Arendt sees 
in means-end rationality – a rationality that tolerates no 
appreciation for something as valuable in itself. Homo faber is a 
goal-oriented utilitarian and Arendt’s worry is that usefulness 
has acquired the dignity of meaningfulness so that meaning is 
reduced to means and ends. “[In] a strictly utilitarian world, 
all ends are bound to be of short duration and to be 
transformed into means for further ends.” (1998, 154) She 
writes: 
The issue at stake is, of course, not instrumentality, the use of 
means to achieve an end, as such, but rather the generalization of 
the fabrication experience in which usefulness and utility are 
established as the ultimate standards for life and the world of 
men. This generalization is inherent in the activity of homo faber 
because the experience of means and end, as it is present in 
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fabrication, does not disappear with the finished product but is 
extended to its ultimate destination, which is to serve as a use 
object (1998, 157, cf. 229). 
As we saw, for Arendt a human world always exists in a 
relation of tensions as it is both connected with nature and at 
the same time considered to dominate nature. This is one of the 
key tensions in her thinking. What is puzzling is that she 
embarks on a critique of artificiality ˗ that one does not trust 
anything that one has not made oneself, a form of hyper-
scientific or engineering attitude. The philosophical trajectory 
into which this critique is fitted is the expansion of 
(quasi)nature, the realm of necessity that needs to be 
counterbalanced by work. Work in the form of generalized 
instrumentality that treats the world as an object to mold is 
thus a threat against the world as dangerous as the expansion 
of (quasi)nature. Somehow, these two aspects, the expansion 
of homo faber and the expansion of necessity, seem to 
crystallize in Arendt’s concept of the social, a strange in-
between that expresses alienation from the human condition. 
This re-introduces Pitkin’s question: what is it that is 
threatening the political?20  
One way to interpret Arendt is that she spells out a role 
making comes to play in our thinking when mastery is 
understood as an unquestionable right to exploit and to treat 
whatever is perceived as an obstacle or a means as worthless 
material to shape and mold. Arendt paints the contours of 
how making and violence go together in the instrumental 
project of shaping a world of objects (cf. Arendt 1998, 139-40). 
One such dangerous role is the idea that through work, the 
                                                          
20 As D’Entrèves notes, it is not only nature that has grown in a worrisome 
way. Also artificiality is a threat in the sense that instead of ‘real’ necessity, we 
have a man-made condition of expanding science and technology where it is 
ever harder to discern what is necessary (1993, 51-53).  
81 
 
world can become anything (an idea she hints at in her writing 
on totalitarianism) – the world can be shaped in accordance 
with the idea we have in our heads. The architect Howard 
Roark in Ayn Rand’s novel The Fountainhead (1994) is an 
example of this form of thinking in which the world becomes 
a mere object of one grand human’s molding. Roark is a 
rugged individualist who takes the core of his profession to be 
to hold on to the Idea; the architect is to be a ‘prime mover’. 
The most dangerous thing is to compromise one’s singular 
vision. He loathes what he sees as the modern, populist style 
of buildings where classicist elements are inserted for frills. He 
forms the image of the pure, perfect building. When the real, 
tangible building does not correspond to his ideas, due to 
terrible and populist scheming, he unhesitatingly builds a 
bomb and destroys the faulty creation that did not live up to 
the idea. Here, making is a solitary and violent process of 
molding. However, Roark cares little for what Arendt sees as 
fundamental for the world created by the homo faber: use. In 
the novel, making boils down to fierce will-power. The way 
the novel contrasts individualism and collectivism also evokes 
another danger with ‘making’, that it leans on individualism 
in a way that has no love or care for differences between 
people, that all it sees is a world which needs to be worked on 
˗ which for example is expressed precisely in Roark’s 
contemptuous attitude to other people as mere pawns or 
anonymous instances of the mass.  
Another example of the destructive role of homo faber, the 
ruthless rule of fabrication, would be the idea that society 
itself, through work in the form of thorough and principled 
administration, can be methodically constructed. This idea 
about society as a human, engineered construction is the 
opposite pole of Arendt’s own concept of the political, where 
plurality, free development of differences, stand at the fore. As 
I’ve already noted, Arendt worries that this free development 
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of differences is always non-productive and frail, and 
therefore easily threatened by necessity or the ideal of 
engineering. Plurality is seen as a constitutive dimension of 
what she calls action: for her, frailty here is good, and so is the 
non-productive character of action.  
Nonetheless, institutional stability is needed to some 
extent, otherwise politics would become free-floating, but 
when the political itself takes on the character of construction, 
strength or stability, then something has gone awry. One of 
Arendt’s insights is that an aspect of the frailty of politics is 
precisely that it easily turns into an ideal about predictable 
making and that even though a formal and administrative side 
of institutions is inevitable and even good, it is wrong to think 
of institutions from the point of view of making in the sense 
that politics would have a solid basis – even though she, as we 
saw, emphasizes that politics needs a stable surrounding. The 
most dangerous wish of all is the wish that a ‘strong man’ will 
clean up and re-arrange the disorderly sphere of politics. This 
view of the ‘strong man’ is, I think, connected with a distrust 
of politics, the belief that mostly, politics amounts to idle talk 
and that something much more robust and predictable should 
take its place. Such mistrust of politics typically holds up a 
peculiar ideal of ‘usefulness’ (1998, 157; 188; 191; 208). This 
elaboration of the destructive role of work is connected with a 
dialectic relation Arendt astutely registers between collectivity 
and individualism. When society itself is seen as a process to 
be governed, society and individuality are split up, so that the 
latter becomes subjective, but not intersubjective. Arendt 
acknowledges, and I side with her, that this is not the only 
way in which we are individuals; this is individuality reduced 
to conformity or privatized experience. The Human Condition 
evokes a world drained of real possibilities: in a society of 
process-thinking, isolation and conformity, anything is 
possible and it is this ‘anything’ that is the problem. Arendt 
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argues that this is true for totalitarian societies as well as 
societies dominated by consumption and labor. 
1.7 Politics 
Arendt seems to consider action and politics as largely 
synonymous concepts, both of which she focuses on through 
the temporal aspect of initiative and hope. Her concept of the 
political contains two main aspects. The first is self-expression, 
and the second is initiative, founding, creating something new 
(cf. 1998, 176-7). For my own part, I find the second dimension 
more intelligible, especially in light of her critique of ‘the 
social’ and, as we saw and will see further, her rejection of 
politics as control and administration. However, she sees a 
tension between two aspects of politics, politics as initiative 
(beginning something new) and politics as achievement (as a 
result, as focused action aiming at a specific goal) (1998, 189). 
The overall characterization of politics in The Human Condition 
is that it is no more than human togetherness, human 
communication; politics has no other foundation than this 
(1998, 199). In a time when politics is written off as toothless 
and powerless – politics seems to be unable to deal with the 
big questions, global injustice and ecological destruction – 
Arendt’s attempt to formulate the difference between politics 
and administration is highly relevant (cf. Pitkin 2000). Even 
though the defiant assertion that can be found in her books 
and essays that economic concerns do not belong in the realm 
of politics might sound outright crazy, the patient reader 
should try to see what she has in mind. 
Let’s start with a statement that on the face of it seems 
outrageous: the aim of politics is not to alleviate suffering. 
Why would she advance a preposterous idea like that? One of 
the images that Arendt attacks is the idea that politics is 
mainly about the distribution of resources and accumulation 
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of wealth (1998, 69). In this sense, her thinking is situated very 
far from the type of political philosophy in which the main 
field of disagreement is that between distribution and 
entitlement. Both of these tenets play an extremely prominent 
part in contemporary political philosophy – rights and 
resources being the two major dimensions, and models of 
justice being the main topic of a certain form of widespread 
political philosophy (Rawls 1973, Walzer 1983). I will try to 
shed light on Arendt’s hostility against politics as a form of 
household economy, politics as the administration of society. 
Here one can see, I think, how her critique of labor and work 
goes together but the tensions I have noted in her concepts of 
nature and necessity remain.  
When labor becomes the concern of politics, Arendt writes, 
it is based on the distorted image that politics is an expanded 
household, the resources of which are managed by political 
bodies (1998, 28-33). It is here that her concept of the social 
enters the scene. The realm of the social blurs the boundaries 
between the common world and the maintenance of life. 
When private interests – along with the market – emerge in 
the public sphere, and when society is assumed to be held 
together by one common interest, society appears, and with the 
social comes conformism (1998, 35-41). Society, in this sense is  
[the] form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of 
life and nothing else assumes public significance (Arendt 1998, 
46). 
A central aim in Arendt’s political philosophy is thus to 
specify, against the predominant ideas, what genuinely 
belongs to the sphere of politics and what can be seen as pre-
political elements which are now, falsely, seen as political. As 
we have seen, she insists that politics is not based on force or 
violence: these modes of social being are, she says, pre-
political (cf. Arendt 1998, 31, 200-2). The main point seems to 
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be a rejection of the image of politics as administrative power 
that molds society in accordance with a specific idea, aiming at 
a specific result. Social engineering is the classical image of the 
government of human life. Work, but also health and leisure, 
are thought of as forms that need to be molded by detailed 
and overarching policies. Rational principles are extolled as 
the foundation of society, so that human needs and interaction 
become a process to be rationally governed. The goal of 
politics is perceived to be productivity. This ideal can also be 
traced in present political debates: if it is to be worthwhile at 
all, politics in all shapes and forms must be able to maintain 
the process of production and consumption. Jobs are created, 
companies are growing, the inflation rate is kept down and 
citizens assist the economy by being good consumers and 
efficient jobholders. From that perspective, politics is judged 
according to how well it preserves and expands the societal 
machinery. 
In The Human Condition, the promise of politics concerns 
the relation between people, not a maximization of resources 
or an engineering of distribution. As I said, Arendt maintains 
that imagining politics as order or solidity is to fall prey to the 
temptation of seeing the political itself through the lens of 
mastery and rule (1998, 220-2). An instrumental idea of 
politics (e.g. a government has the monopoly to rule over its 
subjects) is fiercely debunked. Arendt’s critique of 
administration – what she grasps as the rule of nobody – is 
thus both an assessment of a role work comes to have, and a 
feature of what she calls the social. Richard Bernstein (1986, 
242) suggests that Arendt saw a culmination of this sphere in 
the welfare state. As I said, the critique of labor and work 
coincide at this point, as administration in her sense manifests 
both an expansion of necessity but also the transformation of 
politics into ruling and government.  
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The problem is that Arendt is so worried about the 
instrumentalization of politics that what she says about 
politics risks ending up as a rather formal description of 
politics: she spells out the boundaries of politics, but leaves 
open what the content could be. Nonetheless, the reason why 
Arendt talks about politics in this way should be 
acknowledged. The most important thing for her is that 
politics (in opposition to labor) has the ability to create 
something new. She does not discuss freedom as sovereignty 
or choice. For her, freedom has to do with founding, initiative, 
a sense of togetherness: 
If it were true that sovereignty and freedom are the same, then 
indeed no man could be free, because sovereignty, the ideal of 
uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory 
to the very condition of plurality (cf. Arendt 1998, 234; Pitkin 
1998, 147).  
The political is nothing without plurality – this is her 
important main contention about the political. In politics, for 
Arendt, differences are expressed in evolving forms of human 
communities, rather than stemming from for example 
individual preferences on which overarching policies with the 
aim of optimizing society could be based. For this reason, she 
is critical of politics being reduced to necessity, which one can 
here view as tantamount to ‘survival’ or ‘maintenance’. 
Necessity makes it look as if there are no challenging 
differences, no genuine deliberation, just a society to maintain 
and citizens to govern. In this image of politics, there is no 
space for what Arendt considers to be most important, politics 
as initiative, deliberation and dialogue. So where does that 
take us and how does it stand in relation to the other elements 
of her thinking?  
Appealing to classical thinkers like Aristotle, the political is 
defined as the freedom from necessity. The political in 
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Arendt’s sense starts with an irreducible sense in which we 
are different from each other, whereas she, as we have seen, 
construes ‘labor’ as being based on sameness and collectivity. 
She even explicitly labels it as anti-political. The context is a 
discussion about the labor movement. Arendt ventures into an 
argument in which she explains that all forms of labor 
communities build on sameness and sociality; the rhythm of 
labor creates such a sameness, a smooth functioning in which 
individuality does not matter.  
This unitedness of many into one is basically anti-political; it is 
the very opposite of the togetherness prevailing in political or 
commercial communities […] (1998, 213).  
Instead of the institutional level, or the level of administrative 
policies for the benefit of all, she writes about what takes place 
between people, how a concern evolves between people and 
how people’s engagement is born within a setting in which 
people have different views on things, different commitments. 
In the best case this engagement implies a kind of openness 
and hope so that people place their trust in the possibility of 
engaging with others. The connection between trust and the 
political is important. Openness excludes control, and this 
makes it even more intelligible why she is mistrustful of the 
idea that politics should be predictable. We don’t exert control 
over the meaning of our actions.21  
Arendt is right that politics can be perverted into necessity 
so that all forms of openness in relation to the future are 
closed down and politics becomes optimization and 
maximization, rather than the world being a place in which 
                                                          
21 Interestingly, Arendt makes a parallel between labor and action in the sense 
that they both lack durability. The difference seems to be that there is nothing 
in labor that could be preserved (labor is connected with consumption), 
whereas politics in its authentic sense leaves traces for example in storytelling, 
laws or in institutions. 
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there is a place for – but also trust in – critical evaluations of 
fundamental ways of living together. In this sense, it is not 
surprising that she presupposes a tension between economics 
on the one hand, and politics on the other; this is a role 
economics has come to have.22  
However, I would argue that Arendt is unequivocally 
wrong in maintaining that, if that is what she does, labor is 
inherently un-free, so that every contact between the political 
and ‘the sphere of labor’ leads to an erosion of the political 
realm. One of the most grotesque and disconcerting examples 
of such a view is Arendt’s claim that the failure of the French 
revolution was due to its being driven by what she calls the 
‘social question’, a public recognition of the need to abolish 
poverty, its entanglement in laboring people’s lives and their 
claims to justice. Poverty is said to implicate an immediate 
dependency on the life process. When the multitude of the 
poor, imprisoned within necessity in this way, rises up as a 
revolutionary brigade, disaster and violence ensue. Arendt 
puts it as crudely as this: “When they appeared on the scene of 
politics, necessity appeared with them […]”. (cf. 2006c 51-3, 
Pitkin 2000, 220-3). The dark undercurrent of this and similar 
passages is that the dream of the poor, ‘driven by the needs of 
their bodies’, is inevitably a one-dimensional craving for 
abundance and release from pain, the destructive side of 
which is also pointed out in The Human Condition. There, she 
writes a propos the utopia of leisure:  
                                                          
22 Pitkin suggests that it is not economics in itself that is pre-political. When 
economics is about fundamental forms of human organization it is important 
to acknowledge the political nature of economic decisions. Arendt herself 
sometimes seems to dismiss a certain attitude towards economics as quasi-
political, rather than economy itself: the task would then be to spell out what 
this attitude is, but this is where Arendt’s approach falls short (cf. Arendt 
1998, 185, Pitkin 2000, 179-80).  
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The ideal is not new; it was clearly indicated in the unquestioned 
assumption of classical political economy that the ultimate good 
of the vita activa is growing wealth, abundance, and the 
‘happiness of the greatest number.’ And what else, finally, is this 
ideal of modern society but the age-old dream of the poor and 
destitute, which can have a charm of its own so long as it is a 
dream, but turns into a fool’s paradise as soon as it is realized 
(1998, 132-3). 
As I said in 1.4.2, one of the tantalizing questions haunting a 
reading of Arendt is what the animal laborans is a description 
of. Here, she does in fact write about “the age-old dream of the 
poor and destitute”. Even though this is never spelled out, she 
seems to argue against the involvement of poor people in 
politics on the grounds that these people never know what 
true freedom is about. They are not fit for politics because all 
they dream of is abundance and a life released from pain. 
When the poor are let loose into the realm of politics, they 
drag the voracious appetites of necessity along with them. A 
more charitable reading would be that the claims of the poor 
are about the presuppositions of politics, what must be in place 
if the political is to flourish, and that politics does not end with 
for example the abolition of poverty. But to me, this is not 
what Arendt ultimately is saying: she seems to say that the 
demands of the poor are anti-political.  
Even though the sections I quoted just now are unsettling, 
we also saw that the concept of the political has a complex role 
in Arendt’s thinking. To take the example Arendt herself uses 
in a very good way: union struggles might play out in several 
ways. Her point is that the labor movement was once a truly 
political phenomenon. But she is eager to reassure us that this 
movement was not founded on a desire to re-organize labor or 
to abolish it. Without further descriptions of what once made 
the labor movement political, Arendt says that this was really 
a moment were laborers appeared in public (note that ‘appear 
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in public’ is her definition of what the political is) and instead 
of having the role of animal laborans (fighting for narrow 
economic interests), they “fought against society as a whole” 
(1998, 218-9). Arendt claims that labor unions were political in 
so far as they constituted a new form of public space (cf. 1998, 
215-6; 219, Benhabib 1996, 142-5). For my own part I would 
say that of course, labor unions have often focused on 
struggles for interests in a narrow sense. Unions are 
encouraged to become integrated in the societal machinery so 
that their claims become more balanced and realistic: 
according to this view, to be a part of the machinery is to exert 
responsible power. This would be a case of integration into 
what Arendt calls ‘society’. But it is also possible to imagine 
very different examples of union struggles that cannot 
exclusively be rendered in the language of interests. 
In the documentary Harlan County U.S.A (1976, Direction: 
Barbara Kopple), a miner’s union in eastern Kentucky is on 
strike. The wives of the miners have a prominent role on the 
picket line. Wages are a part of the issue, but also better 
working conditions, safety and fair treatment. After a while, 
the struggle, as the company threatens to introduce a no-strike 
clause and state troopers have been brought in to keep the 
road open for workers going to the mine, turns into a fight for 
the right to strike. Older members of the community recall the 
violent strikes of the thirties. What I think is important in the 
documentary is how the workers and their relatives’ own 
version of the story come to the fore. The description of the 
strikers’ activity is controversial, and the company 
representatives do all they can to keep up the image of greedy 
workers and illegitimate, violent action. One of the company 
bosses complains that this is not the behavior he expects from 
‘American women’ – he refers to the women on the picket line. 
The perspective of the film is that of a struggling community, 
a context in which work does not constitute an isolated sphere. 
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To fight for the community, here, is not to fight for the 
sustenance of a social apparatus. 
I would suggest that Arendt would not able to see the level 
at which this kind of documentary operates. It works like a 
piece of testimony about the meaning of ‘getting organized’, 
and the testimony is rooted in a hope that future generations 
will also care and struggle for their jobs and their 
communities. This testimony does not allow an ontological 
distinction between different kinds of activities. Thus, a strict 
distinction between the political and the pre-political (or the 
political and the working activities) cannot be upheld. One 
could rather say, like the philosopher Richard Bernstein:  
Issues or problems do not come labeled ‘social’, ‘political’, or even 
‘private’. Indeed, the question whether a problem is properly 
social (and therefore not worthy of public debate) or political is 
itself frequently the central political issue (Bernstein 1986, 252).   
Bernstein claims, rightly I think, that (if this is her point) 
Arendt’s distinction between the social and the political risks 
looking away from this sort of openness – and admittedly, I 
think Arendt herself at times recognizes this as well. After all, 
the categories of labor, work and politics are not labels of 
distinct activities but are instruments of a diagnosis of societal 
malaise. Bernstein notes that Arendt’s own account contains 
many tensions when it comes to the idea that has shocked 
many readers, the idea I referred to above: liberation from 
necessity is pre-political. At times, she leaves room for the 
historical differences with regard to what the public sphere, 
the political, contains. However, Bernstein calls Arendt’s 
approach to critical questions about this distinction evasive: she 
seems to hold the position that the public sphere is simply a 
sphere that contains questions that are debated. He observes 
that Arendt never seems to realize the context that surrounds 
debates: what is perceived as a legitimate debate, what is the 
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difference between obligations and mere debates? Rather than 
claiming that the public or political realm is constituted by 
debates, debates can be said to have their own social 
circumstances. Bernstein aptly remarks that the distinction 
between the social and the political when it operates in real 
contexts tends to rest on hidden political judgments about 
what is political and what is to remain social (he mentions the 
rejection of feminism as an example) (1986, 248-52). The 
reminder about the surrounding of political debates is apt 
when one looks at examples in our own society where some 
aspects of work are seen as political concerns, while others are 
regarded as concerns that should be dealt with only within the 
specific organization, and nowhere else. The distinction 
between the political and for example the merely technical 
often play an ideological role.  
Harlan Country U.S.A clearly contributes to a debate by 
defending union action. Like Bernstein, I would say that there 
is no clear-cut line where the political begins and ends, even 
though useful and not always ideological distinctions can be 
made in specific cases. The question whether union action is 
political in a genuine sense is itself part of a controversy. That 
Arendt is wary of defining what politics contains would 
therefore be a very promising start: politics is about our 
responsibility for the future. Her ideas about politics help us 
to conceive of some aspects of the political, especially politics 
as resistance and change. In my opinion, here it is intelligible to 
say, like she often does, that political agency has a revealing 
character – for example, that an act of civil disobedience may 
reveal that a regime or a law is illegitimate. 
Arendt talks about politics in negative terms, rather than 
enumerating what she would consider the political to be. This 
is no mere lapse: she characterizes politics as renewal, 
struggles for the future and in this sense politics cannot 
‘contain’ anything specific. This central point is not easily 
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squared with other things Arendt says. If politics is truly open 
in the sense that it concerns the fundamental ways in which 
people live together and if ‘politics’ refers to the establishment 
of new relations, then it would be very strange to set up 
absolute limits for what forms of living together would or 
would not be eligible for politics. As Bernstein says, such 
limits are a politically invested affair. There can be no neutral 
boundary. My point with the Harlan County U.S.A example 
was to show that a particular struggle reveals new sides of 
politics and – this is significant – new sides of work. What is 
striking in the film is that it shows the role family members 
play in the union’s picket line as one aspect of an entire 
community being engaged in the degradation of the work that 
for most people offers a means of subsistence. This shows why 
Arendt’s reduced perspective on subsistence – what I called 
her concept of sheer life ˗ does not hold up to scrutiny. In the 
film, the strikers worry about basic features of their shared 
lives. ‘Subsistence’ here cannot be detached from concerns 
about what they want their community to be like. This 
example could remind us of how conflicts rooted in work 
often have the character of disagreement about how the 
conflict is to be characterized: stakes are articulated, 
questioned, re-articulated. It is even hard to imagine most 
strikes without this element of articulations about what is at 
stake for the workers, for the employers and for those whose 
daily existence the strike has an impact on. 
So: on Arendt’s account, human needs, labor/work and 
economy do not count as political concerns. What does the 
image of the political and the pre-political bring with it? As I 
said in 1.2, the questionable side of her thinking is that 
necessity is something to master, something to surpass, 
something to demarcate. It is time to look at what attitude 
comes to the fore in this idea about controlling necessity: what 
is shoved out of politics? In her book Manhood and Politics, 
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political theorist Wendy Brown argues that Arendt’s contempt 
for the spaces where life is “created, reproduced and 
maintained” is typical of political theory.  
A strange trait in Arendt’s thinking is her eulogies about 
the failure of modern society to live up to the greatness of 
Greece 400 B.C. In the following passage, Arendt refers to the 
political experience in Plato’s and Aristotle’s times:  
Without mastering the necessities of life in the household, neither 
life nor the ‘good life’ is possible, but politics is never for the sake 
of life. As far as the members of the polis are concerned, 
household life exists for the sake of the ‘good life’ (1998, 37).  
It is here that life is contrasted with mere life, biological life – 
these are the necessities to master. A strict dividing line seems 
to be erected between the human, the political being, and the 
animal, the laboring animal. Historical examples have a dual 
role in Arendt’s thinking. They shed light on a promising 
possibility, but the image of politics in early Greek antiquity 
also seems to function as a historical route to conceptual 
purity. Hanna Pitkin writes:  
[The] ancient Greeks also import into Arendt’s argument some 
problematic features she surely did not (consciously) intend to 
adopt: an agonistic, narcissistic, and misogynist striving for heroic 
glory […] and a corresponding set of rigid, pejorative contrasts 
ranking Greek above barbarian, freeman above slave, public 
above private, and male above female. (Pitkin 2000, 148)   
This inclination can thus be seen as unconscious, Pitkin 
argues, because Arendt explicitly says that labor/necessity is 
needed, it is a part of our life (ibid). For all the ambivalent 
remarks about poverty and necessity, it is very hard to think 
that Arendt really held the idea that some people are doomed 
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to a life outside politics.23 Still, as Brown writes, some of what 
she writes about necessity seems to imply the idea that only 
some people count as being fully human; others are stuck in 
life, in necessity, in their bodies and their labor (Brown 1988, 
24). Above all, this description latches on to Arendt’s concept 
of ‘natural relations’ that are, to her, different from politically 
relevant relations: these natural relations are not eligible as 
political voices, voices constituted by what she calls plurality. 
Even though Arendt never explicitly said this, as far as I 
know, she never bothers to reject the idea of poverty as a, as it 
were, technical problem, that is, the idea that poor people can 
be helped by means of certain structures that somewhat 
unburden their daily existence, while their lives are still 
understood to be ‘sheer life’. The covert attitude is that these 
poor people will remain poor. Politics is aimed at them, not 
representing them.  
A certain image of the world struggles to keep itself pure, 
free from ‘sheer life’, but as we’ve seen, Arendt can’t be said to 
have stood entirely behind that tendency. The problem is not 
that Aristotle and Arendt take insufficient notice of necessity 
and life – that their values are skewed. As Brown writes, the 
problem is the dichotomy they establish, hold on to and distil: 
Rather, the problem lies in the extreme dichotomy established 
between a life of necessity and a life of freedom, between material 
existence and “fully human existence”, between animal being and 
human being. When these various aspects of our existence and 
activities are institutionalized as oppositions and/or ordered 
hierarchically, the result is self-estrangement as well as 
estrangement from the context within which one lives (Brown 
1988, 27). 
                                                          
23 For an extremely critical account of Arendt’s tendencies to glorify the 
philosophical clarity of the Greek thinkers, cf. Wolin 2001, 62-69.  
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The major problem is Arendt’s insistence that the life of 
necessity (even if this need not imply a direct reference to 
certain people) should be mastered, that is, kept in its place: 
hidden, out of sight. Above all: I am wary of the distinction 
between freedom and necessity. In philosophy about work a 
recurring idea is that freedom over necessity is legitimately 
won only by means of domination (cf. Arendt 1998, 83-4). That 
is, when one moves within the sphere of freedom, this 
presupposes that the sphere of necessity is kept in place.  
But doesn’t her worry about the expansion of necessity 
have something in them? If necessity is tantamount to the 
jobholder’s society, keeping necessity in its place would mean 
to stress other sides of life than labor and consumption. As we 
will see next, this links Arendt to later critics of work.  
1.8 The jobholder society 
In one of the most shocking passages of The Human Condition 
(1998, 119), Arendt writes that slavery before modern times 
sprang from the human condition itself: life is always a burden 
for human beings, whose essence transcends sheer life, and 
slavery was consequently a form of technical solution. Slavery 
released the burden: 
The fact that slavery and banishment into the household was, by 
and large, the social condition of all laborers prior to the modern 
age is primarily due to the human condition itself; life, which for 
all other animal species is the very essence of their being, becomes 
a burden to man because of his innate “repugnance to futility” 
(1998, 119). 
This passage reeks of Aristotelian contempt. True life takes 
place in the agora, but human life is also a life of labor and 
necessity. She concedes that slavery was unjust and violent, 
but still insists that labor’s rightful place is in the darkness “of 
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pain and necessity” (ibid).24 As we saw, Arendt’s overarching 
contention is that labor does not belong to the public life. 
Modern life is corrupted because there is no clear sense of the 
public. When she criticizes labor for colonizing the public 
sphere, it remains unclear what it is, more specifically, that she 
is critical of: market economy, division of labor, administration 
or civil society? The answer seems to be a combination of all of 
these modes of economic life that in her opinion contribute to 
a process of transformation in which work becomes labor and 
labor becomes a primary societal concern.25 The crux of the 
matter seems to be a process of leveling: 
The point is not that for the first time in history laborers were 
admitted and given equal rights in the public realm, but that we 
have almost succeeded in leveling all human activities to the 
common denominator of securing the necessities of life and 
providing for their abundance. Whatever we do, we are supposed 
to do for the sake of “making a living”; such is the verdict of 
society, and the number of people, especially in the professions, 
which might challenge it, has decreased rapidly (1998, 126-7).  
Arendt writes that the laboring society transforms all activities 
into ways of making a living. Beyond this there are hobbies 
and play. All serious activities are interpreted as labor or 
“securing the necessities of life” (1998, 46; 126-8). These 
                                                          
24 In an earlier passage of The Human Condition she expresses the matter in a 
much more complex way, so that one can interpret her as saying that slavery 
was not a technical way of dealing with the human condition, but rather a way 
of fleeing from it, “to exclude labor from the condition of man’s life” (1998, 84). 
And in yet another passage, she says that slavery during antiquity was not 
natural, it was man-made (1998, 112). In Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt also 
writes about a system of slavery immersed in a futile attempt to flee the 
human condition (cf. 1968, on the Boers). 
25 When Arendt criticizes ‘national economy’, her critique is aimed at an entire 
form of life, rather than a very specific phenomenon; she does not criticize 
bureaucracy or market economy as such. In this way Arendt is conscious of 
historical change (cf. Pitkin 2000, 189). 
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remarks reflect her understanding of labor not as distinctive 
types of jobs but rather as a hegemonic form in which more 
and more activities are now seen to take part. In these 
passages and others, Arendt describes the changes labor goes 
through, how more and more activities are transformed into 
labor because of technological changes, but also because of 
perspectives on what is valuable. There is thus a historical 
dimension in how work or labor is contrasted with something 
else. The insight she offers is that the changes of work and 
labor are not to be understood as a neutral process. To render 
this insight in my own way: people react against what they see 
as destructive tendencies, and controversies tend to arise with 
regard to what work has become and what it should be. 
Under the theoretical surface of Arendt’s discussion about 
the transformation of work into labor ethical and political 
stakes can be discerned. One of the points she makes that has 
such implications is the claim that we can no longer take talk 
about jobs as subsistence – what she calls the jobholder society 
– at face value. Her argument seems precisely to be that a 
certain idea about the importance of work and labor takes 
society for granted in a way that makes the political disappear 
into bureaucratic agreement about our common life. 
‘Productivity’ and expansion are neutralized and human life is 
drained of its plural forms. The consequence of such a society 
according to Arendt is that the dimension of shared life is 
impoverished. Other people are rendered into competitors or 
co-workers in the same expansive project, but that they have 
views on and reactions to things in their own right, is of no 
avail.  
Arendt evokes what many other writers have discussed in 
terms of a system of consumption and production. Limits of 
abundance are intolerable. Consumption must be tied to 
collective processes in a way that transcends the needs of 
individuals: consumption must be attuned to capitalism’s 
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craving for boundless circulation – overproduction is a grave 
manifestation of crisis. Houses, clothes and cars become 
products to consume, products that have a limited life cycle; 
these consumer goods are treated according to a logic of 
abundance. They are made like consumption products in the 
sense that they are produced to be worn out quickly and this 
is partly what is at stake in Arendt’s worry about the 
transformation of work into labor. When consumption takes 
on this collective role, the problem of leisure will be the 
problem of keeping people busy in a way that fits the 
structural role of employment and consumption. Everything is 
sucked into what she calls the life process and there is a 
constant problem of keeping this process going (1998, 124-5; 
131-2). I understand Arendt as saying that this is a situation – 
she uses the puzzling expression ‘intensification of the life 
processes’ to describe its fatality – in which we are no longer 
thinking about what we are doing. The implication, I take it, is 
that production and consumption become complementary 
functions upholding each other – the human is reduced to 
producer and consumer, so that the aim of production is 
consumption, and the aim of consumption is production. The 
individual’s responsibility for society then boils down to two 
duties: to produce and to consume, while the collective task 
and the task of politics seem to be to resolve the equation of 
production, work and consumption. More is to be produced, 
and what is produced must be consumed; higher wages boost 
the economy, but inflation must be evaded at all costs.  
A society like ours, she writes, could have minimized 
labor, the realm of necessity and the life processes (I take it), 
but this has not happened. We cling to the idea that labor and 
work are the most central element of human self-expression, 
that the core of human beings is the capacity to produce. She 
was critical of the trend of labor psychology in her own time 
and their idea that labor should be humanized, that all labor is 
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inherently respectable. Such ideas will only glorify labor, 
thereby reducing human life and falsely convincing us that 
labor can become something that, to her, it can never be: an 
expression of what we are as human being (1998, 149). 
Arendt’s perspective helps us see how labor starts to appear as 
a collective form immune to critical evaluation. If labor 
becomes a collective form in this sense, we no longer have to 
be concerned with each other on a basic level. One has to fend 
for oneself. Labor, like consumption, becomes a form of 
collective or individual flight from the common. For Arendt, in 
such a society, it is not clear what liberation or emancipation 
would mean, even though such talk is always in the air and 
even though, as she points out, a minimization of labor is now 
technically possible. True freedom cannot start from 
minimization alone: shortening of time spent on laboring will 
not in itself erect a common world. Freedom is not 
synonymous with leisure. This takes her to what she perceives 
as a graver matter that I have already touched on: animal 
laborans does not know how to be free or what freedom is. For 
animal laborans, freedom from labor will mean “the private and 
essentially worldless activities – ‘hobbies’” (1998 117-8; cf. 127-
8; 132-3). 
It is a society of laborers which is about to be liberated from the 
fetters of labor, and this society does no longer know of those 
other higher and more meaningful activities for the sake of which 
this freedom would deserve to be won (1998, 5).  
One can interpret this quote as aligning with Aristotelian 
notions of the higher life versus the life of reproduction, and I 
already pointed out how problematic that sort of hierarchy is, 
but it can also be read as an objection against a role labor and 
work has as a compensation for meaningfulness. A central 
strand that I think is more valuable than one may realize on 
first glance is the danger she sees in a society that despite its 
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easy and comfortable life thinks of itself mainly in the 
language of subsistence. Subsistence becomes an obsession 
that we cling to and here I think Pitkin’s and Arendt’s remarks 
about the powerlessness we bring upon ourselves – letting 
things happen – are illuminating. The intriguing (and not 
problematic) tensions manifested in The Human Condition are 
that on the one hand, contemporary society is obsessed with 
jobs and subsistence and hijacked by necessity. On the other 
hand, Arendt portrays a society in which people lead a 
comfortable life in such a way that they can’t think clearly 
even about necessity: it has becomes harder to acknowledge 
its role: 
The easier that life has become in a consumers’ or laborers’ 
society, the more difficult it will be to remain aware of the urges 
of necessity by which it is driven, even when pain and effort, the 
outward manifestation of necessity, are hardly noticeable at all 
(1998, 135).  
As we saw, Arendt is not satisfied with the aim of ‘liberation’ 
from work: she holds that this ideal is permeated by illusions 
and false hopes and that it co-exists uneasily with an 
idealization of work and a dangerous utopia of necessity itself 
being finally overcome. Her pessimistic conclusion is that we 
no longer know how to become free. One account Arendt 
offers is that life has become too easy, life seems comfortable, 
but this has alienated us both from necessity and from the 
political dimensions of shared life. Private comfort (where we 
think of ourselves as independent) may be the utopia of a 
liberal account of freedom, but the ideal of abundance and 
“happiness of the greatest number” could also be perceived as 
a nightmarish tendency such that, if it became too real, our 
lives would be quite horrible (1998, 133). This is a society 
dazzled by growth, “caught in the smooth functioning of a 
never-ending process”. Above, I gave an outline of the 
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potential gruesome implications of the contention that some 
people ruled by necessity can only settle for a life of comfort. I 
suppose she tries to say that this societal state of comfort 
makes the distinction between necessity and freedom 
inconspicuous, that it makes us nurse a number of illusions –
we are no longer able to think straight about necessity. 
Economy is transformed into waste economy and one worries 
about losing one’s job without being able to think about what 
the job is needed for. As we will see in the next chapters, this 
view is shared by work critics like Marcuse, Gorz and Weeks.  
1.9 Concluding words 
It is not entirely true that Arendt considers only politics to be a 
worthy activity. In a short but significant passage, she points 
out that labor is a guarantee for vitality; in laboring, we stand 
in contact with life itself. She paints a contrast between vitality 
and real necessity, and a quasi-necessity or a flight from 
necessity that turns humans into vegetative consumers (1998, 
120). For this reason, labor cannot be subtracted from human 
life altogether without something essential being lost. Arendt 
insists that the sphere of necessity has its vital place in human 
life and it is important that it is not broadened or elevated as 
the core of human life. She agrees with Aristotle in so far as 
seeing labor as valuable most of all for creating a space for 
other worthy activities: acting and thinking. Her political 
project resembles later critical writers’ conceptualizations of a 
space beyond a society based on wage labor along with 
conceptualizations of the political distinguished from politics 
as administration of resources.  
As we saw, Arendt claims that we will never be liberated 
from the burden of labor. The main tenet of her argument is 
nonetheless that we now indulge in labor as necessity to the 
extent that the space for the political is about to disappear. 
103 
 
Society is understood to be driven by a set of law-like 
regularities to which politics must submit. Arendt’s 
description of the jobholder society is linked to that broader 
concern. According to her, labor is situated in the kingdom of 
necessity but this kingdom has usurped society itself. If we 
read her concept of necessity in a critical, rather than an 
ontological sense, her question is highly relevant, as it 
challenges a pattern of thinking in which work and labor (to 
stick to Arendt’s concepts) are seen as an ever-changing force 
tied to other forces (economy, societal interests) so that the 
goal of politics is to manipulate and control these ‘forces’.  
The problem is, however, that Arendt herself is prone to 
describe what she calls labor as a force that invaded human 
life. As Pitkin says, this feature of Arendt’s thinking makes it 
unclear in which sense we have brought this jobholder society 
on ourselves, in which sense we are responsible for 
maintaining it. Necessity, then, has many roles in the book. 
Arendt claims that we are bound by it. This is a reminder both 
about the presupposition of politics and work, but also the 
dangerous threats posed against them. In other words, she 
wants us to grasp the limits both of necessity and of the sphere 
of action. This double role creates a troublesome tension when 
her analysis of what it is that threatens politics presupposes 
the view that necessity binds us and that human life is 
subjected to the urgency of life itself – necessity is neutralized. 
This is, to my mind, one of the major tensions in her 
thinking. I would insist that one of the strengths in her 
philosophy that has everything to do with the theme with 
which I am grappling – the neutralization and moralization of 
work – is the way Arendt struggles to present an alternative to 
a world of privatization and conceptions of society in which 
activity is suspended, a world in which society is a force to 
perpetuate. This description resonates with how growth, 
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welfare and national policies are commonly understood: the 
aim is to perpetuate, maximize and sustain. 
Arendt asserts that labor, life-affirming toil, and work, 
world-making, should not be politicized. If one follows a 
certain strand in her writings, economic concerns appear as a 
technical problem that is not fit for politics in her special 
rendering of the word – even though she would of course 
agree that it is a central dimension of politics as it is mostly 
understood, as government. According to her, the social and 
the political must not be conflated. As I tried to show 
throughout this chapter, other dimensions of her thought take 
us in other directions. Paradoxically, her analysis actually 
encourages us to think hard about what role necessity and the 
plural forms of working activities have in human life. 
Remember that Arendt sets out to criticize how necessity has 
colonized the way human beings live together, and recall her 
critique of the relation between consumption and 
subjectivism. When read this way, Arendt wants to call us 
back to responsibility, engagement, questioning: she is after all 
one of the few political philosophers who attend to the 
openness of the future. What do we imagine when we imagine 
human activities independent of a tightly knit unity of 
production and consumption? This is what many later critical 
writers have asked: if we are not to imagine that all forms of 
work are necessary simply in their capacity of value-creation, 
then how are we to think about necessity and in what way 
does this challenge our notions of human and common life? 
(Gorz 1989, Marcuse 1968, Krisis Manifesto 1999) In other 
words: Arendt’s thinking could open up for a critical 
assessment of the relation between necessity, needs and 
society. What do people work for, what type of world does 
people’s work create, reproduce, or destroy?  
A central aim was to think through Arendt’s insistence that 
labor is the naturally fertile and endless process of life itself, 
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while work produces a world of permanence and familiarity. 
Another distinction I wanted to scrutinize was that between 
the social and the political. We saw that her argument rests on 
a contrast between reproduction and world-building activities, 
along with the expressive realm of politics.  
Why is this line of thought at all noteworthy? The reason is 
this: it is not easy to think clearly about necessity when the 
reigning common sense is that expansion of jobs and 
consumption is an ineluctable necessity, the condition of 
society and welfare. Secondly, in Arendt’s writings one can 
also detect an evaluative attitude that props up already 
existing hierarchies of values where certain forms of 
labor/work are seen as less important or valuable, even 
though it is acknowledged that someone has to perform these 
tasks. In this hierarchical setting, the image of labor that yields 
no permanent results appears. To articulate this image with 
Arendt’s vocabulary: some forms of labor support the basic 
functions of life. They need to be done, somehow, by someone 
because of the very tangible, but dark and private world of 
basic human needs. One can speak about a nexus of images of 
labor, necessity and nature here that often take the form of a 
defense of work in contrast to labor and here we see Arendt’s 
shadowy distinction at play in common rhetorical patters: the 
lives of creative people should not be consumed by basal 
chores; such tasks can be performed by others so that these 
people have enough time to dedicate their lives to their 
important work. Labor is futile reproduction, while 
productive work contributes to the progress of humanity or 
the creative development of the individual. Thus, the question 
one may want to fire at Arendt’s argument is this: do we really 
want to agree that there is a world of acting, supported by a 
world of making, on the one hand, and a private and closed 
world of life processes and needs, on the other hand? Like 
Wendy Brown one can ask what such a distinction leads to, 
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what kind of hierarchies it re-produces: what does it make us 
see and what does it make us look away from?  
The question articulated in The Human Condition is one that 
can’t be sidestepped: if necessity is described as a burden, 
what would it mean to be free from this burden? One of the 
things Arendt can teach us is that there are many ways to 
deceive oneself about necessity or about liberation from it. She 
writes that a worrying sign of the predominance of animal 
laborans is that the need for labor has lessened due to 
mechanization and innovations in the division of labor, but 
this is a truth which we won’t take to heart. We live in a labor 
society in which there is not enough labor to make people 
satisfied, Arendt gloomily writes (1998, 134). Ultimately, her 
point is that no laboring society could answer to human 
potentiality. The conclusion seems to be that the expansion of 
what she calls the life processes can be understood from the 
point of view of the distrust and the hopelessness the 
jobholder society reveals under the surface of the apparent 
optimism of the consumer society and its solid-seeming belief 
in growth and expansion. The irony she gets at is, I think, that 
no amount of labor/work could satisfy the jobholder society. 
This observation is a crucial one: at the same time that many 
people dream of the end of work (the golden days of 
retirement, the possibility of working part-time, a year off, 
etc.), everything that departs from full-time employment just 
as often appears to be a an unsettling prospect. In what 
follows, I will repeatedly return to the issue of why leisure 
appears as a threat, as something unsettling, and how this 
reveals several tensions in how we relate to work.  
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Chapter 2: The work critics 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter grapples with a tendency to think of freedom in 
terms of freedom from an imposed system of work. The image 
of freedom from is common within political philosophy. A 
negative formulation of freedom, defined as freedom from 
external constraint and interference dominates Anglophone 
political philosophy. Drawing on Isaiah Berlin’s classical essay 
“Two Concepts of Liberty” (Berlin 1969) one can conclude that 
the idea of freedom as freedom from external constraint has a 
long history. For the classical Anglophone political 
philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Mill), who all agreed that 
unlimited freedom was impossible, the challenge was to 
define what kind of curtailment of freedom any functioning 
society requires.26 Here, freedom means not to be tampered 
with, and for these philosophers, an eternal haggling process 
between the sphere of freedom and other values (justice, 
equality etc.) must be assumed. The content of freedom cannot 
be settled but the limits and boundaries of it can be staked out. 
One topic emerges as the central question of political 
philosophy: what type of restrictions of freedom can be 
considered justified? As Berlin points out, this image rests on 
an individualistic understanding of human beings (1969, 123-
7): society is seen as external. 
One is thus free when nobody stops one from doing what 
one wants to do. A version of the image of freedom from 
coercion and domination appears in very diverse political 
contexts. I will discuss a group of thinkers for whom I have 
                                                          
26 It has been pointed out to me that this may not be that clear. Locke (1980, § 
22 & 57) and Mill (1978, 12) both talk about freedom and the limits of freedom 
in a way that goes beyond depicting freedom as ‘doing whatever I want’.   
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chosen the label ‘work critics’. Among these I will focus on 
Herbert Marcuse and André Gorz who, for all their 
differences, share some interesting similarities with regard to 
how they view freedom from a society dominated by wage 
labor. The writers I call work critics dissect the system of work 
in capitalism and they investigate what bearing that system 
has on life. These two writers explicitly theorize work through 
the dichotomy between coercion and freedom, and both 
question dominant ideas about what necessary work amounts 
to. I set out to explore what these writers mean by ‘coercion’ 
and what they consider freedom from it to be. I will show that 
both Marcuse’s and Gorz’s projects are riddled with 
conceptual confusion and tensions with regard to how the role 
of technology is understood. The bottom line in my critique is 
that even though their conceptual framework does not 
succeed in giving a clear image of what they see as coercion, 
their respective analyses incite crucial questions about work, 
domination, society, potentiality and free time.  
Even though, as we saw, thinkers from Aristotle onwards 
define work as a constraint on our lives that stands in 
opposition to the free life of politics and contemplation, I want 
to argue that new aspects of the idea of work as 
compulsion/coercion arise in connection with wage labor, a 
formally free contractual relation, and yet a system in which it 
is – generally speaking – true to say that most of us must work. 
These aspects are dealt with in critical accounts of work 
arguing that coercion can be seen as a very fundamental 
relation within capitalism, but also in attempts to formulate a 
perspective on good work: what is good work if it is not 
coercion? For many philosophers since the 19th century, the 
challenge has been to elaborate a concept of work 
disentangled from the necessity to produce, the necessity of 
making money, or the necessity of earning a pay-check. This 
has been done on several levels of abstraction, but one striking 
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example is how Marx in his early writings – in the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts he espoused his famous ideas 
about alienation – emphasizes that the essence of human work 
is that humans continue to work even when material 
circumstances make it unnecessary. The alienation of the 
worker in capitalism is expressed among other things by work 
becoming a repulsive activity which the worker, who feels free 
only outside work, engages in only because of external 
compulsion: s/he works in order to live. Like Hegel, the young 
Marx saw work (which is here production in a very wide 
sense) as a lasting transformation of the world, and he also 
perceived work as a realization of human potential; work is an 
essential activity of life (Marx 1992a, 326-9, Kitching 1988, 21-
2). The question for many philosophers then becomes whether 
we can imagine a working activity not driven by necessity or 
external coercion. The Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts, an 
early essay by Marx, was first published in 1932 and the 
publication sparked an interest in his early ideas. Writers 
associated with the humanistic branch of Marxism prevalent 
in the fifties and sixties – György Lukács (1971), Herbert 
Marcuse (1968) and Erich Fromm (2004), among others – drew 
on this text in order to bring out the dignity of work that is 
distorted by the present system of capitalism. These thinkers 
were at pains to articulate a notion of non-alienated work and 
productivity in ways that orthodox historical materialism or 
structuralism could not accommodate (cf. Schacht 1970, 
Fromm 2004, Marcuse 1969). These writers shared the idea 
that alienation is not a mere economic relation. By way of the 
concept of alienation, they analyzed the relation between 
human beings and work and also the relations between 
humans: these discussions were often geared at disclosing the 
good possibilities of work. Within this heterogeneous tradition 
and in the many variations of Critical Theory (these overlap) 
liberation from the coercive and disciplinary system of work 
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was a predominant theme. Marcuse is perhaps one of the most 
famous representatives of this tradition, but a critical scrutiny 
of work is elaborated more methodically by the French 
philosopher and journalist André Gorz, whose thinking is a 
form of existentialism and who was suspicious of the idea of 
non-alienated work and the idea of work as the potential of 
human beings.  
That the image of freedom from the coercion of work is 
intelligible to a certain extent can be seen if we consider the 
fact that most of us are dependent on jobs for our subsistence 
and that one of the significant present debates concerns the 
relation between the individual, work and society. What 
purposes does work serve and what impact does wage labor 
have on our lives? Does work make us free and independent? 
If so, what sort of life do we imagine? What is the relation 
between paid jobs and the plural forms of work that, 
regardless of the economic circumstances, need to be done? As 
soon as one enters the debate, it is clear that freedom is a 
fiercely contested concept (see Introduction); these 
controversies are discernible in discussions about work. When 
discussions about work are sparked we need to get clear about 
which aspects of work are focused on, and why that particular 
dimension of work is emphasized. This is significant because 
debates about work typically involve conceptual muddles in 
which it is not clear what is talked about: examples of such 
muddles will abound in this chapter. 
What does freedom mean within a culture that thinks of 
itself as having achieved the basic forms of freedom? This 
concern is central in debates about work: which types of 
freedom are most important when we talk about work? One 
thinker who has based almost his entire philosophy on this 
question is Herbert Marcuse. As a follower and colleague of 
Horkheimer and Adorno (he was also Heidegger’s student), 
Marcuse probed into the workings of a technologically highly 
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developed mass society: we seem to be free and our daily lives 
have been made more comfortable than ever, but from a 
different point of view, we are enmeshed in a society of work 
and consumption – a complacent affluent society crippled by 
its many forms of repression where work has more to do with 
domination than basic needs. Marcuse suggests that this is not 
an inescapable predicament. He advances the possibility of a 
society free from labor as domination. Technological 
rationality has a certain shape in capitalism, but technology 
can have a different role. Even though I am not satisfied with 
his contrasting image of work as free play, I think Marcuse’s 
approach exposes complexities having to do with the role of 
work as an overarching system. This aspect is focused on by 
André Gorz, who tries to pin down what this structural aspect 
of work consists in and what freedom from it would mean. 
This is the point of connection for these otherwise rather 
different thinkers. Both set out to advance an alternative to 
what they see as a society dominated by one-dimensional 
rationality.  
This chapter has three parts. In the first section (2.1-2.5) I 
write about the image of work on which Gorz and Marcuse 
draw: work is situated in a gigantic societal apparatus which 
colonizes our lives. A pivotal tenet of theirs is that work is 
socialized as a functionalized unit. This functionalization 
allegedly implies subordination. By means of a discussion 
about how they elaborate work as domination and division of 
labor, I point out conceptual problems in this view of work as 
functions. In the second part (2.6-2.7), I present the problem of 
freedom as it is stated by Gorz. He contrasts autonomy – a 
realm of freedom and autonomy – with what he calls 
heteronomous work. I find his thinking politically pertinent in 
its critique of commodification, but the articulation of the 
opposite of wage labor is too entangled with the image of a 
compulsory system and it is based on the rather pessimistic 
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idea that true freedom consists in increasing something good 
(autonomous activities), while reducing the heteronomous 
work that by its very nature cannot offer people freedom. I 
argue that Gorz’s concept of functionality contains a muddled 
understanding of what he is rejecting. On a more positive note, 
I suggest that Gorz and Marcuse are right in saying that the 
concept of freedom cannot be settled once and for all, that it is 
immersed in tensions with regard to how contrasting images 
of wage labor and a society dominated by work are drawn. 
This point is exemplified in the third part (2.8) through a 
discussion about basic income. This debate reveals the 
political stakes involved in conceptions of work as domination 
along with attempts to imagine lives less colonized by wage 
labor and the fluctuations of the labor market. 
2.2 Work and society 
Arendt argued that freedom is not the result of a process we 
can control. In the last chapter, I talked about how she 
conceives of labor and work as spheres of life that are 
presuppositions for the human potential for freedom. As we 
saw, her concept of freedom was an unusual one: for her, 
freedom is connected with politics, action and plurality, rather 
than with an inner sphere, or a mental faculty. In “What is 
Freedom?” she boldly contends that almost the entire history 
of philosophy has distorted the concept of freedom as it has 
been construed as an inner sphere (2006b). As my discussion 
about Arendt’s distinction between freedom and necessity 
revealed, she is also skeptical of the idea that freedom is 
simply freedom from necessity, what she calls ‘liberation’. Still, 
Arendt’s ideas align with a long tradition in philosophy in 
which necessity and freedom are conceptualized as two 
incompatible spheres; one could even say that Arendt’s 
distinction between liberation (freedom from) and freedom 
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radicalizes that idea. As we saw, despite the sinister aspects of 
some of her arguments about necessity, the merit of her view 
is that she does not regard freedom as an automatic result of a 
specific historical situation.  
I think this point should be taken seriously. It is tempting 
to think that the modernization of society (economic growth, 
market liberalism and evolution of societal institutions) has 
increased the space for freedom and politics – the idea that, 
finally, we are in charge of our own lives. The standard of 
living has improved considerably and people have plenty of 
time for leisure, as working hours – in some specific countries, 
that is – are thoroughly regulated. People now have the skills 
and resources to re-shape society. One of the main points in 
Herbert Marcuse’s book One-Dimensional Man (first published 
in 1964) is that the general conviction that we are free is a form 
of deception. It is just that this idea is not completely wrong 
either. His idea could be unpacked like this: Humans have 
gained several forms of freedom. For many, work is no longer 
physical toil. People spend more time on leisure activities than 
before and the standard of living for many (but not all) people 
in the West is satisfactory. The argument continues: these 
forms of freedom from brute necessity lull us into the 
conception of being self-managing, even though we are not. 
The working class no longer experiences the situation as 
unbearable. Instead, people are generally satisfied. Satisfaction 
glosses over the domination that work still exerts over our 
lives, even though domination no longer takes the form of 
physical toil (cf. Marcuse 1968, 1969).  Marcuse calls this one-
dimensional thinking, the most central trait of which is its 
constant affirmation of the status quo. This is the starting 
point for several thinkers. Here I will focus on Marcuse and 
Gorz, two writers interested in the dynamics between work, 
coercion, control and freedom. 
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One could argue that critique of work has existed for a very 
long time. The classic Greek thinkers are frequently rendered 
as forerunners of a modern debate about work (cf. Anthony 
1977). Marcuse and other philosophers critical of work as 
wage labor make contributions to a discussion that has been 
going on for several hundred years (or at least since Marx): in 
what way is work as wage labor immersed in what we think 
of as society and in what ways has a coercive system of work 
emerged? One strand in this debate that originated in the late 
19th century (with Paul Lafargue’s The Right to be Lazy (1883)) 
is a critique of the idea that work in the form of wage labor is a 
right, that every human being has the right to employment. 
According to several critical voices, such a defense of the right 
to work confirms and contributes to a stabilization of the 
present system of wage labor and thereby commits itself to 
status quo: work is the basic form of income and it is in the 
interest of everyone to have a job. A system built on coercion 
comes to look like a system based on the universal eagerness 
and willingness to work (cf. Paulsen 2010, 48-9).  
That work should be regarded as an aspect of society is not 
self-evident at all. That a society is well-organized and that 
there is a sophisticated division of labor need not have 
anything to do with work in the sense familiar to us now – 
work as wage labor. We can imagine very different societies in 
which work is in some sense shared, or societally distributed. 
In Capital, Marx shows that the division of labor is socially 
organized in a very specific sense as it is transformed into wage 
labor on which people are dependent for their daily 
subsistence, as farming, craft work etc. turn into wage labor. 
People must be compelled to work for money instead of 
working for themselves and in addition to this, workers must 
double as consumers. Private ownership and the state are the 
basis for this specific type of societal work (cf. Marx 1990, 165, 
272). This hegemonic form of work implies drastic changes: 
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the product of work is a collective process, rather than an 
individual achievement, and the instruments of work are not 
owned by the worker. This transformation implies that wage 
labor is a mediated process revolving around commodities. 
Critics of work argue that wage labor introduces a new form of 
compulsion that needs to be exposed precisely as coercion – 
their point thus counteracts the ideological image of freely 
chosen, contractual work.  
Critics of work have drawn on many different sources 
(economics, social theory, feminism and philosophy) and 
more importantly they have imagined very diverse 
alternatives to wage labor.  Two main forms of critique can be 
mentioned for the purposes of the present chapter. The first 
form is the primary topic of this text; society is organized 
around wage labor so that shared life comes to appear as an 
apparatus over which we have no control. In a society where 
productivity and automation increase, it is strange that wage 
labor largely remains an unquestioned component of the life 
of society; the ideal of full employment for everyone is an 
insistent one, these critics argue. This is a society with the aim 
of creating jobs but the unsolvable question in an age of 
increasing automation is what these jobs are to be. Endless 
growth is typically criticized by these writers. The second form 
of critique, merely hinted at here, concerns the disciplinary 
side of laboring society: workers are made docile through 
various disciplinary techniques and through ideologies of 
work (cf. chapter 3). In many cases, the two forms of critique 
are closely connected.  
It is essential to see how the tradition of critique of work 
responds to a specific historical situation and the roles wage 
labor occupies. Marcuse and Gorz both set out to dissect a 
society where paid work is the predominant source of 
subsistence, a society of mass unemployment and developing 
technology, but also a society of relative wealth. Gorz, who 
116 
 
published his last books in the late nineties, discussed the 
dismantling of the welfare state, declining economic growth 
and the changes in employment that a system of just-in-time 
production, i.e. the system of production based on strict 
reduction of inventory and innovations in the organizational 
structure, implies. These two writers can also be said to take 
part in a broader discussion about technical innovations and 
the implication for ‘the end of work as we know it’ (Rifkin 
1995, Aronowitz & DiFazio 2010) and a crisis of work (cf. 
Sennett 1998). Gorz’s writings have had a significant influence 
on critical attempts to outline the changes wage labor go 
through in an era dominated by Fordism and the welfare state 
– by ‘Fordism’ I mean mass production and consumption, the 
system of rationalized work, relatively high wages and easy 
credit (cf. Aronowitz & DiFazio 2010, 27-8) – on the one hand, 
and a historical situation characterized by deregulation, 
precarious work and knowledge work on the other hand. In 
the latter, capitalism obtains an increasing freedom of 
movement – freedom from national ties, governments take 
booming business to be the primary concern of society etc. – 
and the company is increasingly dependent on networks of 
subcontractors, a tendency that strengthens the tendency of 
precarization (cf. Gorz 1999, Granter 2009). For all their 
generalizations and exaggerated conclusions, Marcuse and 
Gorz (and similar critics) make us attend to the changing 
meaning of wage labor.  
2.3 Work as subordination 
Writers who can all be said to belong under the wide heading 
Critical Theory27 (of the Frankfurt school and beyond: 
                                                          
27 It is important to keep in mind that Critical Theory contains disagreements 
and that it changed during its active years (from about 1930 to 1970) from a 
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Horkheimer, Adorno, Arendt, Bloch and Marcuse) make the 
following type of point: the Enlightenment project – 
enlightenment as the interrelation between science, technology 
and society, a project of domination and liberation from 
mythological thinking – seems like a project of freedom. It 
bears the promise of freedom in which we are our own 
masters. They describe a dialectic relation between power and 
powerlessness, mastery and subjection. The present state 
seems like a realization of this promise where human being 
take charge of and dominate nature and where human 
potentialities are gradually realized as a rational use of 
technology develops. This project, the project of dominating 
nature, has, they argue, turned out to become, it has revealed 
itself as a project of domination of human beings, and thus the 
true potential of freedom is quenched. Abnegation and 
adaptation to the apparatus are the sinister truth of the 
ideology of progress and freedom. They criticize the idea that 
technology is autonomous and that its functions can be 
explained without regard to society. They also reject the idea 
that society should adapt to the requirements of technology 
(cf. Feenberg 1999, 77).28 The project of Rationality that seemed 
                                                                                                               
more Marxist view of political economy to thinking about administrative 
society and mass culture (cf. Kellner 1989).  
28 This image of freedom as control over nature is prominent in the writings of 
Friedrich Engels, who claims that mature capitalism has broken down the 
obstacles to freedom through mastery of nature. For him, freedom is not 
freedom from natural laws but rather, freedom is knowledge and control of 
these laws. In Anti-Dühring, he writes: “Freedom therefore consists in the 
control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on 
knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore a product of historical 
development.” (1947, 69) The capitalist mode of production is collapsing 
because of its contradictions, and the full development of the forces of 
production will abolish class society. Building on the technical development 
of the present society, a new mode of production will evolve. We become 
masters over our own societal relations and are no longer ruled by alien forces 
(1970, chapter 3).  
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to be about freedom and liberation turned out to be a project 
of violence and power. Thus, they point out tensions within 
this project of freedom. 
The entire tradition of Critical Theory revolves around a 
questioning of instrumentalization and many of these writers 
contest the idea that technology is a neutral force.29 
Technology is not reducible to machines – technology is social 
relations. They posit technology and work as sites of social 
struggle and class conflict in a society where exchange 
governs almost all social relations. As Marcuse maintains: 
instrumental reason is not the neutral, rational, society-
building faculty it is taken to be: it is unruly and opaque, 
rather than a rationally governed instrument. Instrumental 
reason transmutes from a force directed at nature into a tool of 
power over other people (Marcuse 1968, 1969). Work is 
immersed in an apparatus consisting of administration and 
technical rationality, in which we all must take part.  
For all the critique of technology, Marcuse’s position is 
puzzling. Even though the main trail is that violence and 
power relations are built into technology and institutions, he 
also develops ideas about time now being ripe for 
fundamental change. Here, he leans on an argument about 
scarcity having been overcome and a confident conviction that 
automation will free people from the apparatus of wage labor, 
if only we can break the spell of the domination of capitalist 
(ir)rationality. The idea that time is now ripe for change is 
stated rather often in Marcuse’s writings. He assumes that at 
some point in history, oppression was necessary because of 
scarcity. Even though he is critical of technology and progress, 
                                                          
29 Jürgen Habermas is an exception. Even though he criticizes 
instrumentalization, he claims that technological reason is always about 
control, that technology derives from instrumental action itself, and that the 
main concern in our lives is not to let this type of rationality colonize other 
spheres of life (cf. Feenberg 1999, 156-9). 
119 
 
he simultaneously holds the view that human beings have 
finally conquered nature (1969, 3, 88, 110, 152). Curiously, he 
concludes that the ‘conquest of scarcity’ is completed and that 
the project of dominating nature can be abolished. He would 
then argue (like Engels) that it is the power relations of 
capitalism that hold progress in check and that there is an 
ultimate, rational use of societal resources and technology, so 
that other arrangements such as industrial capitalism can be 
called ‘irrational’.30 Marcuse oscillates between two positions.  
(i) Technological development (automation, for example) 
has, in itself, provided the precondition for a new society.  
Advanced industrial society is approaching the stage where 
continued progress would demand the radical subversion of the 
prevailing direction and organization of progress. This stage 
would be reached when material production (including the 
necessary services) becomes automated to the extent that all vital 
needs can be satisfied while necessary labor time is reduced to 
marginal time. From this point on, technical progress would 
transcend the realm of necessity, where it served as the 
instrument of domination and exploitation which thereby limited 
its rationality [… ] (1968, 16)  
                                                          
30 Given that Marcuse historicizes human needs and given his remarks about 
the false consciousness of the affluent society, it is surprising that he posits a 
generalized concept of scarcity, generalized in the sense that his view makes it 
possible to ask whether a specific society has or has not overcome ‘scarcity’. 
Like Nicholas Xenos, I would ask: what perspective does the notion of 
‘scarcity’ presuppose; what origin does the generalized, supposedly trans-
historical, concept have? Xenos notes for example that this generalized 
‘scarcity’ is intertwined with an equally unspecific understanding of needs, 
according to which it makes sense to talk about ‘subsistence’ in general (1989, 
3). Xenos’ thesis is close to Marcuse’s own ideas: the concept of scarcity 
expresses a universalized experience of an affluent society in which ‘desire’ 
and ‘need’ are lumped together into a general concept of ‘want’. A brute 
rendition of this idea: I need an Iphone in the same way as I need food and air 
to breathe. This is very similar to one aspect of Marcuse’s culture critique in 
One-Dimensional Man.  
120 
 
In this quote, it seems as if the technological progress in itself 
opens up for a fundamental change so that the presupposition 
of liberation seems to be in place: necessity is abolished. That 
is, when this stage is reached, technology no longer 
necessarily implies domination. 
(ii) This society has made the possibilities of technology 
seem neutral and thus a myth has been created about 
inevitability. Marcuse and other critical theorists of technology 
have argued that certain groups take advantage of the 
appearance of neutrality and that they strive to uphold this 
appearance of an autonomously rational technical approach. 
Such apparent value-neutrality lends itself to the purposes of 
the ruling class (cf. 1968, 44, 132, 1969, 36, Feenberg 2010, 69, 
206). “Technocracy armors itself against public pressures, 
sacrifices community values, and ignores needs incompatible 
with its own reproduction and the perpetuation of its technical 
traditions.” (Feenberg 2010, 71)  
So on the one hand, Marcuse argues that we need to 
challenge a neutralization of technology (one-dimensional 
thinking in its prime!) and the false necessities that society 
revolves around. On the other hand his own thinking about 
change seems to presuppose precisely that kind of 
neutralization, especially when he argues that scarcity is not as 
grim as it used to be, which for him means that most forms of 
repression now lack material justification. By this he means that 
producing the necessities of life takes less time than before:  
Technology operates against the repressive utilization of energy 
in so far as it minimises the time necessary for the production of 
the necessities of life, thus saving time for the development of 
needs beyond the realm of necessity… (Marcuse 1969: 105) 
Marcuse does not seem to question the idea that there is a 
linear story about how the development of technology 
transforms general scarcity into general abundance – the idea 
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that there is “a necessary struggle with scarcity that will yield 
a future of abundance” (cf. Xenos 1989, 47). A similar form of 
tension as that which I detect in Marcuse’s thinking is 
recurring in debates about socialism: is socialism a new way of 
grasping the world of production, perhaps a new organization 
of activities perceived as fundamental and necessary, or is it 
merely a new form of distribution in the sense that private 
ownership is abolished but society continues to be built 
around large-scale production? (cf. Kitching 1988, 148-9) 
Marcuse’s oscillation indicates a tension within many kinds 
of critique of work revolving around a conception of a crisis of 
work. When I read Marcuse (and Gorz) I am lead to ask: what 
does it mean to claim that the world of work can be changed? 
What sort of ‘can’ is this? Does it mean that a change is 
technologically possible? In that case, what idea about 
technology is implied? A problematic (yet common) statement 
would be that productivity liberates people from toil and 
scarcity if the technological development is steered in the right 
direction (cf. Thompson 1983, 22).31 The danger of this idea is 
that technology is dissociated from its societal relations, it is 
thought of as a productive force to be steered.  
As we saw (1.8), Arendt argues that this idea about 
liberation from necessity is spurious if the setting is a society 
in which we can simply not imagine our lives in any other 
way than the present jobholder framework – she claims that 
this is the setting in which leisure becomes a ‘problem’ and all 
activities that are not jobs are reduced to hobbies. Technology 
itself does not, she advocates, possess what it takes to bring 
                                                          
31 Like Gavin Kitching, I want to emphasize that it is only in a very specific 
type of societal surrounding that it is possible to think about technological 
progress as something to ‘adapt’ society to or something to ‘steer’. This is a 
society of a specialized branch of engineering and R&D-departments who are 
dedicated to technological development and a society where production 
creates a great volume of products (Kitching 1988, 53-4). 
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freedom into human life. In a similar vein, Marcuse claims 
that automation tends to have a dangerously integrative effect, 
in other words, that work is now less toilsome so that people 
no longer see any reason to oppose it. Nonetheless, for him, 
technology is potentially liberating (1964). I interpret him as 
saying that productivity and automation are a wake-up call that 
could and should make us ask questions about what is the 
human result of such technical and organizational processes: 
what is saved, what is liberated, what is gained? To sum up: 
Marcuse, along with other critics of work, contests ways of 
normalizing and stabilizing the status quo. However, he is 
also prone to insist that his own proposals are realistic, that 
they are grounded in real technological progress. Here I see a 
tension.  
Beyond this tension, why is it so important for Marcuse to 
talk about domination? According to him, in the present 
society, work is a repressive and dominating principle that 
holds sway over human life so that people are now enslaved 
by a false sense of necessity. He suggest that what is needed is 
not only a change in attitudes towards technology, but also a 
change in the sense of what is necessary, which would mean, 
among other things, that the assembly line, weaponry and 
mass media would no longer make up the core of our culture 
(Feenberg 2010, 198-9, 202).  
Domination and one-dimensional thinking is a form of 
violence (which Marcuse calls ‘surplus-repression’) exercised 
and normalized in everyday life, in our working life, in 
consumption and in thinking – in the form of relations, habits 
and structures that reproduce capitalism and an efficiently 
functioning society. A charitable reading of what he says 
would be that violence is built into the apparatus of work and 
technology, and that this violence is exercised through 
apparent neutrality, which makes us act along – participate. 
This tendency can be seen in how nuclear power, the arms 
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industry, tourism (violent transformation of communities and 
nature) and the meat industry live on as branches of industry 
that are discussed with regard to their commercial prospects, 
rather than the effect they have on human beings and on the 
planet. The role such neutralizations have could help us make 
sense of Marcuse’s concept of domination and one-
dimensional thinking. As I said in the Introduction, 
neutralization of the form ‘this branch of industry offers 
employment to people who would not otherwise find a job’ is 
frequently taken to be the last and authoritative word in the 
controversies arising in, say, Finnish debates about the 
economic crisis and how it is to be prudently handled.  
To take the meat industry as a further example of 
Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensional thinking: critique of 
cruelty against animals – insufficient space for the animals, for 
example – is often repudiated by means of a frequently 
repeated story about the tough and competitive situation of 
the meat industry. When issues like insufficient space for the 
animals are discussed, the point of departure is taken for 
granted within this specific perspective. Voices appealing to 
animal welfare are made to look like challenges of the 
necessary state of affairs: the right for entrepreneurs to make a 
living. From that perspective, animal welfare is discussed so 
that gains and losses are taken to be an unshakeable 
framework and those are the factors that set the limits of what 
is possible: if animal rights claims are to have any weight, they 
must take into account that the meat industry is a hugely 
competitive branch of industry: therefore, space for the 
animals cannot be as generous as the entrepreneurs as persons 
perhaps would wish it to be. The bottom line is that the 
animals and the surroundings become assets to be used as 
efficiently as possible. Supposedly, there is simply no room for 
alternatives if the entrepreneurs want to stay afloat in the 
game. If one wants to keep being an entrepreneur in this 
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branch, there is no alternative to accepting the competition it 
involves. This may be what Marcuse has in mind when he 
talks about one-dimensionality and violence built into and 
normalized in everyday life (cf. 1969, 93-4, 150). Such 
examples about competition can shed light on what is meant 
by the concept of domination and a hegemonic rationality of 
quasi-necessity. 
This form of neutralization, in which production is to be 
sustained and consumption is to be maximized, reveals a 
complex relation between legitimizations and practice, a 
complexity Marcuse’s argument contains but which he does 
not articulate. A practice is built around this necessity and 
legitimizations of the practice reproduce what Marcuse sees as 
violence, the violence inherent in the status quo. The sinister 
nature of the example is that the quasi-necessity is made real, it 
is turned into praxis; it operates both as an array of forms in 
which the status quo is defended and as praxis. Towards the 
end of this chapter (2.8), I will return to the relation between 
legitimizations and praxis, that is, the relation between 
rhetoric and praxis, through a discussion about a concept of 
economic reason. I will point out that a separation between 
rhetoric and praxis can at times be called for. 
2.4. Gorz and Marcuse on work 
So what do Marcuse and Gorz say more specifically about 
work? Work critics like Marcuse and Gorz paint an image of 
work as firmly integrated in the organization of society. 
Unlike Arendt, they talk about wage labor, not a trans-historical 
concept of work.32 In Critique of Economic Reason Gorz writes 
about work as now being a matter of social integration – work 
                                                          
32 Critical writers often attack each other for deploying an ‘anthropological 
concept of work’. I don’t think ‘anthropological’ is the right word here, as 
what they seem to mean is a generalized or trans-historical concept of work. 
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belongs to the public sphere and it is not directly related to 
tasks we need to do in order to maintain our individual lives 
(Gorz 1989, 13-7). The following quote sums up Gorz’s 
position in his most clear-sighted mode:  
There can be no society, no life, without ‘work’, but not all 
societies and lives are based on work. Work and the work-based 
society are not in crisis because there is not enough to do, but 
because work in a very precise sense has become scarce, and the 
work that is to done now (sic) falls less and less into that 
particular category (1989, 153). 
What he says is, I think, that there are a lot of things that need 
to be done: the sick are to be treated, kids are to be educated, 
fires are to be put out, medicines need to be developed, public 
transportation is to be available. Gorz, who reminds us of the 
importance of defining what we mean by ‘work’, argues that 
work as wage labor is not primarily concerned with these 
needs. In the world of wage labor, it is completely intelligible 
that work can become scarce, even though tasks people regard 
as important abound, regardless of whether these necessary 
tasks are jobs or whether they are seen as ‘work’ at all. 
Quoting Max Weber, Gorz describes capitalist work as 
residing in a system of one-dimensional economic rationality 
where all other forms of rationality are stripped away (1989, 
18). He shares this point with Marcuse. The major change of 
industrialism was the transformation of work into calculable, 
quantifiable units. This process created a rift between work 
and the worker’s motivation; motivation is no longer 
embedded in the job itself but rather in some external factors 
(1989, 20). Industrialized society has turned into a gigantic 
machine which, instead of liberating people from toil 
(according to Gorz, this is the utopia of industrialism), makes 
people dependent. People are tied to the apparatus, as 
workers, or as unemployed people looking for a job. The point 
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made by thinkers like Gorz and Marcuse, but also by Marx, is 
that the significant transformation of work (for Marx it is 
crucial that work becomes a commodity) affects the entire life-
world of the worker. The functioning of corporations is 
dependent not only on investments, a prediction of demand 
and due payments of debts – to function, they need a stable 
environment of institutions, and the life of the individual must 
be organized in calculable ways (Gorz 1989, 21, 31). This, then, 
is how ‘domination’ is spelled out more specifically in relation 
to work. 
Like Gorz, Marcuse holds that wage labor can be seen as 
coerced. In his psycho-analytically inspired book Eros and 
Civilization (1955) he argues that instead of fulfilling human 
potentiality, a historically specific combination of 
administration, work and technology unleashes destructive 
and aggressive forces. Society, here, is synonymous with what 
Marcuse calls repression and domination (1969, 35; 81-3, 110-
1). Society, organized around competition and economic 
performance, is antagonistic and dependent on control 
exercised in work relations. People are dependent on work as 
most of their needs are fulfilled by paid labor but for all that 
people imagine themselves to be self-managing. This 
conviction conceals that people work not for themselves but 
for a societal apparatus over which they have no control, 
“which operates as an independent power to which 
individuals must submit if they are to live” (1969, 45).  
Not only do people sell labor time, also free time is molded 
by the commodification of work (1969, 47-8). Marcuse 
scrutinizes the form of freedom that appears as part-time 
freedom, freedom as a certain amount of hours people have at 
their disposal. As Henri Lefebvre, another Marxist critical of 
work, points out in Critique of Everyday Life (the three volumes 
were published in 1947, 1961 and 1981): leisure should not be 
glorified as freedom. What characterizes leisure is often that 
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we understand it as a break from work. Like Marcuse, he 
defends the idea that it is not only work that is alienating: 
alienation also takes the form of an attempt to liberate oneself 
from work by creating a zone of rewarding free time. A 
vicious circle appears. One works in order to have leisure and 
leisure is defined as a break from work (Lefebvre 2008, 34-40). 
Many work critics maintain that the free time people have 
tends to be corralled back into the laboring apparatus so that 
leisure is dependent on work and on a world of commodities. 
There is thus more to say about leisure than its simply being 
hours that people spend off duty. Marcuse and other critical 
theorists describe a sort of deadlock of modernity: people find 
work to be repulsive, but at the same time they are afraid of 
freedom and make do with the stunted hours of leisure. 
Marcuse and Gorz paint an image of work as a part of a 
smoothly running apparatus to which we can and must take 
up an external relation. They see work and consumption as 
imposed on us, as a rhythm of life we internalize. In Eros and 
Civilization, Marcuse tries to elucidate the totality of 
requirements society imposes on us. Every society, he says, 
requires domination of some sort; the individual is always 
dominated by society (he inherits this image from Freud). 
There is also a form of surplus repression which is not 
“indispensable for civilized human association”. Marcuse is 
inclined to carve out a limit beyond which (capitalist) 
domination is no longer necessary (1969, 37). In the essay 
”Freedom and Freud’s Theory of the Instincts” he defines 
domination as ”in effect whenever the individual’s goals and 
purposes and the means of striving for and attaining them are 
prescribed to him and performed by him as something 
prescribed.” (quoted in Kellner 1984, 165) As you will see, this 
characterization is strikingly similar to Gorz’s definition of 
heteronomous activities. Domination, then, is exercised as 
force, ideological thinking and restraint but it can also be 
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exercised as internalization (Kellner 1984, 165-7). Including 
everything on the scale from violent subjugation to 
unconscious patterns, domination becomes an extremely wide 
phenomenon. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse provides an 
account of how individuals are integrated into society as 
consumers, hard-working conformists or progressive 
individualists. A general concept of internalization is 
advanced to explain why people act in a docile and orderly 
way.33  
I would suggest that the risk is that this view of 
domination presupposes the idea that internalization is the 
only way people can relate to society, that wage labor (and free 
time) could be exhaustively and exclusively accounted for in 
disciplinary terms and that the same goes for consumption: as 
if all forms of consumption are dependent on false needs and 
commodification. The apparatus is understood to be so vast 
and all-encompassing that all avenues of escape are closed off 
and this ultimately makes it very hard to substantiate what 
this description would amount to in real life. Terry Eagleton 
writes:  
For Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno, capitalist society 
languishes in the grip of an all-pervasive reification, all the way 
from commodity fetishism and speech habits to political 
bureaucracy and technological thought. This seamless monolith 
of a dominant ideology is apparently devoid of contradictions – 
which means, in effect, that Marcuse and Adorno take it at face 
value, judging it as it would wish to appear (2007, 47).   
Drawing on Lefebvre (2008) and his notion of everyday life as 
the place where human life always resides, I would say that 
the major flaw of an all-out emphasis on domination and 
                                                          
33 In a similar way, Gorz maintains that technology can make life easier, toil 
can be reduced, but work is always separated from life and domination is 
always part of the story (over nature and over oneself) (1989, 87). 
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internalization is that it fails to take account of symptoms of 
discontent or forms of resistance – what Lefebvre sees as 
spontaneous expressions of critique in our everyday lives 
(2008, 40). One of his insights important very important for 
this thesis is that it is possible to view what people do or how 
people react as both a manifestation of alienation but at the 
same time as an expression of critique, real needs, a desire for 
another life. Bitterness is an example: ‘it will surely always be 
this way…’ If the desire for another life is not recognized, 
what makes bitterness of this kind so troubling is not seen. 
Work can be treated in its mode of repressive system, but the 
existential destructiveness of this repression will not be 
grasped if it is not situated in people’s daily lives which are, in 
an important sense, undetermined and thus impossible to 
reduce to an all-encompassing framework of domination. This 
is a point that lurks under the surface in Marcuse’s writings: 
after all, his description of the domination built into everyday 
life is a part of a project of showing that another society is 
possible. Taking everyday life as a point of departure in 
describing the roles of wage labor will be a prominent theme 
in what follows.  
To regard wage labor as domination could have a point, as 
we will see in chapter 5, in which I talk about abstractions of 
work to which all wage earners are potentially subjected. On a 
more specific level, one could talk about striking asymmetries 
of power in the world of work: there are aspects of coercion 
which one sees when reflecting on the very different 
bargaining positions of employee and employer.  
Let me mention one example of how a critique of work can 
start from everyday life, rather than an all-embracing concept 
of domination. Gorz and Marcuse imagine society as a 
basically one-dimensionally rational system, even though 
Marcuse goes to great length to reveal that the hegemonic 
rationality is a form of irrationality, a rationalization process 
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the outrageousness of which is exposed when understood in 
human terms (Feenberg 1999, 160-1). The question is whether 
such an analysis of the societal apparatus yields an 
exaggerated image of rational institutions and rationally 
organized work.  
Roland Paulsen has examined this description by means of 
an investigation of what he calls empty labor, the time an 
employee spends at the job doing other things than working, 
or doing nothing at all. He noted diverse forms of it: for some, 
not working was an outlet for frustration about the 
meaninglessness of the job, for others, it was a matter of 
getting away with minimal effort. Others needed a break from 
a hectic job. A significant observation is that in many cases 
empty labor is a result of there being too little to do. Idleness, 
in these cases, was enforced on the employees, even though 
they related to this idleness in different ways. Some felt they 
had to endure the situation, while others welcomed the 
opportunity to take it easy. What makes empty labor in all its 
forms so peculiar is that it is never done in the open. From 
this, a crucial point he makes is that no simple distinction 
could be drawn between resistance and adaptation. Should 
the bored web designer who is cyber-loafing on Facebook be 
seen as acting out hir resistance, or should this behavior rather 
be seen as a sign of resignation, or perhaps as a way of 
indulging in a few leisurely moments? (Paulsen 2012) A much 
more detailed story about the organization, hir attitude to hir 
job and the effort required by the position would have to be 
added, and even then the question is a very open-ended (and 
not empirically solvable) one. Here I would also say that a 
general account of internalization and adaption would not help 
us answer that question, even though the concept of 
adaptation may figure in an attempt to understand for 
example the employee who’s attitude is that of resignation – 
‘this place will never change…’. Paulsen shows that there may 
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be something questionable in the idea that either something is 
a real challenge of power, or it is a mere triviality. This is in line 
with what Lefebvre writes about the critique of everyday life. 
Paulsen’s investigation provokes the question: what are the 
existential circumstances of empty labor for a cashier, a web 
designer or a warehouse worker? What squandering of human 
efforts and resources do they imply? In a much more clear-
sighted way than Marcuse, Paulsen’s approach encourages us 
to attend to what is meant when efficiency and 
instrumentality are said to ‘permeate’ society. Empty labor 
reveals sides of work Marcuse and Gorz describe: the 
disciplinary aspect is strongly present when a person is simply 
required to be at a certain place, regardless of whether s/he is in 
fact needed there. This is domination in a very tangible way. 
The job-form trumps over the content and above all, the thing 
that makes the pivotal difference is whether one has a job, 
regardless of what the job involves. The phenomenon of 
empty labor evokes a more ambiguous image of the world of 
work than we find in Marcuse and Gorz. There are alternative 
ways of describing the history of capitalism than the familiar 
narrative about instrumentality, rationalization and control – 
was of resources and waste of people’s time is equally 
important. Marcuse is not blind to this aspect: after all, the 
writings I have quoted from circle around a constant shift 
between perceiving society as rational and seeing it as 
irrational, as in Marcuse’s denunciation of one-dimensionality. 
However, I would still not say that this move registers the rich 
flora of concepts related to waste: squandering, uneconomical 
behavior, carelessness, indifference, etc.34  
In what follows I will say more about the pessimism I have 
already hinted at here. Even though both Gorz and Marcuse 
on the face of it stand for radical thoughts about the liberation 
                                                          
34 For a penetrating text on waste see Hertzberg 1995. 
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of or the liberation from work, as it turns out, they harbor 
rather pessimistic thoughts about what such liberation could 
be. If the focus up until now has been on Marcuse, I will now 
turn to Gorz’s ideas. 
2.5 Division of labor 
Adam Smith (1974 [1776], book one, chapter 1) and Marx (1990 
[1867], chapter 13 & 14) both wrote about the division of labor, 
and it is obvious that their accounts are reactions to drastic 
historical changes in the work process. For Marx it was 
important to distinguish the division of labor and 
specialization that has developed within work and societies 
(people of a certain age or gender performing specific tasks, or 
systems of specialization or rules as in the medieval guilds) on 
the one hand, from division of labor as an aspect of capitalism 
as a versatile system that re-organizes work according to the 
logic of competition on the other hand. The quest for 
valorization (rather than technological necessity) drives the 
latter kind. Marx shows how capitalism absorbs and shapes 
cooperation in work, and one of the central issues he focuses 
on is the introduction of machines and the winding historical 
process in which the worker and the work process have to be 
adjusted to the needs of an unbroken process of work. There 
must be no disruption, no stops, no breaks in the process itself 
(this unbroken work system is also extended to work 
associated with circulation, repair and consumption) (1990, 
502). A central point of departure for Marx was that the 
gradual development of the capitalist system abolishes 
specialization: work becomes increasingly abstract and loses 
its character of performing a qualitatively specific task (cf. 
chapter 5). For him this capitalist division of labor coincides 
with the subsumption of labor under capital and in this sense 
it embodies power relations. For Marx the mechanization of 
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work poses a threat to the individual (who turns into an 
‘appendage to the machine’), but automation is also a positive 
phenomenon in that work becomes easier, more rational, and 
what he calls ‘craft narrowness’ is eliminated (cf. 1990, 487-8).  
One of the prevailing themes in the literature about work 
that can be found as early as in Smith and Marx is the impact 
of the division of labor on the workers. I will return to this in 
the last chapter (where I will discuss Sennett’s view of 
fragmentation of work), but already here I want to mention 
that this discussion has revolved around how work is split up 
into entities organized by an external management unit and 
not by the workers themselves. Writers critical of 
contemporary wage labor have assessed the organization of 
work, scrutinizing how work is divided and distributed. They 
regard wage labor as an aspect of society (and culture) that is 
in need of critical analysis, rather than seeing it as a concern 
for the individual looking for a job or a commercial concern of 
companies. Attacking the division of labor is connected with 
evaluating the transformation of wage labor I talked about, 
that work becomes a job for the individual while 
simultaneously forming a part of a socially orchestrated 
process. Gorz maintains that the division of labor reveals that 
work is increasingly socialized in the sense that it is no longer 
the exertion of the individual who strives to satisfy needs. 
Work is transformed into wage labor, a socially recognized 
function. Work becomes something people have rather than 
something they do (Gorz 1989, 24, 1999, 3).  
The reason why I introduce the division of labor is because 
that discussion throws light on what I have presented as the 
idea of work as a societal apparatus. Next, I will give yet 
another example of how the political pertinence of a 
discussion disappears because of a generalized treatment of 
themes that have a central place in critical analyses of wage 
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labor. Let me start with what I take to be a good treatment of 
division of labor. 
In Harry Braverman’s classic study Labor and Monopoly 
Capital (first published in 1974), the relation between 
Taylorism and the process of capitalist value-creation is 
investigated. Braverman analyzes Taylorism as a form of de-
skilling where work is structured so that management plans 
and organizes while the personnel on the floor executes these 
plans, which leads to a situation in which there is no room for 
judgment or skills.  
Thus, if the first principle is the gathering together and 
development of knowledge of the labor process, and the second is 
the concentration of this knowledge as the exclusive preserve of 
management – together with its converse, the absence of such 
knowledge among workers – then the third step is the use of this 
monopoly of knowledge to control each step of the labor process 
and its mode of execution (1974, 119). 
The worker is degraded into an executing function. This is just 
as true for the office worker as it is for the factory worker: both 
of these job types are part of a process of homogenization of 
wage labor. One of the merits of Braverman’s approach is that 
he shows how a Taylorist regime spreads to different sectors 
of work. Among other things, he shows how a dynamic 
process of profit-maximizing and changes within the work 
process itself create the preconditions for work being so de-
skilled that it becomes possible to move a factory from one 
part of the world to another (this would not have happened 
without other significant changes in the financial system) 
(Braverman 1974). This is an ongoing process we see as much 
now as when Braverman wrote his book. As the 
organizational theorist Paul Thompson (1983, 57) maintains: 
there have been many waves of deskilling. It appears in new 
ways in new forms of work – office work is one striking 
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example mentioned also in Labor and Monopoly Capital. A 
further strength of Braverman’s book is that he takes note of 
capitalism as a system dependent on expansion: new areas of 
life are connected with commodities and services. However, 
when one takes a look at some of the critical literature on 
work, it seems as if what is meant by ‘division of labor’ is 
something slightly different than the division of labor that a 
system of global capitalism engenders. The discussion at times 
seems to be about what work essentially is rather than a critical 
account of global injustices. Below, I will mention one instance 
of this tendency. 
Discussions about alienation and division of labor 
frequently have functionalization as their main target. Gorz 
argues that functionally defined work is done within an 
organization that determines the aims of the job. The worker 
may not always be aware of or have any deeper knowledge 
about these aims and perhaps s/he does not even need to in 
order to do a sufficient job. The job is defined by the pre-
established organization, so that productivity and profits 
structure the tasks at hand. External motivating factors are 
integral for the system to run smoothly: money, consumption 
and prestige make people work. The conclusion Gorz draws 
from these very different aspects is that work has become a 
means. Examples he mentions are the postal, rail and air 
networks but also industrial plants requiring a functional 
specialization (1989, 32-6). So far, one may say that the 
discussion takes place at a sociological level where the aim is 
to spell out worrying tendencies in the organization of work 
that turns the employee into a mere function, a cog in the 
machinery denied fundamental forms of responsibility. Gorz 
would agree with Lefebvre, who writes that the division of 
labor is imposed without the worker having clear knowledge 
of the system of which hir work forms a part. In some jobs, the 
employee doesn’t even need to have knowledge about the 
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wider context in order to perform the job satisfactorily. This is 
what rightly can be called domination: 
Therefore, for every individual, worker or expert, the division of 
labor is imposed from without, like an objective process, with the 
result that each man’s activity is turned back against him as a 
hostile force which subjugates him instead of being subjugated by 
him (Lefebvre 2008, 166).  
It is the next step that causes confusion. Gorz assesses 
functional behavior within an organization. According to him, 
this conduct is rationally programmed, attaining results 
irrespective of individual intentions. His point is that this is 
unavoidable within certain fields of work and that this has 
consequences for how we should think about work and 
liberation: 
For, in order to function, the industrial-bureaucratic 
megamachine requires a subdivision of tasks which, once put into 
effect, is self-perpetuating and has to be self-perpetuating by 
inertia, if the functional capacity of each of its human cogs is to be 
made reliable and calculable. […] It is strictly impossible 
subsequently to reinterpret this functionalization of hetero-
determined activities in terms of voluntary social collaboration 
(1989, 42-3).  
Gorz wants to make it absolutely clear that if an organization is 
to run as a smooth, functional, efficient system, there can be no 
room for self-organization. He writes that the effects of 
alienation can be ameliorated, but they can never be fully 
eliminated (cf. Granter 2009, 122). But it is not that Gorz claims 
that cooperation is always alienating; what he says is rather 
that this type of work does not allow for cooperation in the 
sense of self-organization. He seems to think that this 
characterizes the division of labor in itself and that it stems 
from the nature of (industrial and functional) work, rather than 
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from the specific arrangement of work and technology within 
capitalism. 
The division of labor and knowledge into fragmented but 
complementary technical skills is the only means by which it is 
possible to accumulate and put to work the huge stocks of 
knowledge embodied in machines, industrial systems and 
processes of every scale and dimension 1982, 100).   
Which are the reasons invoked? Firstly, he appeals to the 
process of work in industry. It will always be a matter of men 
serving machines or the management crew. Allegedly, the 
work process can be humanized in several ways, but it will 
never be man’s sovereign action – Gorz seems to regard 
sovereignty as the most important dimension of human life. 
He denies that refinery work, work in a rolling mill or driving 
a train could be anything else than wage labor characterized 
by subordination (1989, 52-4). He claims that the economic 
development tolerated no other form of work than strictly 
quantifiable, predictable pieces of work that don’t rely on the 
worker’s own non-formalizable knowledge. This is a point 
Marx also makes in his own way. What is puzzling is that 
Gorz nonetheless seems to perceive this as an irreversible 
progress of industrialization itself. This aspect of work persists 
no matter what (cf. 1989, 56-7). 
The second reason he offers is that certain types of work are 
specialized according to macro-social patterns, which means 
that a specific working activity has no meaning in itself, but 
only in combination with other activities. Unlike Braverman, 
he does not, at least not primarily, have Taylorism, the process 
of fragmenting the work process into strictly defined tasks, 
thus making it more controllable, in mind. Instead, he talks 
about the industrial process and that it is necessarily divided 
into a complex network of know-how as it is dependent on a 
massive scale of specialized knowledge. Such complex 
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networks cannot, Gorz says, be handled by means of 
voluntary, self-regulated and conscious cooperation.35 For 
him, this implies that all forms of grand-scale planning require 
a negation of freedom. The idea seems to be that planning and 
cooperation do not function if people engage only in what 
they like to do the most. He mentions the example of 
assembling a bike: an enormous set of skills, machines and 
processes are involved in this seemingly simple enterprise 
(1989, 55).  
Already here I want to make clear that I find the contrast 
between the voluntary and the network of specialized 
relations suspicious: that my work is dependent on the work 
of others in itself says very little about troubling restrictions of 
freedom. In this case, Gorz’s concept of freedom fails to take 
issue with what he in the end seems to be concerned about 
and that he articulates strongly in his earlier books (cf. Gorz 
1975, 93): powerlessness, humiliation and the domination a 
division of labor in capitalism leads to. Here, the focus is upon 
showing that in this destructive setting, the possibility of 
wanting to do the job is undermined. For all the formal 
freedom of wage labor, it makes sense to talk about forced 
work. His later claims entrenches the view that all forms of 
work must be un-free because all jobs are dependent on social 
relations. However, my main line of critique has to wait until 
section 2.7 (and some of this discussion is delayed until 
chapter 6). Gorz remarks about specialized networks have an 
appearance of common sense: it is often hard to imagine 
somebody doing most of the things that one does in a job 
                                                          
35 Spontaneity in the form of doing what one likes is one aspect of Gorz’s 
concept of freedom; self-organization and sovereignty are two others. When 
reading him, it is not always easy to know which of these he is emphasizing, 
and how they are related to each other – it is for example very easy to imagine 
a case of disciplined forms of self-organized work that require that people do 
not give in to momentary impulses or whims.  
139 
 
outside of that context, at least if we think about what the jobs 
of an accountant, a lawyer, a factory worker or a sales 
manager require. These jobs are embedded in a rich context of 
relations and institutions structured around paid work and 
commodities. The problem is just that it is hard to give any 
substance to this rather trivial point, especially if Gorz urges us 
to look at complexity in itself, that, as he says, jobs are 
socialized tasks dependent on macro-social functions. What 
depends on his observation about interrelated tasks and 
functions, beyond the quotidian fact that work is structured 
around complex networks and that very few jobs are 
independent of what others do? That some jobs are parts of a 
composite process with many steps seems like a self-evident 
truth rather than an insight that helps us think more clearly 
about work as subordination. Gorz’s generalizations make 
him draw hasty conclusions: he loses sight of the specific 
contexts in which it makes sense to talk about subordination. 
The problem with work under capitalism does not at all stem 
from the fact that work requires complex networks of 
cooperation or that there is somebody in charge of the project 
who knows more about the process than those involved. Marx 
writes: 
All directly social or communal labor on a large scale requires, to 
a greater or lesser degree, a directing authority in order to secure 
the harmonious co-operation of the activities of individuals, and 
to perform the general functions that have their origin in the 
motion of the total production organism, as distinguished from 
the motion of its separate organs (quoted in Sayers 2011, 151). 
As Sean Sayers points out, Marx sees this as a technical 
necessity with no special implications for a person’s consent or 
freedom: freedom is not compromised by work being 
characterized by cooperation (2011, 151-2). Descriptions of 
subordination must have their point of departure elsewhere – 
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what Braverman describes, for example, is subordination not 
regarding an underlying form of freedom, but rather the 
specific hazards of de-skilling and the specific power relations 
within management-controlled Taylorized work. At best, one 
can see Gorz’s observation as a negative critique of traditional 
views within Marxist writings. One could then interpret him 
as saying that it is wrong to think that work becomes fulfilling 
and un-alienated if controlled by the workers. However, he 
seems to be making a further claim about freedom and 
division of labor: what he calls heteronomous work is here to 
stay, even though it clashes with individual freedom.36  
It is true that cooperation requires a refined system of 
division of labor because many projects are such that one 
person alone cannot handle them and work needs to be split 
up between people with the appropriate skills. This usually 
requires a certain level of centralized control and 
administration of the project. That need not have anything to 
do with disciplinary forms of domination and control of 
workers, nor does it necessarily take the shape of 
fragmentation of work and powerlessness (I will discuss that 
aspect at length in chapter 6). This makes it hard to see what 
the overarching framework of Gorz’s critique of work 
amounts to, and what he really has in mind when he sets out 
to probe the possibility of ‘abolishing work’. As we saw, he 
thinks that some forms of heteronomous work will always 
remain, and that there will thus be parts of our lives that 
remain unfree.  
                                                          
36 In Farewell to the Working Class it is obvious that he makes a very big claim: 
“As a structured system, society is necessarily external to its members. It is not 
the product of free voluntary co-operation. Individuals do not produce it by 
starting from themselves; they produce it on the ground of its own inert 
exigencies, adapting themselves to the jobs, functions, skills, environments 
and hierarchical relations pre-established by society to assure its cohesive 
functioning.” (1982, 76) 
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The problem with this discussion is that the terminology 
flounders. In Critique of Economic Reason Gorz discusses 
division of labor, specialization and fragmentation in one 
breath. In this sense, his reasoning aligns with a long tradition 
in which specialization is coupled with the stunted individual 
whose development is inhibited: 
Almost all trades and forms of labor presuppose a form of 
specialization which, while not necessarily being either narrow or 
stupefying, thwarts rather than fosters the full intellectual, 
physical, aesthetic, emotional, relational and moral development 
of the individual (Gorz 1989, 98). 
As a critical challenge of capitalism this doesn’t hold up: as 
Marx shows, the division of labor that turns the worker into 
‘an appendage to the machine’ is not the same as work being 
specialized, but rather, as I said, the way the quest for 
valorization (surplus-value) changes the division of labor. Nor 
does it do as a valid insight into soul-crushing, monotonous 
work, which is not his intention anyway, as is seen in the 
quote. His own formulation leads to the question what a 
thwarting of the individual’s development means if it is not 
connected with narrowness or stupefying work. Gorz’s 
treatment of specialization is in need of distinctions. For 
example, specialization in medicine is hard to use as an 
example of fragmentation or alienation. One would rather say 
that specialization is here structured around the emergence of 
a new field of expertise and that specialization expresses the 
changes in how diseases are treated and perceived. This is one 
example in which division of labor is related to conceptions 
and visions about developing and improving a field of work; 
new areas of work emerge, new tasks are seen as necessary to 
perform and to define. This may have nothing to do with a 
one-dimensional ideal of efficiency or a process in which work 
is fragmented into simplified operations as in the pin factory 
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Adam Smith holds up as an example of division of labor and 
its subsequent “increase of the productive forces of labor” 
(1974, 110). As Eliot Freidson says, one must remember that 
there are no natural whole tasks in work; when one talks 
about specialization one does so in relation to a notion of what 
the entire task is. One can think of surgery, administration, 
police work, baking or building a house. What specialization 
is will thus be a historical matter of perceiving a specific job as 
consisting of parts (2001, 37). Again, it is impossible to say 
anything general about work becoming a social process 
consisting of complex networks where specialized skills are 
required – be it building a ferry, assembling a mobile phone, 
going over the latest sales figures with the board or editing a 
journal. Everything hinges on what purpose specialization 
serves and the context in which it appears or is quenched. 
What the opposite of specialization is will depend on such 
contexts. I would agree with what Wittgenstein writes in 
Philosophical Investigations: what an element is will depend on 
how the context is perceived. There are no given ‘simples’ 
(2009, § 47). 
To sum up: the major shortcoming in discussions about 
division of labor is that diverse aspects of work are not 
differentiated: specialization of trades or occupations does not 
necessarily tell us anything illuminating about the 
fragmentation of tasks within a bicycle factory, a university, a 
shop or a hospital. The temptation, once again, is that hasty 
conclusions are drawn about work as a societal process. In 
other words: an assessment of monotonous work (or 
fragmentation or loss of control?) should not be conflated with 
a critique of occupations and specialization as such.  
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2.6 Gorz’s critique of work 
When Gorz criticizes contemporary work he does not limit 
himself to a critique of work as a network of functions over 
which the worker has no control. As I said, on another level, 
he takes issue with false hopes about meaningful work and a 
rational society. These are potentially valuable insights. In a 
world where wage labor is allegedly no longer the main 
productive force (he claims that machines are a more 
important productive force) and where permanent jobs for all 
are no longer possible, Gorz tries to convince us that we have 
to give up the utopia about employment for all (cf. 1989, 69). 
He also encourages us to give up some of our ideals of 
meaningful work that makes the human condition easier 
(1989, 88). In the same spirit, Marcuse claims that alienated 
work cannot be transformed into anything better. Even though 
he elaborated an ideal about non-alienated work (in Eros and 
Civilization he called this free play) his point is that the present 
system of work, as it is organized now, doesn’t change its 
character simply by being owned by the workers or some such 
change (1969, 105; 155-8). 
It is essential to make clear what political project Marcuse, 
Gorz and similar thinkers are committed to and I will first try 
to substantiate what I think is valuable in this type of critique. 
They wrote during a time when Marxism was on the top of the 
cultural agenda and the Soviet Union still existed. A skeptical 
approach to the glorification of work was offered as a 
counterweight to a glorification of productivity. Gorz is hostile 
to the idea (recurring in Soviet-friendly socialism) that the 
individual could be happily integrated into society by means 
of work, vaguely supposed to be based on free collaboration, 
even though in reality it is carried out within a gigantic 
network of industrial production. I assume that he thinks 
about the rhetoric of the humanist schools of management and 
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the enthusiastic proclamations of a new culture of work: from 
the middle of the 20th century onwards, management schools 
critical of mechanistic Taylorism devised a number of theories 
about how to best elicit the consent of the employees (cf. 
Anthony 1977, chapter 10, Braverman 1974). According to 
Gorz, the way voluntary collaboration is conceived in these 
theories and management methods emphasizing human 
interaction remains lofty: it takes little account of lived 
experience. Instead these management methods flatter 
themselves by pointing out the fact that collaboration is now a 
vital part of how work is organized, a progression towards a 
more humane workplace. Gorz charges them with stopping 
short at scrutinizing what collaboration means and the 
tensions that ideas about collaboration may contain. 
Chiapello’s and Boltanski’s discussion of management 
discourse in the nineties (in their The New Spirit of Capitalism) 
reveals an updated version of this idea about humanized 
work. By creating autonomous teams and by introducing new 
skills, blue-collar workers (especially) would be made to feel 
less 'alienated’ “because they become wholly responsible for 
some output, their work is thereby ‘enriched’, they are freed 
from authoritarian petty tyrants, and it is easier for them to 
obtain adjustments that facilitate the performance of their 
tasks” (2005, 82). According to Gorz, the positive-sounding 
stress on human interaction within management theories 
builds on the idea that employees are to take pride in a 
rationally organized whole. At the same time people are to 
think of themselves as independent persons (cf. 1989, 39-41).  
What I think Gorz gets right is that the ideal of humanized 
work can be stripped down to a contradictory ideal about 
rationalized work optimized by management methods 
cultivating the ‘social’ dimension of work along with a 
subjectivist conception about human interaction, the core of 
which is that the employee is to feel or experience hir work in a 
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certain way. This critique of ‘progressive’ management 
methods shows that Gorz doesn’t ignore the historical and 
economic reasons for his pessimism about work. Even though 
work has been ‘humanized’, and even though automation has 
gotten rid of many dangerous and monotonous tasks, an 
unambiguous ideal of collaboration or meaningfulness cannot 
be upheld. As Gorz’ shows, ‘humanization of work’ is a telling 
description. It is tacitly agreed that the need to make profits 
sets limits on what changes can be made, but within these 
limits, work can be humanized. Even when some effort has 
been made to make work more interesting, more stimulating 
etc., the economic logic that forces – or is claimed to force – 
firms to lay off workers is a sobering reminder of the ultimate 
power to decide, and thus a reminder of the frameworks of 
this allegedly free, social collaboration (1989, 64-6). My own 
position would be that it is with regard to these kinds of 
observations that it does make sense to talk about wage labor 
as domination: this observation about the ultimate power to 
decide reveals a troubling and structural form of 
powerlessness wage labor entails (cf. chapter 5). 
Like Marcuse, Gorz dismisses one-sided images of work 
and free time. In the beginning of Critique of Economic Reason, a 
question I think cannot be easily brushed aside is posed. As 
some forms of work take less time to finish, free time is 
released. This also goes for the unremunerated work of the 
household made more efficient by tools and machines. Home 
appliances, to take one example, save time for everybody. The 
promise of these time-saving technological innovations is that 
they make life easier for everybody when these machines 
become so cheap that most people can afford them. At best, 
time-saving technology co-exists with critical debates about 
what free time is and thus what a good consequence of time-
saving technology would be: 
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’Advances in technology’ thus inevitably pose the question of the 
meaning and content of free time; better still, of the nature of a 
civilization and a society in which there is far more free time than 
working time and in which, therefore, economic rationality ceases 
to govern everybody’s lives. (1989, 4)  
The crux is that free time is not distributed equally or fairly 
and this is seen in a polarized class society. Gorz contends that 
everyone doesn’t benefit from automation. A professional 
elite, dependent on the work of others (cleaners, nannies etc.) 
to release some free time, work as much as before, but this 
does not save time for the people, the cleaners and the 
nannies, earning a living on jobs transferred by this 
professional elite. Gorz paints the picture of a class society 
consisting of a professional elite, idealizing their hectic lives, 
the people who work for them in servant-like ways, and in 
addition to this, the abundance of people who have no job at 
all. In a situation where a large section of the population is 
unemployed or have precarious employments it is easy for the 
professional elite to buy cheap services as the labor market is 
structured around a core of workers and a periphery of more 
replaceable jobholders (1989, 5-7, 67). In the political rhetoric 
(say, in Finland in 2015), this system is justified by arguments 
about step-by-step entrance into the labor market and the 
structural need for low-wage jobs: these services, it is said, 
create jobs for people who need them.  
So, Gorz talks about free time as time that has been set free 
by increasing productivity, but in a class-society the potential 
of real freedom is not fulfilled, as the goal here is not freedom 
from wage labor for everybody. The meaning of free time is 
thus problematized; if free time is mainly a way to delegate 
the chores of the people of the professional elite who want 
their precious free time to be undisturbed by certain everyday 
activities to people who need the odd jobs they can find to 
earn a living, then this ‘freedom’ is immersed in unequal 
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employment relations. In this case free time is transformed 
into ‘job opportunities’ for somebody else; free time is firmly 
integrated in work-centered society. One of Gorz’s main 
contentions is that we can imagine free time less immersed in 
the sphere of work. This dimension of free time can only be 
recognized insofar as we break away from economic 
rationality, where the main purpose of free time is to generate 
new jobs (1989, 92; 94). This claim is, I think, a serious 
indictment of what Arendt calls a laboring society, a society 
revolving around subsistence, jobs and consumption and here 
Gorz’s concept of freedom is perfectly clear: he urges the 
reader to imagine an alternative to a class society in which we 
are all dependent on wage labor.  
2.7. Heteronomous and autonomous 
The problems start to accumulate when Gorz gears up for a 
theoretical approach. Two of the key concepts for him are the 
distinction between heteronomous and autonomous spheres. I 
mainly follow his argument in Critique of Economic Reason. For 
Gorz, the central characteristic of heteronomous activities is 
their functionality. I talked about that above: in “gigantic 
technical installations and tentacular organizations” the 
worker’s own aims and projects are necessarily sidestepped 
and the organizational aims have no substantial relation to the 
goals of the individual (1989, 36). Most of the cases he 
imagines are jobs executed exclusively for external reasons, 
such as factory work. That said, Gorz adds that heteronomous 
work is not necessarily oppressive, and it need not be boring: 
it can involve cooperation and camaraderie. Gorz’s point is not 
that heteronomous work is deskilling or harmful. Nonetheless, 
the goals are never defined by the worker. I tried to read this 
in a charitable way (work as domination) and a way that 
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shows how the idea about necessary heteronomous work 
leads to a conflation of diverse aspects of division of labor. 
What is his contrast? Theoretically, an autonomous agent 
“should question every external control over the character, 
organization and goal of work, including the economic and 
political decisions which condition it” (1999, 39). Although a 
reservation is made by adding that this is a ‘theoretical’ claim, 
it is clear that Gorz thinks that this is what the ideal of 
autonomy amounts to. The autonomous sphere comprises 
activities done for their own sake, and they are controlled by 
the individual (1989, 7). As we saw, he claims that wage labor 
always to some extent entails a lack of control and that is, for 
him, what makes it heteronomous. He argues that in the case 
of autonomous activities, there is an internal connection 
between means and ends: this is what he regards as doing 
something for its own sake. That something is done ‘for its 
own sake’ is a of course a familiar way to distance a 
description from instrumentalization. For Gorz, the emphasis 
lies on voluntary commitment, and often, on doing what I want. 
As I noted above (note 35), many different words are used to 
describe the contrast to heteronomous activities:  he talks 
about freedom, autonomy, voluntary activities, ‘doing what I 
want’ and self-organization. He also talks about economic and 
non-economic rationality. In his existentialist way, Gorz 
renders wage labor as a state in which one is under the sway of 
an alien will; one is acting in accordance with alien purposes.  
An aspect that unsettles the distinction between 
heteronomous and autonomous – and that hints at an 
ambiguity in what he calls ‘social’ – can be seen in the section 
in which Gorz talks about three forms of activities. There are 
1) heteronomous activities which maintain the functioning of 
society on a macro level, 2) microsocial activities and 3) 
autonomous activities shaped by personal desires and 
inclinations. The second form is a space of in-between, where 
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the person is not totally in control of the goals of the activities, 
but where the activities can still be self-organized within a 
group. This work-for-oneself may involve everything from 
doing household chores to mutual aid in the community – 
what matters is that these tasks are not commodities on the 
market and that it is not a part of institutions (1989, 154-60). 
Again, it is apparent how he lumps together commodification 
and institutions, what he sometimes calls the socialization of 
work. Gorz describes such shared tasks as a matter of people 
“becoming the masters of their own destinies” (1989, 159). 
This addition of shared communal tasks is a welcome example 
that shows the complexity of contrasting wage labor with 
activities that are not and should not be wage labor. When 
Gorz points at microsocial activities, he also hints at the very 
fluid line between things we do for ourselves and things we 
share with others and things we do for each other. However, 
for all his insights about the sites where critique and solidarity 
grow, his understanding of human commonality is often 
mired by the idea that all human activities can be seen as a 
continuum between the voluntary and enforced activities.  
A problem with the contrast between heteronomous and 
autonomous activities is that it makes us think about work as a 
coherent system. The consequence of Gorz’s ideas about the 
division of labor is that this system cannot be altogether 
demolished, but it can be limited (cf. Sayers 1991, 17). Like 
philosophers working in Critical Theory, Gorz sets out to 
expose a societal tendency by debunking a specific rationality. 
The conflict he describes is between this rationality and its 
outside, autonomous in relation to wage labor. His view of 
work as ineluctable subordination inadvertently contributes to 
a neutralizing understanding of work if the subsequent point 
is that we must accept some forms of heteronomous work, but 
that human flourishing takes place in the sphere of self-
directed activity. The message is that this latter sphere is to be 
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preserved while, as Sean Sayers suggests, he also seems to say 
that basic material necessities are to be taken care of by the 
market that tends to these necessities in an efficient, and 
therefore satisfactory, way (1991, 17). 
I would suggest that a critical assessment of work cannot 
start from the presupposition that work is problematic 
because it is not self-directed. As Gorz realizes often enough, 
the ideology of self-directed work is based on an ambivalent 
concept of self-direction: the ideal of self-directed work has 
been an important part of management tactics. Instead of 
reflecting on the historically specific circumstances that make us 
inclined to regard ‘self-directed activities’ as an ideal, he 
jumps to the conclusion that this is what freedom always is. 
One could say that the activities people find worthwhile 
could not be described as meaningful because they are self-
directed. Is talking to a friend, participating in an Amnesty 
campaign or helping a colleague with a translation ‘self-
directed’? One could instead ask in what situations people 
focus on activities as being self-directed, in what situation 
activities are perceived under this description. The problem is 
that Gorz, when he tries to explicate why the expansion of 
wage labor and commodification needs to be criticized and 
why the economic rationality needs to be limited, emphasizes 
the alternative as voluntary, ‘self-directed’ activities. For him, 
the goal is that more and more activities are to be self-directed. 
In the following quote from Marcuse, one sees how the image 
of self-directed activities is easily transformed into a 
dichotomy that by being enamored with the ideal of freedom 
ends up in blatant exaggerations: “In a single toss of a ball, the 
player achieves an infinitely greater triumph of human 
freedom over objectification than in the most powerful 
accomplishment of technical labor.” (quoted in Wolin 2001, 
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161) 37 One of my objections is that the contrasts Gorz makes 
are so rigid that the multiple roles work and non-work occupy 
                                                          
37 Several writers critical of modern work dream of the possibility of work as 
free play. Fourier is an early example of a thinker who loads work with 
aesthetic and libidinal energy (Granter 2009, 36-9). Marcuse is a part of this 
tradition and he draws on Schiller’s ideas about play and aesthetics (Schiller 
2008). Marcuse elaborates a contrast between alienated work (work in which 
one becomes a part of a machinery and which is completely determined by its 
function) – and free play. He is not satisfied with mere negative dialectics; he 
wants to say something about what work could be outside a technicized 
apparatus. For him, play has no external purpose and is not restricted in any 
sense. Play signifies an activity that makes up its own rules – it is self-directed 
and it is not determined by anything external. The aesthetic dimension of free 
play manifests the reconciliation between man and nature, and it is also 
immersed in what Marcuse sees as human potentiality (1969, 176-7).  
        I find Marcuse’s concept of free play symptomatic in its being a concept 
dependent on its opposites, alienation labor and instrumentalization. “Play is 
unproductive and useless precisely because it cancels the repressive and 
exploitative traits of labor and leisure; it ‘just plays’ with the reality (Marcuse 
1969, 195). Marcuse’s invocation of free play is typical in the sense that it 
contrasts technicized society with aesthetics: Marcuse sees free play as an 
aesthetic expression. This contrast can also be detected in Gorz’s writings. 
      What makes so many work critics resort to art as a form of escape from 
work society? When writers try to articulate good work they frequently turn 
to creative work, poiesis, work as a form of art, as an ideal. Sean Sayers is a 
typical example. Here he articulates what according to him are Marx’s ideas 
about the ultimate form of freedom: “Artistic creation, by contrast, is truly free 
activity. It is not in the service of material needs and its product is not for 
consumption: determination by natural desire is entirely transcendental. Such 
an activity is not a means to the end of satisfying material needs, it has no 
economic functions. Its aims are aesthetic, not economic. It is an end in itself.” 
(Sayers) 2011, 68)  
     The intuition here seems to be that art represents autonomy and non-
instrumental productivity – this is without doubt an understanding of art that 
can, and should, be questioned. In a spirit of optimism, many authors set out 
to delineate the possibility of a new, post-industrial era of work. I think 
Shershow is right when he says that many theorists conjure up an image of 
work as the production of a creative subject. The problem is that 
preoccupation with work as free play or the production of subjects risks 
bringing with it a concept of autonomy and creativity without anchoring in 
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in our lives in the form of wage labor as well as working 
activities that are not paid work, are reduced to one single 
measure of what is worth striving for. In Critique of Economic 
Reason ‘to be free from wage labor’ adheres to an ideal that is 
thought to be the essence of what it is to be human.  
Against this image of freedom as essence, a very different 
approach to critique of work would start from the cases in 
which it makes a difference that a specific activity is not wage 
labor. Things we do for each other, such as offering someone a 
meal, doing a plumbing work or fixing a broken computer, 
can involve plenty of exertion or skills, skills that may have 
been acquired within a job or formal training. We do things 
for each other as give-and-take favors or as a dimension of 
friendship. It may be significant that these services are not 
done as wage labor (even though money may be involved, as 
when I offer the driver money for the gasoline if s/he offers me 
a ride) but the reasons for this vary. I may appreciate the 
neighbor’s kind attitude in fixing my computer in hir spare 
time, as it took hir several hours to do it. In another situation I 
may offer my friend money for giving me some freshly caught 
fish, but s/he refuses it because, as s/he says, s/he enjoys 
fishing (one could also imagine hir being puzzled or even hurt 
by the idea of remuneration). In another case, a politician is 
criticized for paying workers under the table for a small 
renovation project around the house. The politician is blamed 
for undermining the critique of gray economy s/he has fiercely 
supported. Those who criticize hir think that this case cannot 
be seen as ‘small favors’ between people; it is work 
                                                                                                               
moral dimensions: the purposes of work are, once again, seen as unimportant 
if creativity is valued in itself. However, my objection to an aesthetization of 
work doesn’t imply that I would make a strict distinction between, for 
example, use/function and aesthetic dimensions. (On the role of the aesthetic 
in everyday life and daily work, cf. Saito 2007). 
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comparable with wage labor. What can be seen as ‘comparable 
with wage labor’ is often contested.  
A central theme in the thesis re-surfaces: new concepts of 
work emerge as new contrasts are made. In a way, I think Gorz 
would agree with this as it is important for him that care work 
for example unsettles a traditional concept of wage labor. He 
tries to elucidate tensions within, as he sees it, the concept of 
work. Regrettably, for him, this turns into a rather essentialist 
– and at the same time wobbly – distinction between activities 
that are to be preserved as voluntary tasks and activities that 
can be jobs (or: commodities, professions, socialized 
functions?). Care changes meaning in a worrying way when it 
becomes ‘work’, Gorz argues. He concludes that it would be 
best if care was to be performed by volunteers or family 
members and that all such tasks should be de-professionalized 
(1989, 142-6). Again: what he is unable to do is to give a 
description of what exactly ‘heteronomous activities’ mean 
here, and in what way they clash with what he thinks should 
be voluntary concerns between people. Does the harm consist 
in care being a job, or a social function, or is the problem that 
care becomes a commodity on a market? Is it really true that all 
forms of standardized and regularized care are distortions of 
activities that should belong to the sphere of self-regulation? 
(cf. Sayers 1991, 18) And to also question the other side of the 
dichotomy: what does it mean that care is performed 
‘voluntarily’? Does it make sense to say that tired parents take 
care of their ill kids ‘voluntarily’? When would this be said?  
My point is that specific situations draw our attention to 
particular senses in which something takes place beyond wage 
labor. Gorz himself also looks in other, more fruitful 
directions. He warns us that some of our vital needs, 
unpolluted water and air, for example, are at risk of being 
commercialized. Thus, he asserts their non-commercial value 
in contrast to things that have exchange value (Gorz 1989, 236-
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7). That these vital needs must not be commercialized is 
hugely important to point out, given the doctrine of job 
creation, an ideology according to which every new job on the 
marked is laudable. His critique is aimed at the link between 
this seemingly boundless job creation and equally seemingly 
boundless consumption. “There is no shortage of work, since 
there is virtually no limit to the needs we have to satisfy” 
(ibid). Here the importance of the question of inside/outside 
the system of wage labor is easy to grasp. The target of the 
critique is commodified needs and unsustainable job creation. 
Gorz’s argument shows that, for example, the hope that so-
called ‘green jobs’ will save the economy must be an illusion if 
the bottom line still is that ever more jobs need to be created and 
that the economic system is inevitably expansive. As Gorz 
suggests, the goal should be to reduce jobs, to prepare 
ourselves for a future that does not revolve around job 
creation.  
Talking about ‘inside/outside the system of wage labor’ can 
thus be politically pertinent, as the critique of growth by 
means of green jobs shows. It is just that this pertinence is lost 
when it is drenched in the idea that heteronomous work 
should be limited and autonomous activities should be 
expanded. The best one can make of this contention is to show 
that the scope of wage labor is not settled, and that this should 
lead us to reflect on the hazards of commodified relations (Gorz 
1989, 102). Relations built around commodities can be 
distinguished from relations autonomous of such relations: 
relations based on sharing, gleaning, learning and free giving, 
for example. ‘Autonomous’ can be a fruitful concept and as I 
said his critique of job-creation is apt: the world turns into 
‘untapped residues of employment’, the goal is that tasks that 
we used to take care of ourselves should now “occupy the 
greatest number of people and absorb as much working time 
as possible”. He thinks about cleaning services and the food 
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industry (1989, 154-5). Gorz tries to create a very different 
entry into the dilemma of scarce wage labor than the present 
ideology of job creation. ‘More work’ should not be the 
general goal of society. 
2.8 A new blob 
We now need to inquire into how Gorz thinks about 
‘economic’ activities. This is a key concept, as the entire 
Critique of Economic Reason is structured around this concept. 
For Gorz, ‘economic’ not only coincides with commercial 
activities, but in addition to this he sees what he sometimes 
calls ‘socially necessary production’ as cases of economic 
activity, defined as instrumentalized economic rationality. So 
what is Gorz’s position with regard to ‘socially necessary 
activities’? No absolute opposition between necessity and 
freedom is construed. Gorz points out that taking care of one’s 
own things and caring for others don’t fit the description of 
external requirements. These chores make up an aspect of the 
stream of life (1989, 58-9). He explicitly says that freedom is 
not the opposite of being enslaved by necessity. As we have 
seen, his position is that autonomy can, to a certain extent, 
exist within heteronomous activities (1989, 93), which seems to 
be the same as saying that wage labor may contain a certain 
amount of individual independence. The main line of 
argument is this one: 
We are therefore less in thrall to the ‘necessities’ of existence than 
to the external determination of our lives and our activity by the 
imperatives of a social apparatus of production and organization 
which provides willy-nilly both the essential and the superfluous, 
the economic and the anti-economic, the productive and the 
destructive (1989, 166).  
Our lives are governed more by the social apparatus than by 
necessity, he claims. Heteronomy is thus by no means 
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synonymous with necessity. As we have seen, the most 
important trait of heteronomy is its being a social, functionalized 
apparatus. Nonetheless, when he talks about the autonomous 
sphere he appeals to precisely the contrast between freedom 
and necessity. For him, autonomous activities are not, as we 
saw, governed by an external goal. Even though they are not 
opposite to necessity, if they are dictated by necessity, they 
remain formal, Gorz says, dismissing the ideal of autonomy as 
craft work or alternative market economies (ibid). As I said, 
even though he makes a distinction between heteronomy and 
necessity, he contrasts necessary societal production and 
autonomous activities. The latter are not just play, they can 
also be productive projects – the important characteristic is 
that they are not part of society’s basic infrastructure. The 
implication seems to be that autonomous activities must be 
free from all kinds of constraints, and thus they can’t have the 
role of necessary tasks: “they have to stem from a conscious 
choice which nothing forces me to make” (1989, 168).  
So what are the implications for how he thinks about 
work? Gorz defines work in the economic sense as taking 
place in the public sphere, as having use value and because it 
is aimed at exchange, the job performance must be measurable 
in time (1989, 138-9). In many cases, working for wages 
deviates from these criteria, but that only reflects the tensions 
within work. As we saw, he states that self-directed, free 
pursuits are inherently different from an economic logic. In 
the present society, autonomy can only exist when we already 
make a living, when we have already secured and organized 
the means of life. Autonomous activities thus take place 
beyond societal production and earning a living: Gorz even 
says that the autonomous sphere must be excluded from 
economic concerns (1989, 97-8). The unresolved question is 
whether Gorz, who argues that heteronomous work can be 
limited, not abolished, really ever challenges the idea that 
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autonomy always presupposes heteronomous (alienating) 
work?  
Even so, the relation between the heteronomous and the 
autonomous sphere is by no means a rigid one. In a section 
that brings Oscar Negt and Henri Lefebvre to mind, he 
emphasizes the obligations we have as citizens to critically 
scrutinize jobs and industry and, according to him, as we 
acquire more autonomous free time, this form of critical 
inquiry could increase (1989, 82-3, 93, cf. Negt 1986). He also 
concedes that protests and activism within the sphere of wage 
labor may challenge economic rationality.38 In a later book, 
Reclaiming Work, Gorz (like Simone Weil) asserts that workers 
should claim responsibility for work in a much wider sense 
than what is the case when jobs are seen as a narrow set of 
tasks. Workers should assume responsibility in a process of 
distributing work; work should be controlled by the workers 
to a greater extent (1999, 46). However, the point he holds on 
to is that we cannot get rid of heteronomous activities: 
heteronomous work has an enormous role in our lives, Gorz 
says, and this role should be diminished so that there will be 
more space and time for autonomous activities (1989, 93). For 
him, this does not mean that we are forever chained to the 
kingdom of necessity. Most of our needs are taken care of by 
                                                          
38 For example, arguments about what is a sufficient living wage do not have a 
purely economic character and the same thing can be said about conflicts 
about the content of work (1989, 116). What I talked about in chapter 1, in 
connection with the discussion about Arendt and her concept of the political 
reappears: the debate about a living wage reveals deep differences of 
understanding what is at stake in arguing about whether something is a 
political (or a mere individual) matter at all. These differences are revealed in 
attempts to make clear what it really means to work at jobs that are so poorly 
paid that one is not able to pay the necessities of life (Ehrenreich, 2002). Such 
appeals to a living wage cannot be reduced to an economic sphere. Appealing 
to a living wage often has to do with bringing out in which ways poverty 
structures and sets limits on daily life. 
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means of industrialized work, but it would be strange to one-
dimensionally label this as ‘necessities’ as so much of what is 
produced is not in an immediate sense ‘necessary’ (1989, 166). 
He is right in being suspicious of false claims about the 
inherent meaningfulness of work and unwarranted optimism 
regarding ‘humanized’ work. The problem, as I see it, is that 
Gorz’s attitude towards wage labor reveals an ambivalent idea 
about what he would see as a better society: the goal seems to 
be to reduce something bad (loss of freedom) in order to 
increase the amount of free time. As I have said, the problem 
is that the argument misfires in its definition of what is 
destructive in work relations (heteronomous relations) and 
that the argument leans on sweeping and ambivalent ideals of 
‘self-organization’ against a machinery of heteronomous work 
that we have to accept as a part of our lives. I would agree 
with Marcuse that the idea that we could live our lives ‘part-
time’ is dangerous, even if the idea is that free time should be 
increased.  
Let me develop my doubts about Gorz’s account of 
heteronomous relations, now through a more specific 
discussion about how he thinks about economic rationality. 
He admits that economic rationality, even though connected 
with capitalism, may have diverse expressions. He 
nonetheless maintains that it has a common root, calculation. 
Calculation typically cleanses activities of all other 
considerations: no other aim than ‘more’ fits into the picture. 
The economic rationality excludes and dismisses qualitative 
judgments (1989, 121, 124). Gorz concludes that economic 
rationality can have no other role than heteronomy (1989, 169), 
and that there thus can be no alternative economies. Economy 
is economic rationality in the above sense, even though 
economy need not be capitalism – even in socialism economic 
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rationality must exist (Lodziak & Tatman 1997, 80).39 The effect 
of this is the same as when Arendt talks about necessity: an 
alien force is assembled and even though it is undoubtedly 
understood to stem from our active ways of upholding and 
reproducing a system, it seems eerily dissociated from social 
formations we have brought upon ourselves. Gorz’s 
functionalized and instrumentalized economic rationality is in 
this sense quite similar to what Pitkin called ‘a blob’ (cf. 1.4.2), 
a necessary but eerily expansive sphere attacking us from the 
outside. It is as if a calculating rationality intrudes on our 
craving for freedom.  
As Feenberg writes, critics of technological rationality or 
economic rationality may unwittingly affirm the perspective of 
the technocrats themselves; critics unwittingly commit 
themselves to the technocratic view that the field of technical 
or economic rationality cannot be radically changed (1999). 
Even so, as I said, Gorz himself wavers. Sometimes he 
navigates towards the view that technology is neutral in the 
sense that efficiency is the main way we should evaluate it 
when it is used in the proper spheres of life. At times he 
stresses that technology is always steeped in values (a similar 
tension can be found in Marcuse’s thinking, as we saw in 2.3). 
This once again brings us to what at least to some extent seems 
to be the consequence of Gorz’s argument: the heteronomous 
sphere and economic rationality make up a necessary part of 
societal production so that tensions arise only when the 
economic sphere threatens to annihilate the autonomous 
sphere. 
                                                          
39 Gorz seems to have changed his mind as he wrote Reclaiming Work, in which 
he dedicates a long section to local exchange trading systems (1999, 102-8). His 
point there seems to be precisely that plenty of activities have the character of 
co-operation, distribution of tasks, work, economy and social interaction at the 
same time.  
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As Gorz and Marcuse project a technological logic (even 
though this logic is situated within a capitalist context), their 
perspective makes it hard to discern the difference between 
ideology and praxis. What is really taking place and what is a 
case of ideological presentation? I don’t say that this is a clear-
cut distinction, but for critical purposes it is useful to be aware 
of it. Let me illustrate what I have in mind. Andrew Feenberg 
mentions the example of the debate about child labor and the 
length of the working day in the middle of the 19th century. 
Industrialists and politicians strongly asserted that regulations 
would be the end of the industry: they claimed that child labor 
had to be used and the working day must remain unregulated 
(1999, 82). This can be seen as an ideological outburst in which 
the industrialists advocated that this is what it takes for the 
industry to survive, which was of course not true at all as 
companies found other ways to make profits. It can also be 
seen as a practical defense of interests: in this historical 
situation, child labor generated considerable profits.  
An appeal to the principle of economic rationality does not 
capture the complexity of what is going on in this example. 
This is indicated by the present situation in the same countries 
in which the debate took place (England, say). In these 
countries, the use of child labor is not seen as an option to be 
considered in the drive for low costs. That children don’t 
spend their childhoods at work has become what could be 
called a social fact (Feenberg 1999, 98). The point is that child 
labor no longer – in these specific countries, that is – appears 
on the horizon of what is, even economically, possible to do.40  
                                                          
40 Often, it does make sense to talk about purely economic concerns. For 
example: ‘the committee looked at the question as a matter of economic 
feasibility but did not take other concerns into account.’ Just as often it makes 
sense to talk about an economic logic. Marx is doing this in the Capital, but that 
investigation presupposes a certain form of abstraction. He tries to elucidate a 
capitalist process and does not pretend that this capitalist logic simply is what 
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This type of example shows that it is not helpful to render 
economic reasons into an abstract principle, even ‘economic 
rationality’ may, as in this example, be appealed to as a defense 
of particular interests. That is precisely why this economic 
rationality could not and should not be taken at face value. 
Instead, it is crucial to look at the tensions within a debate 
where economic factors are contested or interpreted in certain 
ways (cf. Cockburn 2011). To sum up: in the beginning of the 
chapter, I wanted to read Marcuse charitably by looking at 
how what from a specific perspective can be seen as quasi-
necessity can become real when a praxis is structured around it. 
This doesn’t contradict the need for a distinction between an 
ideological idea about necessity and praxis. ‘One-
dimensionality’ can also be a way in which the status quo is 
upheld by people appealing to economic necessity as an 
indisputable reason. In one and the same situation, we may 
both want to call for a critique of rhetorical exclusions of 
alternative possibilities, while also acknowledging how the 
present system is upheld by means of a world of institutions, 
laws and dependencies.  
2.9 Freedom and dependency: a basic income? 
What does it mean to be free from work? As we saw, for Gorz 
and Marcuse, this is the essential question and Gorz in 
particular focuses on how we can become less dependent on 
the relations of wage labor. He calls for redistribution of work 
(sharing jobs rather than polarizing the labor market) but he 
also calls for a basic income. He was by no means the first to 
present the idea that has figured in political debates since the 
end of the First World War (van Parijs 1992, 6). As we saw, 
                                                                                                               
every particular capitalist actor would understand hirself to be driven by. He 
explains the framework in which producers become competitors.  
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Gorz insists that autonomy requires free time, and he is at 
pains to show that this is the opposite of what capital relies on. 
Capitalism demands and creates a worker desperate to get 
and keep a job, and people usually have no choice but to earn 
their living through wage labor (1989, 119, 1999, 56). Jobs are 
scarce and this fact aggravates the asymmetry between 
employer and jobseeker/employee. The point is that in the 
capitalist system the amount we have to work in order to 
make a living depends on things over which the individual 
has very little influence (such as how much a specific job is 
paid or the general standards of the working day). One is 
usually hired in a way that makes it natural that one does not 
quit the job when one has enough money to take some time 
off. Capitalism presupposes that people will work continually 
in order to make a living. As many historians have shown 
(Thompson 1972), it was far from easy to make people submit 
to this rhythm of continuous work when the factory system 
was still in its early phase. Nowadays, breaks from the 
working life are understood as an exception, and such breaks 
are often seen as problematic, as is evident from political 
debates over parental leave. However, these questions are 
frequently on the political agenda, which the Finnish system 
of subventions for a year off (‘job alternation leave’) for 
employed workers clearly shows.41 
Incomes are society’s main way of distributing wealth. This 
means that people take part of society’s wealth by working, 
and that wealth is mostly created in the system of paid work. 
Wages provide a weighty income for the state in the form of 
taxes. All in all, especially in countries where the welfare state 
plays a marginal role, social security is to a great extent 
                                                          
41 
http://www.tem.fi/en/work/labour_legislation/job_alternation_leave_study_le
ave_family_leave_remote_work 
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centered upon employment. Many writers since Marx have 
pointed out that this system makes people dependent on work 
in a way that is quickly brought to light when a person finds 
hirself standing outside the labor market. A trend in the latest 
thirty years is allegedly that those who have a secure position 
constitute an elite in society: work is increasingly precarized 
(cf. Standing 1999, 2011) – precarious work has been described 
in more narrow terms, as specific circumstances surrounding 
employment, but it has also been used in a more open-ended 
way, to describe the work and market-related circumstances 
that make life itself precarious (Precarias a la deriva 2009). 
From this, debaters have drawn the conclusion that our 
dependency on work is harmful – it manifests a split in society 
between those who have steady jobs and the rest of the 
population who have no job at all or who are desperately 
trying to hold on to part-time jobs or an employment with 
irregular hours. Many of these critics suggest a solution that 
would create the precondition for a life less dominated by the 
capriciousness of the labor market. A basic income for 
everyone would dissociate the right to an income from the 
right to a wage: basic sustenance would no longer be 
dependent on the fluctuations on the labor market. To have an 
income would not be the same as to earn a wage (Gorz 1989, 
204).42 Philippe van Parijs defines a basic income as an amount 
of money paid unconditionally, with no work requirements or 
a means test of whether one is eligible for it. It would thus be 
paid to all citizens and it would be irrespective of other 
                                                          
42 Many writers, Gorz included, worry about a basic income becoming a mere 
symptom of this polarization of society, so that some people are simply left to 
take care of themselves, with minimal support – a basic income then remains a 
mere temporary palliative and it may even be a supportive structure for 
fragmented, insecure jobs. A basic income would then strengthen harmful 
tendencies on the labor market and so job insecurity would be even more 
accepted (1989, 130). These are, I think, serious reservations. 
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sources of income (the implication for other transfers is 
debated) (1992, 3-4). 
The arguments in favor of a basic income have several 
political homes. Milton Friedman and others have argued that 
a basic income would lessen the state bureaucracy – but if the 
basic income is too high it will make people lazy. For like-
minded people, the aim of a basic income (or a negative tax, 
which is not synonymous with a basic income, but shares 
some elements with it) is then to make it worthwhile to accept 
a job and so the incentives to enter the labor market and accept 
any job must be optimized. I suppose the assumption here is 
that a basic income would be lower than the present forms of 
unemployment support. The ‘temptation’ of living on 
unemployment support instead of accepting a job would 
allegedly disappear. From this point of view, a basic income 
supports economic growth, deregulation and a flexible labor 
market (Gorz 1999, 81-2, cf. Foucault 2008, 203-4). The hope 
here is that a basic income would spur entrepreneurship.  
Many people on the left consider a basic income a 
promising challenge of the compulsion to earn a position in 
society through work (Weeks 2011).43 Instead of making 
people accept low-paying and precarious jobs, a basic income 
                                                          
43 Up until Reclaiming Work, Gorz argued that a basic income should be 
associated with work in the sense that a basic income should be coupled with 
an obligation to guarantee work for all citizens. The basic income would still 
be earned, even though it would not be dependent on employment (1989, 
208). It is evident that he thinks about this ‘society service’ in other terms than 
workfare, the system of obligatory requirements of work for being granted 
welfare allowance. Gorz argues that workfare is based on the idea that 
unemployed people are work-shy individuals who must be forced to work (cf. 
1999, 81) In Reclaiming Work, Gorz abandoned the idea about ‘society service’, 
instead claiming that the basic income should be unconditional and also 
arguing that compulsory labor alongside the labor market is untenable and 
that it blurs the line between work (as defined by Gorz) and non-work, for 
example caring for others (1999, 85-7).  
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could make it possible to refuse these kinds of positions (Gorz 
1999, 83). One of the main strands of this idea about a basic 
income is to provide an alternative to the contemporary state 
of wage labor and to acknowledge that the impossibility of 
full-time employment for everyone is not a temporary 
situation that could be fixed by means of Keynes-style 
stimulation programs. Critics of work like Gorz argue that 
basic income is the best way to distribute wealth in a society 
that can no longer provide life-long secure work for all citizens 
(and a society in which resources are thus distributed 
unequally). They reject the image of work as a ‘shared 
burden’, or shared responsibility, and instead the importance 
of other activities is recognized. A basic income sufficient to 
cover basic living expenses would create the preconditions for 
a system in which wage labor would not structure the primary 
trajectory and outline of life. Other life options than 
employment become feasible. Other practices – other forms of 
co-operation and other forms of social life – than wage labor 
are given the space to evolve (Gorz 1999, 78-9; 83). The 
practical formulations of how a basic income would be 
realized (how it is to be financed and whether it should cover 
basic subsistence) differ in just as many ways as the 
explanations of what a basic income would be good for. 
Experiments with basic incomes have been carried out in the 
USA, Canada, Iran, Namibia and India (Birnbaum 2013).44  
What makes debates about a basic income interesting is 
that they reveal assumptions about work and this is an instance 
where I think it is relevant to highlight tensions going as deep 
as being a disagreement about the extent to which work is to 
be regarded as the center of society and human life. Compare 
these views and how possibilities and impossibilities are 
articulated: 
                                                          
44 For several accounts of the idea of a basic income, cf. Van Parijs 1992. 
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(1) A basic income would endanger the work ethic and it 
would institutionalize, fleeing from the burden of work 
– free-riding on the system. If a basic income made it 
possible to live without work, many people would lack 
an incentive to seek employment. Thus, a basic income 
would be harmful for society as it would make people 
passive. A system where wealth is distributed in a way 
not dependent on work is thus practically impossible 
(tax revenues would decrease because so few would 
work) or even morally dangerous.  
(2) A basic income would make people more active in the 
sense that they have time to develop capacities not 
defined by what is considered productive from a labor 
market point of view. Other things than paid work 
could be appreciated. A basic income makes it possible 
to enjoy friendship, be with one’s family, attend to 
things that need to be done, make art. Even though a 
system of basic income can develop into something 
revolutionary from the point of view of work society as 
we know it today, it would not be a very drastic 
change to go through with a basic income, considering 
the present system of social subsidies. From a practical, 
administrative point of view, a basic income has to be 
carefully calculated so that it works optimally. From a 
political and existential point of view, it is impossible 
to estimate the subversive potential of this proposal 
beforehand.  
The debate brings some controversies to the surface. Does 
employment stand for dependence or independence? Is the 
fundamental goal in life to have a job or is the goal rather that 
people should have the possibility to dedicate themselves to a 
multitude of things they consider meaningful? Is the right to 
employment more important than the right to decline a 
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harmful or precarious job? Should and can work be 
conceptualized as an obligation people have to society?  
A question that is almost always sparked by the suggestion 
of a basic income is the following: would people still be 
willing to work or would they plant themselves on the couch? 
The question is typically articulated as a concern about the 
nature of work, rather than wage labor. Should we say that 
work is inherently repulsive so that nobody would work if 
they were not forced to do it for economic reasons? A puzzling 
perspective is evoked: if people were not forced to work, they 
would degenerate into idlers and loafers. In this fashion, 
activity is interpreted as work-related. Critics of work like 
Gorz argue that the worry about incentives is symptomatic. As 
the philosopher Oscar Negt observes: this fear could be said to 
be a capitalist fantasy, intelligible only from the point of view 
of ideologies about work and the forms of coercion that the 
world of wage labor is imbued with (1986, 181-6) The jargon 
about there being a need for external incentives to get people 
to ‘work’ tends to rely on a mixed message. In mainstream 
political arguments, work is praised as a virtue and a source of 
independence and self-esteem. However, when political 
proposals are made that would make it possible for people to 
reject bad jobs – jobs that put a person in a precarious position 
or jobs that are injurious for the health – and thus to become 
more independent of wage labor as coercion, a common 
response is that people won’t bother to get a job if they are not 
forced to. The rhetoric about self-realization is exchanged for a 
language of external discipline or external incentives (Gorz 
1999, 98). Gorz puts his finger on a worrying tendency in 
debates focusing on what measures are to be taken in order to 
drag people out on the labor market. He and Marcuse try to 
imagine a life not incarcerated by coercive patterns, and they 
try hard to bring out how traits that may not on the face of it 
strike one as coercive at all – getting a job as a precondition for 
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accessing primary rights and entitlements such as good health 
care or a decent pension – could still be understood in that way 
so as to get a clearer grasp of how our lives play out in the 
society we live in. What the debates about basic income reveal 
is that reflection on the domination of work has a practical 
underpinning and that reflecting on dependency on work goes 
together with a host of issues connected with work, such as 
conceptions about obligations to society, ideas about work as 
coercion and various understandings of liberation from work. 
In the next chapter I will say more about the dangers and the 
potentials of this perspective. 
2.10 Concluding words 
The main tension this chapter has introduced is the utopia 
about automation and free time on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, wage labor as coercion, leisure as the promise of 
job-creation and humanized work within the limits set by 
profits. This tension is an important one, but it loses its edge if 
the conception of work as coercion relies on problematic 
generalizations or one-sided ideals. Gorz’s idea about societal 
functions and freely developed time doesn’t meet the needs of 
a substantial critique of the contemporary system of work, nor 
does it provide a clear account of the relation between wage 
labor and life beyond wage labor. I discussed the idea that 
work is enmeshed in a general division of labor and I tried to 
give an outline of the problems with that description when it 
is disengaged from political debates. In the previous chapter, I 
focused on the tensions in the concept of necessity and what it 
means to regard necessity as a burden or as an expanding 
field. Here I wanted to say more about the next step in a 
debate that continues on Arendt’s trail: what does freedom 
from the jobholders’ society mean? How is this freedom to be 
articulated? Why would one say that this freedom is possible, 
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and yet why is it so difficult to spell out this possibility 
without falling into the trap of optimism about technological 
progress? It was evident that Gorz and Marcuse regard 
freedom from work in quite different terms than Arendt. As 
you remember, for her, freedom stood in contrast with 
necessity, and for her the dangerous idea is that automation in 
itself offers freedom in the form of liberation. For Gorz and 
Marcuse the main focus is on liberation from work integrated 
in a societal apparatus, and, for them, freedom is defined as 
the human activities taking place outside this apparatus. From 
this, we see that the meaning of ‘compulsory’ varies and that 
writers attend to diverse aspects of work; work as repetitive 
and anti-political toil (Arendt) or work as a functionalized 
sphere (Marcuse/Gorz). The reflection on the debate about a 
basic income was intended to show that liberation from 
compulsory work is a perfectly intelligible ideal, but some of 
the strands of Marcuse’s and Gorz’s analyses are categorical, 
and even distorting, as they posit the alternatives as being 
functionalized work or sovereign self-regulation. In the 
example about a basic income I wanted to suggest that talk 
about liberation is no mere philosophical quandary – political 
differences are at stake and they concern what ‘the work 
critics’ are writing about: the compulsion to work. The merit 
of Marcuse and Gorz is that they show that the concept of 
freedom cannot be said to have a fixed content; what is needed 
is an acknowledgement of the possibility that the world can be 
different. This was, I think, Arendt’s project in The Human 
Condition as well. In the next chapter, in connection with an 
analysis of Kathi Weeks’ ideas about liberation from work this 
idea will resurface. I now shift my attention from the question 
about work and domination to an inquiry into ways of 
perceiving work-centered life, busyness and what Weeks calls 
‘the work ethic’.  
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Chapter Three: Work and busyness 
Let us for once think through this thought: to accomplish 
something in the world. One hears so much of both impatient and 
misleading talk about this. To be sure, it is well that all should 
wish to do something. It is indeed earnestness to desire it, but 
should it not also be earnestness to understand in oneself and in 
life precisely what is meant by saying that one man accomplishes 
such an exceptional amount, or that another man seems to 
accomplish nothing at all (Kierkegaard 1956, 135).   
3.1 Introduction 
Work has an immensely prominent role in contemporary 
society. In typical formulations of the aim of schools, 
psychiatry, medical practice, and welfare policies the goal is to 
make as many people as possible enter into or remain in the 
labor market. Employment is placed at the center of societal 
strivings, and gaining access to the labor market is seen as a 
primary aspiration. One of the existentially most radical forms 
of the dominating position of work is a rendering of the 
question ‘what will you become’ into ‘how will you make a 
living?’ In her book The Problem with Work (2011) the political 
theorist Kathi Weeks probes into the background of why work 
has achieved this role. The present chapter enters into 
dialogue with Weeks’ views because I find her reasoning to be 
a challenging, but far from unproblematic, account of critique 
of work. I also think that her book is a representative and 
radical contribution to a contemporary debate about the 
relation between work and life. Weeks tries to get to grips 
with the roles work has by critically analyzing what she calls 
‘the work ethic’. What makes her approach noteworthy is, in 
my view, that she highlights a number of tensions in the 
relation between work and life. In this sense, I see a kinship 
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between her reasoning and my own. The worry articulated in 
her book is this: if we regard work as potentially meaningful 
and if we take for granted that we should demand better and 
more meaningful work, we have committed ourselves to a 
hope which is easily taken hostage by the status quo. 
The problem […] is how to advance demands for better work – 
how to make good on work’s promise of social utility and 
individual meaning – in a way that does not simply echo and 
reaffirm the prescription for a lifetime of work (Weeks 2011, 108). 
Weeks’ book can be read as a provocation, or as an appeal to 
assess the role of work. What happens when work – and the 
very system of work – is embraced so uncritically that we lose 
a sense for it is for? To live is to work, but what this means 
seems too obvious: we simply have to do it: to live is to work. 
Weeks makes an astute observation: as soon as questions 
about why we work are seen as perverse or irrelevant, as soon 
as the topic of work is surrounded by self-evident truths, 
something is awry. Even though wage labor has a 
fundamental role in present society, we must, she maintains, 
try to imagine a society very different from the present one. In 
her book, she challenges us to think boldly about living 
differently – as she calls it, “a life beyond work” (2011, 227). 
This demand for radical change already exists in some sense, 
she argues, for example in the political desires expressed in 
proposals about a basic income or shorter working hours (cf. 
2011, 229).  
Theorists of work such as Arlie Hochschild (2003), ‘Bifo’ 
Berardi (2009) and Kathi Weeks maintain that contemporary 
forms of work absorb and threaten the self to an increasing 
extent. My main resource in work is my own self, my 
emotions and my relations to others. Whereas earlier thinkers 
worried about work being alienating and disengaged from 
life, we could now, they argue, instead talk about how work 
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colonizes life.45 If the problem used to be that the worker was 
alienated from hir work the concern is now that people are 
immersed in their work in a way that makes it increasingly 
hard to distinguish work from non-work (Weeks 2007, 240-3). 
I don’t think that this is a valid or sufficient analysis of all 
contemporary forms of work. Most of these work critics can be 
charged with constructing hasty diagnostic remarks about 
‘what work is like now’ and the changes work has gone 
through. However, instead of focusing on such critique, I want 
to use Weeks’ perspective to elucidate the role work comes to 
have when the question about what it is for is avoided, or 
when this question is repressed. These critical writers dissect 
skewed forms of meaning by showing multiple manifestations 
of what Weeks calls a work ethic that makes people look away 
from ways in which work takes charge of their lives in a 
problematic or even dangerous way. A common theme in 
contemporary critical accounts of work is that the elevation of 
work (all forms of work) as the central outlet for creativity and 
self-realization stands for a one-sided perspective on human 
life. In other words: the ideal of work as self-realization skews 
the ways in which things are, or can be, important in our lives.  
The present chapter is dedicated to a theme that earlier and 
later chapters also touch upon: in which ways are questions 
about the meaning and purpose of work repressed? The aim is 
to prepare the ground for topics that will arise in later 
chapters. The point is not so much to attack a certain idea and 
to present an alternative thesis of my own, as it is to explore 
interrogations of work in its shape of a value that is taken for 
granted as the ultimate good. I will focus on Kathi Weeks’ 
                                                          
45 The expression of ‘colonization’ used in this way can be traced to Habermas 
and his Theory of Communicative Action (1989) in which he chronicles the 
demise of the lifeworld and the expansion of markets and power relations that 
appear as natural entities. 
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description of the work ethic of hard work and self-realization. 
She presents this work ethic as an ambiguous rhetorical 
pattern. An overall aim is to scrutinize the image of a life 
where work has a seemingly unequivocally positive role, as 
self-realization, or as the hustle and bustle of the active life. 
One of the points is to pin down the expectations of life that 
appear here: life is something that one can take a break from 
as one is engaged in hectic work projects, or life is something 
to be managed. I will also take a look at Weeks’ framework for 
reflecting on alternatives. She scrutinizes basic assumptions 
about what life. Important for this quest is that demands and 
affective questions, rather than clear-cut policy proposals, are 
understood as constructive critical tools.  
I will also give an outline of what I see as shortcomings of 
Weeks’ treatment of the work ethic. Even though her critical 
approach is astute, there is something that this perspective 
does not take account of. To talk about a work ethic is not 
only, I will argue, to take notice of a praxis-entangled pattern. 
I propose that the idea about a work ethic does not even make 
sense if the existential temptations and attitudes inherent in and 
expressed through such patterns are overlooked. It is not that 
Weeks is entirely insensitive to this ethical aspect, but it is 
rather that the vocabulary she uses does not do justice to the 
struggles in how we relate to our jobs. The reason why I find 
this form of critique relevant is that it is precisely the tensions 
of the work ethic Weeks herself highlights. One of her main 
questions has an ethical dimension: how can we reach beyond 
a naturalization and normalization of waged work? In order to 
cast Weeks’ question in what I see as a radicalized form I will 
turn to Kierkegaard who, perhaps quite surprisingly, provides 
an excellent description of what it means that work turns into 
an escape from and a repression of concerns about meaning. 
His verdict on the life of frenzied activity, the busy life, 
culminates in existential questions: what does it mean to live 
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whole-heartedly? What does it mean to dedicate oneself to 
what is good? My aim in this chapter is thus to show that it is 
precisely these kinds of questions that are quenched when 
work takes on the role of self-realization or manifestations of 
hard, ‘dedicated’ work.   
3.2 Busyness and suspension of existential worries 
[Each] of us has to “make oneself” – to choose a position best 
suited to one’s potential and achieve it. But to do so one must 
know what one’s potential is (not an easy thing to do in most 
cases before the potential is realized) – one has to “find oneself,” 
in other words (Greenfield 2005, 331).  
Leah Greenfield writes about a culture in which everything 
appears to be a burden. Leisure is a burden. Family is a 
burden. Work is a burden. One is busy and one knows one has 
to prioritize and make the right choices. She is puzzled by this 
agonized search for the right choices. What is it that afflicts 
these people who live in a rather comfortable society? It is not 
hard toil, nor a sheer lack of time. What she describes is a form 
of joylessness; unsurmountable burdens wherever one looks. 
She calls this phenomenon busyness, a very ambiguous mode 
of being active with an equally ambiguous sense of 
commitment. Alan Ryan writes that ‘busyness’ usually means 
the opposite of real, productive, hard and serious work. The 
busy person is all appearance, and little substance: busyness is 
a form of pretense (Ryan 2005, 427-8). The positive-seeming 
image of the busy life is contrasted with a concept of busyness 
as sham or at least as an ambiguous attitude towards life.  
Weeks for her part is not content with a neat distinction 
between honest toil and jobs that have only an appearance of 
seriousness. In what follows I carry on with Weeks’ project by 
looking at two ideals of work where I think it actually makes 
sense to talk about busyness: the ideal of hard work and the 
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ideal of work as self-realization. These are often seen as 
opposites, but I will show that they are related: in both cases, 
the celebration of work risks leading to a view where it is 
unclear exactly what is celebrated. The nature of the 
commitment to one’s job/to work is unclear, and this is where 
I think busyness enters the picture. With Kierkegaard, I will 
talk about busyness as forgetfulness. I will interpret busyness in 
this ambiguous form as anxiety related to work that instead of 
being described as just that, often appears as the purpose of 
life: hard work, self-realization and work-family balance. 
However, I do not agree with Alain de Botton, who claims that 
work in itself is an expression of anxiety and that all work 
amounts to busyness in the sense of holding a basic level of 
anxiety at bay (cf. de Botton (2009). What I would like to 
describe is rather an existential role work comes to have: in 
contrast to de Botton’s contention, this does not reveal what 
life must always be like, but what life can become. The basic 
question is, I take it: what kind of commitment does our 
involvement in work express?  
The concept of busyness needs to be combined with other 
ways in which work is detached from purposes. Weeks’ 
critique takes its point of departure from two things: the 
elevation of ‘productive’ work and the naturalization, what I 
call neutralization, of work. Many – but not all – of the writers 
I called work critics (chapter 2) share a critique of what is 
sometimes called productivism, a concept which to them is 
tantamount to a general elevation of work or productive 
activities. Horkheimer, among other critical theorists, 
maintains that this society glorifies productivity, even though 
productivity has no particular aim. “Productive work, manual 
or intellectual, has become respectable, indeed the only 
accepted way of spending one’s life, and any occupation, the 
pursuit of any end that eventually yields an income, is called 
productive.” (Horkheimer 2004, 28) Weeks wrestles with the 
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celebration of productive powers that she sees as an extension 
of industrial work under capitalism, but also as a typical form 
of Marxism where the hope is that a communist society will 
finally liberate the potentials of the forces of production. She 
claims that it is misleading to think that the problem is that, as 
some Marxists say, ‘living labor power’ is harnessed by 
capital, and that this living labor power should be set free so 
that its authentic energies are let loose (2011, 15). Thus, she is 
critical of a humanist version (cf. chapter 2) of the idea about 
unfettered productive forces.  
Weeks maintains that the social role of waged work has 
been so naturalized as to seem necessary and inevitable: it 
might be tinkered with but never escaped (Weeks 2011, 7). 
Already here I think it is worth pointing out that two 
assumptions should be avoided. The first is to conclude that 
there are conclusive ways to establish what is necessary and 
inevitable. That would go against the grain of everything that 
Weeks says. The other wrong-headed path would be to claim 
that all uses of ‘necessary’ and ‘inevitable’ are ideological. We 
need to look at the specific case, what is meant by ‘necessary’ 
or within which kinds of relations people talk about 
something as ‘necessary’. 
So, The Problem with Work sets out to investigate the 
naturalized position work has gained. She challenges the 
“reified common sense” (2011, 43) valuation of work. This 
rejection of common sense takes off from contradictions, an 
outlook “that forces us to look for disequilibrium where we 
might expect to find stability, that scrambles traditional 
assumptions about who is active and who is reactive, and that 
encourages recognition of the working class not primarily in 
terms of its economic role but as a political agent.” (2011, 94 – 
the context of the quote is a discussion of Autonomist 
Marxism but she seems to be in sympathy with this line of 
thinking). According to Weeks, the glorification of work 
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creates a sphere in which a set of alleged truths are produced 
and upheld. However, she does not, as some writers do (cf. 
Muirhead 2004, 98-103), look for a more authentic form of the 
work ethic that reconnects work with true moral sources and 
with the belief that work has an intrinsic worth. What she calls 
‘the work ethic’, which could be understood as a version of 
Marcuse’s one-dimensional thinking, a life geared to work, is 
described as a coherent yet contradictory system. The work 
ethic is both tenacious and unstable (2011, 38). This is what I 
will turn to in the next two sections. 
3.3 Hard work 
Weeks is one of several writers (cf. Rose 1999, Lazzarato 1996, 
Sennett 1998) who connect work and subjectivity, and explore 
how work changes our self-understanding. As she states in 
her book: it is not sufficient to focus on the organization of 
work. One also needs to attend to the moral (or quasi-moral) 
emphasis on work: how the central role of work is upheld. 
Talking about exploitation and de-skilling is not enough. Even 
if it is crucial to be clear about how most forms of work do not 
live up to the ideals people have about meaningful and 
rewarding work, scrutinizing these ideals themselves, Weeks 
argues, is essential as well (Weeks 2011, 11-4).  
She talks about a work ethic central for understanding the 
role of work in our lives: work is considered to be endowed 
with dignity and this is not immediately connected with 
purposes or the specific nature of the job one is doing. Work is 
dignified in itself. According to Weber’s classic description of 
the protestant work ethic, hard work is worthy whatever 
character it has: work is not done for life, but it is done in the 
spirit of being a moral duty in its own right. This can only be 
achieved through what Russell Muirhead calls ‘the restless 
activity of consistent work’ (cf. Weber 2001, 19, Muirhead 
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2004, 102-4) Interestingly, there seems to be a democratic 
potential in that idea. Hard work, regardless of its nature, 
allows everyone to demonstrate their worth and their personal 
sets of aptitudes.46 However, Weeks points out that for all the 
democratic potential of the stance according to which all work 
can be a calling, such positive valuation of work tends to 
contain normative and hidden hierarchies and biases. She 
argues that class differences are hidden when work is 
singularly praised in accordance with the idea that even the 
most humble form of work is important. This praise remains a 
form, not an attempt to actively improve the conditions of 
work, or to radically change people’s perception of various 
forms of work (2011, 44).  
As Weeks claims, the levelling of all forms of work 
constructs both inclusion and exclusion. New hierarchies are 
generated, for example so that normative definitions of hard 
work tend to be biased in terms of race or gender (2011, 61-5). 
What characterizes such types of exclusive normativity is that 
they are rarely explicit. One can here think about the tendency 
in certain left-wing movements to glorify the toil of blue-collar 
work performed by men, and to romanticize hard, sweaty 
work. Furthermore, class-specific masculinities tend to be 
structured around the conception of hard work even though 
such conceptions take different shapes depending on whether 
one thinks about the ideal of ‘honest, blue-collar work’, the 
ideal of ‘work hard, play hard’ in a more middle-class setting 
or the busy life of the corporate executive. It is easy to imagine 
normative uses of hard/real work that builds upon exclusion 
                                                          
46 There is an ongoing discussion about what ‘democratic’ means. Michael 
Walzer argues that one democratic idea of work implies that there are jobs 
that nobody should do and that such jobs should be abolished. This seems a too 
idealistic account, he claims: allegedly, sharing hard work fairly does not 
work either. Another option is to re-organize work so that it can be a source of 
pride (1983, 167-180). 
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of other forms of masculinities; ‘sitting behind a desk’ or 
‘brainless job’ are examples of pejorative descriptions of work 
that tend to appear in such contexts.  
The French philosopher Jacques Rancière writes:  
Whenever workers speak in the name of Work, affirm its rights or 
glorify its greatness, we run the risk of inferring a false picture of 
the collectivity they represent or of the realities which underly 
[sic] their speech, unless we determine very precisely who is 
speaking, who is being addressed and what the stakes are 
(Rancière 1983, 9).  
What Rancière gets right is that elevation of work or skill (or 
representations of work-related pride, self-worth or dignity) is 
easily taken at face value so that one forgets the contexts in 
which such statements are made: what are the stakes and what 
are such statements responses to? What sorts of moves are 
made by means of such statements? What kind of self-
understanding do they express and in relation to which 
worries and concerns are such things said?47 The wider point 
he makes is that uncritical histories of the workers’ movement 
often single out certain groups of workers as the driving force 
of the movement. When the stakes and surroundings of such 
histories are forgotten, mythologies lurk around the corner, 
especially mythologies about ‘good’ or ‘progressive’ workers 
(Rancière 1983, 12-3).  
Such proneness to mythologize progressive workers shows 
the stakes of Weeks’s argument: the praise of ‘hard work’ has 
an air of common sense, an air of appreciation and grounded 
reasonableness. However, what examples of such positive talk 
reveal is that undercurrents of exclusion and fear of failure are 
internal to that ethic: the image of hard work feeds off the 
shadow of the loafer, the unemployed, the worker whose job 
                                                          
47 For similar discussions, cf. Cobb & Sennett 1972, Lamont 2000. 
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doesn’t fit into a certain idea about what ‘hard work’ amounts 
to. A similar dynamic of exclusion/inclusion can be noticed in 
the political elevation of hard work. Just to mention a few 
statements that often appear in American political debates: 
‘I'm worried that we will become a socialist country in which 
people who want to work hard and be innovative will be 
punished....’, ‘I work hard for my money. Nobody has the 
right to take it away from me.’ ‘America is a good country 
because you can reach your goals. If you work hard you have 
the possibility to be successful.’ ‘We want to work hard and be 
successful.’ Such statements manifest a way of presenting 
oneself as a hard-working, resilient and honest citizen, 
perhaps in a way that forges a strong distinction between the 
hard-working citizen and the subsidy-dependent loafer.  
It is striking how fragile this ethos seems: many claims in 
political campaigns try to drive home a point about how a lack 
of economic incentives will make the work ethic crumble. In 
other words, this work ethic is easily demoralized if ‘not 
working’ becomes an option. To repeat Negt’s point (chapter 
2.9): the problem of ‘loafing’ is a specific capitalist fear, that 
people will no longer be accessible to the labor market as 
flexible labor power. As I also said, this leads to a very mixed 
message about the inherent value of all kinds of work and the 
general worth of working hard: the emphasis on incentives 
tends to tip over into a language of threats, punishment and 
control. Welfare programs then come to seem dangerously 
close to discouraging people from work (cf. Shershow 2005, 
116-20). The underlying assumption is that people are lazy by 
disposition and need to be more or less forced to work: the 
rhetoric shifts from choice to coercion.  
Work becomes a matter of social integration and the aim is 
that people should develop ‘a work habit’. Workfare programs 
epitomize this tendency: those who receive unemployment 
benefits are required to ‘work off’ the value of the public 
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assistance, which in practice means everything from mopping 
floors, cutting grass and doing general office work. It is 
claimed that such programs will take away the stigma that 
living on welfare is supposedly imbued with, that it will 
enhance people’s self-esteem and that the unemployed will 
feel that they are making a contribution to the community 
(Hawkesworth 2001). In this rhetoric, the nicest thing you can 
say about poor people or migrants is that they are willing to 
work, that they are willing to become full-blown members of 
society. Margaret Hawkesworth sums up the consequences of 
the workfare programs very aptly, and this is what I would 
regard as an example of the neutralization of work:  
But workfare also has a profound effect upon work life in 
America by foreclosing debate about the fundamental meaning of 
work for an individual, about the relationship between work, self-
definition and self-determination and about the relation between 
the nature of work and the constitutive principles of society. […..] 
The very notion that people have a right, individually and 
collectively, to examine the nature of work and to choose to 
accept or to restructure the conditions of worklife in 
contemporary society is supplanted by a profound resignation to 
the prevailing patterns of debilitating employment as the only 
conceivable option (Hawkesworth 2001, 276). 
This example of how debates about worklife are actively 
foreclosed illustrates what Weeks has in mind when she talks 
about the work ethic as tenacious and unstable, forceful and 
fragile. This side is revealed when one looks at the 
contradictions that go deep in the moralizing celebration of 
work in contrast to dependence or welfare. The quote above 
reminds us of how the tenacious ideology of workfare can be 
seen both as foreclosure of debates that threaten it and as 
dangerous resignation or cynicism expressed in acceptance of 
harmful or precarious jobs. This sums up what I mean by 
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neutralization of work: a foreclosure of debates that already 
exists all around us. 
The ethic of hard work takes various shapes and it can be 
placed in radically different political settings: idealizations of 
social mobility and the idea that everybody will succeed if 
they work hard, try hard, an emphasis on working-class 
dignity or a celebration of self-expression (cf. Lamont 2000). 
As I see it, the work ethic in the sense of work as a neutralized, 
positive activity is characterized by its detachment from 
purposes and needs, while this work ethic is at the same time 
instrumentalized in its aspect of wage labor within capitalism. 
By ‘instrumentalization’ I mean the transformation of work 
into labor power, a commodity. In other words, the work ethic 
overflows with tensions that concern means and ends, what 
we are working for. Instead of inquiring into the purposes of 
work, Weeks notes, people make do with ‘workaday 
existence’ (Weeks 2011, 44-47). This detachment from needs 
has often been rendered as an ethic of discipline in which 
people’s jobs are detached from what people judge as worthy 
purposes:  
The crusade [of the work ethic] was also aimed at detaching 
things people did from what they saw as worthy of doing and 
thus as sensible things to do; detaching the work itself from any 
tangible and understandable purpose it might have served 
(Bauman 1998, 8). 
My reading of Weeks starts from the worry she struggles to 
articulate. If I understand the argument correctly, her view (a 
free interpretation of Weber) is that the meaning of an ethic of 
hard work or an elevation of all work as worthy is separated 
from work as a doing, an activity that makes a difference in the 
world. Weeks’ point is that there is an alarming tendency in 
this appreciation of work that makes us look away from or 
trivialize the shady purposes work might serve. If all work is 
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worthy, then no further inquiries into the functioning of wage 
labor is needed. If one has worked hard, one has done one’s 
part, but what kind of ‘part’ one’s job is supposed to be 
remains outside this picture of contributing to society. One 
could say that the ethic of hard work fetishizes ‘doing one’s 
part’: the meaning of ‘doing one’s part’ takes on an almost 
obsessive positive meaning so that it becomes very hard to see 
through it. Work is seen as a societal project in which we all 
should take part as responsible adults. This is strongly present 
in the idea that work is integrative, an idea in which Arendt 
would discern the most unabashed and repulsive 
amalgamation of labor, subsistence and shared life. As Weeks 
says, this kind of thinking breeds and upholds a world of 
inequality especially between those who have a job and those 
who don’t (2011, 53): being a member of society is predicated 
on the fragile and precarious circumstance of having a job. 
This image of hard work is related to the idea that work 
guarantees independence.48 
Not only is the ethic of hard work riddled with tensions: it 
proclaims a concept of dedication that seems to have little to 
do with the job being seen as important or good. Hard work is 
commonly understood as a virtue, but the kind of virtue that 
requires that people shouldn’t ask themselves too complicated 
questions about what work means in their lives or what the 
job that they do means to people affected by it. The sociologist 
Madeleine Bunting quotes a woman in advertising:  
 
                                                          
48 One of the first substantiations of the connection between work and 
independence can be found in John Locke’s understanding of work as 
something that the person hirself owns, an idea related to a theory about the 
source of property. The person owns hir own work along with the fruits of hir 
work. By means of work, the sphere of ownership is extended – the primary 
form of work then appears to be appropriation of nature. The working person 
creates a sphere of personal independence and freedom (Locke 1980, 305-10). 
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I feel that there is an expectation that work should be treated as a 
vocation and, that working hard is just not quite enough. But I 
don’t feel that my job is really that important (to society or to me) 
to really want to take on the extra and damage my home life. Not 
all of us have a vocation – what about those of us who want to do 
a good job, but want time to see partners, friends etc. after work? 
(Bunting 2005, XV)    
The employee in the quote expresses the worry that hard work 
is not even enough. The work ethic of hard work reels from 
emphasizing ‘doing one’s part’ to an elastic logic in which no 
amount of work can be seen as sufficient – this is what André 
Gorz chose to call ‘economic rationality’ (chapter 2).  The ethic 
of hard work elicits the fear that one is not working as hard as 
others are; one is not dedicated enough. Following the pattern 
of ‘the protestant ethic’, one cannot know whether one has 
worked hard enough; maybe you are not the Chosen One, 
perhaps you will be made redundant tomorrow despite your 
unceasing toil. In other words, there is a striking dissonance 
between the ideology about work as ‘doing one’s part’ and 
this paranoid and elastic image of dedication entangled with 
fears of losing one’s job or one’s position. The paranoia of hard 
work and dedication reveals a worrying figure of thought: one 
has to work oneself into a position of being a worthy member 
of society, and even then it is never a stable position. Perhaps 
this is one of the reasons behind the persistent dreams of 
earning a stable, recognized position by means of hard work? 
This paranoia also figures in the idea that the best society we 
can think of is a society that at least rewards hard work. 
 Implied in this ethic of hard work is that one is on one’s 
own in many different senses of the word. The empirical facts 
are sobering: hard work doesn’t even always pay. Some 
people work hard without earning a decent living and for 
them, it is very clear why it is often cruel to talk about work as 
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‘doing one’s part in society’.49 In this way, the myths about the 
hard-working individual can be penetrated by sociology and 
journalism, but ideological depictions of the relation between 
the individual and society should also be dissected. The most 
fatal aspect of idealizations of ‘hard, honest toil’ by means of 
which one earns a place in society is that such ideologies 
makes it difficult to react against exploitative forms of work. 
Work is treated as a progressive societal project in which all of 
us should take part. To speak up against exploitation risks 
being seen as irresponsible and disloyal if the point of 
departure is that the main obligation for all of us is to find a 
job by means of which we contribute to the wealth of society. 
This shows a very delicate aspect of the ideology about hard 
work, namely that hard work appears like a choice, an act of 
will or an admirable expression of dedicated discipline.50 In this 
rhetoric where hard work is related to responsibility to 
society, an unavoidable necessity – to get a job – is thus 
presented as a choice one commits to (cf. Bauman 1998, 19). 
Individualism and collectivity coalesce.  
A striking example of how the ideology of independence 
and hard work is the distinction between the ‘deserving’ and 
the ‘undeserving’ poor (or to use an older vocabulary, ‘true 
paupers’). Some appear to live in poverty in spite of their hard 
work (perhaps due to sickness or age) while there is 
supposedly another group who has chosen their own fate by 
failing to enlist in decent society’s work. The first group is 
then thought to be beyond the work ethic, while the other 
group, idle pretenders, is to be reformed or, to use a more 
contemporary word, ‘rehabilitated’. The only way the latter 
                                                          
49 Barbara Ehrenreich’s Nickel and Dimed (2002) is an instructive overview. 
50 This description sometimes clashes with another: hard work is often 
connected with brute necessity or unflinching toil. For all their contradictions, 
these rhetorical patterns sometimes overlap. 
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group can be saved is through being morally changed so that 
their attitude towards work is reformed. What such 
distinctions produce is, again, a work ethic that creates a 
language of inclusion and a language of exclusion. As several 
writers have shown, the ethic of hard work and independence, 
for all its promise of democratic value, is bound up with class 
differences and resentment stemming from hierarchies in how 
work is valued. A typical example is a working class person 
who defends hir place in society by emphasizing hir success in 
providing for hir family while some ‘other people’ live off the 
state without giving anything back to society. Sennett talks 
about this kind of situation using the term “zero-sum game of 
respect” (2003, 46), which I think captures the sinister sides of 
the ideology of hard work: it lends legitimacy to competition 
and contempt towards what does not conform to the ideal of 
hard work.  
I will now move on to a quite different form of elevation of 
work, namely work as self-realization, but the same structure 
of a restricted distribution of respect and fear of failure 
prevails, a fear which leads me to talk about busyness. I will 
also go on to illustrate what Weeks means when she talks 
about the work ethic as contradictory, tenuous and fragile. 
These images of work – the elevation of hard work and the 
conception of work as self-realization – should be placed 
within the same frame. For most writers, these images are 
opposite and they are said to belong to very different 
historical situations (cf. Bauman 1998, 33). My point is instead 
that these are two sides of the same coin. They express a 
similar fear, the fear of exclusion and the fear of loneliness. 
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3.4 The ambiguous concept of self-realization 
The worker is portrayed neither as an economic actor, rationally 
pursuing financial advantage, nor as a social creature seeking 
satisfaction of needs for solidarity and security. The worker is an 
individual in search of meaning, responsibility, a sense of 
personal achievement, a maximized ‘quality of life’, and hence of 
work. Thus the individual is not to be emancipated from work, 
perceived as merely a task or a means to an end, but to be fulfilled 
in work, now construed as an activity through which we produce, 
discover, and experience our selves (Rose 1999, 104). 
A dominating discourse right now is that we should all have 
meaningful jobs. Meaningfulness has become a cultural 
rhetoric that can be traced in how people talk about their lives 
and what is important for them (Svendsen 2009, Muirhead 
2004). This quest for meaningfulness can be formulated in 
various ways. Below, I want to focus on how the quest for a 
meaningful job can turn into an ideal with problematic and 
self-deceptive features that may not be apparent when one 
looks at the familiar desire to find a meaningful job. I will look 
at a rhetorical tangle according to which we are to live 
meaningful lives, epitomized by our having what appears like 
a good job that gives us personal affirmation. I am not saying 
that every desire to have a rewarding job is enmeshed with this 
logic, but I do suggest that the idea of work as self-realization 
can be an existential temptation which, for all its self-affirming 
promises, might have a disturbing side.51 Paul Heelas writes 
about the idea that life should be brought to work:  
Many (MBA’d [Master of Business Administration]) managers 
want work to cater for the exercise, expression and development 
                                                          
51 There are different ways of emphasizing self-realization in work. As 
Nicholas Rose points out, one way of doing this is stressing social solidarity, 
participation, democracy at the workplace and the worker as a unique person 
aspiring to meaningful work (1999, 105-7).  
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of personal life as an aliveness or rejuvenation of subjective life, 
the air of being all that they can be. Many do not want to waste 
their time by just ‘working’, without also ‘growing’; many feel 
that life is too short and working hours too long for them to be 
content with the ‘raiding work attitude’; many feel that their own 
lives are too significant to be sacrificed or disciplined for the sake 
of the company (unless, that is, their growth is assured) (Heelas 
2002, 93).    
According to this image of self-realization, work infuses our 
lives with significance, fills life with intensity and challenge. A 
distinction to ‘mere work’ appears: a job should contain the 
potential to grow and develop. It should not be ‘just a job’ or 
‘mere work’. In this collective, but also personal, way of 
talking, desiring a meaningful job takes the shape of a 
normative understanding of what it is to be a striving, healthy 
person.  
The focus on worthwhile activities is of course important, 
and I will say more about that at the end of this chapter and in 
the next one as well: one can talk about how a job molds a 
person’s life in a way that does not mean that life is colonized, 
but rather that a person is dedicated to a worthwhile 
occupation. However, in the normative idea I have in mind, 
the meaning of ‘a worthwhile activity’ is strangely displaced 
so that what is emphasized is what everybody should strive for 
and instead of development being connected with what is 
considered important, it coalesces with concepts such as 
opportunity or career – a notion of success worms its way into 
the ideal. What appears like a personal quest for meaning may 
thus be said to be a collective elevation of work as jobs with 
‘potential’, jobs for ambitious people. This is what I have 
talked about as a moralization of work. When extended to 
individual growth and identity, work appears like one of the 
choices that make us unique ˗ it is dressed in the language of 
life style choices. One needs to remember that there is 
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disagreement as to which jobs bear the emblem of personal 
success, whether it is being an electrician, a corporate lawyer 
or a journalist. Already this kind of disagreement indicates the 
tensions at play here. 
The risk at hand is an uncritical conviction about some 
having fulfilling jobs, while others are considered to have jobs 
that make the life of these ambitious professionals easier. The 
professional and hir busy life are idealized, and ‘mundane’ 
chores are contracted out to service workers (cf. Bunting 2005, 
160-173; Blair-Loy 2003, 34-5). To repeat Gorz’s astute 
observation: a class society arises that legitimizes the idea that 
some have ‘fulfilling jobs’, while a great number of people are 
reduced to servants. Some jobs are understood to stand for 
progress and creativity, while other jobs serve the purpose of 
making it possible for creative people to invest themselves 
fully in these rewarding jobs. Bauman describes what he sees 
as a contemporary situation: society is split into an elite of 
workers who praise free choice and self-fulfillment, and the 
rest who have no choice but to accept any job: 
Work that is rich in gratifying experience, work as self-fulfillment, 
work as the meaning of life, work as the core or the axis of 
everything that counts, as the source of pride, self-esteem, honour 
and deference or notoriety, in short, work as vocations, has 
become the privilege of the few, a distinctive mark of the elite, a 
way of life the rest may watch in awe, admire and contemplate at 
a distance (Bauman 1998, 34). 
As Richard Sennett points out in his book Respect in a World of 
Inequality, a work ethic connected with status, prestige and 
respect, at least in some of its appearances, does not allow for 
the idea that all should have meaningful jobs. What he says 
can be applied to conceptions of work as self-realization. 
Sennett talks about the self-understanding this work ethic 
presupposes: it often expresses a form of individualism, but 
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within this work ethic one is constantly subjected to being 
accepted, confirmed and watched. This gaze is also directed 
towards oneself, and one instance of this gaze Sennett 
discusses is the anguished worry that one may not be a person 
who has ‘potential’. He says that potential is a puzzling 
concept existing somewhere in the space between ability, 
talent, aptitude and motivation – in other words, in a twilight 
zone between inherent traits, will power and resolution. To 
lack ‘potential’ then appears like a blow against one’s entire 
person (2003, 74-6). 
Sennett aptly outlines a fragile sense of self of the person 
worrying about failure, about not being motivated enough or 
not having earned the opportunity s/he has got. The troubling 
side of self-realization can be seen in a specific conception of 
everyday life and a specific attitude to day to day reality. I 
would say that the ideal of enthusiastic dedication does not 
acknowledge the day-to-day rhythm of work: having a bad 
feeling in the stomach when one drives to the office; nagging 
customers; a kind word at lunch; working slowly with a 
difficult problem and finally being able to get it right; doing 
the job that you don’t see as the best job in the world, but it 
doesn’t eat up your life. What happens when people are no 
longer able to feel enthusiastic and ‘passionate’ about their 
job? This question reveals the fragility of the sense of self 
expressed in the ideal of self-realization. At the same time, 
what I have tried to say so far is that the disturbing aspect of 
self-realization and the language of passion disregard fragility 
in the form of worries about neglecting or exploiting relations 
to other people. Have I been using my family as a resource in 
my life project? Do my colleagues appear as threats in my 
project of making a career? This disregard is manifest in how 
the emphasis on ‘passion’ and self-realization is glued on the 
brink of disappointment or disenchantment about the ideals at 
hand. It is not surprising that the ideal of downshifting – the 
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desire to settle down in a quiet life in which one has time 
instead of money, the desire for a more ‘balanced’ life – for a 
selected few exists as the flip side of the work ethic. Exhaustion 
and longing for some peace and quiet is, so to speak, inscribed 
within the picture of work as self-realization. 
Sennett evokes an equally fragile “perverse, seductive 
power of inequality” (2003, 89). Here, too, competition 
dominates the picture. Comparison and assessment among 
people are the chief way in which a work ethic of self-
realization is created and upheld. The work ethic in this sense 
is about proving oneself to be a specific type of person, and 
this process of appearance and proving has no end point – as 
Sennett writes: a kind of “moral fitness training through 
work” (Sennett 2003, 58; 108-10). Self-realization, in this sense, 
has to be representable and representative; for this reason it 
may not be that surprising that recognition is a prevailing 
theme in the literature on work. By ‘recognition’ writers 
typically mean a collective and mutual form of understanding 
and respect, along with a collective process of identity-
formation. As Stephan Voswinkel aptly remarks, recognition 
of work and workers leads to the questions: which types of 
work are seen as worthy of recognition and which sorts of 
achievements are recognized? As he also notes, a common 
understanding of recognition is that it stems from social 
contribution and that in being thus inscribed in often unequal 
social relations, it is inscribed in existing relations of power. 
His conclusion is that work-based recognition reflects social 
tensions, a society in which not all forms of work are 
recognized. This is evident in more specific concepts of 
recognition as well. Professionals are admired and their work 
is associated with prestige, while other workers will have to 
make do with being appreciated for ‘doing their duty’. The 
latter form is, he claims, on the verge of being outmoded by a 
subjectivized language of self-realization, which gives rise to 
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new crises of recognition (2011, 274; 278-9, 280). These crises 
direct our attention to ‘recognition’ as a symptom.52 Rather than 
being an ontological cornerstone of our social being (as a 
mechanism of subject formation), an analysis of recognition 
can start from the worry about misrecognition, about status and 
about jobs being despised, disrespected or neutralized for 
example as a ‘function’.  
Sennett highlights self-realization as an ideal: what may on 
the surface appear as a democratic recognition of all forms of 
work can turn into a fiercely competitive work ethic in which 
only a few people can achieve what is seen as the aim – 
fulfilling, challenging, but also respected, work. Sennett aptly 
describes this highly ambiguous work ethic: work is promoted 
as a universal value but “a universal value with highly 
unequal consequences” (2003, 89). It is not only that this work 
ethic of self-realization has elitist tendencies. In the 
summoning of enthusiasm and manifest forms of dedication, 
an abundance of things are glossed over: injustice, inequality, 
hidden dependencies, destructive organizational structures, 
sinewy economic relations, sexism and newspeak. The image 
of self-realization is often used to idealize the self-reliant 
entrepreneur who can turn every situation into a challenge; 
every situation spurs the entrepreneur to test hir abilities. 
Someone may ask whether the image I have painted is not 
mere newspeak. Life goes on as before and the dream of self-
realization is limited to cheering speeches by work counselors 
and consultants. The sociologist Nicholas Rose writes:  
These new images of work and the worker may seem no more 
                                                          
52 In several texts, Nancy Fraser has criticized an identity-based politics of 
recognition. Such politics displaces claims about distribution and instead the 
focus is upon identity and culture, she argues (2010). She also views this 
politics as a symptom of a society of economic inequality, and lack of 
preparedness to deal with this maldistribution.   
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than the dreams of academics, researchers, consultants, and other 
professional entrepreneurs, themselves in search of a sense of 
fulfillment, personal advancement, and a fast buck. And it is 
important to stress the gulf between the rhetorical hype and the 
realities of productive life in industry, in the ‘service sector’ or on 
the dole queue. But what can be observed here is more than the 
froth of ideology. Once again we can see the ways in which 
connections and symmetries are forged, at both the conceptual 
and practical levels, between political concern about the 
government of the productive life of the nation, the concerns of 
owners of capital to maximize the economic advantages of their 
companies, and techniques for the governing of the productive 
subject (1999, 119). 
The valid point he makes is that talk about self-realization and 
creativity may seem to be fluff-talk, mere rhetoric, mere words, 
mere ideology. The distinction between rhetoric and the life at 
a specific workplace or the life of the unemployed has a 
central role in reminding us of how lofty this rhetoric often 
becomes. At the same time, the ideal about self-realization 
surfaces in economic and social relations, in legitimizations, in 
fears, in encouragement and advice. This very ambiguous 
ideal – with its hopes and blind spots – is expressed in how 
people think and feel about their lives and their futures. This 
language is also utilized in order to make people flexible, and 
perhaps even to make people drop some of their claims about 
what is just or safe: the most important thing is the stimulating 
job I have been offered. These kinds of suspension are what I 
will turn to next. 
3.5 Managing everyday life 
It seems to me that a one-sided emphasis on self-realization 
and hard-working commitment takes no interest in everyday 
life or even, as Weeks supposedly says, it represses the 
everyday which is subjected to managing: managing the kids, 
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managing the shopping and managing the weekend. The 
everyday becomes a problem to keep in check. A typical 
expression of the idea of work in this sense of frantic 
dedication is that it is an activity people choose to engage in 
for certain periods of time, while (ordinary) life is temporarily 
bracketed. As an example of this attitude, I would like to 
mention a newspaper article about Swedish young female 
professionals working in New York. They all had what is 
normally called rewarding and creative jobs (some were 
designers, others were artists), but there was an agreement 
among the young women in the article that one does not come 
to New York to live, one comes there to work. Work was 
represented as immersive and entirely busy, demanding 
focused attention and having an adverse relation to 
distractions. I am tempted to add: it has an adverse relation to 
life. In the article, this point was not made in the spirit of 
lamentation, but rather like a fact: this is what professionals 
working in a competitive environment must be prepared to 
handle – no time to live, no time to rest; especially, no time to 
be unfocused. A certain pride of working hard in New York 
could be detected in what they said. One must be determined, 
passionate and motivated.  
This image of work is a familiar one, but it is ambiguous, as 
Kierkegaard would say. Here busyness rises to the surface 
more explicitly. Restlessness is strangely present in this image 
of immersive work, as one of the modes of ‘the busy life’, as 
one of its equally ambiguous manifestations. This restlessness 
is bustling, a very positive word. It is lively, which makes it 
seem as if one is living to the full. Paradoxically, busyness 
does not exclude the ideal of being immersed in something, 
another very positive word: it is important to be absorbed in 
what one does. Even words like ‘obsession’ and ‘compulsion’ 
come to have an air of positive drive, ambition and ‘single-
mindedness’ (cf. Blair-Loy 2003, 32-3). The problem with work 
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in the form of busyness is that being busy is all about creating 
an image, turning oneself into a manifestation. Life with all its 
ethically significant change and openness is not tolerated: 
falling in love, being sick, taking care of ailing parents or 
having a child, losing the job. Such changes disturb the 
bustling and restless prospect of an immersive career. When 
ideas about work as self-realization gravitate towards building 
a career the fragility of the work ethic is accentuated: the 
fragility stemming from a concept of meaningfulness being 
immersed in competitive relations on the labor market and in 
organizational life. Most of all, these fragilities concern the 
future. 
The bracketing of everyday life in the busy schedule of the 
professional is routinely represented by a worry about the 
work-life balance. Many books by academic and non-academic 
authors have been published on the subject (cf. Hochschild 
2001, Blair-Loy 2003, Bunting 2005). While some of these take a 
critical attitude to the concept of a work-family balance, 
questioning the framework in which the worry is situated (for 
example criticizing it for having a bias for certain privileged 
professionals), others take on the task of solving this as a given 
dilemma ˗ and typically it is seen as a problem for women 
specifically ˗ as two components or commitments that need to 
be ‘juggled’ and reconciled in a realistic way. As many writers 
point out, a danger is that such problems seem to be 
individual concerns or choices (Blair-Loy 2005, 3). My view is 
that talking about work-life balance does not quite capture 
what is going on when life itself is seen as something to control 
and manage according to the needs of the career. What is 
more, what I called a bustling working activity – the hectic 
positive-seeming busyness – can be seen as a flight from life 
when one considers it from an ethical and existential point of 
view. That kind of existential worry tends to be absent from 
the story about work-family balance that, in its uncritical 
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forms, takes the demands and relations within the world of 
work more or less for granted as a hectic and competitive 
sphere, as the hectic nature of leisure and family life are also 
assumed as normal components of life, the unruliness of 
which must somehow be controlled. In this sense, a 
disciplined and fulfilling working life does not have to be 
what it appears to be.  
The tendency to repress everyday life also takes another 
expression, an even stronger one: life itself, with its “wealth of 
possibilities” as Weeks writes, must be kept in place (Weeks 
2011, 48). Life, sleep, love, friendship, relations, joy are 
consumed or drained by work: working double jobs, being 
unemployed and worrying about work, over-working, 
planning life so that work is the main factor that everything 
else has to adapt to. Weeks argues that work relations are 
reproduced in ways not limited to what one would normally 
think of as employment: desires, habits, routines and hopes 
are shaped by these relations (2011, 54; 141-2). It is from the 
perspective of the work ethic that everything that is not 
production is perceived in a deprecating way:  
Productivist ethics assume that productivity is what defines and 
refines us, so that when human capacities for speech, intellect, 
thought, and fabrication are not directed to productive ends, they 
are reduced to mere idle talk, idle curiosity, idle thoughts, and 
idle hands, their noninstrumentality a shameful corruption of 
these human qualities (2011, 170).  
If free time is not a shadow of work, it poses a threat to the 
work ethic. This is a central tension of the work ethic she 
describes and as we saw, also Marcuse and Gorz tried to 
articulate this devastating tension. The tendency of wage labor 
in its present form is, according to Weeks, that our entire lives 
are subjected to it so that this affects what we imagine a life 
and a future to be. She recalls Nietzsche’s admonishing of 
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ascetic morality and denial of pleasure. The existential weight 
of these remarks can, I think (even though one may be in 
disagreement with Nietzsche’s general scheme of thought), be 
illustrated by a quote from his Daybreak: 
Fundamentally, one now feels at the sight of work – one always 
means by work that hard industriousness from early till late – 
that such work is the best policeman, that it keeps everyone in 
bonds and can mightily hinder the development of reason, 
covetousness, desire for independence. For it uses up an 
extraordinary amount of nervous energy, which is thus denied to 
reflection, brooding, dreaming, worrying, loving, hating; it sets a 
small goal always in sight and guarantees easy and regular 
satisfaction. Thus a society in which there is continual hard work 
will have more security (Nietzsche 1982, 105). 
Nietzsche is on to something here, even though I would not go 
along with his economic view of human energies. The quote 
produces an image of a life where work shrinks the horizon of 
things that matter. To translate this into the situation for many 
people today, even regardless of the proneness to emphasize 
work as self-realization and, as we saw, even as a manifestation 
of it: the security of having a job makes other perspectives 
rather irrelevant; the security of employment is so all-
important that other concerns become secondary. This may be 
a stunting of hope: ‘at least I have a job…’ Nietzsche describes 
how work turns life into a life where we have to settle for 
little: balance between the working life and family life, 
perhaps, earning health care through employment, and so on. 
However, this is not to say that good health care is trivial or 
inconsequential. The problem is, to allude to a figure of 
thought in Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition, when life 
shrinks: paying off debts and making sure that the next 
generation can have what we have are then seen as the 
primary concerns and responsibilities. This is a key insight in 
her writings and it is from this point of view one can interpret 
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her worry about the disappearance of the political and the 
reduction of non-work activities to hobbies. The sense in 
which the future is open is lost, or distorted. As Ernst Bloch (to 
whom Weeks refers) writes, futurity in a very basic sense is 
related to hope: hope is internal to our sense of reality. Weeks 
claims that this dimensions is repressed when fear upheld by 
the world of work diminishes our capacities to act and care. 
Typically, fear takes the form of a certain kind of spur, the 
spur to self-preservation (2011, 198). People are consumed by 
an exhausting sense of here and now, this job application, this 
career step, this bill, this meeting. 
The pressures of getting by in hard times tend not, as Robin 
Kelley notes, to be generative of the political imagination; instead, 
‘we are constantly putting out fires, responding to emergencies, 
finding temporary refuge, all of which make it difficult to see 
anything other than the present.’ (2011, 11)  
This quote sums up the logic of what I would call management: 
time shrinks to an ever-restless now, beyond which the future 
does not appear as more than something to handle, control 
and calculate. The horizon for political imagination closes 
down as the attitude is that one has to make do within the 
present situation or one has to be ambitious, preparing for the 
next step in one’s career.  
I have focused on how the ideals of hard work and the 
elevation of self-realization risk undermining or inhibiting an 
ethical and existential reflection on the relation between work 
and life. This discussion will be continued by means of 
Kierkegaard’s articulation of busyness as a form of self-
deception. In what follows, I return to Weeks’ dismissal of the 
‘work ethic’ and her misgivings about what she calls the ethic 
of ‘better work’.  
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3.6 Life beyond work 
Like other thinkers critical of contemporary work, Weeks 
encourages the possibility of turning against or exiting from 
the present work-centered society. According to the 
understanding of wage labor in capitalism she promotes, work 
is imposed so that life is subordinated to work. My 
understanding of this is that wage labor presupposes that 
people make themselves and their entire lives available for the 
requirements of the world of wage labor, and this means that 
one’s life is organized around the job or employment. Weeks 
proposes refusal:  
[The] refusal of work is not a renunciation of labor tout court, but 
rather a refusal of the ideology of work as highest calling and 
moral duty, a refusal of work as the necessary center of social life 
and means of access to the rights and claims of citizenship, and a 
refusal of the necessity of capitalist control of production (2011, 
99). 
Instead of encouraging a reinstatement of noble work or better 
work (as in humanist Marxism, cf. chapter 2), instead of 
immersing oneself in what she calls ‘a lifetime of work’, other 
possibilities can be sought out. What this requires is a 
disidentification with the present, a distancing that allows for 
reflection and hope (2011, 205). Two aspects of such distancing 
are to assess common solutions for and consolidations of 
political organization that responds to the problem of work.  
Weeks, who is wary of the conventional ways of settling 
these problems, suggests that work-family balance is not the 
solution. She tries to battle thinking that seems to be critical of 
work, but that instead strengthens its hold:  
Thus we find in a body of management literature and practice 
that spans the Fordist and Post-Fordist periods an expressed need 
to locate and preserve some kind of balance between work and 
family – a relationship that many feminists, on the contrary, 
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struggled to expose as a product of normative impositions rather 
than natural proclivity and a site of flagrant contradiction rather 
than imbalance (Weeks 2011, 27).  
Her claim, with which I am sympathetic, is that the proposal 
of a work-family balance normalizes and naturalizes the 
present system of work and the present norms of the family, 
including gender roles (2011, 155-9). She is critical of the idea 
that our lives unfold in neatly distinguishable spheres. She 
calls this a functionalist pattern of thought that takes things for 
granted by life being imagined as a set of pre-existing building 
blocks. For example, the moral call for recognition of the value 
of unpaid gendered work in the household further entrenches 
gender essentialism ˗ that housework is women’s work ˗ and 
in this way status quo is legitimized (cf. 2011, 129). The 
problem with thinking in terms of spheres is that such 
functionalism unwittingly invites the idea that the problems 
surrounding wage labor boil down to proportions and limits, 
not as Weeks herself would have it, a problem with an entire 
mode of life and the work-centered dependence it engenders 
(2011, 99). The view of spheres elicits a desire to seek the 
ultimate balance between them. I agree with her that resisting 
such views can be done by highlighting the tenuous and 
unstable character of work society: this requires an 
investigation of how a work-centered society is upheld and as I 
said in 2.3, it requires a critique of everyday life. What makes 
this claim even stronger is that Weeks encourages a critique of 
work from within these tensions, one of the manifestations of 
which is the conventional reference to work-family balance. 
She warns against the image of life manically protected from 
the claims of the working life; ‘quality time’ is placed in 
distinction to ‘working time’, the fantasy of the perfect 
vacation or the utopia of downshifting emerges. These 
attempts to restrict work paradoxically turn into techniques of 
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managing life outside work as something that needs to be 
maintained as an undisturbed zone, which according to 
Weeks gives rise to many suspect images of the purity and 
authenticity of family life in contrast to the ‘cold’ rationality of 
the market (cf. 2007, 244).  
As we have seen, Weeks describes life and reproduction of 
life in a way that underlines the state of tensions: she 
emphasizes the possibility of life beyond work but, like many 
autonomist Marxists who make a similar conceptual move, 
she says that “capital seeks continually to harness its times, 
spaces, rhythms, purposes and values” (2011, 29). Weeks 
astutely maintains that a vital task is to understand life in such 
a way that it becomes clear how the destructive 
transformation into an elementary function of the work 
society does not happen without resistance, and that such 
corralling is by no means necessary. What is called for is a 
conception of life less readily rendered into a supportive 
function or a unique project of self-realization.  This view 
implies that a critique of work cannot consist in an 
interrogation of the role of work without at the same time 
being an evaluation of what work has become, what it is, and 
how it changes innumerable other things in our lives (cf. 
Scholz 2011). A critique of work is also a demand for state-
financed child care, care for the elderly, support of unwaged 
parents etc. (cf. 2011, 173). And again: child care and support 
of the elderly and unwaged parents are not to be seen as a 
side-function to be mastered, nor as a function to be 
commissioned to badly paid (female) service workers.  
Grasping life as a well of resources for work is thus 
attacked by Weeks. She wants to show the ways in which the 
world of work turns life into such a resource and that this is 
by no means an inescapable fate. Life can be seen in other 
ways than as an object of life management where the 
challenge consists in juggling a hectic work life with a 
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functioning family life. This requires that some descriptions of 
life – along with some practices – are rejected and that we are 
willing to scrutinize and change our own lives.  
Appealing to essences, or invoking an idealized concept of 
work will not help; there is no safe point of departure outside 
the present state of wage labor (2011, 90). This makes her 
critical of humanist Marxism and other forms of attempts to 
install a concept of working-class identity based on the ideal of 
good or better work. Such concepts, she argues, are yet 
another reappearance of an ascetic morality, praising 
discipline and hard work. Nor does she buy into the ideal of 
liberating creative work: this is already one step towards 
tolerating precarious jobs.  
I think her worries are partly overwrought if what she 
means is that destructive elements of the work ethics creep 
into every hope about what I have called good work (or family 
life). As I will argue in chapter 4, the hope about good work 
expresses people’s struggle to make sense of their everyday 
lives. Be that as it may, I agree with Weeks that taken in itself, 
references to ‘post-capitalist useful work’ remains an empty 
gesture (that disregards the capitalist system), or an 
ambiguous allegiance to a work ethic. Like her, I would also 
say that the possibility of an alternative already exists and it 
exists precisely in the form of present tensions in the work 
society. It is these tensions that have the power to incite other 
hopes, other desires and other dreams. In a society where 
work is dependent on spending consumers, while many jobs 
can’t even cover the most essential living expenses, or in a 
society where the right to work for everyone is a common 
rhetoric existing side by side with a structural form of 
unemployment, something is awry (2011, 102). The critique of 
work starts from here. The present distribution of wealth and 
work, along with the ideal that everyone should work because 
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work is a person’s contribution to society, give rise to the 
question: must work have this role?  
This is a very different position than for example that of the 
German philosopher Axel Honneth, who has recently argued 
that a critique of work must not appeal to unrealistic or 
utopistic ideal such as autonomy or craft work, it must not be 
a mere wish. Critique of work must rather be anchored in the 
norms underpinning the present system of work. Two such 
norms are that the economic system should grant all workers a 
living wage and that work should be socially recognized. 
Given that the market economy is understood as morally non-
neutral, as a basis for social integration, these are rational 
claims “embedded in the structures of social reproduction 
themselves” (Honneth 2010, 225). In other words: even though 
people make subversive demands about things, these 
demands can be seen as immanent critique only if they make 
up justified standards within the present economic and 
organizational relations (2010, 228). In other words, Honneth 
takes himself to have provided a realistic basis for which kinds 
of judgments and criticism are legitimate. This view, that has 
been criticized for turning capitalism into an undisputable 
system (cf. Deranty 2012), differs from Weeks’ in the way it 
draws a very sharp limit between utopistic claims and already 
existing norms, even though they can be said to agree that 
critique cannot draw on concepts of the nature of work, what 
work is in itself. Weeks abhors the idea that critique of work 
must be realistic. Instead, she argues that a central dimension 
of a critical approach to work includes an examination of what 
we take demands to be. 
The critique of work Weeks settles on is a form of 
repoliticization of the concept of work. She talks about the 
expressive and performative force of demands for change. 
This has a bearing on how she thinks about her own role as a 
writer who issues critical claims about work (2011, 145; 205-6; 
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222). In a reflection on the Italian movement of wages for 
housework during the seventies53, Weeks writes that one 
aspect of the movement in question was that demands were 
put forward in the spirit of provocation, while at the same 
time being a manifestation of collective action that brought 
antagonism to the surface (2011, 133-5). A demand in this 
sense is not necessarily or not merely a policy proposal: a 
demand can be an encouragement to scrutinize how we live 
(differently). Her point, which I think is a sound one, is that 
this sort of demand is not necessarily put forward in the spirit 
of a pragmatic appeal; the emotional aspects of such demands 
are crucial (2011, 220). Again, hope has a central place in her 
outlook. To sum up: despite some ambiguities54 (which I 
cannot go into here) so far, Weeks’ critique of work is to the 
point, especially considering that she reflects on what it means 
to engage in critique. In the next section I will raise some 
objections to her approach, and this has precisely to do with 
what it means to reflect critically on work. To do this, I will fist 
look briefly at how writers have talked about the themes 
Weeks is concerned with: integration into the work society. 
                                                          
53 The aim of this movement (represented by feminists such as Selma James, 
Silvia Federici and Maria Rosa Dalla Costa) was to initiate a discussion about 
how wage labor, far from being an independent sphere, is predicated upon 
work of a different kind: work performed in the home. The most eye-catching 
aspect of the campaign was the demand for compensation for such work, but 
as Weeks shows, there was also another dimension, the critique of work 
society and the dependencies it creates. 
54 These stem from Weeks’ outline of her vision of collective invention and 
political change. According Scott Shershow, the thinkers Italian autonomist 
Marxism (on whom Weeks draw) develop a vision of a departure from a 
capitalist logic. What comes in its place according to them? Creativity, 
community and togetherness are all central elements of their view, but it is not 
clear what the fundamental concern is: a new form of productivity or a new 
form of living together? (cf. Shershow 2005) 
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3.7 Work and adaptation 
Many critical writers set out to direct our attention to an 
element of social order within the world of work: “Since at least 
the early nineteenth century the significance of work for 
public order had been as important as its directly economic 
function – its moralizing effect upon the worker, its capacity to 
enmesh the individual in the network of expectations and 
routines that make up the social body.” (Rose 1999, 63) This 
side of work is not limited to disciplinary methods of 
employers. For example, in Finland, it seems entirely 
unremarkable that the government appoints a group of labor 
experts who outline a strategy for how to improve people’s 
attitudes to work and employment and where the aim is to 
increase their cooperation and trust.55 Such reports typically 
express concern for employees’ well-being while also, 
unwittingly, yielding an instrumentalization of that well-
being: contented workers are productive workers. Even so, I 
would like to ask what is going on when writers theorize 
about the ways in which people ‘comply’ with working hard 
or ‘internalize’ a work ethic. Which concerns are critics like 
Weeks struggling with when they develop concepts such as 
that of the work ethic?  
Critical authors wrestling with the role of work in 
capitalism have typically wanted to distance themselves from 
prevailing views in the literature on work. One classic 
example of such an approach can be found in Michael 
Burawoy’s Manufacturing consent (1979). One of Burawoy’s 
aims is to consider a different aspect of work than the external, 
despotic power relations that, in his view, Marxist writers 
have explored. The challenge, then, is to pin down what kind 
                                                          
55 For one such project, cf. Arbetsliv 2020: 
http://www.arbetsliv2020.fi/sv/projektet_arbetsliv_2020 
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of control is exerted in wage labor. Burawoy looks at a number 
of management techniques that shape people’s compliance: 
the piece rate system, job mobility and collective bargaining 
are three such methods. The conclusion he reaches is that 
there are a number of organizational conditions that function 
as ‘breathing holes’ for discontent, and that the result is 
integration, rather than rebellion (Burawoy 1981).  
Marxists writing about the process in which work is 
transformed into labor power have been occupied with 
showing how a work-centered society (cf. chapter 2) is 
maintained and the historical development of integration 
within it. These writers have disagreed about the nature of the 
domination of capital: what dimensions of life should be 
focused on? How narrowly should the wage labor relation be 
defined? How should integration be defined?  
In a recent book, The Soul at Work: From Alienation to 
Autonomy (2009), Franco “Bifo” Berardi penetrates into what 
he sees as affective and digital capitalism and what he 
conceives of as the ways it takes charge of its subjects’ entire 
lives in its creation of docile and domesticated subjects whose 
attention is ceaselessly mobilized. Like other thinkers in the 
tradition of Italian Autonomist Marxism, whose tendencies to 
celebrate cynicism he shares, he adheres to what is sometimes 
called the view of the social as a factory. Not only does work 
dominate people’s (or to be honest, throughout he is most 
interested in what he calls ‘the cognitariat’) waking hours; 
work absorbs people’s desires and the present form of 
abstraction of work creates a world in which almost 
everything can be dealt with as flows of information. Social 
relations are thus stripped down and streamlined. Rose is 
trying to articulate a similar view: “Communication became a 
vital instrument for realigning workers’ values with 
management objectives, through explaining the situation, 
clearing up misunderstandings, and allaying fears and 
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anxieties.” (1999, 72) I think Berardi’s point could be that 
‘information’ and ‘communication’, contact between people, 
coalesce, becoming all-encompassing, abstracted categories 
threatening to make it difficult to distinguish between things 
of very different kinds – everything is treated as ‘information’ 
or ‘networks’. On the other hand, Berardi sees the present 
system of wage labor as highly specialized in the sense that 
few jobs are interchangeable. This specialized form is, he 
maintains, a background for why (again: information) work 
comes to be seen as a means for a person to exercise hir unique 
abilities (2009, 75-8). He asks: “How is it possible to explain 
the workers’ conversion from disaffection to acceptance?” 
(2009, 79) Like other work critics Berardi claims that the 
present world of work, despite its aura of specialization and 
self-realization, stands for an impoverishment, an affective 
impoverishment. Work has turned into an ‘eternal flow’ “from 
which they [the workers] cannot step back save at the price of 
marginalization” (2009, 87; 89).  
To repeat what I said in the last chapter: the problem with 
such analyses is that they are prone to rely on hasty diagnostic 
generalizations about a changing world of work. The tendency 
is to pick out one class – information workers, in this case – 
and by means of an account of the present state of the work of 
this class, issue wide claims about the future of civilization. I 
do realize that these diagnostics express an attempt to develop 
critical tools. This was also my entry into Weeks’ perspective: 
a thought-provoking analysis of contemporary work is 
connected with a project of making demands about a better 
world. Concepts such as internalization, pacification, 
adjustment, integration etc. seem to be contributions to a 
debate in which writers strive to understand the ailments of 
contemporary life. The essential question will then be whether 
using them helps us bridge the gap between a system of work 
and lived experiences. In other words: it is misguided, I think, 
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to discuss the conceptual cluster I have mentioned in terms of 
social ontology even though that may be how these critics think 
about their project. Writers eager to unmask and uncover 
unacknowledged aspects of how we relate to work easily end 
up subscribing to projects in which they imagine themselves 
to reveal the ontology of society or the workings of subjectivity. 
For them, the aim is to postulate a theoretical representation of 
how things really are and for all their hopes about change they 
seem to set out to portray mechanisms that generate specific 
forms of behavior and thoughts. The risk I see is that these 
mechanisms – internalization, adaptation – come to serve as 
explanation, for example of lack of political agency (as Berardi 
has it). A confused aspiration of social theory is that the 
ultimate aim is to provide an account of social order as it 
really is (for a useful critique of such ontological 
preoccupation masked as ‘critique’ cf. Pleasants 1999). A much 
more fruitful approach is, I think, to remain at the level of 
critique: what does it mean to say that the world of work builds 
on adaptation, adjustment or integration? What does this form 
of critique catch sight of and what may remain outside its 
grasp? 
3.8 What does it mean to talk about a work ethic? 
There is a question I would like to address to Kathi Weeks: 
isn’t there a risk that the concept of a work ethic leans on a too 
one-sided conception of our relation to work? Over-
emphasizing the work ethic may lead one to look away from 
the existential richness of meaning that forms of commitment 
to work have. Think about the following examples. A mother 
with a young child longs to get back to work, where she has 
friends, her life, she says. A hairdresser who had to retire early 
because of rheumatism misses hir job and the customers that 
used to visit the salon regularly. S/he liked hir job and now 
209 
 
s/he tries to build another life for hirself. A single parent 
confides to hir friend that at this point, the job is extremely 
important to hir: without the job, s/he wouldn’t know how to 
keep going. The job provides the family with an income, but 
not only that: s/he says that she wouldn’t know what hir life 
would be without the job. It would be cynical, I think, to 
conclude that all of these examples can be completely 
understood as manifestations of the work ethic, as yet another 
instance of how people are made dependent on work.    
Weeks is aware of the fact that consent alone explains 
nothing, but coercion is also an insufficient perspective if one 
wants to shed light on the centrality of work in society. She 
asks whether it is not spurious to talk about a work ethic in a 
situation in which workers within flexible organizations are 
afraid to lose their jobs. When employees do their utmost to 
keep their jobs, ideological support is not needed; the 
economic system would be, so to speak, compulsive enough. 
Weber (2001, 123) famously argued that a work ethic is no 
longer needed in the later stages of capitalist development: 
technical management is now what drives capitalism. Even so, 
it still makes sense to talk about a work ethic, Weeks writes. 
For example, she argues, many organizations emphasize 
commitment and attitudes – compliance is not enough. The 
entire person is evaluated. She refers to the famous sociologist 
Arlie Hochschild’s book The Managed Heart from 1983, among 
the first books to give a perspicuous presentation of the 
existential consequences of emotional work. Hochschild 
describes the emotional coping among flight attendants and 
bill collectors, whose jobs require that one engages on’es entire 
personality. What are the existential consequences of niceness 
or nastiness being a job? What is more, Weeks writes, when 
results and achievements in service work are allegedly harder 
to measure, evaluating employees’ attitudes arises as a 
possibility. Consequently, specific attitudes towards work – to 
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approach work as professionalism or as a career, regardless of 
what specific position a person holds, for example – are 
inscribed in work relations (2011, 69-74).  
Even so, Weeks’ concept of work ethic seems problematic. 
What exactly is she purporting to explain? I suspect that 
concepts such as adaptation and integration are suspect when 
they appear as explanations. A version of this explanatory 
approach can be found in Bauman’s writings:  
The work ethic, and more generally the appeal to the sentiments 
and the consciences of the current and would-be factory workers, 
was but one of several alternative means of making the wheels of 
the industrial system turn. It was not necessarily the most 
efficient one, and certainly not the only one conceivable (Bauman 
1998, 19-20).  
From this perspective it seems perfectly in order to discuss the 
work ethic in terms of its efficiency: did it in fact mold 
productive and crouching subjects, or were economic factors 
more important for producing such subjects? This makes it 
tempting to think that there could be an empirical answer to 
whether the work ethic, at a particular historical stage, was 
indeed efficient.  In these presentations a linear story about 
shifting ideals is typically produced. The trouble is that one 
does not get a sense for in what way these ideals speak to 
people; in what way are they ideals. Charles Taylor writes 
about the ideal of authenticity and self-realization: 
Articulacy here has a moral point, not just in correcting what may 
be wrong views but also in making the force of an ideal that 
people are already living by more palpable, more vivid for them; 
and by making it more vivid, empowering them to live up to it in 
a fuller and more integral fashion (1991, 22). 
I do not think that the vividness or palpability of ideals is 
restricted to either attacking people or empowering them, but, 
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nonetheless, I agree with Taylor that articulating an ideal has a 
moral role. 
By talking about a work ethic Weeks seeks to shed light on 
how ‘exploitable subjects’ are produced. She helpfully 
suggests that the work ethic can be a tool for illustrating which 
rhetorical means are used to support for example workers’ 
rights or women’s waged work. She argues that given that 
there is an ideal of work as a respectable and society-building 
activity, claims for that ideal to be realized can also be made. 
Thus, workers issuing claims can hold defenders of work 
accountable for not even standing up for their own positive 
view of work (2011, 75). Granted that work is seen as dignified 
in itself, and if work is thought to command respect, this 
should imply the legitimacy of demanding better working 
conditions (2011, 29, 58-60). In The New Spirit of Capitalism 
(2005) the French sociologists Luc Boltanski and Evé Chiapello 
make a similar point when they investigate legitimizations of 
capitalism, an inquiry related to an attempt to understand 
how capitalism is sustained. These legitimizations cannot be 
grasped only as ideological forms. They were responses to 
critique, for example the critical student movement of 1968, 
and for this reason it would be counter-productive to reduce 
them to ideology or attempts to produce submissive subjects. 
Boltanski and Chiapello show that real concessions were 
made: minimum wages were settled, unions were formed, 
more autonomy was granted to at least some workers. 
Critique was responded to, but in this way the critique was in 
danger of being neutralized by being incorporated within the 
system, and capitalism thus becoming stronger. If the 
conditions for the workers are made more decent, then why 
would one say that there is anything wrong with the market 
economy and the world of work; isn’t this development, 
generally, a positive development towards humanized work 
and flexible systems that offer creative job opportunities for 
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many employees? One can thus return to the point I made in 
connection with Rancière: it is important to look at the context 
in which work as self-realization is elevated or in which the 
right to work is appealed to. Boltanski and Chiapello provide 
such a background for the idealization of adaptability and 
creativity and they frame it in a broader network of 
justification and critique. The merit of their argument is that it 
reminds us of the instability that constitutes the world of work 
and in this sense they are in agreement with Weeks (cf. 
Cockburn 2011, 82-4). 
What can be treasured in Weeks’ analysis is thus not an act 
of simple explaining. Rather, much of what she says highlights 
the use – for example as a legitimization – of a certain set of 
rhetorical patterns: the idea of work as independence, work as 
self-realization or work as professionalism. Placing herself in a 
Foucauldian tradition (which is just one source drawn on 
among many) she talks about the insufficiency of the image of 
external power/submission. Most processes in which people’s 
subjectivities are created can’t be rendered into coercion. 
These processes are not only imposed on people, they shape 
them, people internalize them and selves are produced.56 The 
risk is that the work ethic for all Weeks’ attempts at self-
scrutiny becomes a reified ‘it’ that shapes people’s existence:  
The ability of work to harness desires for a life beyond work 
depends, perhaps now more than ever, on the power of the work 
ethic. The ethic’s consistent prescription for our identification 
with and constant devotion to work, its elevation of work as the 
                                                          
56 In the Autonomist literature that makes up another inspiration for Weeks 
‘production’ has a very wide meaning. The use of the concept of productivity 
is paradoxical: for all their critique of what they call productivism (laborism) 
‘productivity’ is sometimes seen as the development and changes that take 
place in social relations (cf. Lazzarato 1996). The problem is then that 
‘production’ seems to take place all the time and everywhere in the ‘social 
factory’. 
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rightful center of life, and its affirmation of work as an end in 
itself all help to produce the kinds of workers and the laboring 
capacities adequate to the contemporary regime of accumulation 
and the specific modes of social labor in which it invests (2011, 
76).  
Even though she mostly describes the use of rhetorical 
discourses and the place they come to have, in this quote (“the 
ethic’s consistent prescription [….] all help to produce”) it 
seems as if what she calls the work ethic has a power in its own 
right.   
Significant sides of life are, I think, normally left out in 
these Foucauldian analyses of power relations. Let me unpack 
what I mean. (1) There are more or less formal or economically 
induced requirements of work inherent in a specific system of 
waged work that concerns how long people work and how 
their lives are structured because of this (for example, how 
time is split up into work time and leisure time). (2) There are 
also more implicit requirements and expectations, and this is 
what I talked about above as the idealization of hard work or 
the ideal of self-realization. These first two aspects are covered 
by Weeks’ Foucauldian approach, but there is also a third one 
which I think intersects with the first two in a complicated 
way. What I will say here will only be a sketch of this aspect, 
as I will expand on it more systematically in chapter 6. I am 
here thinking about the existential situation of people who 
relate to their jobs, the temptations, hopes and relational 
networks within these situations. People wrestle with the 
requirements of work and their jobs; they try to make do, they 
try to resist structures they experience as unfair or destructive, 
or they grow cynical. Talking about ‘subjectivities’ and 
‘produced subjectivities’ (as Weeks often does) is misdirected 
here: the image of a work ethic that shapes people’s 
subjectivities takes one to the territory of social ontology and it 
leads one to ask questions about the social processes in which 
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these subjectivities are constructed. When the inquiry is 
slanted towards production and construction, what is not seen 
is how people grapple with work-related issues, how this takes 
place within lives. For all her understanding of the instability 
of the work ethic, Weeks’ inquiry does not capture how we are 
all the time speaking from within this existential grappling. To 
focus on production/construction is taking a – an illusory one, 
I would say – step away from the way people are enmeshed 
within work-related tensions.  
If this existential dimension is ignored, and if the language 
of internalization or construction of subjectivities dominates 
the picture, something essential in our relation to work is 
overlooked, and the hazards of what Weeks calls the work 
ethic, that we live for work rather than work for life, are then 
not acknowledged. Weeks’ critique of work, along with 
similar projects, are at risk of treating ‘the work ethic’ as a blob 
(cf. chapter 1 and 2) in the sense that it is not clear in which 
ways we are responsible for the existence of this work ethic: 
what is its appeal? Writers like Weeks never quite succeed in 
even raising this as a concern. As I said, she writes insightfully 
about the work ethic as a field of tensions, for example the 
tension between independence and submission. What doesn’t 
become so clear is how these tensions are also present within 
us. She writes:  
This antinomy – that work and its ethical discourse produce both 
independence and dependence, captured by Weber in that 
strange self-discipline he struggles to account for – renders the 
wage relation always potentially unstable (2011, 55).  
I fully agree that the wage relation is rendered unstable by 
such antinomies, but what bothers me is that it is not clear 
what is meant by ‘ethical’. Is it only a form of moralistic 
exhortation, or could the ethical be something else as well? My 
own take on this is that existential struggles over the role of 
215 
 
work do not mirror some work ethic. If we still want to talk 
about a work ethic, normative ways of talking about 
independence, self-realization and hard work, can only be 
meaningful against the background of existential struggles in 
which what I have called moralizations and neutralizations 
appear. Elaborating on normative ideals and patterns is, then, 
not enough. If the idea about a work ethic is to be defended an 
account of what it means that people understand themselves 
and their work through such normative ideals; how would 
people actually express such ideals?  
My point is that to see the ethical danger of what she calls 
the work ethic, its life surroundings must be taken into 
account. Weeks explains that she prefers to talk about politics 
rather than ethics because the latter is allegedly too bound up 
with encounters with specific others (2011, 228). As we saw, she 
is suspicious of ethical language about better work because 
such language supposedly has “been absorbed so comfortably 
into the warp of contemporary managerial discourses.” (2011, 
105) In my view, this makes it seem like ‘the language’ is 
something that exists in itself, so that if the language is 
hijacked by managerial elevation of work, then that is what 
the language means, tout court, perhaps that the hijacking can 
be seen as a revelation of what this language always was). For 
Weeks, it seems as if all appeals to good work are always-
already complicit with the management rhetoric. “The 
affirmation of unalienated labor is […..] too readily co-opted 
in a context in which the metaphysics of labor and the 
moralization of work carry as much cultural authority in so 
many realms.” (2011, 107) I would like to question such an 
always-already by pointing out that people make demands for 
better work conditions in diverse situations where one needs 
to pay close attention to the context where this language 
appears. It is not even clear what it would mean to say that 
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such claims are ‘always-already’ enmeshed in management 
discourse.  
To take one example that may illustrate what I have in 
mind when I say that Weeks’ rendering of the work ethic 
leaves something important out of the picture. The example is 
inspired by the interviews Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb 
conducted in their book The Hidden Injuries of Class (1973). 
Imagine two parents who worry that their children will lose 
contact with them because the children have settled on a 
specific path of work (they have become doctors, executives 
and lawyers, say). When the parents talk to their friends about 
their kids what they say reveals a certain element of shame 
and indignation in relation to their ambitious offspring even 
though the overall impression their friends get is that these 
parents are proud of their children’s achievements. They talk 
at length about how well their kids have succeeded in their 
careers and in their lives but how little they, the parents, know 
about their jobs and how rarely they see their children 
nowadays. The tone is that of fascination and satisfaction, but 
a hint of insecurity and sadness can be traced as well. The 
parents worry that their kids become strangers but they are 
proud of their children who have ‘made something of 
themselves’. In other words, they feel somewhat unsettled by 
their children’s class mobility and they express mixed feelings 
about it – an ambivalence that may not be obvious to 
themselves, but may be painfully apparent to their children 
who have to deal with their parents’ fears and the sadness the 
eager stories about job opportunities betray. Their friends ask 
questions about the busy children but they also feel that they 
should talk to them about what it is like to miss one’s grown 
children.   
 This example features ambivalent emotions, shame and 
insecurity. These emotions and their role in the parents’ lives 
show the relevance of talking about a work ethic, for example 
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that we can talk about a normative expectation that parents 
should be supportive of the ambition of their children no 
matter what, or the idea that parents have an obligation to 
inspire a positive attitude towards work in their children. It is 
in this way that the ideal of independence becomes an ideal. It 
does not do to talk about such emotions as produced, even 
though they are for sure intelligible only against a very 
specific background (of praxis and thinking). These emotions 
are responses. One of the reasons for raising such a critique of 
Weeks’ approach is internal to what seems to be her own line 
of thinking. Even though she has plenty to say about the kind 
of individuals needed by and molded by capital ˗ capital 
needs in/dependent and flexible subjects ˗ another aspect of 
the book elicits a different take on the question. Our lives play 
out in a maze of normative invocations of the value of work. 
How can we reach beyond this naturalization and 
normalization of work? To reach that ‘beyond’, we need to 
understand the lives we live now. What I think is at stake in 
this question is something altogether different than what can 
be captured by a concept of the production of subjectivities: 
the kind of fear and hopes that ‘the work ethic’ expresses 
needs to be acknowledged as ethically significant responses 
and by looking at these we can learn to better understand 
ourselves. Weeks’ analysis of the work ethic dodges the ethical 
challenge of the desire to shed light onto a possibility of life 
beyond work society. It is this challenge I seek to radicalize in 
what follows. What existential pull do the ideas about work as 
busyness have on us? 
3.9 Kierkegaard on busyness and self-deception 
An objection can be raised to this discussion about work as 
busyness and conceptions of a work ethic. There are cases 
when we just do things. A multitude of situations do not call 
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for specific questions. Most of our everyday life seems to be 
like this: hustle and bustle, things happen, we react; 
something else happens, we know what to do. Isn’t a 
fundamental aspect of the active life it’s being mostly taken for 
granted? We know how things work, we know our way about. 
Breakfast is prepared in a hazy rush; I drive my bike to work, 
a jumble of things whirling in my mind; I reply to a routine 
email and press ‘send’; I stretch my back and shuffle into the 
kitchen to pour myself a cup of coffee; I say hi to my 
colleague. To some extent, this is true – it is not as if we are all 
the time in a state of meaning crisis, or that such crisis always 
lurks under the surface.  
I use some writings by Søren Kierkegaard to point at the 
life situations in which the hustle and bustle of life turn into a 
problematic escape from existential questions. Kierkegaard 
formulates an astute critique of what he often calls ‘busyness’. 
He alerts us to what makes that sort of life seem tempting. 
These remarks bring to the surface a theme with which I have 
engaged throughout this chapter: work as flight from life, a 
displacement of meaning. As I will show, the concerns 
Kierkegaard engages with can be seen as closely related to the 
structural issues, with which Weeks wrestles. I use 
Kierkegaard’s reflection on the busy life to show in what way 
activity comes to be seen as something positive in itself and I 
also want to point out the connection with the role busyness 
can come to have in a view of life according to which it is 
important to be a striving, goal-directed person. There are two 
things going on here: (i) activity is valued in its own right (in 
the shape of diligence, for example) and (ii) one wants to be 
seen as an active person, which makes appearances more 
important than reality. Kierkegaard demonstrates how this 
image of resolution and direction creates a seemingly safe spot 
– one appears to be the resolute doer – that shields off 
‘distracting’ worries. Even though work is not the overall topic 
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of his reflection, his line of thinking radicalizes what Weeks 
writes about the work society and its foreclosure of the 
pressing question: how are we to live?  This existential and 
ethical question is unlike a concern about which one can say 
‘this is not the right time to ask that question; there is a time 
for everything’. This question does not go away and it is never 
timely, that is, there is no specific time for it, nor  are there 
periods or situations sheltered from it (1956, 42). This 
perspective on untimely questions cannot be easily squared 
with the tendency I talked about above, where jobs are 
understood as so important that life itself must be paused or 
managed.  
Kierkegaard describes the existential luster and danger of 
the busy life in a sermon with the title Purity of Heart is to Will 
One Thing. The context is the bourgeois circles of mid-19th 
century Copenhagen. What Kierkegaard says evokes the 
image of burgeoning urban life. He talks about an attitude 
towards life that is not clear to the person living it, and that 
can even be described as a mode of self-deception: it is more 
important to seem busy than to devote oneself to something 
that one finds meaningful. Kierkegaard focuses on the notion 
of busyness (Travlhed), the bustling life and the person for 
whom leisure would bring hir too painfully close to hirself. The 
person does not dare to stop to think, to be confronted with 
hirself and the emptiness of hir life. Kierkegaard looks at what 
it means to be lulled into a spiritual stupor that comes with 
living according to an agile rhythm of respectable business. 
Central to the argument is the idea of willing one thing, which 
is not at all the same as dedicating oneself to one specific 
purpose. To will one thing, according to Kierkegaard, is by no 
means a glorious exercise in will power (1956, 56). He explains 
why it is impossible that the person who strives for honor and 
power wills one thing. Willing one thing is willing the good.  
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He introduces a cluster of interrelated concepts in order to 
show that an existential problem has several forms. The busy 
person is double-minded (tvesindethed), dispersed among the 
events and progressions that are hir life. Being involved in 
plenty of things is not a problem in itself. The problem is that 
the busy person braces hirself with the security of an elastic ‘in 
case that’– hir will is conditioned by this ‘in case that’, which 
means that hir will is not absolute, but always dependent on 
this and that thing that happens to come along. If my project 
does not succeed, I can always resort to the comfortable 
reassurance that this is not my real calling anyway 
(Kierkegaard 1956, 59-60, 83, 199).  
As we have seen above, what seems like a life of resolution 
and dedication may deceive in its insistent and ambitious 
appearance, so that the frailty or the anxiety of that life is not 
obvious. Kierkegaard draws the contours of a person inclined 
to create a pleasant image of hirself, a person seeking honor: 
Is, then, this desire for counting, is this to will one thing? To count 
and count until it suffices, to count and count until a mistake is 
made; is this to will one thing? Whoever, therefore, wills this 
honor or fears this contempt, whether or not he is said to will one 
thing in his innermost being, is not merely double-minded but 
thousand-minded, and at variance with himself. So is this life 
when he must grovel – in order to attain honor; when he must 
flatter his enemies – in order to attain honor; when he must woo 
the favor of those he despises – in order to attain honor; when he 
must betray the one whom he respects – in order to attain honor 
(Kierkegaard 1956, 58-59). 
This person is thus externally driven but hir goals are unreal, 
and they cannot become real. The goals reflect a person’s self-
deception; Kierkegaard talks about being ‘at variance with 
oneself’.  
Even though the sermon is written from a religious 
perspective, it can be applied to a discussion about work as 
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well. Work can become appearance, admired for being a 
purposeful occupation, or an admirable position. 
Furthermore, diligence is commonly seen as a virtue in itself. 
The ambiguities Kierkegaard pinpoints are close at hand: on 
the one hand, diligence seems good because it expresses a 
person’s attachment to specific purposes: s/he is steadfast, does 
not give up as soon as an obstacle appears. Such a person 
could be understood as responsible and reliable. On the other 
hand, the concept of diligence seems to express a form of 
generality that puts all purposes in brackets. What is 
important is not the thing to be done, be it a gardening project, 
an essay in philosophy or a sales pitch; what matters is the 
general industriousness, the general activity. The concept of 
diligence does not discriminate between the kinds of purposes 
to which a person applies hirself. Nor does it reveal how, in 
what spirit, a person relates to what s/he does. Activity is, as it 
were, distilled into a general form. Such reductive concepts of 
activity are all-important for Kierkegaard, who is at pains to 
show what such perspectives reveal about a person’s 
commitment (or lack of it): 
When a man is active early and late “for the sake of the Good,” 
storming about noisily and restlessly, hurling himself into time, as 
a sick man throws himself down upon his bed, throwing off all 
his consideration for himself, as a sick man throws off his clothes, 
scornful of the world’s reward; when such a man makes a place 
among men, then the masses think what he himself imagines, that 
he is inspired. And yet he is at the other pole from that, for he is 
double-minded, and double-mindedness no more resembles 
inspiration than a withdrawal resembles the steadiness of the 
standing wind (Kierkegaard 1956, 101).    
Kierkegaard thinks about a person who in one way is 
dedicated to a good purpose but somehow everything s/he 
does turns into a project, or more derisively still, s/he is the 
well-meaning busybody. For this person, goodness seems too 
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slow; s/he tries to make it temporally accessible, manageable, 
tangible – attainable, to be gloriously conquered. This person 
succeeds in deceiving us, but mainly hirself, Kierkegaard says, 
because s/he does not seek rewards, she seems to be dedicated 
to a worthy purpose. A person who loses hirself in the task fits 
this description; s/he responds to all requests and s/he 
diligently does everything s/he thinks that people expect hir to 
do: hir industriousness expresses a sort of worry that s/he is 
not doing enough. S/he is not interested in worldly happiness 
nor does s/he seem interested in how s/he appears to the 
world: s/he really applies hirself to things. The double-minded 
life has a deceptive “gloss of unity and of inner coherence” 
(1956, 103, 119), but the busy person (in Kierkegaard’s use of 
the word) pursues transient interests and hir attitude remains 
fickle. This person is self-forgetful. Busyness, Kierkegaard 
writes, is like a charm, an enchanting forgetfulness. When 
work has this role, other worries are more or less quenched.   
The TV-series The Wire (2002-2008) offers a striking 
example of what Kierkegaard talks about as the person who 
wants to “take the good by storm” (1956, 100) and who 
doesn’t understand that the good can “go on without him” 
(1956, 102). This example is also a further attempt to explain 
the entanglement between the existential and the structural. 
The frame of The Wire and this example are the agonies of 
police work in a post-welfare city in which the police much 
too often are preoccupied with presenting beautiful statistics 
that will bring them more funding, rather than solving crime. 
The story of the series gives no false hope of glorious police 
investigations and solved cases. There is work to be done, the 
question is just: what is good work and what does a sound 
relation to it mean in an organization plagued by competing 
priorities due to financial problems? There is clearly plenty of 
work out there to do. The world portrayed is a world of social 
problems that go on and on – criminality is part of an ailing 
223 
 
society of business, poverty and marginalization. No single 
case closure can get rid of those structural problems. The 
conversation below is an exchange between Jimmy McNulty 
and Lester Freamon. Both of them work in the Baltimore 
police department and both are involved in tracking down a 
drug cartel. McNulty lives for his cases and likes to do things 
his own way. He has zero tolerance for the bureaucratic 
apparatus. He wants to bring the cases to closure and there is 
no time for anything else, no time to live. When things come to 
a halt, when the cases go nowhere, he slides into a state of 
frustration and despair. He doesn’t know what to do with 
himself. His life is a mess but he keeps justifying his situation 
by appealing to his work and the toll his work takes on him: if 
one is a police officer, this is what life must be like. He assigns 
his depression to the frustration related to police work and the 
slow progression of the cases. His own view, and even more 
so, the view of people close to him, is that it is his cases that 
keep his life from falling apart completely: paradoxically, they 
keep him going. In the end, it all revolves around is what a 
‘having a life’ amounts to. 
Lester: Tell me something, Jimmy. How exactly do you think it all 
ends? 
McNulty: What do you mean? 
Lester: A parade? A gold watch? A shining Jimmy-McNulty-day 
moment, when you bring in a case sooooo sweet everybody gets 
together and says, "Aw, shit! He was right all along. Should've 
listened to the man." The job will not save you, Jimmy. It won't 
make you whole, it won't fill your ass up. 
McNulty: I dunno, a good case – 
Lester: Ends. They all end. The handcuffs go click and it's over. 
The next morning, it's just you in your room with yourself. 
McNulty: Until the next case. 
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Lester: Boooooy, you need something else outside of this here. 
McNulty: Like what, dollhouse miniatures? [Lester makes 
dollhouse miniatures in his spare time.] 
Lester: Hey, hey, hey, a life. A life, Jimmy. You know what that 
is? It's the shit that happens while you're waiting for moments 
that never come. (The Wire, 3.9) 
McNulty’s frenzy can be understood in relation to the 
machinery the series depicts in which the appearance of 
efficiency is conflated with real work. From one perspective, 
he is represented as somebody very dedicated to his job (he 
applies himself fully to the cases). From another perspective 
he is portrayed as a person deceiving himself about his job 
and about many other things about himself and his relation to 
work. He fits Kierkegaard’s description of the impatient, 
driven man who strives for a good cause but who is, as 
Kierkegaard says, double-minded and forgetful. In his wish to 
save the city of Baltimore in his job, and to save himself by 
working, he forgets himself; he appears to be a resolute 
person, but work has the role of an escape that in a 
paradoxical way provides some security. The series connects 
this forgetfulness with structural busyness, pointedly 
represented by shadowy bargaining, the administrative hunt 
for decent statistics, and lean organizations. The existential 
situation feeds on this kind of structural predicament and the 
system feeds on the existential worries. The series shows 
different responses to busyness and quasi-work. Cynicism 
abounds among his colleagues, but McNulty reacts in another 
way: he becomes the rebellious renegade. 
McNulty’s frenzied dedication re-introduces what I talked 
about in connection to self-realization above: frailty. What 
becomes of him if he fails in his pursuits? In this life, failure 
and disappointment lurk around the corner, as the example 
from The Wire shows: McNulty’s hectic work keeps his 
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existential worries at a distance. Before having failed, from one 
perspective the busy person’s life is successful, from another it 
is a life of self-deception. The idea underlying this claim is that 
the person whose will is not divided dedicates hirself to the 
good in an absolute way. This does not mean that one specific 
thing is pursued obsessively. What Kierkegaard talks about is 
instead a specific kind of concern and the spirit in which people 
dedicate themselves to something. Worldly matters, work and 
success, are essential, but the role work has will depend on the 
good (Kierkegaard 1956, 111-112, 119, 200).  
In one of his edifying discourses, “What We Learn from 
The Lilies of the Field and from the Birds of the Air” 
Kierkegaard contrasts two images of work as subsistence. 
Work, in itself, is not bad. By something he calls ‘Næringssorg’, 
worry about making a living, he intends to describe a 
particular attitude towards work; work, and money – worldly 
goods – and not God, are seen as the means of survival. One is 
worried about making a living, and one cannot devote oneself 
to the present. One does not trust God, nor that God will see 
to it that one lives. The small-minded person who is ensnared 
by ‘Næringssorg’ will never be satisfied; s/he will work and 
work, save and collect. Nothing will suffice. Hir life will be 
devoted to survival. In relying on hirself, s/he turns away 
from God, but hir self-reliance turns out to be a prison. In hir 
desire for security and wealth, s/he worries about the future – 
s/he compares hirself with others, s/he wants to achieve what 
they have achieved. ‘Næringssorg’ is a state in which a person’s 
actions are performed out of worry, out of insecurity (cf. 
Kierkegaard 1993, 165, 172-174, 179-80). Thus, he aptly draws 
our attention to an alternative to a life in which worry, 
comparison and the fear of failure reign supreme. To will the 
good is not to will some specific worthy purpose recognized 
by some worthy people: it is to be whole-hearted. 
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I would thus concur with Weeks in saying that valuing 
work ‘for its own sake’ could have (and very easily has) an 
ominous meaning if it implies that work becomes a realm of 
its own where ‘being active’ is the all-inclusive aim and  
industriousness seems to promise a life of personal 
development and social inclusion. Kierkegaard’s very 
important point is that the person preoccupied with good 
deeds and the person preoccupied with honor can be equally 
self-forgetful in the sense of not being whole-heartedly present 
in a situation.57 Both may be preoccupied with ‘leaving a mark 
on the world’, ‘changing the state of things’ or ‘leaving a 
record’.  
In this chapter, I wanted to track the process in which the 
purposes of work are bracketed. More strongly than Weeks, 
Kierkegaard shows that work as busyness is synonymous 
with a loss of reality. The double-minded person wants lots of 
things, but what s/he wants is not real. As the McNulty 
example indicated, the mode of striving is in a certain sense 
disengaged from reality. Thinking about ‘accomplishments in 
the world’, according to Kierkegaard, cannot be real. This lack 
of reality can take on many appearances: it can appear in the 
form of boundless enthusiasm, immersion, or invocations of 
‘grim necessity’, a grown-up’s stern responsibility for ‘real 
things’. One reason why I have talked at length about 
Kierkegaard’s account of busyness, double-mindedness and 
forgetfulness is that he takes issue with something many work 
critics rarely stress, namely the existential tension that a life of 
busyness makes manifest: one wants to lead life as if the most 
important thing is to leave a mark, to work hard and to 
dedicate oneself completely to the projects at hand, but this 
                                                          
57 This can be translated into a more general moral philosophical question 
about doing the good in order to be a specific kind of person, the person who is 
doing the good. 
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project is surrounded by frailty and an ambivalent attitude 
towards what is really important.  
3.10 Concluding words 
Kathi Weeks concludes her book with a discussion about the 
relation between work and life. She considers the colloquial 
invocation ‘Get a life!’ A life in this sense is a possibility, she 
suggests. It has no given form and in the best case it is an 
alternative to privatized withdrawal. Even though the political 
utopias she discusses – shortened working days, basic income 
– do not change the world of work drastically or 
instantaneously, these changes bear with them a provocation 
to think about another life, different from the life of careers 
and commodification. The endeavor is more about evoking 
new terrains of struggle and to open up a critical distance to 
the present, than about reaching a specific destination (2011, 
221). She challenges us to listen carefully to cries of 
desperation and dissent. To quote Ernst Bloch: “Nevertheless, 
the rebellious desire, desire for something different, does not 
fail to appear in the long run, nor even in the hours after work; 
for human beings are not a commodity.” (Bloch 1986, 910)  
The merit of The Problem with Work is that she shows the 
problems involved in rushing to the defense of work, no 
matter what. She shows that this neutralization and 
moralization of work can be regarded as a stunting of life, 
where the terms are dictated beforehand. When work turns 
into an incontestable realm, the ways in which wage labor 
summons life and the future are difficult to grasp. This point 
touches on an overall trajectory in the thesis: if the meaning of 
work appears in the language of common sense, the present 
state of work is indeed presented as ‘challenging’ – an 
awareness of crisis belongs to this common sense. But the 
important challenges are to normalize work so that the 
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question is how people can live up to the multiple challenges of 
the working life: how is work-family balance to be sorted out 
or how are unemployed people to be ‘activated’? Weeks sets 
out to tear down this normalization of the status quo. 
Weeks and Kierkegaard are both concerned about 
fundamental reflection about our lives and futures being 
whisked off with the excuse that always appears to be 
justified: ‘there is no time for such-and-such concerns now’. ‘We 
cannot afford to think about this now.’ I have explored how a 
truncated view of the future arises when life is seen as a 
project to be managed. The future is blocked or the future is 
reduced to worries about how life is to be managed. This is 
also how my remarks about the busy life and my reflection on 
critique of work go together. By her insistence on critique as a 
form of wake-up call, Weeks encourages the reader to 
radicalize the question about the future. What may have 
appeared as side-remarks about rhetorical techniques are thus 
intimately connected with the subject at hand: busyness. 
Weeks is right when she shows that a neutralized common 
sense view of work and life can also be said to be a hopeless 
view, where a system of work seems like a given necessity in 
which all of us have to become fully integrated.  
Drawing on Ernst Bloch’s three-volume Principle of Hope 
(1954/1955/1959) Weeks talks about fear of utopias: we are 
scared of becoming and becoming different (2011, 203). For 
her, this becoming-different is a challenge to think beyond a 
work-centered society. Unlike Weeks, I would emphasize that 
this battle should also be directed at cynicism with regard to 
work. In a talk, the philosopher Göran Torrkulla asks: do we 
dare to ask the question whether our own work is or can be 
made meaningful?58 The question concerns whether we dare 
to think about work as serving the needs of human life and 
                                                          
58 At Korpo filosofidagar, July 2011. 
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whether work can be a part of the world we share with others. 
The form of Torrkulla’s question is important: to whom is it 
addressed, who is asking?  
As we saw, many of the critical writers on work are 
worried about the role of work as a lifetime of work. 
Acknowledging the meaning of work, to them, comes 
dangerously close to embracing the prospect of boundless work 
and never-ending devotion. What is often seen as a utopia – 
work as a limitless, creative pursuit in contrast to 8 hours of 
toil strictly separated from leisure – they view as a 
monopolization of life. The answer is not that work should be 
valued in a more modest way. Weeks is rightfully critical of the 
view that work should be valued at the right proportions. What, 
then, did I want to say? The idea behind this worry about 
limitless work, I take it, is that an acknowledgment of the 
possibility of fulfilling work is already on the brink of being an 
injunction to a lifetime of work that takes no account of the 
need for, to take one example, a shortened working day. The 
willingness to apply oneself to useful activities is hijacked by 
the obligation wage labor instils. If meaningful, work seems to 
occupy a rightful place at the center of life. According to 
Weeks, living for work makes it hard to reject the demands of 
the present order of capitalist work (2011, 8, 12, 87, cf. 88). In 
opposition to Weeks, I would suggest that daring to ask 
questions about meaningful work does not make one complicit 
in upholding a collective lifetime of work. Kierkegaard’s 
pivotal question: “What is your occupation in life?” (1956, 198) 
should not be rejected because it allegedly is easily co-opted 
by the work ethic. The task of the next chapter is to delve right 
into the question of good work. The concept of vocation will 
be used as a tool to open up controversies surrounding the 
meaning of work and jobs. What the following chapter shows, 
I hope, is that the fear Weeks nurses about meaningful work is 
misdirected.  
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Chapter Four: On vocation 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I try out the concept of a vocation. By doing so, 
I attend to a specific aspect of how people talk about work. 
Concepts such as vocation are what enable us to distinguish 
between different understandings of what a job is. The aim of 
this chapter is also to reflect on what role such discussions 
about the character of a specific job have. In the previous 
chapter, I discussed the relation between work and life as a 
relation saturated by concerns about what a good life is. Here, 
I want to continue the discussion about the relation between 
work and life by considering an articulation of work and 
meaning that takes its point of departure in the concept of a 
vocation. The underlying idea is that, as the British 
philosopher Iris Murdoch writes, moral vocabulary can be 
said to communicate a vision. Moral vocabulary should thus 
not be required to be specifiable according to strict criteria 
available to all: “it is surely true that we cannot always 
understand other people’s moral concepts”. In this way, 
reflection on moral concepts will be an extension of what 
agents are doing (Murdoch 1997, 82). A leading thought in 
what follows is that moral concepts are intertwined with 
agency. 
My use of the concept of a vocation in order to shed light 
on a person’s commitment to hir job may lead somebody to 
point out that vocation is a concept that belongs to a past 
historical period in which it was intelligible to say that some 
people devoted their entire lives to a specific profession. The 
concept of a calling was important for Luther, but could it be 
intelligible for us? In a context of job insecurity and short-term 
employment it might seem outrageous to say that somebody 
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devotes hir life to a specific occupation. As Richard Sennett 
writes in several books (cf. chapter 6), the reality of 
projectization and precarious work is a hostile environment 
for any kind of commitment. What adds to the oddness – and 
risk – of talking about work as a vocation is that the language 
of commitment has been adopted by business firms in need of 
‘devoted’ workers who are ‘passionate about their jobs’ (cf. 
chapter 3). My initial response would be that remarks about 
changes in people’s relation towards work tend to be of a very 
broad kind, and such diagnoses tend to be simplistic. More 
importantly, even though we rarely talk explicitly about a job 
in terms of its being a vocation, and when we do, as in 
‘vocational training’, it is often synonymous with the labor 
market, I will suggest that this concept can be used to open up 
a discussion about commitment. Such considerations are 
needed more than ever when commitment is under threat. 
Reflection about the meaningfulness of work is also needed as 
a counterweight to the cynical attitude towards all forms of talk 
about good work (for an example of what I mean by cynicism, 
cf. Cederström & Fleming 2012) that suspect forms of 
glorification of work have often led to. Another clarification 
needs to be made: when I invoke the concept of vocation I do 
it with a critical distance to the tradition in which the concept 
of a vocation is embedded, a view of work according to which 
all human beings should inhabit a fixed place in society, so 
that a vocation is connected with societal order (Taylor 1992).  
In the documentary film Vikarien (2006, dir.: Åsa Blanck & 
Johan Palmgren), a teacher in a primary school in a Swedish 
suburb struggles to keep order in the classroom and to reach 
out to the restless students. He explains that many of the 
teachers at the school, exhausted by the difficult working 
situation, are constantly on sick leave. Being at a loss how to 
make things better he calls up his old teacher and asks him to 
be his substitute for a while, knowing that the older teacher 
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had a way with the students. Even the older teacher 
occasionally finds himself standing helpless in the face of the 
chaotic classroom; at one point, the substitute teacher gives up 
and leaves the school, only to return later on. In this kind of 
example, one may say things such as ‘without a special 
commitment to his work, he would never be able to cope’. The 
teacher’s job confronts him with a specific kind of difficulty 
and I am impressed by his ability to do a good job despite the 
hardships. When I marvel at the way certain people relate to 
their jobs and the challenges in these jobs the perspective is 
significant: I marvel, I wonder at how these teachers persevere 
on the job. Such reflections about work and meaning are part 
of exchanges between people, on the job and outside, where 
people try to come to terms with experiences, hardships and 
challenges. One crucial element in this chapter is to explore 
what it means to say that experiences related to work and 
meaning are interpersonal. This implies that such experiences 
are not withdrawn from discussions and questioning. These 
exchanges make up an aspect of doing and acting. Thinking 
and acting are interrelated, and as Simone Weil shows, 
existential and ethical problems arise when they are 
disconnected. 
I try out the concept of vocation in connection with how 
people talk about what it means to be devoted to a particular 
occupation. One of my aims is to show that commitment to a 
job can be described in other ways than as a psychological 
attitude, an appendage to the existing norms of a specific 
profession – a common image in professional ethics. The 
chapter is a response to the Australian philosopher Raimond 
Gaita’s thought-provoking remarks about vocation (even 
though the settings in which his reflection about vocation 
figures concern other things than work). An important point 
he makes, a point suggested also by the British philosopher 
Roy Holland, is that it is through concepts such as that of 
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vocation that the possibility of deepening in an activity can be 
brought out; this makes it possible to talk about what makes a 
job a worthy occupation. We are enabled to talk about e.g. the 
difference between politics as a concern with justice and 
politics as a mere power struggle or to distinguish between 
teaching as a knack and as a commitment. Even though the 
perspective is helpful in counteracting a trivialization of the 
language used to explain how something is worthwhile, 
Gaita’s elaboration of the concept of vocation presupposes 
what I see as a problematic idea: allegedly, only some 
activities are proper candidates for being a vocation. He 
suggests that there are jobs (a garbage collector, for instance) 
that are characterized by functionality. These jobs need to be 
done by somebody, but the person performing them cannot be 
perceived to be committed to them in the way a teacher may 
be committed to hir job. This claim strikes me as questionable. 
I will try to demonstrate why this is so via Simone Weil’s 
concept of a vocation. Weil’s contribution to my discussion 
consists in her, as I see it, striking approach towards what 
makes work oppressive. In contrast to Gaita, her approach is 
also situated within political philosophy.  
One of the reasons why I find it illuminating to talk about 
work as a vocation is that I seek to shed light on what is at 
stake when work becomes oppressive, or when it is degraded 
into mere execution. In this way, this chapter connects with 
the next, in which issues surrounding such transformations 
will be addressed head-on. I will conclude the chapter with a 
short reflection on why questions about work and 
meaningfulness cannot be disengaged from their relational 
settings and that it is here that the concept of meaningfulness 
has its home.  
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4.2 Gaita on professionalism and vocation 
In one of the essays in A Common Humanity Gaita writes about 
the life of the intellectual and the meaning of truth in such a 
life. The concept of truth, he writes, is often understood as an 
instrument, or a mere technical interest in the nature of reality. 
Gaita protests against the picture of the academic as an expert, 
a person who is skillful in a particular area. Instead, he wants 
to show that the responsibilities of an academic can be 
understood from the point of view of the life of the mind as a 
vocation (Gaita 2002, 187-192). He recalls two of the teachers at 
his university with whom he made friends. He was able to 
keep in touch with both of them despite the fact that they were 
hostile to each other for political reasons. Gaita admired the 
respect his friends showed for his intellectual independence: 
they did not try to make him choose sides. He talks about their 
respect as being an expression of their dedication to the life of 
the mind. The commitment to intellectual seriousness was 
displayed in how they were able to put the conflicts with one 
another aside in their relation with Gaita. Reflecting on how to 
describe their dedication, he writes: 
Only something like the concept of a vocation, I think, will enable 
one adequately to characterise the kind of obligations 
acknowledged in that respect and in the nature of their 
commitment to their students and to the life of the mind. It 
showed in the way a commitment to truth and truthfulness 
shaped their lives. The concept of a profession and its associated 
responsibilities and commitment will not capture it. It would 
divide their work from their life in the wrong kind of way and it 
would do so because it would make their passion into a 
contingent psychological attribute, external to the obligations they 
acknowledged when they reflected on what it meant to be a 
university teacher. By their example they disclosed values 
different from and deeper than any found in the most rigorous 
professionalism (Gaita 2002, 195-196).      
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From the quote it is evident that Gaita distinguishes the 
concept of vocation from professionalism and professional 
obligations. Even though I think we should acknowledge the 
multiplicity of meanings ‘professionalism’ has,59 Gaita is 
clearly right in saying that such perspectives are unable to 
give substance to a concept of vocation. He emphasizes one 
such use: ‘professionalism’ yields descriptions in which the 
connection between the profession of a university teacher and 
the teachers’ lives is psychological and therefore, one could 
say, external. Professionalism is here taken to consist in formal 
obligations in addition to which one may have a certain 
emotional investment in the job, ‘passion for a job’ perhaps, 
which is then accounted for as a psychological contingency or 
disposition. Mike W. Martin puts forth the characteristics of 
this image: personal values are strongly distinguished from 
the professional role or the professional obligation (accounted 
for in legal or institutional terms). To express the idea in 
another way: the professional role is what it is, regardless of 
what my own private ideas about it are. One should thus be 
able to define one’s professional responsibilities. The idea of a 
code of ethics may then seem appealing: in tricky situations, a 
professional could invoke unequivocal, standardized sets of 
rules in which the responsibilities of a professional are spelled 
out.60 According to this line of thinking, commitment may be 
                                                          
59 A common definition of professionalism is that it presupposes some level of 
self-regulation so that professionals to some extent control their own work, 
which is often legitimized by referring to the expertise of professionals or the 
function these professions have (Cf. Freidson 2001, 56, 180). But 
‘professionalism’ is also used in a different way, in cases where one would 
consider it natural for a person to react in a certain way, but hir 
professionalism enables hir to react in a different way, withholding the 
spontaneous reaction - think for example about a funeral home director who 
has learned to cope with the grief of the clients. 
60 For two excellent critiques of applied ethics and responsibility cf. Wolgast 
1992 and Hertzberg 2002.  
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important in the form of motivation/passion/personal values 
but the rules of the profession are external to personal 
commitment (Martin 2000, 3-4). In contrast to this picture of 
professionalism, Gaita claims that the concept of a vocation 
concerns a person’s way of relating to and understanding the 
world and hirself. Talking about his friends, Gaita describes 
how the teachers related to politics, and how they tried to 
keep their work unaffected by ideological quibbles. In the 
example, responsibility, commitment and work go together: 
personal commitment reveals a possibility, what academic 
work can, at best, be like. 
In the quote above, the meaning of ‘obligations’ is 
ambiguous: one may read Gaita as suggesting that 
professionalism in his sense presupposes that responsibilities 
can be explicated given some reflection, which latches onto a 
familiar image in applied ethics according to which ethics is a 
form of knowledge, an image opposed by Gaita’s overall 
perspective. This view of morality is common in discussions 
about professionalism. A leading branch of the ethics of 
professionalism consists in spelling out the ideals of 
professions or professionalism. From this ideal, concrete 
obligations could be assumed and applied to the particular 
situation. These ideals are often regarded as having a 
regulative role in the practice of professionals. According to 
Eliot Freidson, it is by virtue of the connection between 
professions and transcendent values that professionals are 
allowed a degree of independence. It becomes evident that 
there is also a moral aspect to this: professionals are said to be 
devoted to more than a fat paycheck. This is not, he seems to 
say, merely a contingent fact, but something that defines 
professions (or the legitimacy of professions) (2001, 121-3).  
However, one may also interpret the quote ˗ this reading is 
reinforced when one looks at what Gaita writes later on ˗ as 
implying that the obligations connected with a vocation stem 
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from reflection on what it means to be a university teacher and 
that the problem with the rhetoric of professionalism is that it 
externalizes passion from the university teacher’s reflection on 
his job. “The concept of a profession [….] would make their 
passion into a contingent psychological attribute, external to 
the obligations they acknowledged when they reflected on 
what it meant to be a university teacher.” (2002, 195) The risk 
this remark brings with it is that it seems as if e.g. the 
obligation of intellectual honesty were an obligation derived 
from reflection, as if particular obligations could be deduced 
from the concept of university teacher – as if there were certain 
obligations inherent in the concept, or as if particular 
dimensions of a job are disclosed as one engages in deep 
reflection on what a specific activity means. Gaita often writes 
that reflection on what it means to be a university teacher 
yields certain obligations (cf. 2002, 203).  
What I take issue with is not that it is important to think 
about what one is doing. My doubts concern whether Gaita’s 
emphasis on the vocation of an academic is dressed in a 
conceptual language that leads him to a one-sided image of 
what it is to be dedicated to an occupation.61 According to this 
interpretation he gives a far too intellectualistic image of what 
a vocation is, even among academics. It also goes against the 
way Gaita underscores that the teachers’ vocation was 
expressed in the relations they had with others, in friendship, 
in conversations: their vocation was expressed in how they 
lived as academics. The emphasis on reflection unwittingly 
                                                          
61 He writes about the question if academics have an obligation to be public 
intellectuals: “Reflection on what it means to be a university academic yields 
no such obligation. I mean that it yields no obligation of the kind that arises 
from the very nature of being an academic.” (2002 203-4) He goes on to make 
a distinction between external reasons (that academics owe something to 
society as it pays their salaries) and the real obligations that are revealed when 
one reflects on the academic vocation (2002, 204). 
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directs our attention away from the specific situations in which 
people grapple with the meaning and responsibilities of their 
jobs. To take an example from my own field: in a situation of 
academic competition, let’s say when I apply for scholarships 
and try to present my work in a way so as to attract the 
sponsors, I might feel that I am seduced into intellectual 
dishonesty. I gradually notice how my own academic interests 
start to conform to the typical debates. The problem evolving 
from a situation like this one is, I suppose, the reason one 
might want to talk about ‘an obligation to keep one’s work 
intellectually honest’. It is in this type of situation I come to 
reflect on – and act on – what it means to be an academic. That 
is why it is strange to think that ‘the obligations of an 
academic’ can be deduced from a particular concept, or a 
certain transcendent ideal about what a profession should be. 
It would be to give a distorted and too contemplative image of 
the dynamic and relational reality of work in which people’s 
commitment is expressed in ordinary situations: caring about 
the bad atmosphere in the team, asking a colleague whether 
s/he needs help with a certain task, or arguing about whether 
unnecessary compromises have been made.  
In connection with this, when discussing the meaning of 
work or what it is like to be an x, one needs to acknowledge 
how tempting it is to direct one’s gaze at work in such an 
exclusive way that the very ordinary circumstances of finding 
one’s job, with all that it contains of friends, tasks, security, 
routines etc. bearable or even rewarding drops out of the 
picture. Could you imagine yourself asking your friend who 
delivers mail, works in a flower shop, as a pharmacist or as an 
accountant for a plumbing firm: is it the job itself you like, or 
is it something else? When would you ask that? What would 
the question imply, what kind of answer would be 
encouraged? My own hunch is that distinctions between the 
job and ‘everything else’ differ hugely depending on the 
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concern in question: are you asking whether your friend 
should quit hir job or are you asking hir why the job makes hir 
lie awake at night? The inclination to make a strong context-
less distinction between the job itself and psychological 
circumstances can be alleviated by reminding oneself (once 
again) of what an ambiguous concept work is. What one will 
say thus depends on what one looks at and with what interest 
one looks at it: the role of a doctor (‘role’ is a tricky concept), 
the employment as a doctor, a medical training, a specific job 
situation. Without any specific context in mind, it is hard to 
speak about the meaning of a job or what is external to it. I am 
not saying this because I want to broaden the picture; the 
remark latches onto Gaita’s own project of denouncing 
reductionism and external images of morality. I consider what 
I have said here to be in line with how I grasp the gist of his 
argument. The framework of professionalism externalizes 
commitment – Gaita is right about that – but there is also the 
risk that one is staring so hard at the meaning of work (‘what 
it means to be a teacher/doctor/politician’) that one conflates 
one’s own ideas and preconceptions about what is external to 
a particular job with the meaningfulness of a job.  
In other words, a complex question is what it is to 
investigate what a job means to somebody. Like 
‘understanding’, the concept of meaning is used in multiple 
ways. We talk about meaning as grasping the point of 
something, as in the cases where we ask what use something 
serves. We also talk about meaning when we discuss whether 
something is meaningful or meaningless (at all). In those cases 
one may be perfectly familiar with the use something serves. 
When people talk about meaningfulness, they often appeal to 
experiences, and then it may – to the philosopher worried 
about realism or anti-realism – appear that whatever I find 
meaningful is meaningful, that there can’t be anything more to 
say about meaningfulness than: this is how it appears to me, 
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from my perspective this is meaningful, I experience this as 
meaningful. In another use of ‘meaningful’, the psychological 
level of experiences does not solve anything. We ask questions 
such as ‘are you serious, how can you think this is 
meaningful?’ As I will go on to show, the categories of 
subjective or objective are not exhaustive: meaningfulness 
cannot be exhaustively defined on such a continuum. Your 
caring about something may strike me as mysterious, or even 
questionable, or it may open up a new horizon for me. My 
point is that it is not at all obvious what talking about finding 
one’s job meaningful entails, what such talk concerns, how 
and when it is raised. This is important to keep in mind when 
meaningfulness is treated as a shorthand way of coming to 
terms with the nature of work and good work. In other words, 
to look at uses of the word meaningful is far more fruitful than 
attempts to fixate what meaningful work (inherently) is. 
To sum up: questions about ‘what it means to be an X’ – 
take note of the form of the question! – cannot be isolated from 
the particular problems arising within the life one leads. 
Appealing to certain ‘grammatically grounded’62 ideas about 
what an occupation is seems to direct one’s attention away 
from the urgency of a person’s struggles with the 
responsibilities or obligations of hir job. My point is that this is 
not what Gaita wants, either (he is against foundationalism). It 
matters that Gaita is discussing the life of academics in the 
sections I have quoted from and one would perhaps think it 
self-evident that reflection is emphasized there. In my view, 
not even of an academic does it make sense to say that the 
concept of an academic plays a very fundamental role so that it 
                                                          
62 A discussion about what Gaita means by ‘concept’ and ‘grammar’ could be 
in place here, and I think his own image is very complex. However, I have 
chosen not to venture into such a discussion as that would take me too far 
from my main errand. 
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could be appealed to when one, for example, wants to settle 
the ailments of the contemporary university. As we will see, 
Gaita’s emphasis on the role reflection has in understanding 
what it means to be a university teacher is very deliberate 
(though ambiguous) and I will go on to question the ideas he 
nurses about how some activities allow for reflection about 
their deepening obligations, while others do not because of 
their ‘constitutive grammar’. I wonder whether Gaita should 
acknowledge the risk that he is transforming his own 
perspective – what he, personally, is able to view as a vocation 
or what he is unable to perceive as a form of self-exploration 
or as more than technique – into a ‘grammatical’ point based 
on conceptual reflection on what it means to be an X. Gaita’s 
emphasis on grammar ignores the interpersonal nature of 
remarks about meaningfulness, and the fact that this 
interpersonal character does not always revolve around 
reflection in any immediate sense. However, as I said, there 
are also other elements in his account: after all, the personal 
story has an important role, not just as an example but, as I 
think Gaita himself would say, as a case that bears witness to a 
moral possibility. 
4.3 ‘A deepening understanding’ 
I now turn to discuss Gaita’s claim that only some forms of 
work can be a vocation, an idea that takes on all the more 
luster if one presupposes that this can be decided through 
philosophical reflection (even though, as I said, it is quite hard 
to know where Gaita stands on this). What Gaita says about 
the distinction between professionalism and vocation can be 
understood in connection with sections in Good and Evil: An 
Absolute Conception dedicated to the concept of craft. The 
chapter in which these sections appear contains a discussion 
about naturalism, virtues and their relation to human needs. 
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Gaita brings in the concept of craft to shed light on how 
virtues are not instrumentally related to needs. One of the 
overall aims of the book is to counteract reductive (often 
utilitarian) conceptions of morality. He sees crafts as distinct 
from skills. Virtue ethics has utilized the analogy between 
crafts and virtues, but in that tradition crafts have, Gaita 
complains, mostly been treated as skills. Skills are, he says, 
determined by their relation to certain defined ends and this 
has a bearing on how one talks about what it means to learn 
something, to master a skill. But the concept of a craft need not 
be restricted to a description of how well particular ends are 
achieved. As in the sections from A Common Humanity quoted 
above, Gaita introduces the concept of vocation to stake out a 
certain possibility which must not be muddled by using the 
wrong kind of vocabulary: 
Craftsmen, like all whose self-understanding is conditioned by 
their having a vocation, are engaged in a limitless process of self-
exploration through an exploration of what they do. What they 
are and what they do come together in the concept, ‘what it is to 
be an X’ (a craftsman, a nurse or a teacher, for example). Certain 
forms of the question ‘What is it to be an X?’ depend upon a kind 
of contrast between appearance and reality that allows for the 
idea of an understanding which may deepen without limit. […] 
Concepts whose constitutive grammar is purely functional (the 
concept of dustman, for example) are relatively transparent, and 
even though some are very complex, their complexity is finite and 
of a sort that enables us to expect that opinions on what it is to be 
such an X will converge amongst competent inquirers (Gaita 2004, 
86, my emphasis). 
There are many things in the quote I would like to challenge. 
Again: by appealing to what he sees as ‘constitutive grammar’, 
Gaita relies on the conceptual in a misleading way: a certain 
dimension of work will, he seems to say, emerge when we 
reflect deeply on what it means to be an X: a constitutive 
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grammar shines forth. What I agree with is that self-
exploration and engagement sometimes come together, and 
talking about a vocation makes sense there. The problem is 
that from Gaita’s horizon, some activities will appear as 
practical chores, while there are other activities that have the 
potential to deepen our understanding of what they are about. 
‘Skill’ is, he maintains, a functional concept and ‘dustman’, for 
him, exemplifies functional work. Answers to the question 
‘what it means to be a dustman’ will thus yield descriptions 
that do not involve questions about meaning in the way ‘what 
it means to be a teacher’ does. This contention about the 
constitutive grammar of what it is to be a dustman is puzzling, 
even though Gaita’s point seems tempting to accept. I can 
definitively feel the pull of the idea that providing a functional 
or technical description with regard to some jobs seems more 
accurate than with regard to others. After all, people talk that 
way about jobs and even about their own jobs, and they do it 
to make various points. Think, for instance, about a person 
who dreams about quitting hir job. S/he tells hir friends that 
the job s/he has at present offers no challenges, no 
development, no deepened knowledge. S/he is eager to learn 
something new, she says. The job s/he has now is fine, but 
after you’ve got the hang of it, there is nothing that keeps you 
active. Even though this way of talking may not be what Gaita 
had in mind, it is one instance of such distinctions. 
I find Gaita’s elaboration of work as a vocation 
illuminating to some extent, especially in its rejection of 
psychologism, namely his rejection of the suggestion that 
passion is a psychological state that can be separated from 
professional obligations. I also by no means interpret Gaita as 
putting forward a strong thesis that distinguishes functional 
jobs from vocations – his main contention concerns ‘what it is 
to be an x’ and what one can mean by crafts. From there, he 
develops an idea about functionality and vocations.  
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So what is the problem with arguing that only some types 
of work can be a vocation? I have already begun explaining 
why this philosophical move is problematic: accounts of ‘what 
it is to be an X’ cannot be detached from accounts of the life as 
an X, of the way new concerns and worries arise within a 
practice (I will return to this in chapter 6). One can, I think, say 
that such concerns do not always take the shape of ‘what it is 
to be an X’ even though they express forms of how a person’s 
commitment to hir job deepens. There is no detached, 
grammatical level of exploring what an activity means and 
somehow Gaita might agree: after all, he claims that the mode 
of reflection he has in mind is a form of self-exploration.  
Let me first try to spell out in what way Gaita’s point 
seems to be on the right track. It is possible to reach a level of 
agreement about what it is to be an X, Gaita says, if this X is 
not seen as a craft. This is shown by the converging opinions 
of competent practitioners regarding what a job is about (what 
is required of a practitioner). I agree with Gaita only this far: in 
many jobs, an important dimension is that practitioners 
express their own views on what is central for doing the job 
well. The question about what good work amounts to arises 
again and again and it is hard to imagine many jobs without 
such discussions and controversies. A concern about what it 
means to be a therapist or a teacher is linked to the practice of 
being a therapist or a teacher; of confronting situations, talking 
with colleagues with different backgrounds and life stories, 
starting to doubt one’s judgment, or voicing a worry about the 
commercialization that has a hazardous influence on teaching 
or interacting with clients. Think for example about care 
workers at a home for the elderly discussing a set of new 
policies and the impact these policies have on the space they 
have for working in a way they themselves find acceptable. It 
would be strange to say that their discussion only has a 
therapeutic function; that it lets off the steam for example. We 
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could imagine somebody, perhaps the employer, reducing 
such discussions to psychological expression of discontent in 
order to trivialize the employees’ opinions and perspectives 
and to render them toothless, mere opinions, rather than 
testimonies of problematic tendencies. Also imagine a group 
of journalists discussing a new marketing strategy aimed to 
increase the amount of subscriptions. Some of the journalists 
grow impatient with the discussion and say that this type of 
thing prevents them from attending to their core 
responsibilities: investigating and writing. The discussion that 
takes place within the practical setting of the job can’t be 
isolated from other aspects of the situations in which the 
conversations take place: a relation with a long history, 
vulnerable moments and vulnerable power relations, the 
desire to be right, bitterness, moments of insight, attempts to 
make oneself understood.  
As I said, such issues are by no means strictly limited to 
‘what it is to be an x’ even though they express worries and 
hopes about the job or the community of which the job is a 
part. It is easy to imagine how relations of power and position 
influence situations in which good work is debated – one need 
only recall one’s own experiences as a new and insecure 
employee at a job and the very different meanings it may have 
in that setting to ask for advice from a co-worker; one’s 
insecurity may even imply that the only thing one sees is the 
other’s authority, not the specific weight experience has within 
that job. A case in which a person’s experience has authority 
regardless of hir formal position can also be imagined.  
So, there are jobs in which debates about the nature of 
good work seem inevitable and this is shown in how 
practitioners value experience in ways that go beyond having 
acquired a set of skills, technical expertise. In this sense, 
talking about a dimension of deepening might reveal a 
dimension of work: commitment. 
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This dimension of deepening is internal to commitment. 
Lars Hertzberg writes about the temptation of social theorists 
to describe all occupations as roles that mold the practitioner’s 
personality. This may be true of some types of jobs, but it 
remains the exception. When it is true, it is in the sense that 
commitment reveals what that job is (the concepts of role and 
personality easily create muddles and it may be important to 
try out other concepts for describing in what way a person’s 
job shapes hir life. He goes on to elaborate on the meaning of 
‘being a scholar at heart’. I read Hertzberg as saying that 
commitment is so central for some jobs that the standards of 
what good work means are tied up with commitment.63  
[The] standards of scholarly work are set only through the ways 
in which scholars actually commit themselves in their work. Their 
commitments show what it is to find meaning in a life of 
scholarship. And this can only be shown by someone for whom 
that life has meaning in itself, that is, by somebody who is a 
scholar at heart (1994, 271).   
This quote shows how a generalized description of a job may 
not at all reveal what good work could be; this is revealed 
through people’s commitment. I think Gaita would fully agree 
because this goes against the idea that passion could be 
disengaged from the obligations of the job. Standards of 
scholarly work may be expressed in quantitative terms (if 
quoted many times in journals with the right profile, a 
scholarly article is ranked as a contribution with a high 
standard), but Hertzberg’s point seems to bring out another 
different dimension of speaking about standards, where the 
focus does not lie on standards as formalization or 
                                                          
63 ‘Commitment’ can have different roles. In contrast to the scholar at heart, 
one can imagine a person who is very ‘committed’ but only in the sense that 
s/he shows enthusiasm for new projects etc., while the commitment never 
materializes in hir work. 
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prescription: standards are not the standards of an institution, 
the academic market or the standards set by one’s peers. The 
obligation one has in scholarly work is not defined in that way 
(1994, 270). If standards are revealed through commitment, the 
project of strict definitions of the obligations of a job seems 
spurious and this again brings us back to the impossibility of 
fixating a definition of work, the limits of work or the essence 
of a job. With this in mind, what is important is how 
commitment comes through in somebody’s life and how 
people actually talk about what it means to mature or to gain 
experience within a job, or to become jaded, cynical or bitter. 
This perspective is challenging because it attends to the 
question of good work from a very different angle than a 
perspective of professionalism that revolves around an ideal 
about agreement on standards and quality. What can be said 
is that good achievements, good work, quality, etc. have 
different roles depending on what kinds of jobs, or what 
historical situation, one talks about. One important 
circumstance is in which way the standards of good work are 
settled or revealed, and whether quantitative or qualitative 
terms are used. What is more, it may even be a violation of 
what is seen as central in a job to talk about ‘standards’. I think 
this is part of Gaita’s rejection of professionalism. The risk is 
that one ends up in a discourse in which professional ethics is 
seen as a set of standards that can be decided by a committee, 
so that responsibility consists in complying with these external 
standards. An emphasis evokes the image of a profession as a 
specific field: the standards of a profession are derivable from 
and even synonymous with the given practice (for a 
contribution to this debate cf. Applbaum 1999). 
The limits of a job are historical in a way that is saturated 
with meaning. The ways in which good work is discussed are 
rarely static: power, change and disputes enter the story as is 
very easy to demonstrate if one takes a look at the 
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contestations of New Public Management and the concepts of 
quality that have been brought into many professions – or 
rather, that have been forced on many employees who report 
their powerlessness over the system. If Gaita’s concept of a 
vocation is applied to exasperated doctors, teachers or 
administrators who feel that external standards and quality 
systems make it impossible for them to live up to what they 
see as good work, the seriousness of what is in jeopardy gets 
clear. Professions are sometimes understood as making up a 
logic of their own, characterized by the control professionals 
exert over their work; professionals are free to judge and 
choose the ends of work. This logic is defined in contrast to 
markets and bureaucracy. Professionalism is described as a 
shrinking realm squeezed in between state regulations and 
commercial interests (cf. Eliot Freidson’s book Professionalism: 
The Third Logic). The language of professionalism (for example 
in the shape of “a logically distinct way of organizing and 
controlling work” (2001, 197)) doesn’t at all guarantee that the 
moral hazards of a situation, be it the commercialization of the 
university or engineering, are taken seriously (cf. Wolgast 
1991). The risk is that we then only see an assault on 
professionalism. If conflicts come to look like a struggle between 
a set of professional ideals and institutional facts, for example 
so that the only problem with new public management is that 
it infringes on the autonomy of professionals, the aspect I 
pointed to above is not seen: the need for people to take a 
stand on what good work means. Nor does the language of 
professionalism capture the ethically immersed relational 
aspect of such changes, how practitioners relate to clients and 
how they relate to each other. What can be concluded here is 
that this type of example shows that the concept of vocation 
can alert us the fear among practitioners that a job is being 
corrupted. This does not stake out a distinction between jobs; 
rather, one can say that the fear that a job is corrupted reveals 
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the room for a worker to voice hir own understanding of the 
job and in that case it doesn’t make sense to say that the job is 
merely functional, or saying it would mean to occupy a 
specific position (perhaps as an employer). In other words, the 
distinction is relevant, but not in the way Gaita thinks. Let me 
continue on that track. 
4.4 Gaita on functionality 
Several writers argue that there is a difference between a 
practice that involves only technical competence and full-
blown practices in which there are internal goods, rewards 
that are internally related to the activity itself. The goals 
cannot be understood without the means, and conversely, the 
means cannot be understood without the aims. For these 
writers, ‘internal goods’ are capacities that transform us as 
persons and in this way they are related to a way of life. 
Russell Muirhead mentions washing dishes, trimming lawns, 
copying papers and operating machinery. These are activities 
that may require technical skills, but they contain no internal 
goods, he argues in his argument that draws on the 
philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre. He adds that the activities 
he mentions can be seen as practices under one condition: if 
they are situated within a wider context (2004, 195-7). 
MacIntyre himself (1981, 175) wrote that football and chess 
can be seen as practices with internal goods, whereas the 
concept of a practice cannot accommodate brick-laying and 
planting turnips. Like Gaita, he underscores that practices 
have no fixed goal and that they are separable from technical 
skills.  
[A] practice, in the sense intended, is never just a set of technical 
skills, even when directed towards some unified purpose and 
even if the exercise of those skills can on occasion be valued or 
enjoyed for their own sake. What is distinctive of a practice is in 
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part the way in which conceptions of the relevant goods and ends 
which the technical skills serve – and every practice does require 
the exercise of technical skills – are transformed and enriched by 
these extension of human powers and by that regard for its own 
internal goods which are partially definitive of each particular 
practice or type of practice (1981, 180).   
Muirhead, for his part, seems to deny that there can be a 
categorical distinction between practices and non-practices (in 
MacIntyre’s book the difference is not categorically expressed, 
either). The importance, for him, of the concept of a practice is 
that it clarifies the promise of good work. If one take’s 
Muirhead’s stance, practices are defined as an open-ended 
concept. When I engage in a practice as a beginner, I cannot 
know beforehand what engaging in it will mean. If the only 
thing Muirhead says is that the promise of good work 
involves more than skills in a technical sense, that it involves 
more than concepts of functionality, then I agree with him. 
However, when Gaita argues that there is a distinction 
between merely functional jobs and crafts that allow for 
deepening I doubt such a distinction can really be made in the 
way he does it. Step by step, I will attempt to give reasons for 
my hesitation. In chapter 2, I discussed how the term 
‘functionality’ has appeared as a critique of de-skilling and 
societal machinery. When Gaita talks about a vocation he 
contrasts it with an image that appears neutral. Gaita’s main 
contention about functionality is this: if a job is functional, it 
contains no room for development other than a development 
in competence or mastery. Functional work is what it is. One 
can understand him as saying that in the capacity of dustman, 
the dustman is a function (cf. 2004, 86).  
He does not seem to understand the cruelty such a view 
unwittingly gives expression to. Gaita’s assumption leads one 
to think that there are some activities that can be accounted for 
solely from a practical, technical point of view. If one 
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interprets what he says in a drastic way, the argument implies 
that some jobs are very easy and straightforward to describe; 
since they are functions, there is nothing more to say about 
them beyond pointing out their technical relation to a 
particular aim. If one has a reduced understanding of 
functions, not even instrumentality seems to fit into the 
picture, as instrumentality opens up for a complex relation 
between means and ends. The problem is also (again) that the 
idea of work as a function zones in on work in a much too 
one-dimensional way when it is assumed that the job of a 
dustman (secretary/cashier/receptionist?) is exhaustively 
described by pointing at the functions it serves, while a 
reflection on the work of a doctor or an academic allegedly 
discloses and responds to essential human values.  
My main objection is that this would make it impossible to 
distinguish a job that can be characterized in functional terms 
(by mentioning the purpose) from jobs which are degraded into 
mere functions. Imagine a grocery store where a person sits by 
the checkout point, repeating the same movements over and 
over again and never having the time to exchange a few words 
with the customers, or imagine a cleaner who was once a part 
of the university staff, but now works for a private firm, and is 
treated by the university staff as a function, rather than a 
person. That these jobs have a history is crucial, as well as the 
changes even the concept of functionality goes through when 
it is inserted in a new context, such as the outsourced cleaning 
services at the university.  
When one reads a book like the journalist Studs Terkel’s 
Working – containing interviews with people working in a 
huge range of different occupations – one also realizes that it 
makes a difference if a person hirself says that the job is just a 
function or whether s/he is treated like an exchangeable 
function (cf. Terkel 1997).  
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Again, what I take to be the decisive reminder here is that 
workers have their own views about what the job is about, 
what degradation of it means and what is important for doing 
it well, views that, as I said, might differ in significant ways 
from the employer’s definition and prescriptions. One 
example could be a person who helps elderly people in their 
homes. Hir employer strongly emphasizes that the schedule 
must be kept at all times. Time is not to be wasted and the 
visits must never stretch out. The employee’s experience is 
that these schedules cannot be kept, that sticking to them 
conflicts with hir commitment to doing the job well. Following 
the schedule appears to hir like an infringement on the 
essential responsibilities: feeding, washing or doing the daily 
shopping (for a good account of this, cf. Mattson 2014). These 
ways of voicing disagreement reveal a side of work that, 
repressed, forgotten or ignored reveals the power relations of 
neutralizations and descriptions of a job in terms of certain 
fixed obligations. 
A recent example of such a disagreement took place in 
Stockholm, Sweden. A new time-measurement software 
program has been introduced in some municipalities to make 
the healthcare workers’ visits at elderly people’s homes more 
efficient. Many workers experienced this software program 
(ParaGÅ) as a strain on their work that has made it harder to 
do the job they are supposed to do; the stress that the system 
brought into the working day puts the well-being of the 
employees and the clients at risk. One of the unions the 
employees are represented by decided to manifest the 
discontent with this new time-measurement system by 
refusing to use program. The employer responded with a 
lockout. Another union representing the employees of the 
same company criticized the refusal and expressed positive 
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views about the software system in question.64 In my view, 
such examples illuminate why there can be no ready-made 
distinction between functional jobs and vocations.  
Let me mention a couple of further cases that go against 
Gaita’s distinction. First, a rather familiar, even mythologized, 
example: consider the way a bartender works a bar. S/he 
recognizes the patrons and cares about them. S/he tries to 
create the bar as a space for everyone. S/he is clearly 
demarcating what kind of behavior is not appropriate. 
Whenever needed, s/he can appear gruff. Most of the patrons 
appreciate hir eye for tricky situations and when this 
bartender is retired, the patrons talk about the significant 
changes this has meant to the community built around the bar. 
I think this kind of example is interesting because it sheds 
light on how witnessing somebody’s work or hearing 
somebody talking about hir job opens up a way in which the 
job makes a moral difference. This is in line with what Gaita 
would say. My point is that references to ‘the merely 
functional’ elicit an inclination to create neat categories that 
makes us less prone to take interest in what a job is like and to 
listen to people talk about how they experience their jobs.  
To take another example, in his book Working in The 
Shadows the journalist Gabriel Thompson talks about his 
experience of cutting salad. The learning process was not just 
a practical process of working faster and more efficiently. He 
explains that it was also a process of getting familiar with the 
environment, the group of (mostly immigrant) workers and 
their various attitudes towards the job. This made him re-
evaluate how people tend to talk about skills. He became 
increasingly suspicious of the idea that cutting salad is a 
simple job that one could learn in a few minutes. He describes 
                                                          
64http://www.ka.se/informationen-om-paraga-maste-bli-battre, 
http://arbetaren.se/artiklar/syndikalister-varslar-om-strejk-mot-aleris/ 
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both solidarity and animosity among the workers: some 
workers are irritated with Thompson’s clumsiness while 
others help him out (2010, chapter 1). The examples show that 
an intimate knowledge about a job reveals new forms of care – 
care in a multi-dimensional sense as expressed in the 
practitioner’s attention: Thompson describes both a way of 
relating to the task and how the salad cutters related to co-
workers – all of which is inconspicuous to people buying salad 
from the grocery store (in chapter 6 I will discuss care more 
directly), and which is definitively inconspicuous to people 
having made up their mind that some jobs are by nature 
manual and involve skills so basic that anyone can do them.  
It is true for many jobs, I think, that an outsider may, for 
different reasons, have a limited understanding (or 
imagination!) of the attentive care that a practitioner’s work is 
an expression of. Like the Norwegian philosopher Jacob 
Meløe, I would say that a person who knows nothing about 
fishing does not share the world that the fisher inhabits, a 
world of the sea, boats and the fisherman’s working day. 
‘World’ here includes both how (and what) we see and how 
we act (1997). Muirhead is thus right when he writes: “It is 
difficult to identify the internal goods relevant to particular 
lines of work, and we should not be too quick to judge 
particular jobs or careers as simply lacking them. Internal 
goods may be hard to locate even at an individual level, with 
respect to one’s own job” (2004, 163). Again, it is important not 
to have too reduced an idea of work in mind here; it is 
precisely in connection with distilled ideas about ‘the job as 
such’– ideas about what is internal and external to the job – 
that one may be prone to overlook or trivialize such care.  
In Gaita’s phrasing of the contrast between a vocation and 
functional tasks functionality is somehow the bare fact of a job 
as execution, important only in so far as it is done. This image is 
related to another one: there are necessary tasks that must be 
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done but nobody would do them if they had a choice to do 
something else. What kind of case would one think of here? It 
would be outrageous were we to assume that the person 
cleaning the streets from garbage necessarily sees hirself as a 
mere function. One could instead think of somebody who 
likes hir job because it is so easy to perceive its function – and 
here function is exchangeable with purpose and aim – to see the 
difference the daily toil makes. This is a language game of 
function very different from the language of crude and purely 
technical instrumentality. Gaita takes for granted that the 
concept of functionality does not allow for deepening: he 
seems to argue that concerns about meaningfulness does not 
and cannot arise here. As we have seen, the view of work as a 
function risks bracketing the concrete circumstances that 
degrade work into mere execution, for example that the 
employee is barred from paying attention to anything beyond 
getting the job done. ‘What it is to be an x’ here seems to be 
reduced to a minimal set of obligatory tasks, and the rich 
varieties in how we talk about work and necessity – what 
must be done – is glossed over. If the only thing Gaita’s 
argument implies is that a practice or a job can be degraded, I 
would agree with it. But degradation never figures in his 
discussion. 
Some writers argue that a distinction between the social 
role of a job and its inherent meaning helps us see the 
difference between a job being intrinsically meaningful for a 
person and its being socially useful. As Russell Muirhead 
writes, an account of work that emphasizes its social utility 
but ignores people’s own claims and aspirations is one-sided 
(cf. Muirhead 2004, 152). Nobody could deny that a person 
could at the same time see that a job is socially worthwhile, 
although s/he couldn’t see hirself fit for the job. I also agree 
with Muirhead that social utility that takes no regard of the 
people who do the jobs is a flawed one – and I would say that 
256 
 
it risks omitting the essential question: social utility for whom, 
under what circumstances? The problematic step is taken if it is 
assumed that there are specific useful jobs that in themselves 
are such that a conflict occurs between usefulness for society 
and ‘intrinsic meaning’, that a job is useful but that its intrinsic 
reward is such that very few people would see it as a job they 
could see themselves doing. Muirhead seems to assume such 
inherent conflicts and he seems to have garbage-collectors and 
grave-diggers in mind. On the other hand, I think the wrong 
response would be the subjectivist one: a person’s own 
attitude solves all questions about meaning. If a person 
happens to like a job, then that job can be seen as meaningful, 
regardless of its conditions. However, it would be very 
dangerous to think that any job could be meaningful, given the 
right attitude.  
I suspect that the trouble with Muirhead’s question ‘is 
there an irresolvable conflict between social utility and 
intrinsic reward?’ is that it encourages philosophical attempts 
to resolve an eternal conflict assumed to characterize work in 
itself, in every society.  I think there is a real, very important 
worry that underlies the question, but it needs to be re-
formulated so that it really has the capacity to challenge how 
we perceive work and social utility, along with tendencies to 
neutralize such conflicts. In a way, Muirhead radicalizes his 
own question later on, even though he does not spell out the 
connection. In connection with a discussion about the division 
of labor, he writes: “Capitalism thus contains an enduring 
antagonism between what human beings are and what it asks 
and requires them to be…” (2004, 158) Gavin Kitching follows 
a similar train of thought in a discussion about Marx’s concept 
of labor power. He writes that a commodification of work 
makes a certain form of degradation of work possible. 
Creativity itself becomes a commodity. Then he adds:  
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On the other hand, however, it does not seem to me that there is 
much human creativity involved in mining coal, or packing cakes 
into boxes, or assembling transistor radios from standard 
components. Would one not much rather that machines did all 
these repetitive, boring, dangerous, or dirty tasks? Why have 
‘living labor power’ involved in them at all? (Kitching 1988, 119)  
This remark prompts the question whether there are certain 
jobs that should not exist at all, if the mere existence of these jobs 
is degrading. For Kitching this is a serious concern: if we 
cannot think of a job as an expression of human creativity, 
then what would it mean to think of a better arrangement of 
this job? (However, I think creativity may not play the role 
Kitching thinks it does.) Would the goal be that we are all to 
share these jobs between us, or is the aim rather full 
automation of these tasks? (1988, 134) Again: the risk is that 
this turns into a sort of intellectual musing: could we imagine 
Marx enjoying a sewer job? Or the question could be reduced 
into playful and hypothetical personal soul-searching: could I 
stand to do it? The fundamental question is all-important: 
should anybody do these jobs? What does it mean that this is a 
job? Many people have no choice but to accept jobs like this. 
Such questions will inevitably incite distinctions between 
various forms of repulsive jobs. Which jobs are unpleasant 
(but somebody must do them, if no machine can), which jobs 
are monotonous, which jobs are morally and emotionally 
challenging, and which jobs should not exist at all? Such 
questions arise in the midst of our ordinary lives, not merely 
in a philosophical mode. The stakes of these discussions are 
big: if there are jobs that nobody should do, there may also be 
services or commodities we must live without. If there are jobs 
that are dangerous or existentially empty and that many 
people agree should be abolished, what bearing do these 
moral views have on the factual existence of those jobs? What 
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political measures can be taken that makes it possible for 
people not to accept such bad or dangerous jobs? 
To sum up: what I protest against is the idea that there are 
aspects flowing from the nature of work or derived from the 
essence of a task that create a basis for a grammatical 
distinction between work that can deepen and work that 
revolves around function, skills and competence. If one reads 
Gaita uncharitably one may even say that his take on 
functionality exacerbates the already existing risk of 
neglecting and undervaluing certain jobs.  
4.5 Work and reality 
As we saw, Gaita relates the concept of vocation to activities 
that can deepen. Roy Holland says something along similar 
lines when in one of the essays in Against Empiricism he talks 
about how mastery stands in relation to reality in a specific 
way that allows for deepening (Gaita draws on Holland in his 
texts). Mastery has to do with learning and the way work is 
judged qualitatively. He hereby wishes to open up a 
discussion about the value of education: 
I do not mean the mastery of just anything but rather of things 
which have enough in them (or which lead on to and facilitate other 
things which have enough in them) to occupy a person’s 
consciousness and absorb a substantial portion of his energies; 
things which afford enough scope for there to be an indefinite 
progression of work, with the possibility always of advancement 
and the growth of comprehension and the natural joy that attends 
the exercise of a human faculty (Holland 1980, 56, my emphasis).  
The problem with this quote, and Gaita’s perspective, is that 
they adhere to the picture that the inherent worth of an 
activity is central for what it is to talk about a vocation and 
mastery. I have already addressed what I think is wrong with 
that figure of thought. Holland’s question: ‘what has enough 
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in it to occupy a person’s consciousness?’ easily turns into 
either a question about an activity as such, or a question about 
psychological experiences of meaning. Both Gaita and 
Holland strongly oppose the latter option, psychologism. 
Holland’s ‘what has enough in it’ can be interpreted as a 
practical (rather than grammatical) point: in the course of 
everyday life, in the midst of doing and acting, we make 
distinctions between activities that are worth engaging in and 
activities that don’t. Holland’s essay contains some astute 
remarks about mastery and work that go in the opposite 
direction of stressing the inherent nature of a specific 
occupation. He says for example that mastery does not thrive 
in competitive relations; it develops in relations of common 
love of work. As with Gaita, I think Holland is on to 
something in his essay. He attends to aspects of work which 
do not conform to ‘the rat race’, or the kind of thinking 
according to which the most important thing is to get what 
one is entitled to (1980, 58). I agree with Holland that it makes 
sense to talk about a deepening knowledge of work to bring 
out such aspects, and from this point of view he is right when 
he says that an achievement is not external to the task when it 
is seen from other perspectives than execution. A certain type 
of attention to what one is doing takes on a very different 
meaning when one starts to worry about results alone (1980, 
57-8, 60). The internal relation between means and ends is a 
recurring theme in the philosophy of work. In connection with 
a discussion of Hertzberg’s example of a scholar at heart, I 
talked about the difference between a person geared towards 
maximizing academic merits, and a person who is committed 
to the life of the mind in a way that is internal to the content of 
that life. This point about the role results or achievements play 
shows how difficult it is to describe a job with respect to what 
is internal and external to it if this is done in isolation from the 
situations in which it becomes relevant to make such 
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distinctions. In this sense, with regard to how careerism or an 
enforced ideal of efficiency shapes a person’s relation to hir 
work, talking about shallow and deep understandings of a job 
has a point. 
Above, I briefly mentioned the complex role of experience 
in relation to work as a vocation. Holland’s essay encourages a 
distinction between being a beginner and having worked 
oneself into mastery – with all the social relations that brings 
in. A sense of vocation appears in the ceaseless dynamics of 
working which cannot be reduced to a strictly defined end. In 
such cases work is not a closed process, but rather a deepening 
of one’s contact with a certain practice. In this interpretation of 
work as practice, mastery is both learning and care. With 
Todd S. Mei, I would say that the task constantly reveals 
things to the practitioner. Many forms of work can therefore 
also be seen as an act of a self-exploration, where questions 
arise about appropriate participation: “[The] use that resides 
in the manner of being of a thing discloses itself to the human 
subject as a calling for appropriate participation with it.” (Mei 
2009, 69) Through such descriptions, Mei’s project is to place 
work within an ethical context. Deepening here has to do with 
the way work cannot be reduced to strenuous molding of non-
responsive material; the material may be resistant to the 
practitioner’s ideas, the material may have been handled 
carelessly, or inappropriate tools may have been used.  
Mei’s formulation shows how a project may change 
aspects: after I have worked effortlessly on it, just going 
through with it as a matter of course, the project may take a 
surprising turn, perhaps due to a bungle, and I have to re-
evaluate everything. From having appeared as a functional 
skill-centered task, a project may transmute into an endeavor 
where I explore the tools, my own capacity and perhaps my 
own involvement in the job. I dwell on the task as long as is 
needed and new aspects appear along the way. An example 
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that might capture what I can make of this point is how a job 
(in a wide sense) can make us experience the world and 
ourselves in unexpected, new ways. In a radio program, a 
person who has worked in the culture sector for most of her 
life tells the story of a drastic change in her life. The stress of 
working as an editor and academic assistant exhausted her. 
She enrolled to train in an education to become a plumber. In 
her daily work, she sees how the way she habitually behaves 
is challenged in many ways. She had to unlearn a feminized 
way of saying ’am I standing in your way?’ She had to rethink 
why she is scared of being troublesome. She learns how to 
study pipes with sensitive fingertips. Learning the job of a 
plumber is learning to look at the world with a plumber’s eyes 
and hearing with the plumber’s ears and feeling with the 
plumber’s fingers (cf. Meløe 1997). The plumber talks about 
the aliveness of sensations and attention, but these are not 
disjointed from learning the mechanics of heating systems in a 
house. I do want to say: at best, devoting oneself to a specific 
job, occupation or task teaches me something about life – my 
life; the life of others; the form of life we share – and gives me 
a sense of what is real, the reality of phenomena as diverse as 
the ear-pinching screams of children, a talkative pensioner 
doing her daily shopping in the morning, heating systems, 
flavors, tax regulations, the relation between the depth of the 
sea and the spawning of fish, the best way to treat insomnia, 
my tendency to shy away from awkward situations, your 
secret revolts against management. This is a different way of 
talking about work and reality than what is the case when 
hard work is valued in its own right (3.3): in that rhetoric, 
‘accepting reality’ means bowing down to hard work, ‘doing 
one’s part’, ‘facing the realities of life’. Here, ‘reality’ is rather, 
as Gaita and Holland point out, a potential for deepening.  
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4.6 Weil on work 
As we have seen, both Holland and Gaita talk about vocations 
as confronting a person with reality. I criticized Gaita for 
showing a deficient understanding of what may make a 
certain job meaningful. I now want to address the question 
posed in the above through Simone Weil’s perspective on 
work. I think her point of view radically challenges the idea 
that one could somehow by an act of reflection distinguish 
jobs that are mere functions from jobs that can deepen. She 
does this through an analysis of work and oppressive 
conditions in the working life. As an act of solidarity with the 
workers Weil took jobs in factories in 1934 and 1935. The work 
was a strain on her health and she was laid off from several 
positions because she worked too slowly for the fixed rates 
and had accidents (cf. Pétrement 1976). In several texts, among 
them “Factory Work”, Weil attests to the degradation 
experienced by the workers in the industrial factory; she 
writes about affliction, oppression of the soul. Oppression of 
this kind cannot be described exclusively in terms of bad 
working conditions, even though that is part of how she 
describes the oppression she witnessed. Weil writes about the 
horror of factory work, the spiritual stupor that the factory 
produces: 
From the moment one is clocked in to the time one is clocked out, 
one must be ready at any instant to take an order. Like an inert 
object that anyone may move about at will. […] There are 
moments when work is absorbing enough for thought to occupy 
itself within the limits just set forth. Then unhappiness, suffering, 
comes to a cessation. But in the evening, once outside the plant, 
and especially in the morning when one’s steps are bent toward 
the place of work and its time-clock, it is dismal to turn one’s 
thoughts to the day’s work looming up just ahead (Weil 1999a, 
55-6). 
263 
 
Work can thus be absorbing, but only for a while. The true 
unhappiness is perhaps felt in the evening, when one thinks 
with dread about having to go to work the next day. That 
work can be momentarily ‘absorbing’ is thus no true solace. 
She elaborates on how factory work, the powerlessness and 
the numbness, injures the soul. The factory destroys a person’s 
capacity to think and feel; it creates loneliness and fear. “Come 
what may, the work must go on. It is up to the worker to get 
on with the job. And he does get on with it. [….] Here, you are 
nothing. You simply do not count. You are here to obey, to 
accept everything, to keep your mouth shut.” (1999a, 55-6) 
When Weil calls the factory work she experienced soul-
destroying, this shows that she is not talking about slight 
inconveniences that could be easily fixed. Weil’s worry, a 
justified one, I think, is that the powerlessness felt by workers 
is described in such terms (for an updated version: talking 
about work as not being challenging enough) that its nature is 
not clear – an insufficient language expresses a failure to act 
on the injustices, the misery of the factories. The difficulty is, 
she writes, to imagine anything which does not ‘bear 
misfortune’s mark’ (1987a, 50). 
As Andrea Nye writes about the consequence of work 
stripped down to a bare sense of execution: such work makes 
possible the scenario that work is “any action, no matter how 
useless, evil, or destructive” (Nye 1994, 87). The only thing 
that matters is what is accomplished. This is oppression, not 
functionality in the good sense, by which I mean that things 
are moving along without hitches and that the smooth process 
is furthering a worthy purpose. Weil describes a state in which 
the worker is left to hirself; s/he starts to look upon hirself as if 
s/he were nothing. Telling the workers why something is done 
was not done; the answer is ‘don’t worry about it’. Weil’s 
testimony does not have a bearing on factory work only; her 
insights into soul-crushing work can illuminate the most 
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diverse forms of work; jobs in which one’s responsibility is 
minimized or skewed and the only thing that matters are 
quotas, sales, procedures or formulas. 
At the same time, according to Weil, physical labor can also 
be a calling on a par with science and art, even if physical labor 
is neither science nor art. The concept of attention is important 
for how she understands the potentiality of work: 
Physical labor may be painful, but it is not degrading as such. It is 
not art; it is not science, it is something else, possessing an exactly 
equal value with art and science, for it provides an equal 
opportunity to reach the impersonal stage of attention. […] 
Exactly to the same extent as art and science, though in a different 
way, physical labor is a certain contact with the reality, the truth, 
and the beauty of this universe and the eternal wisdom which is 
the order in it (Weil 1999b, 322, my emphasis).  
She suggests that working in a factory can be connected with a 
sense of indispensability. Work can be reflective, it can contain 
a unity of thought and action rather than a sense of being 
insignificant, subordinated and bossed around.  
It is necessary to transform incentives to reduce or abolish what 
makes for disgust with one’s work, to transform the relation of 
worker to factory, of worker to machine, and to make possible a 
radically changed awareness of the passing of time while working 
(1999b, 66) 
Her vision of a just society, which is laid out in The Need for 
Roots is structured around a society in which each is dedicated 
to a calling: a person’s calling is hir belonging to a specific 
place in society and s/he should be satisfied with this place, 
whichever it is. The roots Weil talks about in that book can be 
interpreted in other ways than as an ideal of a hierarchical 
society in which everybody is devised a fixed place, even 
though that troubling feature is also strongly present in the 
book. Roots derive from obligations, activity and 
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responsibility – being a member of a work community is in 
this sense linked to activity as a member of society. This 
means taking an interest in society beyond one’s own interests 
and position. Initiatives must make a difference and the moral 
well-being of workers must be taken into consideration. 
Through an analysis of primary needs, Weil emphasizes the 
ways in which people have a need to be involved and 
included (1987a). This is related to the idea that work is one of 
the activities that enable us to gain a sense of who we are and 
we are also able to get a deeper knowledge about the world 
(cf. Nye 1994, 73).   
For all her insights, it is hard to stomach some of Weil’s 
remarks about work: work is seen as a form of servitude 
calling us back to reality, either in the form of degradation or 
sacrifice. Another disturbing feature of her ideas about work is 
that she argues that ‘the spirituality of work’ is something 
people regardless of political or religious background would 
agree about – but she adds that this is easily distorted into a 
collective slogan (1987a, 92-3). For me, the idea that work in 
itself can provide roots is disconcerting because it easily 
adheres to a conditional image of membership in society (cf. 
3.3). Can there be any good idea about a society based on 
work?  
Even so, as a counter-image in relation to the trivialization of 
oppression, or even in relation to the much more harmless 
idea of professionalism as a set of formal requirements and an 
inner ‘drive’, Weil’s writings on work provide a radical 
challenge. Her view is as far as one can get from the ideal that 
work should match one’s personality traits or one’s talents 
(Weil regards talent as a mediocre virtue). When she talks 
about the horrors of the factory, the point is not that a person’s 
talent is spoiled: the work she describes destroys a human 
being because it isolates hir from everything that matters; it 
prevents hir from being a thinking and acting human 
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individual with all that it entails. In The Need for Roots she 
describes the shock a young person is subjected to when s/he 
enter the working life. 
From one day to the next, he finds himself an extra cog in a 
machine, rather less than a thing, and nobody cares any more 
whether he obeys from the lowest motives or not, provided he 
obeys. The majority of workmen have at any rate at this stage of 
their lives experiences the sensation of no longer existing, 
accompanied by a sort of inner vertigo, such as intellectuals or 
bourgeois, even in their greatest sufferings, have very rarely had 
the opportunity of knowing. The first chock, received at so early 
an age, often leaves an indelible mark, It can rule out all love of 
work once and for all (1987a, 52). 
Weil provides no philosophical ideal of full-blown agency; her 
main assertion is that something is askance when acting is 
severed from thinking. Neither is the point that everything 
would be fine were the factory to introduce a few flexible 
routines. It is an entire world of work that needs to be 
changed, Weil suggests, a radical change of circumstances is 
needed and in order to accomplish that, the character of the 
discontent of workers needs to be clear: “how abolish an evil 
without first having perceived in what it consisted?” (1999a, 
54) She asserts, as I said, that discontent is often distorted by 
the people who suffer from it and who express it using the 
catchwords of the day.  
A vocation, for her, brings us into an ethical (and for her, 
religious) contact with the world as it really is. In Weil’s 
thinking, a vocation does not consist in overcoming the 
challenges of an ambiguous empirical reality – it is taking part 
in an intelligible, meaningful world in which I am an ethical 
subject. Vocation in this sense is a demand that I acknowledge 
as absolute, a call that is addressed to me as an ethical subject. 
It is important for her that ‘I’ should not be understood 
psychologically: like Gaita, she does not want to say that 
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vocation is on the level of psychological attitudes. Weil talks 
about work as obedience necessitated by the content, and not 
the fruits, of the task. Yet still: it is I who acknowledge it. My 
action is a response to a demand and this embrace of the 
demand is a recognition of reality. This can be contrasted with 
what she says in “Factory Work” about obliging because one 
is too scared to protest: “The new change is suddenly 
imposed, without advance notice, under the form of a 
command that must immediately and unquestioningly be 
obeyed. The one obeying is thus made to feel that his time is 
incessantly at someone else’s beck and call.” (1999a, 56-7) A 
strand in Weil’s thought is that necessity in an oppressive 
sense, ‘crushing necessity’, is characterized by subordination 
and power relations. Necessity as a mere maintenance of 
existence is always a form of slavery, she argues in Gravity and 
Grace (1987). Obedience in the good sense has to do with the 
necessity of the task; work is then described in the language of 
response, rather than the language of inner drives and will-
power. This form of obligation has a framework of consent, 
not coercion, humiliation or fear.  
At this point, what I have said may also seem to be an 
idealization of physical toil. It would be ridiculous to maintain 
that physical labor simply is a certain contact with reality. 
Weil is clearly not saying that all forms of manual work have 
this power. She evokes what she perceives as a possibility, the 
unity of thought and action. 
Weil’s concept of vocation is connected with attention. It is 
all-important for her that the worker has a sense of the 
purpose of the work s/he is doing; when work is de-associated 
from all senses of purpose, acting is separated from thinking. 
For Weil, such de-association is morally and existentially 
damaging: work in which thinking and acting are separated is 
alienated work. In “Factory Work” she gives a harrowing 
outline of how the role of management in companies has 
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detached thought from reality; workers perform tasks that 
transform them into thoughtless, soulless beings. Such work 
annihilates thought, but in that, it also annihilates the soul. 
One gets used to caprice; one gets used to being bossed 
around, obeying: “the futurity is dead because of its 
unforseeableness” (1999a, 69).  
The split between action and thought destroys 
responsibility. A passage from Matthew Crawford’s Shop Class 
as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work illustrates what 
this amounts to. After finishing his undergraduate studies, 
Crawford got a job in which he was to write short summaries 
of academic articles for the benefit of libraries. At first, he was 
elated by the feeling of finally having a job, but he got 
increasingly skeptical. The employees of the firm were to write 
scientific abstracts of articles. The abstracts were written 
according to a rigid formula. The idea was to add value for the 
customer, but in practice, the abstracts did not even require an 
understanding of the specialized articles. He recalls a middle 
manager at a whiteboard lecturing the employees about the 
procedures. To him, the middle manager appeared like a 
bureaucrat, for whom the official ideology (a respectable job, 
adding value for the customer) is one thing, reality another. 
The job forced him to suppress his ability to think. The 
procedures were decided by somebody ‘far away’ who did not 
care about what the job was really about (2009, 129-141). He 
describes how responsibility shrank to responsibility to a 
formula. This is an example of the hazards of a split between 
thought and reality. 
It needs to be mentioned that Weil’s philosophy is 
characterized by the mode of confession, not generalizing 
statements. She brings out an ethical dimension that has a 
bearing on the subject with which I have engaged in this 
chapter when she emphasizes that we will never be able to 
grasp the oppression of degrading work if we are not able to 
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see how work can offer joy and satisfaction in a way not 
limited to transient psychological states. This is what I take to 
be one of the most central lessons to be drawn from what she 
says about work. This shows the importance of keeping the 
possibility of seeing work as a vocation as an ever open issue, 
not to be restricted by conceptual remarks about what kinds of 
work can be properly described in those terms. Weil shows 
how oppression can be understood as a quenching of the 
potential to do something meaningful. To sum up: Weil’s 
approach reveals the urgency of grappling with the meaning of 
work and the character of oppressive work. This is the reason 
why Weil figures prominently in a chapter about work as a 
vocation.  
4.7 Don’t throw your life away 
At this point I wish to take a step back and reflect on the 
questions I have been struggling with in this chapter. In what 
contexts does the question about a person’s commitment to hir 
job arise? What hangs on such questions? I also like to remind 
you that I did not ascribe to Gaita the idea that jobs could be 
sorted in two neat categories. Even though he does not engage 
in such categorization, his conception of ‘constitutive 
grammar’ reveals a problematic attitude.  
One should remember that Gaita’s aim is not to elaborate a 
philosophy of work (there are only a few stray passages in his 
writings about work); his interests lie elsewhere. When he 
talks about vocation in Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception 
and A Common Humanity, these remarks illuminate what for 
him is a broader issue. Gaita’s primary errand is to develop a 
philosophical framework for a moral vocabulary of the 
absolute. He sets out to challenge the view of morality 
presented by for example utilitarianism or naturalism by 
firmly establishing a view of morality that takes its departure 
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from concepts such as goodness, reality and meaning. By 
doing so, he displaces the normal philosophical way of 
grasping what a moral question is.  
One of the reasons why I engaged in a dialogue with Gaita 
is that attempts to say something about the meaningfulness of 
work have often been brushed off as a legitimization of the 
status quo. For many work critics (chapter 2 & 3), work in the 
sense of wage labor is embedded in a swampy area of 
moralization. To these work critics, talking about good work 
seems politically suspect. As I tried to explain in the last 
chapter, Weeks does not take sufficient note of people’s 
existential relations to work. These are questions people do in 
fact struggle with in their lives and I have been stressing that 
these struggles are entangled with the circumstances of waged 
work (reductions in staff, overwork, division of labor, 
unemployment, etc.) but also the hopes and anxieties people 
have. Again: the concept of vocation takes the discussion into 
a very different direction than talking about moralization of 
work – such discussions typically aim at unmasking, for 
example in which ways moral concepts figure in ideological 
patterns. Even though such projects of unmasking do have a 
place, I also think it is extremely important to, as I said at the 
end of the last chapter, dare to ask the question whether our 
own work is or can be meaningful. This question is 
interwoven with another one: as I said in my critical review of 
Gaita’s points about vocation and functionality, it is 
dangerous to disengage the question of how work is 
important from the way work is de-skilled, banalized or 
withdrawn from reality: by this I mean that concepts of good 
work – such as vocation – are often, as we saw in my 
discussion about Simone Weil, reactions to bad or even 
oppressive conditions. Writers like Weil have described the 
badness of the present through concepts of good work. I am 
inclined to think that it is when such contexts are forgotten 
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that it is easier to take up an attitude to work where the only 
task regarded as critical enough is to unmask ideologies of 
work.  
In this last section of the text (which will also function as a 
summary) I want to focus on the interpersonal aspect of how 
conversations about the meaning of work appear. The concern 
about worthwhile activities is not a general query that a 
philosopher could dig into and solve, even though some have 
certainly tried. To begin with, philosophers have been 
tempted to create an argument about what is meaningful not 
just in the sense that people find something worthwhile, but 
about what is meaningful: they assume that there must be an 
objective or philosophically conclusive way of deciding which 
ends are truly worth pursuing or which are the ultimate 
values of human life. An equally common position is the 
‘existentialist’ denial of objectivity or justification in this sense: 
meaning is a matter of invention or choice, not objectively 
given purposes (for a discussion of such position, cf. Hanfling 
1987). In her Tanner lectures on meaning, the philosopher 
Susan Wolf states that the meaningful life is one in which one 
“finds oneself loving things worthy of love and able to do 
something positive about them. A life is meaningful […] 
insofar as it is actively and lovingly engaged in projects of 
worth.” (2009, 96) Wolf doesn’t hesitate to ask what projects 
are worthy of being called meaningful, but she gradually 
reveals how strange a delivery of philosophical ‘substantive 
judgments’ about what is meaningful appears to be. I think 
she is clearly right in being puzzled. Just like Gaita, she is not 
satisfied with giving a subjective (meaning as a private 
experience) or objective (meaning as a fact that can be 
discovered) account.  
This doubt about subjectivism/objectivism doesn’t make 
her drop the project altogether: her text continues to manifest 
the urge to pinpoint the specific character of the meaningful. 
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Like many other philosophers who have ventured into 
philosophizing about existential meaning, she craves for an 
answer to how futile projects can be distinguished from 
worthwhile ones, the ones that will endow our lives with 
meaning and give us a sense that we are living a meaningful 
life.  
As an alternative to value objectivism (or naturalism) and 
subjectivism Wolf tentatively suggests that the philosopher 
could resort to an idealized subject’s judgments, a subject who 
is sufficiently rational, knowledgeable and perceptive “to be a 
competent judge”, even though she admits that there are 
problems with such a view. Regardless of her resistance to 
perspective-less ideas about what makes people’s lives 
meaningless, Wolf is haunted by the possibility of subject-
independent standards of judgment and her view seems to be 
that the philosopher should somehow be qualified to give an 
outline of an answer beyond pointing to examples like Fred 
Astaire’s mother thinking that her son wastes his time on silly 
dancing instead of doing something more serious (2009, 35-6). 
The lack of an objectivist level of values “gives us all the more 
reason to be tentative in our judgments about what sorts of 
projects deserve inclusion in the class of activities that can 
contribute to the meaningfulness of life” (2009, 37). I would 
like to argue that tentativeness doesn’t free Wolf from the 
insistent urge to say something more substantial: we do say 
things about what is worthwhile and she applies a traditional 
philosophical language of values and classification to this – I 
would say – valid observation. “There are values that are 
independent of oneself which provide reasons for the 
activities from which meaning comes” (2009, 42). The 
conclusion of her argument is that meaningfulness is 
intelligible only if a certain component of objective values is 
acknowledged. This is, I think, different from what Gaita 
would say. Even though I complained about his overemphasis 
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on reflection, his line of thinking clearly shows how a 
dimension of meaning cannot be said to reside in a realm of 
objective values.  
What should one say if one wants to talk about worthwhile 
activities in a way that takes issue with subjectivism and 
objectivism in a firmer way than Wolf’s approach? She is so 
busy carving out a category that she forgets what is at stake 
when people talk to each other about these things. Here I 
think Gaita’s philosophical project comes to its right: how we 
think about meaning will also be a question about how we 
think about responsibility. As he writes, if we can only see a 
job in terms of a profession, we will describe it differently than 
if we relate to it as something that can be a vocation. To 
describe it as a vocation is to commit oneself to certain 
relations, to commit oneself to certain demands (Gaita 2002, 
197). This is one of the main points I have tried to get across in 
this chapter. His point, similar to Weil’s, is that some 
dimensions of a job will be distorted or made unintelligible if 
they are focused on from the perspective of professionalism. If 
we are only able to view the profession of a teacher as a knack, 
a career, we will, according to Gaita, have a very different idea 
about what will constitute corruptions of that job – than we will 
if we are attentive to other ways of understanding what it is to 
be a teacher (Gaita 2002, 232). However, what he says about 
these things makes the question about what kind of point he is 
making resurface. He discusses politics and the view that 
politics is a shady business and, not, as Max Weber claimed, a 
vocation: 
We are more inclined to think of it as a career, partly because we 
do not tend to think of anything under a serious conception of a 
vocation, and partly because we are not inclined to think of 
politics as sufficiently deep to deserve to be called a vocation. We 
tend to think of it as we do garbage collection – it is important 
and must be done, and one does it either because one recognizes 
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that someone must do it, or for reasons and motives we would 
discourage in our children (Gaita 2004, 248). 
I find several things suspect in this quote, among them, again, 
Gaita’s preoccupation with the distinction between a vocation 
and ‘what is important and must be done’. In ‘it is important 
and must be done’ Gaita once again seems to evoke the image 
of functionality, a non-moral, purely practical ‘must’. Now, I 
wanted to say that a distinction between vocation and 
something else cannot be derived from features of a job that 
meticulous reflection could enumerate, or conceptual relations 
that could be resolved once and for all. As I said, it is not clear 
where Gaita stands. Reading the quote I am inclined to ask 
myself to what extent Gaita realizes that what he says about 
politics could also be applied to garbage collection: the 
univocal verdict of the ‘we’ may be challenged and it often is. 
Whom does the vague ‘we’ in the quote to which Gaita refers 
comprise? Here it seems proper to return to the question of 
what it means to say that ‘we’ can make sense only of some 
occupations as being a vocation. 
It seems to me that Gaita ignores the interpersonal and 
contextual entanglement of remarks about what a job is like, at 
its core or in a corrupted form,. Here Kierkegaard’s invocation 
can be brought up again:  
Whether your occupation is great or mean, is it of such a kind that 
you dare think of it together with the responsibility of eternity? Is 
it such a kind that you dare to acknowledge it at this moment or 
at any time? (Kierkegaard 1956, 198)  
‘Eternity’ does not, I think, have an exclusively religious 
meaning. Kierkegaard talks about the existential significance 
of engaging in a specific occupation. For him, the future is 
always connected with responsibility and commitment. What I 
want to bring to the fore here is people’s questioning of and 
puzzlement over the role of work. Rather than sticking to the 
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philosophical query about the subjective and the objective ˗ or 
a sociological survey of cultural patterns ˗ it is the place of such 
questions and puzzlement, the role they have in how people 
engage with each other that could be focused on. This can be 
seen in cases in which I am at a loss to grasp how you can 
devote your life to a particular job. The relation between 
parents and children tend to trigger statements – more 
commonly perhaps: insinuations, vexed outbursts or worried, 
well-meaning questions – where such limits appear. 
Furthermore, these limits are rarely static, as they are 
immersed in the changing relations between people. I return 
to the point I made at the beginning of the chapter, in which I 
wanted to remind the reader of the ways in which discussions 
about work as a vocation cannot be understood in terms of 
fixed conceptions about the meaning of a job. Instead, I 
wanted to say that fixed conceptions or attempts to stabilize 
conceptions – descriptions that further entrench the 
understanding of a specific job as simple or that further seem 
to legitimize offhand references to ‘something that we just 
have to do’ – typically have the role of dismissing worries 
about work and contributing to a neutralization of work in the 
sense that it does not seem important to investigate what 
having a specific job amounts to, existentially speaking.  
Conversations about what is a worthwhile occupation 
rarely revolve around cool articulations of the Meaning of a 
job. To return to the example: the parent’s background, sore 
points in hir relation to hir child, hir own insecurities come to 
the fore in hir questioning of the child’s choice of occupation. 
We can also imagine cases where a parent patiently tries to 
have an open mind about the child’s future, s/he is trying to 
overcome hir own hang-ups or suspicions, perhaps reminding 
hirself that the child must decide for hirself: it is your life! 
Similar relational articulations of what a job means are 
manifested in the responses to a person who resigns from hir 
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perfectly secure and rather well-paid position. S/he says to hir 
friends that the job destroys hir. Some of the friends cannot see 
why the job could be something ‘that destroys you’; having a 
job is a precious thing and one should not let go of it if it offers 
that kind of security, they argue. The discussion might turn 
into a justificatory rant: it is a perfectly decent job; the salary is 
good; you had a great time with your colleagues….So why 
aren’t you satisfied? You should be: others don’t have the 
privileges you do.  
Such examples indicate (against Gaita) that the meaning of 
work can’t be purged of the role such discussions have in 
personal relations, the economic circumstances that they are 
immersed in and people’s often half-conscious, half-stated 
prejudices with regard to work. There is no pure meaning of 
work: distilled images of work make one forget the 
interpersonal relations work is embedded in. So, I agree with 
Gaita that questions about meaning can be understood not on 
a subjective, nor on an objective level. But even though he is 
on the right track here, Gaita’s emphasis on ‘what it is to be an 
X’ fails to take account of the dimension of becoming in 
interpersonal relations. A discussion about the meaning of 
work that loses sight of the temporal also risks losing track of 
the way these questions about good work are urgent questions 
in our lives, here and now. This takes us back to Weeks and 
Kierkegaard’s ‘responsibility of eternity’: how do we perceive 
our future? What hopes and fears are our relationship to work 
saturated by? The challenge is to locate how concerns 
associated with the meaning of work arise between people 
and this in its turn has to do with the practices in which 
people engage: looking for jobs, relating to their colleagues’ 
tasks, referring to one’s rights as a paying customer, etc. This 
means that descriptions of work are not primary in any sense, 
they are immersed in relations. To take but one example: that 
a specific job is often understood as a maintenance structure 
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that supports other, more creative or fulfilling functions is 
connected with the spirit in which people talk about this job 
and those doing it – of course people very rarely say that such-
and-such jobs are maintenance structures, but that this is how 
they think is expressed in how they treat people and things 
they say about them.  
4.8 Concluding words 
When reading Gaita it is tempting to think along the following 
line: a teacher’s, a doctor’s or an artist’s work experience has 
the potential to undergo a form of deepening. But the 
vocabulary for talking about the importance of the assembly 
line worker’s or the grocery store cashier’s job is different. 
They may like their colleagues, and they may be satisfied with 
the working conditions. What is meaningful from this 
perspective seems to be external to the job itself. 
Consequently, one is tempted to assume that there is a clear 
sense of what it means for something to be external to a job 
and what makes up its core, what its meaning boils down to. 
How can a person, except in a psychological and accidental 
sense, find any meaning in piecing together components of a 
particular manufactured product? In this chapter, I tried to 
digest this question by looking at what would follow if one 
were to take such a distinction for granted, as something that 
could be reached by means of reflection. Through Simone 
Weil, I argued that the risk is that such a distinction makes it 
hard to acknowledge the ways in which a job is degraded or 
corrupted: if one does not see how work can be meaningful or 
joyful, it is hard to see its negative transformation. Even 
though Gaita’s concept of a vocation opens up an 
indispensable view of work, I want to reject a general 
distinction between jobs that can deepen and jobs that are 
practical or technical functions. The conclusion was not that all 
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jobs can be vocations, as if everything could be a vocation, 
given the right attitude. What I wanted to do was to 
acknowledge the pull of Gaita’s distinction, and the way it 
might work, but also the sorts of challenges that can be posed 
against it. The danger I saw is that his view neutralizes some 
types of work in a morally problematic way. Throughout, I 
tried to be very clear about one thing: these issues – which job 
can be a vocation? How do we talk about the meaning of a 
job? – are more than philosophical queries. Controversies 
concerning what a worthy occupation is are (inter)personal 
and political.  
In the next chapter I will focus on an issue that has been 
present in this chapter as well: from which perspectives is it 
no longer evident that work can be degraded, which sorts of 
perspectives makes one blind to that aspect? I will look at 
ways in which work is neutralized and naturalized when it is 
transformed into labor power, and how outrage against 
degradation of work drops out of the picture if work is 
transformed into and understood to be a commodity. 
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Chapter 5: The abstraction of work 
5.1 Introduction 
Finland remains a high-capacity economy with a highly skilled 
workforce and generally favorable business environment, but 
labor participation rates have declined as a consequence of 
population aging. Structural unemployment is high, reflecting, 
among other things, matching inefficiencies and constraints to 
labor mobility, such as a limited supply of affordable housing in 
urban growth areas. Productivity growth has dropped as 
economic activity has shifted to less productive sectors despite 
still sizable R&D spending. Furthermore, high wage agreements 
just prior to the global crisis have severely limited the 
competitiveness of an already ailing tradable sector.65 
This is a quote from a report issued by IMF in 2014. The aim of 
the report is to review the general economic state of the 
country and the measures that have been taken to address the 
structural problem in a crisis-ridden economy. The report also 
devises a number of advice: the health care system must be 
more productive, real wages must be adjusted to the overall 
productivity growth, the level of unemployment protection 
should not be an obstacle to entrance into the labor market, 
and pension reforms that boost the labor force are 
recommendable. The work-related questions placed at the fore 
in this context are the following: can the Finnish labor force be 
competitive? How is unemployment to be tackled? How can 
people enter the labor market faster? How can the structural 
environment and the labor force be adapted to a highly 
competitive global market?  
This is a completely workaday document. The language 
does not seem extreme or out of the ordinary in any way: 
                                                          
65 https://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2014/031414.htm 
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work figures as a resource, an economic factor and a 
population problem. Wage labor is accounted for in terms of 
competition and supply and demand – work as a commodity. 
My aim in this chapter is to distance myself from this 
ordinariness by suggesting that the commodification of work 
can be studied as a process of neutralization and naturalization. 
The role work has when it is labor power can be critically 
assessed when it is acknowledged that this role is constantly, 
in the most various contexts, challenged. Even though work is 
transformed into a commodity, I will argue that it can be 
conceived as a life activity, as specific forms of doing and living, 
as manifestations of life – the concept of life relevant here is, 
like I said in chapter 3, that life is directed towards the future. 
I will also suggest that it is because of such neutralizations that 
it makes sense to talk about and emphasize this aspect of life 
activities.  
Does ‘life activity’ have the function of an essence (cf. 
chapter 3), a residue of life and work untouched by 
commensurability, contractual relations and competition? My 
point is the opposite: what I mean is rather that our lives are 
occupied by ever-new forms of wage labor, new forms of 
commodification of work that prompt political and existential 
responses with regard to the purposes work serve and what a 
good life can be said to be. It is the open-ended character of 
the contrast that, I think, really brings out the tensions between 
work as labor power and work as a life situation. Neither of 
these aspects is stable: our working lives are immersed in 
questioning, justifications and disagreement. As the 
neutralization of work as labor power is criticized, aspects of 
life or work that are quenched or ignored are emphasized. 
What is more, the transformation of work into labor power 
did not take place at some historical point, after which paid 
work ‘was’ labor power tout court. This transformation – in the 
form of commodification of work – is taking place around us 
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every day. A central aim of the text is to point at the 
inconclusive and necessarily incomplete character of this 
process. 
For the sake of clarity, let me briefly mention an example of 
how such contrasts collide, and where the relevance of such 
contrasts can be spotted. 20-year-old Raša is one of the 
workers in the salad-packaging factory that are laid off when 
the company has decided to scale down. She lives in a rural 
part of southern Sweden with her dad, who has problems 
with his back and who is therefore on sick leave most of the 
time, even though the doctor won’t quite acknowledge how ill 
he really is. They have moved from Montenegro to Sweden 
when she was a baby. Raša is enraged by having been laid off. 
Disappointed, she tells people that she was skillful and 
worked faster than the others. She is enrolled in the job 
center’s program where she and other people from the area 
are coached to develop themselves into employable people 
who are to sharpen their core competencies. They watch PR-
movies about the region and learn how to talk about 
themselves in a sellable language. Raša, who has no high 
school diploma, wants to work, whatever it takes: she roams 
around the village and asks whether there is something for her 
to do. She wants something to do, to be of service, but she also 
needs a job that can pay for the rent and the heating. Her 
father decides to travel to Norway, where he can get some 
well-paid gigs. Her daughter is worried about his health, and 
asks him not to go. This is the story of Eat Sleep Die (2012), a 
Swedish film directed by Gabriela Pichler. Raša is eager to 
work, but the salad-packaging company (that the manager 
offers a few kind words does not change anything) treats her 
as one of several superfluous workers. In the job center 
program she meets people who have already been spiritually 
broken by the life as unemployed. The story of Eat Sleep Die 
unfolds in an existential situation that involves both hopes 
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and fears. Raša has aspirations and dreams; she is energetic 
and headstrong, but also caring and considerate. She fights 
against what life might slide into: a state of economic 
hardships, a state of mere getting by, a state of eat, sleep, die. 
The film ends on an unsettled note: what will life become for 
Raša and her father? 
By ‘life activity’ I have in mind precisely this kind of 
setting, the open-ended and unsettled lived-life contrast to work as a 
commodity. Talking about ‘life activity’ might help one catch 
sight of the acuteness of questions and controversies that 
occur in the midst of contexts in which work appears as a 
resource, a commodity, a necessary component. The economic 
order is surrounded by struggles. In the same way, work can 
be regarded as an essentially contested concept (cf. 
Introduction).66 In this text, by means of concepts informed by 
a reading of Marx, I seek to bring out that one important form 
of contestation concerns in which setting work should be 
placed. I will argue that a neutralization of work as a 
commodity can be challenged by reminding ourselves of the 
difference such settings make. In the Introduction I said that 
one of the central aims of the thesis is to re-entangle and re-
politicize work. What I hope to do in this chapter is to look at 
the role of work as labor power from the point of view of its 
relational setting, thus critically scrutinizing the conceptual 
constellations that transform work into an isolated element.  
A thread that has been running throughout the thesis is the 
question ‘what is work?’ In this chapter, my question concerns 
the process of abstraction work goes through when it appears 
                                                          
66 Patrick Cockburn’s approach in his thesis (2012) has inspired me here. By 
means of examples (begging, selling street papers) Cockburn discusses in 
which ways the economic order is defended or rejected in how people talk 
(defend, accuse, reject, legitimize, insult etc.) about a specific phenomenon. 
Cockburn looks at cases that indicate broader disagreement and struggles 
over the economic order. 
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as a component of economic value-creation. My contention is 
that a transformation of work into labor power can, besides 
being a historical process, also be studied as a transformation 
that takes place whenever the aspect of work as a commodity 
on the labor market is distilled so that other concerns, other 
aspects, are not taken into account. Wage labor is changing, 
but so are also the many contrasts to wage labor: study, being 
retired, sick leave, volunteering, freelance work, living on 
interests, unemployment, grey economy, gifts, substitute 
work, unpaid overwork (cf. Standing 2011). Wage labor is thus 
not a fixed concept. It evolves and changes historically, taking 
on new traits while losing others. A few examples: the use of 
child labor, the piece rate system, the expectation that an 
employment should be for life or part-time jobs – all of these 
are historically specific. To analyze wage labor is thus to 
analyze the particular historical circumstances, and even when 
for critical purposes one would like to appeal to contrasts to 
work as wage labor, it will not do to invoke a notion of work-
as-such. My aim has been to look at different aspects of wage 
labor, and it is only in this present chapter that I focus directly 
on wage labor in the form of labor power. 
Arendt wrote about a society of job-holders (cf. chapter 1). 
The risk is, as she argues, that the aspect of being a job seems 
self-evident and that the language of labor power and 
subsistence puts very different activities on the same level: 
they are jobs. In this sense, having a job is primary, and it is 
intelligible that we can talk this way about a job without 
knowing anything (or without a need to know) about the 
specific activity that the job involves. The bank officer 
assessing a customer’s credit risk is not interested in whether 
s/he is an overworked kindergarten teacher who cannot sleep 
at night or a lorry driver who has worked 20 years without 
tiring of hir work. It is also intelligible for a person to say that 
s/he dedicates many hours of hir day to what to hir is ‘just a 
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job’, or that hir job is ‘as good as any’. This language of work 
as labor power is a part of the political rhetoric, it appears in 
people’s self-understanding and it is also a real transformation 
of the very conditions of work as an activity. My intention is 
show how this seemingly stable, seemingly neutral role of labor 
power is challenged when other aspects of work are 
highlighted and I suggest that they can be regardless of how 
hegemonic or pervasive the role of work as labor power has 
become.  
Thus, there is a tension between these two aspects, work as 
any paid job and work as existentially and politically non-
neutral activity, work as a life situation. We can imagine 
almost anything as a job on the labor market: washing dishes, 
looking after kids, baking pizza, helping a company to evade 
the national tax laws, comparing costs and incomes, writing 
reviews for a progressive rock magazine, teaching literature, 
dressing up as a stuffed animal on a cruising ship, monitoring 
the quality of jars that roll by on a conveyor belt, fixing roads, 
helping a person suffering from post-traumatic stress, tuning a 
piano, doing research on a new cancer drug, performing a 
sermon, giving somebody a ticket for parking in the wrong 
space, being responsible for the PR at a company, selling 
magazines to people over the phone. At the same time, we 
constantly ask, in the context of daily life: what is it like to do 
that job? What difference does the job make? How does the job 
affect me/you/the practitioner? These concerns express 
perspectives that challenge the role of work as commensurable 
labor power.  
So far I have been talking about neutralization of work as 
labor power, transformation and work as a life situation. 
Another concept that will figure prominently in this chapter is 
abstraction of work. This concept helps me elucidate what I 
mean by a hegemonic neutralization of work as labor power. 
When I talk about abstraction of work, I refer to the structural 
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transformation of work into commensurable commodities. As I have 
already said, it is important to pay attention to what the role of 
work as labor power leaves out, or what is actively suppressed 
when work becomes a commodity inserted into relations on 
the labor market. Dependencies and power relations 
disappear from view. I will argue that the abstraction of work 
into labor power can have consequences for all types of 
positions that are wage labor: quantification and 
commensurability is a possibility because of the societal 
relations in which wage labor is embedded. All jobs are 
commensurable with regard to their capacity as economic 
value.  
The abstractions I have in mind are not mere mental 
constructions or ideological mist. Work becomes labor power 
in a practical sense which is seen in how our lives are shaped by 
the labor market, the capitalist process of production and a 
globally operative system of work. The following quote by 
Marx hints at what I have in mind. Before this, he has 
criticized Hegel for thinking that the real is fundamentally a 
dimension of thinking. He describes how abstract categories 
like population, property and labor as inscribed within real, 
societal relations (Marx 1973, 100-5): 
As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of 
the richest possible concrete development, where one thing 
appears as common to many, to all […] On the other hand, this 
abstraction of labor is not merely the mental product of a concrete 
totality of labors. Indifference towards specific labors corresponds 
to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer 
from one labor to another, and where the specific kind is a matter 
of chance to them, of indifference (1973, 104).  
This is what Marxists have called real abstractions, which were 
defined by Alfred Sohn-Rethel as an abstraction related to the 
commodity form that cannot be seen as a mere product of 
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thinking. This abstraction is a social relation characterized by 
an absence of quality (Sohn-Rethel 1978). To talk about labor 
power is thus no mere one-sided generalization. Furthermore, 
it must be said immediately that the problem is not 
abstractions as such. Given a certain context, as I will go on to 
show, departing from a concrete level can be useful. When I 
talk about abstractions, the problem is hegemonic relations 
and descriptions in which struggles, dependencies and 
controversies in relation to work are ignored: work is 
normalized as a commodity. From this perspective, work can 
never be degraded: there is no room for acknowledging such 
degradation when people who work are understood as labor power, 
when the character of their specific labor is not important. What 
does it mean to resist the abstraction of work? I am not making 
the simple point that concrete work – cleaning, care work etc. 
– is undervalued and unrecognized (even though that point 
can be important). My task is to show how the tensions 
between commodification and work as a life activity 
disappear if labor power is taken for granted as an economic 
asset. As I will show, it is insufficient to present these tensions 
as a result of ideology. The tension adheres to the fact that 
people really are labor power competing on a market.  
I articulate this neutralization of work by means of Marxist 
concepts, but this should not be read as an attempt to outline 
an exegetical exposition of Marx’s use of the term abstract 
labor. There are thus many aspects of his understanding of 
abstract labor (and work) that I will not touch upon at all and 
many intricate interpretations I will leave aside. The concept 
of abstract labor will thus not be treated as a technical term. 
My use of this concept is a part of an exploration of the 
neutralization of work. For Marx, abstract labor is the result of 
a process in which economic values and commodities shape 
society and in which all forms of work are made 
commensurable. This commodification concerns people’s 
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daily existence in a number of ways. A key aspect of a society 
of commodities is that people have no other choice but to look 
for a job that from this point of view counts as work only in so 
far as it is paid, and can function as economic value. The 
abstraction of work is built into people’s very existence and 
Marx shows the methodological challenges of revealing these 
drastic changes of a society that revolves around economic 
value. I will address a temptation to limit oneself to a 
dichotomy between the abstract and the concrete so that the 
task appears to be a return to the concrete. This is, as I will 
show, also a political temptation. Towards the end of the 
chapter I return to the existential tension between work as 
labor power and work as a life situation. An example about 
home cleaners illustrates the controversies that arise when the 
description of work as a commensurable resource is 
challenged. I want to point out how such an example can 
make us attend to the transformations of working life in its 
shape of labor power.  
5.2 Labor power 
In the following, I will track Marx’s concept of abstract labor 
in order to shed light on the tension that occupies me in the 
present chapter and thereby I try to formulate my own idea 
about wage labor as commensurable work. One of the main 
aspects of work Marx highlights is the process of a life activity 
being transformed into wage labor, commensurable work – the 
form of a commodity. In my reading, this transformation is 
not a historical process that at some point is completed. Marx 
describes a historical development in which wage labor 
becomes a fundamental aspect of social being, but this does 
not mean that work has now simply become a commodity, 
bought and sold. Wage labor is all the time in a state of 
becoming where challenges, struggles, forms of resistance 
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appear along with ways of upholding and strengthening the 
commodification of work, that is, upholding and 
strengthening the transformation of work into a resource.  
Economic value is the target of investigation in Marx’s 
writings. From the very first sentences onwards, Marx 
describes the task of revealing what this value is and how it is 
related to commodities.  
The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production 
prevails appears as ‘an immense collection of commodities’; the 
individual commodity appears as its elementary form. Our 
investigation therefor begins with the analysis of the commodity 
(1990, 125). 
Capitalism and the commodity are internally related, this is 
the axis around which the first volume of Capital revolves. But 
what is the commodity, and how is it related to Marx’s ideas 
about a transformation of work? All commodities possess 
value, and value has a dual form as use value and exchange 
value. The latter means that 100 pencils are worth, can be 
exchanged for, 1 pair of trousers. These are different things 
but being commodities, they can be compared in this way. A 
commodity must possess both use value and exchange value. 
But the word ‘possess’ may lead the thought into a dangerous 
direction. Value is easily seen as an elusive essence that the 
commodity simply possesses. With Michael Heinrich, I would 
say that Marx’s intention is the opposite: he talks about values 
and commodities as relations. It is these relations that make 
commodities comparable, not some essence they have in 
common. Heinrich writes: “That the chair is a commodity is 
not a characteristic of the chair itself as a thing, but rather of 
the society in which this thing exists.” (2004, 41) What does the 
form of the commodity presuppose? This question is relational 
as well. For Marx, this question is linked to the evolvement of 
what he calls abstract labor, which expresses a separation 
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between use values and exchange values. The form of the 
commodity presupposes that all commodities are 
exchangeable and commensurable – they have value. One of 
the major questions for Marx is why commodities have value. 
This was the question he accused earlier economists of not 
having grasped properly because they have “never once asked 
the question why this content has assumed that particular 
form, that is, why labor is expressed as value and why the 
measurement of labor by its duration is expressed in the 
magnitude of the value of the product.” (1990, 173-4) For him, 
the answer is the transformation of work into quantitative 
units. Commodities are commodities because they are 
objectifications of quantitatively measurable units. Capitalism, 
labor power, commodities and markets are thus unthinkable 
without the separation between exchange value and use value. 
To quote Sohn-Rethel: “The economic concept of value […] is 
characterized by a complete absence of quality, a 
differentiation purely by quantity and by applicability to 
every kind of commodity and service which can occur on the 
market” (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 20).  
When transmuting into a value-creating force in the 
production of capital, the utility of the working activity is 
unrelated to what it creates or what service is provided. The 
aim of production is valorization of capital, that is, to generate 
a surplus. This subjection of work under one standard is all-
important for the possibility of economic value and 
commodification of work (Marx 1990, 134-7, 159, 166). The fact 
that labor power produces things we, in some sense of the 
word, need or want, is a limiting concept. Marx writes: “The 
commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which 
through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind. 
The nature of these needs, whether they arise, for example, 
from the stomach, or the imagination, makes no difference” 
(1990, 126; cf. 131, 293).  
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A central Marxist point is that during a historical process 
comprising division of labor and development of the capitalist 
process of circulation, wage labor has been detached from 
content. This is Marx’s account of the development of value. 
The economic aspect of work is distinct from what a certain 
job is concretely about and the multitude of purposes it serves. 
Work in Marx’s sense of abstract labor is not as such a specific 
activity (writing, punching a card, driving, hammering, 
baking), but rather, it is a societal relation that presupposes 
that commodities are produced for sale. Marx examines how 
this is expressed in the emergence of the money form that 
makes possible a general measure/expression of value and he 
also looks at the emergence of a distinction between labor 
power and means of production. Again, on a logical level, this 
presupposes that the worker does not own the means of 
production (cf. Marx 1990, 166). Marx describes how labor 
power becomes a predominant form of work. In the more 
historically orientated part expounding what he calls 
‘primitive accumulation’, he shows how wage labor evolves so 
that the ownership of the means of production, the conditions 
of work, is separated from the worker. In contrast with Locke 
and Smith, he writes about the violence, power and juridical 
frameworks by means of which earlier communities and 
forms of life were dissolved and transformed into capitalist 
relations (cf. Thompson 1972; Braverman 1974).  
To sum up: work acquires a two-fold character: it is 
concrete work and abstract labor.67 For Marx, abstraction is no 
small detail. Capitalism is an abstraction of relations. His 
examination of the commodity form challenges the reader to 
think about what specific changes capitalism brought and 
brings into the world with regard to what is often taken as 
                                                          
67 Marxists quarrel about the meaning and importance of abstract labor. For 
one overview of the debate, see Bonefeld 2010.  
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trans-historical concepts such as work, production, 
consumption and exchange. 
5.3 Labor power and capacities 
So what does Marx say about this abstract side of labor 
power? I will talk about work and capacities – and the section 
will end with some remarks about what bearing this has on 
the relation between work and life.  
Capitalism is a system where labor power is bought and 
sold on the market. The worker sells labor power, not labor, 
which is bought by the capitalist. (When Marx writes about 
‘the capitalist’ he is not talking about an empirical human 
being.) The worker does not sell hirself, nor does s/he sell a 
specific product. S/he sells hir capacity to work – s/he sells time 
(cf. 1990, 270-3, 675-7). As Marx writes, the concept of labor 
power can be described as a process of realization, in which 
the capacity to work is put to use by the buyer of labor power, 
i.e. the employer. 
The use of labor power is labor itself. The purchaser of labor-
power consumes it by setting the seller of it to work. By working, 
the latter becomes in actuality what previously he only was 
potentially, namely labor-power in action, a worker (Marx 1990, 
284). 
This is obvious when workers are laid off because their labor 
power, for some reason, is no longer needed. On a structural 
level the commodity, the capacity to work, is useless when it 
has no buyer. On an everyday level this means that if nobody 
will hire you, your labor power is useless. The worker sells hir 
labor power and in principle, what s/he then gives up could 
precisely turn into anything. What defines labor power is thus 
that it is put to use in a way specified by the employer. Strictly 
speaking, this is what use means in the world of wage labor. 
Compare this to a situation in which my guitar playing or my 
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ability to drive a boat proves useful, they are useful in 
whatever situation such skills are called for: when they are not 
needed, it would be strange to say that these capacities are 
redundant or useless as such – even though it makes sense to 
say that this social gathering has no need for guitar players 
because there will be a DJ, or my navigation skills are not 
needed because somebody else is driving. In the world of 
wage labor, not only is it intelligible to say that the computer 
coder’s capacities are made obsolescent when s/he is laid off 
from hir work, it is even intelligible to say that people’s 
capacity to work has been made redundant when s/he is laid off. 
Furthermore, and this is perhaps one of the most crucial 
points, I think Marx would say that it is specifically in 
capitalism, in a setting of commodification of work, that a 
general capacity to work is made possible  and even necessary. 
I don’t mean that this character of work is present all the 
time, but that this is a possibility when work is reduced to 
labor power can be seen for example in disgruntled debates 
about how unemployed persons are too picky, too spoiled to 
accept the jobs they are offered – the message is then precisely 
that they should be prepared to sell their labor power as an 
‘anything’, a flexible, general capacity. In this sense, it makes 
sense to talk, as Marx sometimes did, about work as 
externalization, renouncing of property. More specifically, this 
means that capacities are made to look like – become, in a 
certain sense – economic assets so that these appear to be goods 
that the human being hirself exploits at hir best interest. The 
asymmetries between the employer and the employee who 
sells hir labor power are striking. Marx’s fundamental point, 
without which his entire economic critique is unintelligible, is 
that the worker has only hir labor power to sell. When 
considering the concept of employability, one realizes the 
force of this fact, and the huge difference in positions that this 
asymmetry entails. The capacity is strictly defined according 
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to the demand of the labor market and for an individual the 
goal is to maintain and enhance hir competitive advantages.  
Let me point out how this takes us straight to the tension I 
am concerned with, the tension between work as labor power 
and work as a life situation. The exhortation to accept any job 
exists in the same setting of commodification as does the 
exhortation to make oneself ‘unique’ by having a ‘unique’ set 
of skills.68 The sociologist Beverly Skeggs writes about people 
being treated as, and treating themselves as, alienable 
capacities – capacities that one can disengage and use in a job. 
The individual is imagined to be an optimizing creature. What 
happens then, Skeggs maintains, is that capabilities are partly 
disengaged from the surroundings of work so that they come 
to look like an essence, what the human being really is: 
capacities to work. One then forgets that not everybody can or 
wants to become this optimizing individual. Nor do all 
’capacities’ fit into this scheme; not all capacities are 
interesting from the perspective of wage labor. Let us return to 
Eat Sleep Die. The job-seekers at the job center program are 
asked to list their qualifications, ‘what they are good at’. Raša 
tells them that she can expertly estimate the weight of a box of 
salad. The job coach sighs and tells her that it is not the type of 
skills that are sought after. The image of the optimizing 
                                                          
68 For Marx, who is describing the fundamental aspects of the capitalist 
system, the point of departure is what he calls ‘simple labor power’, an 
average of labor power (1990, 135). His analysis is not based on the different 
levels of skills and education, but rather the way value is created as 
abstractions. For Marx, skills complicate the picture, but the analysis starts 
from an average (which is historically and culturally determined.) – The 
reason why I bring the subject up here is that I think a critique of Marx that 
has often been made, that he depicts a world of manual, industrial labor, but 
that his analysis is unable to account for today’s world of specialized skills, is 
untenable. My point has been to show that the structure of abstract labor can 
be illustrated by several roles that skills have: skills as treating oneself as a 
unique commodity and the exhortation to accept any job. 
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individual builds on an idealization that turns a blind eye to 
aspects of reality that do not align with alienable capacities 
(Skeggs 2004, 68-75). The essential point, I take it, is that 
abstract labor can be understood from the point of view of 
idealizations that turn away from the way human capabilities 
are embedded in contexts where it is important to learn things 
for a specific purpose that is considered worthwhile. 
Therefore, one should be skeptical of treating all aspects of a 
human being as capital, as if this is what the human being is: 
social capital, emotional intelligence, etc. – descriptions that 
strengthen the hold of commodification. 
Labor power, then, is a promise of working capacity, but 
this capacity is realized as labor power only if and when it is 
sold – this is the cruel truth of capitalism (Marx 1990, 277) – 
cruel, because it creates the possibility of obsolescence I 
referred to above and in the initial example from Eat Sleep Die. 
For Marx, this capacity is realized in the form of labor time on 
which economic value depends. However, this is not real time, 
real hours spent doing a particular thing that requires a 
particular amount of effort, not the hours per day spent in the 
workplace by a particular worker, but a form of historically 
specific social generalization, the average of how long it takes to 
do certain things, socially necessary labor time. For example, 
the power-looms reduced the socially necessary labor time for 
producing fabrics (1990, 129, 677). Given this specific concept 
of time, it becomes possible to compare the work that I do to 
the work that everybody else is doing – ‘everybody’ thus not 
only people working in the same branch of industry. “Abstract 
labor has the paradoxical status of a fact that is lived in its 
effectivity, in terms of the demands it imposes to produce 
according to the speed and rate of this average.” (Read 2003, 
69) This can even be illustrated (despite the difference in 
logical level) in the individual company’s quest to produce 
more efficiently than the competitors – by investing in new 
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technology or changing the organization of work, etc.. The 
socially necessary labor time and the abstraction of labor are 
two of many preconditions for work figuring in this globally 
comparable way. The abstraction of work manifested and 
presupposed in this global race for profits can be seen in work 
as different as factory work, farming and building. This is the 
view of work as a factor in the production process.  
In all of his writings, Marx describes capitalism as fuelled 
by living labor power, but the system of labor power 
encompasses far more than the hours sold to the capitalist.69 
This can be illustrated on a practical level: one part of the 
worker’s life is sold to the employer, while the other part is 
transformed into recuperation and reproduction of the 
working class. One could even say, like Thoreau, that “the cost 
of a thing is the amount of what I will call life which is 
required to be exchanged for it, immediately or in the long 
run.” (Thoreau 1953, 24) As I have already pointed out (which 
is very clear in an example like Eat Sleep Die), the worker’s life-
world is formed by the capitalist process of value creation. 
                                                          
69 The character of wage labor is that it produces more value than it costs. 
Marx calls this surplus value. He writes about the way the worker stands to 
the production process as labor power, as an element in the profit-making 
process – the driving element that makes machinery and tools something 
more than dead stuff: it is only human abstract labor that adds new value to 
the economic process, that furthers the process. Machinery has no value in 
itself, it is only when they are a part of work that machines and tools transport 
and realize, but do not create, value. For Marx ‘value’ is thus not at all the 
same thing as ‘wealth’. It is important to keep in mind that this new value is 
not created by work in the concrete sense of particular tasks (boats being built, 
ipods being manufactured, hair being cut) – it is created by means of abstract 
labor – quantifiable labor. According to Marx’s theory, surplus value stands in 
contrast to the work that covers the expenses for the worker’s (historically 
relative) basic means of subsistence. So, again, the point of the theory of 
surplus value can’t be that the individual worker produces new value with hir 
specific work – it is socially necessary labor time that is relevant, not the 
concrete hours. 
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However, this need not always entail a state where companies 
try to extract surplus value by means of brute oppression 
Marx himself talks about different ways of extracting surplus 
value, which is not limited to lengthening the working day or 
intensifying work. What Marx talks about as a society 
dominated by the value form can be seen in rather different 
historical situations.  This should be kept in mind because it 
would not be right to say that, as is sometimes done, for 
example in Marshall Berman’s book All That is Solid Melts into 
Air and also sometimes in Richard Sennett’s writings, that 
Marx describes a process where social relations and social ties 
are destroyed. As Kathi Weeks writes: sometimes sustaining 
societies is emphasized to a great extent, as in the situation 
after World War II when unions were strong in many 
countries and rights for workers were increasingly secured – 
this is a situation in which the stabilization of work also meant 
a normalization of wage labor. Sometimes, she writes, the 
stress is more one-sidedly on creating surplus-value. “The 
competing requirements of creating surplus-value and 
sustaining societies upon which it depends form a potential 
fault-line through capitalism’s political scenarios.” (Weeks 
2011, 27) This is what I would call the elasticity of capitalism.  
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx writes:  
Labor not only produces commodities; it also produces itself and 
the workers as a commodity and it does so in the same proportion 
in which it produces commodities in general (Marx 1992a, 324).  
The task in this chapter is to show that what Marx talks about 
as “producing workers as commodities” includes a wide 
range of relations. As we saw in chapter 2 and 3, paid work is 
one thing, but we also spend much of our lives as workers, 
preparing ourselves for work, getting an education, making 
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ourselves presentable, travelling to and from work.70 For 
Marx, this is what the working human being becomes in a 
capitalist society, a person who splits up hir life, a person 
whose life from the capitalist point of view is that of labor 
power: a resource used to get the profit-making process to 
take off. Marx did not simply write about the world of 
commodities. He tried to bring to light the kind of setting that 
such a world of commodities presupposes. Here, he talks 
about how resistance is broken down: 
The advance of capitalist production develops a working class 
which by education, tradition, and habit looks upon the 
requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural 
laws. [….] The silent compulsion of economic relations sets the 
seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker. […] In 
the ordinary run of things, the worker can be left to the ‘natural 
law of production’, i.e. it is possible to rely on his dependence on 
capital, which springs from the conditions of production 
themselves, and is guaranteed in perpetuity by them (Marx 1990, 
899). 
As the philosopher Jason Read writes, this world of 
commodities and labor power requires normalization – which, 
can also be a normalization of for example precarious work! – 
and perhaps even a process in which the conditions of this 
commodified form of life are effaced, i.e. capitalism appears as 
self-evident and natural, appearing “to generate its own 
conditions of possibility” (cf. Read 2003, 43, cf. 35-6, 41). This 
means that the social conditions of profit-making are made 
invisible, so that the evolvement of capitalism appears like a 
story of thrifty people and trickle-down effects. In what 
follows, I will say more about such effacement. To sum up: 
Marx criticizes an image that does not take into account the 
kind of system that re/produces the wage laborer. 
                                                          
70 On this dimension of work, cf. Ehrenreich 2003. 
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Understanding wage labor requires an understanding of the 
system within which wage labor becomes a necessary element.  
5.4 Marx on abstract labor 
Below, explain how the abstraction of work can be understood 
only from a relational point of view. This helps me to come to 
terms with the question whether abstract labor refers to a 
specific type of work. 
As I said, labor power, according to Marx, is the capacity to 
work. I also said that what he calls commensurable, abstract 
labor is separable from specific workers with their specific 
skills and specific experiences. It is work in this sense that 
generates value, according to Marx (cf. Marx 1990, 129). A 
logical extension is that the wage laborer fills a position that 
can (in principle) be filled by anyone. From this point of view, 
the relation between the baker, the factory worker and the 
hair-dresser appears very clear: they all provide wage labor. 
The rather difficult presupposition is that the central concepts 
of this analysis – commodity, abstract labor, socially necessary 
labor time – only make sense if the point of departure is not (as 
in neoclassical economy and its concept of marginal utility) 
the specific commodity, or the specific transaction, but rather a 
complex network of societal and historical relations. What this 
emphasis of a relational nexus brings home is the way a world 
of commodities (markets, money, consumption) and a world 
of work (labor power, investments, companies, production) 
co-exist in creating standardized, homogenized measures of 
value to which work is subjected (cf. Read 2003, 71). The result 
of this process is both a normalization of the commodity 
system and a system in which a person’s capacity to work is a 
product on a market.   
I would suggest that the question of abstract labor is more 
fundamental than it is often taken to be. As Read writes: 
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“Marx presents abstract labor, the equalization and reduction 
of diverse labors and practices to the same standard, as a 
problem that is continually reposed” (2003, 83). According to 
one reading of Marx I am in sympathy with, abstract labor can 
be understood only when looking at the realization of value in 
the exchange process (cf. Heinrich 2012, 55). Such a reading 
rejects the view (often ascribed to Adam Smith) that abstract 
labor creates values as a supposedly autonomous productive 
activity, so that the consequence would be that if this 
productivity were somehow to be turned in another direction, 
perhaps owned and controlled by the workers themselves, it 
would create general societal wealth instead of exchange 
values. An aspect of abstract labor is illuminated if, as 
Heinrich writes, one sees it as a relation of validation, i.e. that 
something counts as abstract labor. It does so only within a 
specific nexus of other relations and conditions – the most 
important thing being that the commodities are exchanged. In 
order to have value, a commodity must stand in relation to 
other commodities, that is, to other products of abstract labor 
(Heinrich 2012, 49-53).  
So this is not about an individual commodity being sold, 
rather than remaining unsold in a warehouse somewhere, but 
rather: the act of exchange is an aspect of what commodities 
are, what it means that they are commensurable. If 
commodities are not sold, crises appear. Heinrich writes: “The 
substance of value, and thus the value-objectivity, is 
something only obtained by things when they are set into 
relation with one another in exchange.” (2004, 51)  
As we have seen, for Marx value is not intelligible from the 
point of view of one single commodity. Heinrich’s remark also 
latches on to a very central aspect of the commodity that I 
have already mentioned: it is produced in order to be sold. It 
is from here that the abstractions of labor take off. If this were 
not the case, it would not make sense to talk about abstract 
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labor being ‘congealed’ or ‘crystallized’ in a commodity. 
Things made for other purposes (my friend makes lasagna 
and offers a bite to all her colleagues) are concrete things with 
a use, and work then has another role: there is no ‘socially 
necessary labor time’ for example. In conclusion, this means 
that what Marx has to say about value and commodities, is 
also related to that there are people who buy these 
commodities.  
Again, this relational approach to abstract labor 
counteracts the inclination to think about abstract labor as 
(quasi-physical) expenditure of labor power, so that abstract 
labor would, after all, be a matter of a mental abstraction of 
the manifold of work into the simple acts of physical exertion 
– or so that Marx’s theory of value would be interpreted in an 
empiricist way: every hour of expenditure of labor power 
adds new value to the commodity in a supposedly 
‘materialist’ way. The aim here is to stave off a temptation to 
try to locate a specific point at which abstractions enter the 
scene, the point at which the concrete becomes abstract – how 
does this specific hamburger become a commodity? Is it when 
it is grilled or when it is sold over the counter at McDonald’s? 
As I said in 5.3, Marx reminds us of the world of relations that 
makes the commodity as a thing that has economic value 
possible. Again, Marx suggests that these conditions should be 
brought to the light.  
What such a reading adds up to is also that it is slightly 
misleading to talk about ‘abstract labor’, as that easily evokes 
the idea of a specific form of work with a set of characteristics 
that, were these characteristics to be taken away, could be 
brought back to ‘concrete work’. My intention in talking about 
abstractions of work is the opposite: this is an aspect of work 
given many other relations into which work is inserted. In 
other words, my reading focuses on the process of 
transforming work into labor power, a commodity and the 
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relations that the capitalism system relies on, but which are 
neutralized so that they are not conspicuous.  
Therefore, the abstractions of work are not tantamount, for 
example, to fragmented Taylorism. There are ways of 
extracting surplus value that would not allow for such 
organization of work: a firm that permits plenty of 
independence in order to increase efficiency can still reduce its 
employees to economic assets. All forms of wage labor are 
imbued with abstract labor in their being a part of the 
capitalist system. This dimension is revealed when we remind 
ourselves of the conditions of working as a nurse, rather than 
helping one’s elderly parent whenever one can. In the earlier 
case, we can imagine the setting of a company and there 
occurring a situation in which some nurses are made 
redundant as an attempt to make business more productive. 
In the latter case (which, as I said in 2.7, should not be 
idealized), an abstraction of work in the sense of labor power 
as quantitatively commensurable units, is conceptually 
impossible to imagine. It is true that wage labor and unpaid 
work overlap in many ways (the content of the job can be 
identical etc.), but a distinctive feature of wage labor is that it 
can be rendered as labor power, competition and 
supply/demand. For instance, in an accountant’s wage lists, 
the job of a janitor has basically the same function as the job as 
a university lecturer.  Regardless of whether we are talking 
about a priest, a kindergarten teacher, a truck driver or an 
accountant, it can make sense to talk about work as labor 
power, as supply and demand. This does not make sense in 
the case of voluntary work, where the relational nexus that 
sustains the abstraction of work does not figure, even though 
there are areas of overlap where commercial relations sneak 
into voluntary work. 
However, I would also say that abstract labor can figure in 
a description of changes in how we work. As Marx sometimes 
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writes, abstract labor is a value-forming transmutation. This 
practical side of the abstraction of work is internal to power 
relations.71 Harry Braverman’s book about degradation of 
labor, Labor and Monopoly Capital (cf. chapter 2) is an important 
contribution to this discussion, even though, as I said, the 
abstraction of work cannot be reduced to specific fragmented 
jobs or deskilling. His book is not only an analytic account, but 
also a moral and political examination of degradation of 
human activities. Braverman states that the capitalist doesn’t 
discriminate between different types of work. He portrays a 
development in which work is not organized according to 
skills, but according to the need for surplus value, profits. 
Work is reduced to one function: to produce value and 
generate profits, or to be supportive functions. Laborers with 
different skills are transformed into labor power, a mere 
function of an overarching process. The specific activity of 
washing, feeding, processing or writing is not important. 
Again: the meaning of ‘capacity’ undergoes a radical 
transformation and as I’ve said many times, this 
transformation is on-going. This abstraction cannot be 
understood without looking at how work is organized; 
looking at changes in the work process is thus one way in 
which one may talk about a transformation of work into labor 
power. Even though it is possible to imagine a specific area of 
work that turns into wage labor without the work being 
changed much it is not strange that changes occur when 
something is inserted into new relations. 
                                                          
71 These questions are controversial within Marxist theory. Alfred Sohn-Rethel 
claims, for example, that “the abstraction does not spring from labor but from 
exchange as a particular mode of social interrelationship, and it is through 
exchange that the abstraction imparts itself to labor, making it ‘abstract 
human labor’” (1978, 6). My rendering of abstractions is different as my 
argument is, as I said, that the abstractions do not spring from any specific 
source but rather from a tangle of evolving relations.  
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In Grundrisse Marx writes that abstract labor presupposes a 
highly developed division of concrete tasks, but where no type 
of work is more important than any other and where it is easy 
to move from one type of job to another. In the following 
section, he goes from pointing out the abstractions of work 
that already Adam Smith had a hunch of, to explaining why 
this insight is not that work is the simplest element and the 
most ancient relation of production. The abstraction of work is 
based on significant historical changes and takes place in a 
concrete development:  
With the abstract universality of wealth-creating activity we now 
have the universality of the object defined as wealth, the product 
as such or again labor as such, but labor as past, objectified labor. 
[…] Now it might seem that all that had been achieved thereby 
was to discover the abstract expression for the simplest and most 
ancient relation in which human beings – in whatever form of 
society – play the role of producers. This is correct in one respect. 
Not in another. Indifference towards any specific kind of labor 
presupposes a very developed totality of real kinds of labor, of 
which no single one is any longer predominant. As a rule, the 
most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest 
possible concrete development, where one thing appears as 
common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a 
particular form alone. On the other side, this abstraction of labor 
as such is not merely the mental product of a concrete totality of 
labors. Indifference towards specific labors corresponds to a form 
of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one 
labor to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance 
for them, hence of indifference (Marx 1973, 104). 
According to Braverman, the professional world has been 
actively disintegrated. Capacities and skills are dangerous 
because they imply ideas about how things are to be done and 
consequently, attempts to minimize their role are an aspect of 
the commodification of work. What we have now, he writes, is 
degraded and fragmented abstract labor, tasks delegated to 
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the worker by management, a group with little contact with 
those who execute the orders (1974, 160). Again, these points 
should not be misunderstood so that abstract labor is 
considered to be manual and repetitive assembly-line work, 
even though Braverman is sometimes interpreted that way. 
One should keep in mind that he also talks about the 
development within offices. The emphasis should be on how 
the abstraction of work – work as meshed within commodified 
relations – is immersed in and also shaped by the organization 
of work. Continuing on this point, the analysis need not be 
limited to an account of the relation between exchange values 
in a restricted sense and the abstraction of work. Similar 
examples could be found in the regime of New Public 
Management, where the job descriptions of a nurse, a teacher 
or a social worker take on a life of their own that do not have 
much to do with the meaning of these jobs. The human beings 
these employees are supposed to tend to are transformed into 
quotas and the friction of reality has no bearing on what the 
employee is supposed to carry out in hir job. As Braverman 
would say: given that the job is about maximizing results, 
realizing the yearly financial aims and striving towards 
efficiency, judgments about what is proper to do in the 
particular situation are rejected as unimportant or even 
destructive. The point above about how an activity changes 
can be applied here. New public management affects the 
meaning of nursing, teaching or administration. The concept 
of abstract labor could, I think, provide a framework for 
understanding this type of example, which would go against 
the very common idea that Marx’s ideas are outdated because 
they are supposedly completely structured around industrial 
work and mechanization.72 
                                                          
72 Some Marxists (cf. Sayers 2011, 39) talk about a historical process in which 
work is more and more mediated and the relation between worker and 
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5.5 Real abstractions 
For Marx, abstract labor is not a mental construction, even 
though the concept has sometimes been understood that way 
(cf. Read 2003, 68). The point is rather that the social relations 
of capitalism – that commodities are commensurable with 
regard to their being values – are not immediately 
conspicuous. More seriously (in practices entangled with 
ideological views on what work should be) such relations are 
made inconspicuous. Anselm Jappe writes that Marx’s 
fundamental concepts (value, commodity and abstract labor) 
can only be elucidated indirectly, that is, they do not emerge 
from a purely historical account (Jappe 2005, 26, 77-80). As we 
saw above, abstract labor should not be rendered into an 
elusive substance that explains what all commodities have in 
common. It is rather a way to spell out a web of relations. It is 
important for Marx that economic relations and social 
relations are not opposites. Economic relations are social 
relations, even though we often do not look at them that way 
when economy is described in a language of law-like relations. 
Marx looks at the tensions between forms of descriptions: 
analyzing wage labor as a social relation or describing it as an 
economic entity, a segment in a process, an isolated, 
individual element. Even though Marx may have overstated 
the case of how the commodity contains labor as a form of 
secret (1990, 163), I agree that it is a challenge to get clear 
                                                                                                               
products becomes more and more distant. “Work becomes increasingly 
distant from the direct production process as such, and the product is no 
longer related in a direct way to the satisfaction of particular needs.” (ibid) 
Administrative or commercial work then seems to be the peak of this 
development. These writers attend to work as a relation that historically goes 
from direct to distant. This is not what I have in mind when I talk about the 
abstraction of work. This image leads astray in ways I tried to demonstrate in 
chapter 2. What is lacking in this analysis is the role of exchange value.  
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about the relation between the individual’s work, production, 
the commodity and capitalism. This quote from the theologian 
Philip Goodchild illustrates what I have in mind: 
It would seem that no one could be more free than an economic 
agent in a marketplace with unlimited opportunities to exchange, 
make profits, and satisfy demands. In reality, such economic 
agents suffer from an immense discipline. For the freedom to 
exchange is a freedom to command labor; such freedom can be 
realized only if labor is available to be commanded. The freedom 
of the wealthy can be acquired only at the expense of the 
servitude of those who work. Market society, while appearing to 
promise liberty, imposes itself as a rigorous system of discipline. 
One is always under an obligation to acquire money. […] While 
appearing to offer the promise of the security of wealth earned 
through the division of labor, market society imposes a condition 
of general insecurity, facing each of its members with the threat of 
exclusion from relations of interdependence (2009, 107). 
Labor power has to be available to be commanded – which 
does not at all rule out the formal freedom of employment 
relations. This systemically required discipline, the tremendous 
energy people dedicate to looking for jobs and worrying about 
keeping their jobs is not conspicuous if work is thought of 
simply in terms of a particular contract on the market, or as 
individual employment. Marx writes similar things in volume 
1 of Capital (1990, chapter 25) about labor power as a reserve 
army, “a relatively redundant population of laborers” that 
belongs to capital even though it may appear external to it in 
consisting of unemployed people outside the labor market.73 
What Goodchild is talking about makes sense only if work is 
                                                          
73 Labor power must “incessantly be re-incorporated into capital as its means 
of valorization, which cannot get free of capital, and whose enslavement to 
capital is only concealed by the variety of individual capitalists to whom it 
sells itself, forms, in fact, a factor in the reproduction of capital itself” (Marx 
1990, 763-4). 
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looked at from a structural point of view: people are 
dependent on employment. 
As I said Marx focuses on the web of relations that is 
presupposed by the commodity form; in doing so he also sets 
out to show that commodities should not only be understood 
as tangible things (bread, tables, trousers) but that the 
capitalist economy is built around the commodity form and 
the commodity as abstraction, that is, as commensurable with 
regard to their exchange values. It is the transformation into 
the commodity form that he talks about in the famous sections 
about fetishism. Marx suggests that one of the difficulties is to 
catch sight of the social relations as these relations between 
commodities are not immediately conspicuous as being a 
relation between people and their working activities. It is 
rather the buyer’s money, the specific desired thing s/he sets 
out to buy and its price that are immediately present – an 
immediacy Marx strongly criticizes by means of the concept of 
political economy. He charges the classical economists of having 
taken this immediacy for granted. These economists’ 
categories, as Marx sees it, are all the more problematic as they 
reflect the naturalization of relations that exist in our everyday 
lives. His critique of economy is in other words a critique of 
everyday life in a society dominated by capitalist relations (cf. 
Heinrich 2004, 34-35). His own approach consists in explaining 
economic relations not from the standpoint of the individual 
(like economics based on the homo economicus figure of 
thought) but from the perspective of the total production in 
society (Marx 1990, 165-72).  
The challenge is to pinpoint what is going on here. Is it a 
matter of something hidden, something forgotten, something 
invisible or something that is made invisible? Marx himself 
talks about inversion, Verkehrung: the relation between 
commodities have taken the place of the relation between 
people. Expressed in other words, this means that production 
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is geared towards valorization and that concrete work is 
subjected to the abstract (cf. Jappe 2005, 30-2). One of the 
crucial things going on in Marx’s writings is that he shows 
how the economic and the social should be thought separately 
– and also together.  
Here is one typical example of Marx’s dialectical moves. 
He starts off the Capital by asking what the commodity is. It is 
a thing, with physical qualities: it is a thing that is used. 
However, it is also a commodity with a price, in which 
abstract labor is congealed in commodities with ‘phantom-like 
objectivity’. Marx shows that the commodity form is a 
manifestation of social relations, of work and production. The 
economic side makes it seem as if the social has disappeared: 
the commodity is simply the thing bought and sold. Marx 
claims that capitalist value-creation makes work ‘disappear’ 
into the product or into money. What is not apparent from the 
point of view of labor power as a commodity on the market is 
that the worker’s entire life is shaped by capitalism, as we saw 
in the quote by Goodchild above. This is clear if it is 
acknowledged that the roles of the wage laborer evolve 
historically, which is revealed when one takes a look at the 
changing meaning of being ‘accessible to the labor market’ as 
a potential wage-earner or employee. The meaning is 
historical and it involves everything from migration and 
education to systems of unemployment benefits and pensions. 
This tension is hinted at in the Capital (cf. 1990, 273, 638, 
chapter 25). One sense mystification has in his analysis is thus 
that elements of the economic system (work, consumption, 
commodities, money) are separated, so that their interrelation 
is not clear.  
One form of ‘disappearance’ of the social that Marx takes 
some interest in is the quotidian but telling encounter with 
commodities in a shop: work is not immediately apparent 
there. A crucial observation Marx makes about the commodity 
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is that its appearance as a concretely existing thing with a 
specific price makes it hard to see its dimension of economic 
value and a product of work. It is this disappearance that one 
most often comes across in discussion about Marx’s ideas 
about mystification of the source of value. I would say that he 
also extends the remarks about mystification to work – not 
primarily in the sense that the concrete work of a commodity 
is invisible (in his dialectical way, he sometimes says it is too 
visible), but rather that the relation between two commodities 
can in fact be grasped as a relation to the totality of 
commodities in society because of their commensurability. 
When seen under the heading of wage or contract, work is 
individualized. In everyday life we encounter work as an 
individual relation, as my job, your job, as this specific task. 
We are bewitched by the appearance of the worker with hir 
own contract, hir own income and so on. As Marx writes: “The 
wage form thus extinguishes every trace of the division of the 
working day into necessary labor and surplus labor, into paid 
labor and unpaid labor” (1990, 680). He challenges the idea 
that the wage builds on a fair exchange between equals, the 
employee and the employer – even though he also states that 
it is fair in the sense that the laborer gets duly paid for hir 
commodity, labor power. The wage form, like the commodity 
form, obscures what takes place when economic value is 
created.  
Marx indicates that the legal fiction of the contract takes the 
worker as an isolated individual free to dispose of his or her labor 
power, thereby excluding the material and social conditions that 
constrain and force this exchange as well as the power and 
productivity of the necessarily collective laboring subject 
implicated in this exchange (Read 2003, 100).  
Marx paints the image of a historical development of work, 
production, exchange and the development of the money form 
310 
 
through which the commodity comes to have exchange value. 
The challenge is to remind oneself of the shift from human 
activity to economic structures, the shift from the individual 
wage earner to the social character of commodity-producing 
abstract labor (Heinrich 2004, 47).  
That the work of the baker and the pharmacist become ‘of 
the same kind’ takes place on a particular level of abstraction. 
However, this is not Marx’s last word. The abstraction is 
engraved in our lives, in social relations, in the role work 
occupies in present-day capitalist society. This is in in a certain 
sense independent of how we think. Abstractions of work are 
independent of thought in the sense that these points can’t be 
rejected by for example showing that the buyer regards a 
commodity in terms of its use (etc.) or by pointing out that the 
individual worker thinks of hir job as a concrete activity. 
Secondly, these abstractions will not disappear were we to 
think differently. Thirdly, changing how I think would not 
solve things, as these abstractions are relational. On the other 
hand, talking about an abstraction of work is always also 
talking about how human practices are related to our 
understanding of them. I would for example disagree with a 
description that contends that people’s understanding, as the 
world of commodities and money expands, ‘grows more and 
more separate’ from what they are doing (cf. Sohn-Rethel 
1978, 26). My purpose here and throughout the thesis has been 
to point out the dynamic relation between practice and 
understanding. Hence, I do not agree with the idea that “the 
abstractness of their action is hidden to the people performing 
it” (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 30) if that means that it is hidden in an 
absolute sense: that would of course take away even the 
possibility to talk about such abstractions. 
Marx often writes about how processes evolve ‘behind the 
backs’ of producers and workers (cf. 1990, 135). The danger of 
this way of putting it is that it creates the Blob that I have been 
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criticizing. Still, there is something right in this expression as 
well. Let me illustrate. We can imagine a coffee shop owner 
who dislikes the consequences of competition and who tries to 
create a good environment for workers. S/he wants to sustain 
the business because of the role it serves in the community. 
Hir aim is not to maximize profits. Still, this does not mean 
that hir business is spared from competition. In the end, 
higher rents, higher interest on the loan s/he has taken to open 
the coffee shop, along with galloping expenses force hir to quit 
the business and to fire hir two employees, who must look for 
new jobs. What this example shows is the complex relation 
between economic actions and people’s individual intentions, 
desires and ideas. There is no elusive hiddenness there, just a 
complicated tangle of relations and practices. The small 
company owner in the example is placed within relations 
based on competition and there is no simple way for hir to act 
as though this was not the case. It is intelligible to say that s/he 
is rendered powerless in some respects. Such an example can 
show the robustness of the abstraction that a world of 
commodification entails. Even though the global market of 
wage labor can function as a lofty abstraction so that the image 
can be criticized for its reductions or skewed perspectives, 
these abstractions of work are an everyday aspect of the way 
we live in the world now. It is what Marxists call a ‘real 
abstraction’ (Sohn-Rethel 1978).  
Marx’s insightful point about how such patterns can be 
said to evolve ‘behind our back’ is just as true as to say that 
these abstractions are created by us. What is peculiar here is 
that the language of labor power makes them appear like 
given, self-evident entities. Marx rephrases these abstractions 
so that we see how they are rooted in praxis (this can be taken 
as a point about language, about a complex relation between 
words and actions). Real abstractions are operative – they are 
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what for example competition presupposes and requires. As 
Jason Read writes:  
For Marx the source of this appearance is to be found in activity 
itself, in the ensemble of relations. It is not so much that value is 
believed to be in commodities but, rather, that one acts in the 
process of exchange as if commodities, despite their distinct and 
different natures, were all reducible to some abstract equivalent 
that constitutes the possibility of exchange (2003, 69).  
In other words: ‘labor power’ is both a hegemonic discourse 
and practice; society is constantly understood and governed 
through a concept of labor power, and then society itself is 
mystified and split up into the isolated elements I have been 
talking about. This mystification is maintained when we start 
to think about ourselves in terms of ‘expensive and well-
educated labor power’ having to adapt to the requirements of 
the market. The description of cheap or expensive labor power 
is, as I said, what capitalism presupposes. ‘The labor market’ 
can be a bewitching image (to use Wittgenstein’s language) 
around which our thinking starts to gravitate but this 
abstraction is also actively built into practices such as job 
applications, outsourcing and private employment agencies. 
In these practices, the abstraction of labor power is 
maintained, and it is also, one could say, strengthened by work 
continually being made commensurable and exchangeable. 
Labor hire and recruitment firms are a glaring example of 
what such strengthening of work as labor power looks like: 
here it is really obvious that labor power is a capacity to sell. I 
am thus not saying that we could get away from this by means 
of ideology critique. At least partly, we live our lives as labor 
power, which influences our hopes, our worries and our fears. 
Everyday life, as in the example with the small coffee shop 
owner, is structured around commodities, jobs and 
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competition. Even so, this is not to say that our entire lives are 
structured in this way.  
To capture such tensions, ‘real abstraction’ may not be an 
altogether happy way of putting things. Expendable labor 
power is not problematic in its capacity of abstraction. In the 
end, what harm can abstractions do? After all, didn’t I also 
admit that Marx is abstracting when he is talking about the 
commodity form? In bringing out what is at stake in the 
transformation of work into labor power, speaking about 
abstraction is not enough. The point is rather that this is how 
work is organized because of competition, agendas, interests 
and power relations. For me, the concept of abstract labor is 
helpful because it illuminates an aspect of a process: the 
emergence of the commodity form. Thus, the problem I want 
to get at – the ways in which work is neutralized – does not 
hinge on abstractness as such, but rather the process of 
abstraction and the relations it is embedded in. To illuminate 
which other words can be used to describe this historical 
process, one could instead talk about violence (the risk with 
using this word is that the possibility of abstraction in the 
world of the university or the coffee shop owner may not be 
captured this way): 
Nonetheless, the violence of economic abstraction is not simply an 
error of the economists; it captures, in an ideological inversion, a 
real process of transformation to market integration, commodity 
circulation, and bourgeois behavior (Sayer & Walker 1993, 117). 
The abstraction involved in the transformation of work into 
labor power is connected with what in the Marxist literature 
goes under the heading of subsumption (cf. Marx 1990, 645). 
Subsumption is the process in which work in its specific forms 
evolves into labor power, both as formally free contractual 
relations and as it is organized around the need for surplus 
value. As many writers point out, this is and has been a 
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process of violence and conflict. Specific forms of work – one 
could perhaps say, specific forms of making a living – are 
subordinated to the overarching aims of valorization, to add 
more value than existed before. This is not only a change that 
applies to economic relations; it is a deep-going 
transformation of social relationships (cf. Read 2003, chapter 
3). Labor power is disclosed as labor power precisely in the 
state of becoming (cf. Marx 1990, 849).74 To continue on a theme 
that has been present in several chapters, I would say that this 
process of becoming has an ethical side. In his early writings, 
Marx writes about work as one aspect of life activity. The 
horror of capitalism is that it reduces and degrades work to 
subsistence, to a commodity, to profits, to surplus. As Marx 
writes, political economy only recognizes the worker as a 
wage-earner, while turning a blind eye to any other aspect. The 
worker’s life is treated as a commodity, but this is not 
acknowledged if one only has the wage-earner relation before 
one’s eyes (Marx 1992a, 335).  
So: when I speak about abstract labor this is not a simple 
myth sober clarification could dispel. The problem is not 
primarily false consciousness. That the relations of abstract 
labor appear as a relation between things (commodities) is no 
mere illusion (cf. Heinrich 2012, 73-5, cf. Balibar 2007, 60-1). 
One could say that even though talking about mystification 
                                                          
74 The best text on this topic I have found is a text published in Endnotes. 
http://endnotes.org.uk/en/endnotes-the-history-of-subsumption It can be 
noted that the discussion about subsumption explicitly poses the question 
about how the transformation of work into labor power should be described. 
Is this an ongoing process or was this process finished at some particular 
historical stage? The discussion also brings up the need to look at several 
descriptions at once: the transformation of work into labor power can be 
talked about as an emergence of free contracts (this is what Marx calls formal 
subsumption) but on the other hand the history of this emergence shows how 
this economic side of work is entangled with other relations: juridical 
relations, family relations and community relations.  
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has its place, there is no such thing as to dissolve the 
abstractions of labor as a mere mystification. Let me quote 
Alberto Toscano: “In other words, the secret of real abstraction 
is precisely an open secret to be gleaned from the operations of 
capitalism themselves, rather than from an ideological 
preoccupation with a true concreteness or hidden essence that 
the abstractions of capital may be deemed to conceal” (2008, 
71). Despite Marx’s fondness for ‘secrets’ and ‘riddles’, there is 
nothing elusive about the abstraction of work even though 
there is a connection between this dimension of capitalism and 
examples of how (conditions of) work is positively hidden, as 
it is when work takes place in closed units and attempts to 
reveal the conditions of work are blocked by companies. 
When Marx talks about abstract labor this is, as I see it, not a 
gesture of revelation of an underlying, hidden structure but 
rather a lucid description of what is going on around us every 
day. What this requires is a complex and sometimes risky 
enterprise of moving between and discerning levels of 
description and how they are related. 
5.6 Against the abstract and the concrete 
I will now continue to point out the risks associated with the 
concept of ‘abstract labor’. In his book The Mirror of Production 
Jean Baudrillard criticizes Marx for not extending his critique 
of economy far enough and for holding onto an ideal about 
work without alienation. Marx’s distinction between exchange 
value and use value is probed in the book. Baudrillard argues 
that production is taken for granted if it is elevated as concrete 
use value, an independent source standing in relation to 
exchange value, described as the abstract and alienating. 
According to Baudrillard, use value is taken to be 
differentiated, specific, concrete and incommensurable while 
exchange value is quantitative, universal and homogenous. He 
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protests: no, use value is also a part of the system of exchange 
value. His point is that concrete value is then only a shadow of 
abstract labor, and that Marxists paradoxically end up 
elevating the generality of work in the pseudo-gesture 
towards concrete labor and the nobility of work. He suggests 
that by referring to concrete and incommensurable labor one 
makes an illusionary move that is still immersed in a 
universalizing logic. Use value is a sort of ideological 
construction that makes us think that abstract value has a real, 
concrete foundation (1975, 21-38). Marx is thus charged with an 
incomplete critique of work that in the end results in an 
affirmation of work in its generality.  
A serious problem with Baudrillard’s conclusion is that it is 
based on what I take to be a misunderstanding of Marx, who, 
according to my reading, argues that exchange value and use 
value are units within the capitalist system. Interpreters have 
disagreed about this, and many would consider it self-evident 
that use-value is a trans-historical concept. In the preface of A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy75 Marx refers to 
Aristotle, and here it seems as if the concept is trans-historical: 
use-values are independent of the economic form. In some of 
the early sections of Capital, volume 1, he talks about use-
values that do not have values, and that are not commodities – 
this is a concept of material wealth with no reference to a 
specific social setting. Work that I do only to provide for my 
own needs can be said to have use-value, he argues (cf. 1990, 
126, 131). Even so, I think another reading is tenable. Firstly, it 
should be remembered that Marx continuously objected to 
uncritical elevation of the concrete. In the same first chapter of 
Capital, volume 1, one finds a fierce questioning of empiricism 
and the idea of immediacy (along with a critique of 
                                                          
75https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-
economy/ch01.htm#2 
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intellectualism). Secondly, as we saw, the concept of use value 
posits a generalized idea of needs. This presupposes that 
needs, like work, can be anything:  anything that in economic 
terms can be counted as demand. The character of these needs 
does not matter in the slightest from this perspective and this 
generalized role could even be said to be a requirement that 
arises in a system of commodities and money. In this sense, it 
makes sense to say that use values are, as I wrote above, a 
limiting concept required for there to be exchange value. If one 
takes the overarching point to be that it makes sense to talk 
about a distinction between use values and (exchange) values, 
that is, a distinction between use and economic value internal 
to the commodity form, then I think it is clear that this 
distinction can arise only in a capitalist society and its 
economy of labor power and commodities, even though we 
may of course apply the concept of use value to other 
historical periods. It is in capitalist society that values appear 
on the horizon: a society in which things are produced 
primarily in order to be sold. In conclusion, when one reads 
Capital, volume one in its entirety, ‘use value’ is a way for 
Marx to clarify what a commodity is and what it means that it 
has economic value. Like other concepts, it is relational. This 
also means that there is a constant dialectic relation between 
use values and exchange values, which can be illustrated in 
the following quotidian situation: in order to go on holiday to 
Thailand, I need to do some extra work now: as Christmas is 
almost here, I can get a job at the post office; they need some 
extra people. In this example, the use values (the vacation and 
the Christmas mail) stand in relation to exchange values, mail 
as a commodity, the vacation as a commodity. The example 
shows the shift between two aspects: use value for me – 
commodity for somebody else. And in reality there are many 
shifts, constant ones. Marx looks at the specific historical 
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relations between consumption and production. To quote 
Read:  
[Rather] than maintaining the simple and linear causality of 
natural needs and historical mediations, Marx develops a thought 
of the complex relations of production, distribution, exchange, 
and consumption in which all act on and determine each other 
and, to a certain extent, produce each other (2003, 50). 
The reason why I mention the sinuous discussion about use 
value and exchange value is that I agree with Baudrillard that 
it is problematic to appeal to concrete work, real work, in a 
way that would in itself equip us with an alternative to 
capitalism. The risk is that words like ‘concrete’, 
‘differentiated’, ‘specific’ and ‘incommensurable’ are filled 
with vaguely positive content. A trans-historical concept of 
concrete work takes us nowhere. Even though it might seem 
tempting to posit a solid positive contrast to the abstraction of 
work, I think that instead of such shortcuts, a critical analysis 
of what kind of transmutations work goes through is a better 
tool for grappling with conflicts and tensions of the present 
world. It should also be added that positing a positive 
alternative is fine, if what one is presenting is a different social 
relation, not a concept of work perceived as a return to the 
concrete. Because if one would be more specific, what would 
this concreteness be? Some jobs are only possible to imagine 
within capitalism (like advertisers or stock breakers). The 
temptation would be to imagine a more simple society that 
would still be built around jobs: firemen, police officers, 
bakers, teachers and farmers, perhaps. A stable, authentic 
society in which concrete work has been restored. One then, it 
seems to me, holds on to an idea about jobs – teaching, 
farming and baking as jobs – but imagines that abstractions 
can be gotten rid of by taking away some specific element of 
the present society (banking, administration or advertising). 
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My point above has been that abstraction of work can rather 
be said to be an aspect of all types of wage labor inserted into 
economic relations – a teacher’s, a plumber’s or a nurse’s jobs 
– and it is this that a dream about concrete work ignores. The 
appeal to the concrete is often a nostalgic evocation of what 
work used to be like. In this rhetoric the contrast to the 
abstraction of work appears as the forgotten: we need to 
remind ourselves of the essence of work, the real, hard work 
that is going on around us or the good ideals that have now 
been forgotten. 
Baudrillard’s warning is worth mentioning given the 
political temptation to look for a solid foundation of ‘real work’ 
by way of evoking contrasts between for example financial 
capital and ‘real, honest work’. The structure of such 
arguments is most often that capitalism is represented by one 
class, and the goal is to replace this class with another. 
According to some Marxists, for example Anselm Jappe, such 
juxtapositions entrench a mystification of capitalism, so that 
the abstractions and the character of commodification are far 
from being noticed. The abstractions are not obvious if 
capitalism is described as the domination of one class of 
people over another – especially if the idea is that the 
proletariat has an inherent right to domination because they 
are the source of value, they are the ones working and 
maintaining the system. According to Jappe, this view of class 
struggles expresses a failure to understand the abstraction of 
work, and thereby it also, by glorifying concrete work, 
neutralizes the working activity and the worker: ‘work’ is 
taken as a self-evident good, the only trouble being the 
exploitation of surplus-value (cf. Jappe 2005, 80-2, 90-95). Like 
Baudrillard, I would question an appeal to an underlying, 
eternal Essence of work, and like Jappe I would say that the 
idea about ‘concrete’ work is also an abstraction:  
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Einer Menschen des vorkapitalistischen Zeitalters wäre es nie 
eingefallen, das Umpflügen eines Feldes, eine Musikdarbietung, 
die Leitung eines Feldzugs, die Entdeckung einer geometrischen 
Funktion und die Zubereitung eines Essens alle auf dieselbe 
Seinsebene zu stellen – als menschliche ’arbeit’ (2005, 99). 
The reader may ask where these remarks about concrete work 
are headed. After all, have I not been defending my own idea 
about good work and work as a life situation? For me, it is 
extremely important that when I have talked this way, these 
expressions are immersed in people’s struggles, fears and 
hopes. They are thus also immersed in tensions, and cannot be 
seen as a matter of reviving or resurrecting a slumbering 
concept that somehow would do away with these tensions. 
My point was that the concept of concrete work glosses over or, 
like Jappe shows (even though I disagree with him that every 
concept of work is tied up with the abstractions of 
commodification) neutralizes such tensions.  
5.7 Work and controversies 
Antagonism is inscribed in the very heart of capital, in the 
commodification of labor, but it does not remain fixed as some 
kind of essence – it is perpetually displaced, encompassing 
different technological, political and social relations (Read 2003, 
144). 
One of the aims of this chapter has been to show the tensions 
within the transformation of work into labor power. This 
transformation continuously encounters limits and struggles. 
The normalization of labor power, its status as a commodity, 
meets with continuous resistance and questioning. In what 
follows I will provide an example of such tensions. My 
intention is to illustrate in what way the seemingly self-
evident language of labor power is put into question in a 
specific controversy.  
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Capitalism is not all-encompassing. Many writers, not only 
Marxists, call attention to the fact that the scope of 
commodification (which is a broader concept than ‘the 
market’) is a field of contestation. Such contestations concern 
whether a particular thing – human organs, sex, education, 
etc. – should be something to sell and buy, whether they 
should be commodities (Anderson 1995, Radin 1996, Sandel 
2012). Juridical, personal and social contestations of 
commodification take place practically everywhere. That more 
and more activities are transformed into labor power, that 
more and more activities are drawn into the sphere of paid 
work, is a historical development that reveals the contingence 
of the line between paid and unpaid work. An expanding 
assortment of daily activities is integrated in a system of 
commodification. This goes for the food we eat, the hobbies 
we take pleasure in, the way we move about in the world. In 
short, daily life consists of an overwhelming network of 
services and commodities, in the case of many of which we are 
not even aware of their role in the functioning of everyday life. 
This expansion of wage labor and commodification obviously 
has to do with the capitalist system but it is also bound up 
with new habits, new desires and new expectations. 
At this point – because it is central for the framework of my 
discussion of Marx and the tension between work as labor 
power and work as a life situation – it should be noted that the 
abstractions that capitalism presupposes cannot become a 
totalizing truth. It would be impossible to understand Marx 
without taking into account his conception of the world of 
capitalism as being shaped by a number of contradictions. 
(What these contradictions are has been a subject of great 
disagreement within the Marxist literature, cf. Read 2003.) 
Capitalism encounters new barriers, new forms of resistance, 
new challenges and it continuously invents new ways of 
extracting surplus value. Again: Marx speaks on the level of 
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capital; the particular company and its attempts to profit on 
work is not his fundamental point of departure, even though 
he illustrates his conceptual remarks about these 
contradictions when he shows the historical progression from 
means of increasing profits by extending the working day, to 
intensifying work through technical and organizational 
innovations that make work more productive. The struggles 
over the working day have an integral place within this 
development: they created new strategies to make profits and 
they also created new political questions and alliances (cf. 
Marx 1990, 645, Read 2003, 95-7, 112). These changes brought 
with them new forms of struggles, new forms of cooperation 
and new forms of division of labor. Capitalism is dependent 
on continuous expansion (more workers, more consumers), 
but at the same time such endless expansion is impossible. 
Where are those profitable outlets to be found? This gives rise 
to incessant contradictions and tensions within a flexible 
capitalism that tries to adapt to new situations and 
surroundings. This has immense implications for how wage 
labor is structured globally: the movement of capital reveals 
strategies of extracting surplus value (cf. Harvey 2011).76 To 
conclude this chapter, I will reflect on an example of one such 
expansion of commodification, and how it has met with 
critique and contestation.  
In 2006, a Swedish tax deduction was introduced for 
domestic service work. The ambition with the tax deduction 
called RUT (a similar tax reduction for repair work had also 
been introduced) was to boost employment. It was argued that 
this would be beneficial for gender equality and that it would 
                                                          
76 One important aspect of the understanding of crisis developed by Marx 
starts from the idea that capitalism is constantly trying to get rid of the source 
of value, labor time; technology has increased productivity and labor time is 
reduced (cf. Marx 1973, 706).  
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provide unemployed people with opportunities to enter into 
the labor market. It would also free time for the buyers so that 
they can work more, which would be beneficial for society in 
general, etc. The tax deduction was furthermore said to be a 
means to combat widespread undeclared work. Critics of the 
initiative argue that it strengthens an existing class society and 
that it legitimizes the existence of a class of servants. The 
connection with increasing gender equality has also been 
questioned by critics (cf. Bohlin 2011, Nyberg 2014). Gavana & 
Calleman write that those doing the work are mostly 
immigrant women, few of whom are unionized. They also 
note that many of the customers using RUT are old people and 
that the limit between private cleaning services and services 
provided by the state are rather fluid (2013). What is striking 
in this debate is how the defenders of the tax deduction in 
question frequently bring up employment and job creation as 
an argument, while many critics challenge this approach by 
looking at the circumstances that are overlooked when 
employment is taken to be the most important goal: the critics 
discuss class society, racialized work and that housework 
formerly performed by women is now transformed into a 
commercialized form of women’s work. This debate shows 
that the expansion of commodification is not a neutral process. 
Instead, the debate forces us to look at the conflicts that arise 
when seemingly self-evident aspects of work are emphasized: 
‘cleaning is a job and everybody needs a job’. Consequently, 
we are forced to take a stand on what it means that something 
is ‘work’, as this is precisely what the debaters disagree about. 
One such critic is André Gorz, who encourages us to ask 
onto whom the domestic service work is loaded, under what 
conditions it is done and how much these workers are paid. 
He argues that these jobs indicate a growing social division of 
labor. Some are overworked, while others have difficulties 
finding a job. The latter situation compels people to accept any 
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job they are offered, the result being a class of exchangeable, 
flexible workers, workers that should be ‘at hand’ (1989, 154-
5). The debate in Sweden revolves around whether the 
cleaners should be seen as wage-earning individuals engaged 
in a perfectly legitimate trade or whether this phenomenon 
should be analyzed as revealing something about our society 
and its divisions. The disagreement is precisely which sides of 
work should be stressed and whether referring to employment 
and jobs should have the role of conclusive argument. Is work 
a neutral service that willing, skillful and able people, 
professionals, provide; a good opportunity for employment, or 
is this job yet another example of an expanding class society? 
Depending on whether the cleaners are seen as professionals 
who have chosen their jobs, or as Gorz would have it, that 
they are seen as people who are reduced to servants, very 
different political implications emerge. If they are 
professionals – entrepreneurs – then the way forward seems to 
be to open up the market for these services as widely as 
possible. Here, it can in fact be misleading to talk about 
‘aspects’ of work, as this easily evokes the idea that aspects are 
complimentary and that the most important thing is not to 
emphasize one aspect one-sidedly. The political and moral 
implications of the descriptions ‘servant’ and ‘entrepreneur’ 
show that one should rather talk about conflicts. The two 
descriptions ‘servant’ and ‘entrepreneur’ give rise to two very 
different accounts of what is meant by work, and my point is 
that this is no mere linguistic disagreement, but rather a 
disagreement about what is seen as relevant to focus on. 
The life situation of accepting a job, working shifts that 
disrupt the rhythm of everyday life or working a low-wage 
job that barely pays the living expenses is not apparent if the 
perspective is that of nation-wide job creation and the 
securing of employment for the individual. This is one 
example of what Marx, on a structural level, talked about as 
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the conditions of capitalism being effaced. Above, I have been 
talking about ‘a normalization’ of work: commodification of a 
certain activity is legitimized and strengthened. When work is 
discussed from the perspective of labor power it seems as if 
the customer ‘offers a service’, ‘helps’ the cleaner in paying for 
the job. All forms of wage labor, regardless of its content and 
the meaning of doing it day in and day out, are then seen 
under the aspect of ‘a service’ to the person who is employed. 
The tax reduction for domestic service work is consequently 
defended by arguing that these jobs offer opportunities for 
migrants in Sweden (cf. Bohlin 2011). Marx ironically gives 
voice to a similar argument about the thrifty capitalist who is 
‘generous enough’ to make the means of production s/he has 
accumulated throughout the years available and useful to the 
worker. The worker should be grateful for this generosity 
(1990, 299).  
The defenders of the tax deduction appeal to what they 
perceive as fair exchange. Everyone benefits from the tax 
deduction. Families with a packed schedule receive some 
well-deserved and needed assistance, elderly people are 
helped out while the cleaners get what they need and want: a 
job (that might lead to other jobs later on), an income.77 An 
employment gives a person rights and an income. What can be 
asked is, once again, what one catches sight of from this 
perspective. As I said, from a certain point of view, ‘having a 
job’ seems to be a description that trumps all other 
descriptions. Marx’s method, looking at several levels of 
description, is relevant here. If the debate is restricted to a 
discussion about incomes and the service provided to the 
paying customer, structural aspects of work and 
commodification and how they are linked to what I called the 
life situations of accepting a job are not seen. And when they 
                                                          
77 Cf. http://www.svensktnaringsliv.se/fragor/rot_rut/ 
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are not seen, these things are not appreciated as problems to be 
dealt with. Instead, work, consumption and labor markets are 
treated as isolated elements. As we saw, Marx’s critique was 
directed at such isolation (which is a real abstraction and an 
ideological mystification). His approach helps us navigate in 
the type of terrain that has been sketched here. 
This isolation of elements can also be seen in how the 
critics of the tax deduction bring out the historical dimension 
of cleaning at another person’s home. Of course, this job was 
not invented when the tax deduction was implemented. The 
critics point out a historical connection forgotten or repressed 
when the cleaners are described as professionals or 
entrepreneurs – this is the history of servants, maids (in 
Swedish, the debate is often called ‘pigdebatten’). The role of 
this historical dimension is not given: a question within the 
debate has been what relevance historical changes or a 
historical continuity, a reappearance of the maid, has, and 
what bearing that has for how work is conceptualized. If the 
job is described as a historical continuation of the maid, then 
this challenges the image of work as a free choice.  
The cleaner in a private person’s home works a very 
different job from a person cleaning in a school where the 
cleaner is in the best case recognized as a member of the staff. 
In this case, a person’s home becomes the workplace of 
another. The home-cleaner cleans whenever s/he is ordered to, 
s/he cleans whatever s/he is told to clean, and the company 
often specifies how the procedure is to be carried out, what 
tools to use and how to save time. The customers and even the 
cleaners themselves might find it tempting, consoling, or safe, 
to relate to the activity as ‘just another job’ – a commercial 
service with a strictly defined content. Another possibility is 
that relations are intimate in a way that makes the aspect of 
business invisible in a problematic way: as many feminists (cf. 
Ehrenreich 2003, Precarias a la deriva, 2009) have pointed out, 
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professional cleaning and care work can prolong but also 
displace traditional ideas about housework and gender. The 
ideal of women as natural care-givers or home-makers tends 
to appear in a way that displaces the commodified dimension 
of the job – make it inconspicuous. This is not to say that all 
home cleaners are oppressed or that intimacy is always 
problematic when it exists within a job.  
In order to understand the tension between work as labor 
power and work as a life situation we must take into account 
more than one level of description. A significant aspect that 
shapes the problematic at hand is how work can be 
understood ethically. Russell Muirhead writes that work 
contracts can – and as I would suggest, should – be judged 
from a point of view of the circumstances under which the 
person accepts the job. The formal right to quit the job is not 
the final level of discussion. His view is that the discussion 
about work and consent cannot be raised as such, without 
context – it must be related to the meaning of the specific job. 
That somebody is doing a specific job ‘out of desperation’ (his 
expression) is something we say also depending on what kind 
of job it is. Like Simone Weil (4.6) he opens up for a moral 
perspective on what consent means when it is not understood 
as a formal concept, as the consent that every work contract as 
such expresses (2003, 75-8). Muirhead’s approach is fruitful 
because on the one hand it rejects a normalization of work (all 
employment is good) but it also anchors a discussion about 
employment in moral questions about what work is and what 
relations it creates between people. As I said in the previous 
chapter: if the question of degradation of work is not dodged, 
this also opens up the question about what good work is. 
What would it mean to say that commercial cleaning in 
private people’s home is good work?  
The answer will, again, depend on what we take the job – 
the activity, the life situation – to be. The debate in Sweden has 
328 
 
circled around how the cleaner’s job is described. Is cleaning 
in itself demeaning? Do those who criticize the tax deduction 
think that cleaning is a demeaning job? Couldn’t we say that 
also a professional home cleaner has a sense of professional 
pride? Symptomatically, the meaning of the concrete, the 
specific task, to clean a dirty space, seems like a self-evident 
way of replying that takes one away from the commercial 
dimension. The idea is then that people need to drop their 
negative perception of the job (and perhaps negative attitudes 
towards ‘women’s work’): cleaning should not be looked 
down on: it is a job as good as any. One may respond that 
attitudes may play a part, but focusing on attitudes in 
isolation from the context is to look away from the present 
reality of the job and relations it involves. One would thus 
argue – like Marx also often does – that concreteness can be just 
as misleading as a language of supply and demand on the labor 
market. In other words: also the concrete may function as a 
way to treat an activity as an isolated element that obscures 
the process of commodification at play. To express it in Marx’s 
dialectical terms: the concrete, ‘to clean a dirty space’, can turn 
abstract if it is disengaged from the real circumstances of the 
job. If the consequences is that the economic (low wages), 
social (low status, gender roles, race) and historical (the maid) 
dimensions are ignored, one could even talk about the 
concrete as a distortion. It is in this type of example that 
resorting to concreteness may be tempting.  
This shows the difficulty of formulating a fixed contrast to 
the role work has when it is an economic asset. I would 
instead say that the meaning of ‘work as life situation’ unfolds 
within these kinds of debates, in which people talk about the 
stakes of getting a job, the importance of a living wage or what 
it is like to do this particular job, day in and day out. A 
Marxist analysis of the concept of the commodity may, not on 
the face of it, have much to say about this kind of open-ended 
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concept of a life situation, but I think a clear-sighted 
understanding of what I have called real abstractions can help 
one formulate an existential question against the background 
of structures: what does it mean to understand oneself as labor 
power? What does it mean that others are treated as labor 
power? What would it mean to resist being treated as a 
commodity? 
The home cleaner example is interesting because of the 
controversy that already exists. I wanted to show what 
happens when the meaning and the purpose of a job is re-
opened. As we saw, a notorious problem with work is: what 
purpose does it serve? This question will be radically different 
if it is asked from the point of view of value creation (labor 
power and employment) or whether we talk about what kinds 
of needs commercialized cleaning responds to and what type 
of relations the job involves and what it means for specific 
people to support themselves in this way. In this controversy 
both the perspective of labor power and the perspective of 
work as a life situation appear: on one level, the debate has 
been about what an insightful description of work amounts to. 
When cleaning is understood as ‘a service’ the question arises 
whether ‘service’ is reduced to a job on the market or whether 
the encounter between real people and their feelings of 
gratitude, humiliation, detachment or tactfulness is 
emphasized. An abstraction of work into labor power gives 
the appearance of all substantial questions about work being 
settled: labor power appears as an isolated element, an 
individual contract. In this way, abstractions are misleading. 
The challenge is, as I see it, to navigate between the view that 
abstractions distort, and that they are also real abstractions, that 
work becomes an isolated element.  
5.8 Concluding words 
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In this chapter I wanted to show that political and existential 
tensions accrue to the seemingly neutral and normal role work 
has as labor power, an economic resource. By means of a 
discussion of Marx’s concept of abstract labor I argued that 
work is detached from content both rhetorically and in 
practice. I talked about the transmutation of work into abstract 
labor: work is inserted into relations of commodification. 
Work as labor power is the capacity to work. I argued that the 
problem is not abstractions in themselves, but rather the 
asymmetric relations maintained through these abstractions – 
and how an appearance of equality and symmetric relations, 
as I illustrated with the home cleaning example, evolves when 
a certain level of description is seen as the self-evident one. I 
talked about a tension between work as labor power and work 
as a life situation and how a normalization and neutralization 
of work makes this tension inconspicuous. This tension does 
not concern a specific form of work but, rather, it potentially 
affects all forms of wage labor. I argued that struggles and 
controversies exist side by side with normalization and 
naturalization of work as a commodity. Ultimately, looking at 
these tensions between work as a commodity and work as a 
life situation can function as a critical tool against a 
depoliticization of work that makes power relations and the 
changes commodification give rise to inconspicuous. In the 
introduction I talked about using tension as a lever. The 
concluding discussion about the RUT tax deduction could be 
an example of the role that articulating and spelling out 
tensions can have.  
If work is rendered as a capacity useful only as far as it is a 
commodity on the labor market there seems to be no room for 
talking about degradation – critical inquiry is undermined 
when work is understood only as labor power. Two points 
were made about possible misunderstandings of my 
argument. (I) When I talked about abstractions of work that 
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make other circumstances inconspicuous, my intention was 
not to paint a simple contrast between abstract labor and 
something else, Real Work or Concrete Work. (II) With Marx, I 
wanted to stress that these questions cannot simply be solved 
by means of ideology critique – work is a commodity, even 
though it is a very peculiar commodity and even though its 
being a commodity is surrounded by tensions. One of my 
aims was to emphasize the need to keep these tensions alive: 
reminding oneself of the different dimensions of work may 
reduce the temptation to define work as an eternal essence or 
a mere mirror of capitalist structures. However, there is also a 
destructive side of the tensions that appear in people’s relation 
to work. In the next chapter, I will say more about this and the 
socio-economic and existential surroundings of such 
destructive tensions.  
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Chapter 6: Work and the fear of 
obsolescence 
If we fail to perceive the points of identity between labor practices 
and modes of life, we will comprehend nothing of the changes 
taking place in present-day production and misunderstand a 
great deal about the forms of contemporary culture (Virno 1996, 
13). 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I pondered on the commodifying 
transformation of work into labor power. I applied Marx’s 
concept of abstract labor to an exploration of the 
neutralization work goes through when it is treated and 
conceptualized as labor power, and I attempted to explain 
why the commodification of work inevitably leads to tensions. 
In this chapter, the existential tensions I discuss concern how 
employees (or the unemployed) understand themselves in 
relation to work. Even though Marxist approaches to work 
have many merits, I here attend to aspects that aren’t usually 
taken into account from that perspective. I look at the 
connection between wage labor and existential fears and 
anxieties; one of the points I want to make is that tensions in 
the roles of work in our lives come to the fore when such fears 
are highlighted.  
In the first part of the chapter, I discuss the sociologist 
Richard Sennett’s writings on flexible work and 
fragmentation. I critically explore some of the concepts central 
in his thinking: control, intelligibility and indifference. I take 
this discussion about fragmentation and work into another 
direction by reflecting on what it means to feel that one has 
become obsolescent, that one’s work is no longer needed. 
333 
 
Drawing on Sennett, I try to articulate how such feelings show 
how the abstraction of work into labor power also expresses 
what could be called a form of existential disorientation: 
Sennett describes people’s difficulties with understanding 
their own work and even their own lives. This discussion 
opens up for the issues dealt with in the second section of the 
text in which I continue the investigation about work and self-
understanding. I reflect on how the fear of obsolescence could 
be conceptualized: it seems misleading to talk about illusions, 
as this fear seems to be made possible by or even seems to be 
built into the world of work. The existential disorientation that 
I am here at pains to articulate makes the relation between 
work and reality re-surface. In the course of ordinary life, we 
often talk about our relations to work in the language of 
reality, realism and maturity. Such talk takes place against the 
background of concerns, worries and commitment. I concur 
with Sennett’s description of how certain attitudes to work are 
built into a system of fragmented and flexible work, yet there 
is still room to say that these attitudes reflect worries about 
one’s place in the world: these worries make the question 
about what is to be taken as real in the world of work an acute 
concern. I conclude the chapter with an example from the 
novel Revolutionary Road (1961), written by Richard Yates. By 
means of that example, I further reflect on and tie together the 
main themes of this chapter: work, self-understanding and 
conflicting concepts of work and reality.    
I Work and fear of obsolescence 
6.2 Sennett on fragmentation 
A common characterization of the contemporary world of 
work is that it induces not a sense of knowing one’s way about 
in the world, but rather a feeling of fear and disorientation: it 
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is a fast-moving and complex context in which the decisions 
and actions of a single human being are entangled with mazes 
of structures, institutions and strategic thinking. As I warned 
in chapter 2, it is tempting to tread carelessly here by jumping 
to generalized conclusions about what this means. 
Nonetheless, most of us can easily recognize the fear of one’s 
skills becoming superfluous: one loses one’s job, and one starts 
to think about oneself as a person who has failed to offer what 
the labor market needs. In the following sections, I will 
critically evaluate Richard Sennett’s arguments about work 
and fragmentation. 
In his famous book about work in late capitalism, The 
Corrosion of Character (1998), Sennett argues that the concept of 
work undergoes a change in flexible capitalism, a concept 
loosely associated with a development from the eighties 
onwards.78 Time, decentralization and flexibility are placed at 
the center in his interpretation of the new capitalism (as he 
calls it in a later book). His main argument, here and 
elsewhere, is that employees (and entrepreneurs, etc.) are 
forced to create an individualized (privatized even) temporary 
space in a fragmented and confusing world. Instead of 
occupying the same job for thirty years, instead of having a 
clear-cut career path, people now do ‘lumps’ and ‘pieces’ of 
work (he derives the word ‘lump’ from what is allegedly an 
                                                          
78 Something I cannot do here is to criticize the historical accuracy of Sennett’s 
presentation. Historians of labor have pointed out that the period of stable 
and secure jobs was very short and even then, ‘standard employment’ was far 
from all-encompassing, even in the wealthier parts of the world. A general 
bias in the history of labor, according to some, has been a one-dimensional 
focus on wealthy countries and a certain type of worker (male, occupied in 
traditional branches like the docks or the mines) (cf. Linden 2008). Sennett’s 
perspective can be charged with both these problems. My philosophical 
approach to his view starts from the idea that even though his analysis may be 
historically or sociologically flawed, his conceptual analysis may still be 
illuminating. 
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old use of the word job: a lump that could be carted around). 
Workers are encouraged to take risks and to think in short 
terms (1998, 9). In another book, The Culture of the New 
Capitalism, he develops a view that can be encountered in a 
number of books on work and organizations: work, or what is 
considered to be ideal work, no longer takes place in 
bureaucratic pyramid-like organizations; to an increasing 
extent, work is done in fluid networks within flexible 
organizations where employees are discarded or added in 
accordance with the needs of the immediate future. Sennett 
depicts a period where money is restless and organizations 
change quickly: stability becomes a weakness, a sign of 
rigidity (Sennett 2006, 41, 48, 78). He stresses that this trend 
does not apply to all kinds of contemporary work, but the 
important thing to note is, he says, that some images of work 
become ideals (2006, 12). Rather than trying to chart specific 
statistically verifiable trends, Sennett can be said to talk about 
how people experience work. As Dale Tweedie writes, he can 
be interpreted as revealing tensions in how people talk about 
their lives (cf. Tweedie 2013, 98). In this reading, Sennett 
extracts the implications of flexibility and short-term thinking 
becoming ideals and means of legitimization of political 
policies.  
So what’s the trouble here? Should the fact that more and 
more job contracts are temporary, rather than for life, be 
lamented? Sennett delivers no easy answer. He sets out to 
show the existential malaise of short-term work, and he tries 
to show the consequence of (what he sees as) significant 
changes in how we experience the world of work for how we 
understand ourselves. His sound observation is that short-
term work is not only a surface phenomenon but also 
something that shapes the fears and hopes connected with 
working. As jobs are no longer meaningful units (as we will 
see, he seems to subscribe to the idea that jobs once existed as 
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meaningful units), commitment remains short term. Like the 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, Sennett characterizes the new 
capitalism with the word fluidity, a state characterized by 
flexibility and lack of solidarity and communality. In his book 
Liquid Modernity Bauman argues that work has become self-
enclosed episodes and I think he makes an interesting point 
when he sums up one discourse in which work is depicted as 
strategic movements within a game. Bauman shows that this 
makes it harder to speak about the purposes work serves and 
makes the idea of work as epitomizing the way the world is 
rationally ordered (increasing wealth and minimizing misery) 
less tenable. In other words: according to Bauman (and 
Sennett) work can no longer function as ‘a secure axis’ (2000, 
137-9). Mostly, Bauman’s arguments are very similar to 
Sennett’s: an increasing individualization of work, stemming 
from changes in the relation between capital and labor, labor 
markets and the logic that govern production of things and 
services, has taken place and this affects how we think about 
work. He perceives this individualization to go hand in hand 
with a general hopelessness with regard to agency (Bauman 
2000, 133, 138-51). Throughout this chapter, I will evaluate 
what Sennett has to say about such helplessness. My critical 
questions concern whether he manages to shed light on what 
is truly destructive about what he sees as a fragmentation of 
work. 
6.3 What is good work? 
Sennett argues that the new capitalism creates its own modes 
of meaninglessness that haunt most people, a form of 
meaninglessness different from the deadening boredom of the 
factory: the fear of being thrown out of the loop, of being 
made redundant and replaced by a machine or a worker 
abroad, or the fear of becoming old (2006, chapter 2). One of 
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Sennett’s interesting claims is that evaluating what doing a 
good job amounts to becomes harder in the new organization 
of work: other things seem to matter. He contends that it has 
become increasingly hard to pin down what a good 
performance is. A woman working in an advertising agency 
tells him that “there were no objective measures which 
applied to doing a good job” (1998, 79). In several of his 
writings, this is contrasted with crafts and a desire to do a job 
well, which he sees as a combination of skills and judgment. In 
Corrosion of Character he writes about the interviews he made 
in the seventies with employees working in a bakery, which 
he revisits in the late nineties. The bakery of the 70’s is 
characterized as a smelly and noisy place. The bakers used 
their hands and noses to check when the products where 
ready, skills that took some years to refine. Even though the 
bakers claimed that they did not enjoy the work, and Sennett 
believed them, still, their work was characterized by a sense of 
honor, connected with a form of ethnic pride: doing well at 
work corresponded with what it was like to be a good Greek. 
He notes that the bakery in the old days was not paradise. The 
bakers often threw up because of the heat, the security of the 
union could also include a system of corruption and the ethnic 
pride implied that some other people were despised.79 
Nowadays, the place is owned by a conglomerate and the 
personnel is of a transitory kind; few people work there more 
than a few years. The bakery is clinical and work is done in a 
flexible way, so that one day they make bagels, the next day 
French bread, the entire process being smooth and automated. 
The only contact the workers now have with the bread is a 
computer screen (1998, 65-70). The job no longer requires the 
skills to bake bread. Sennett speaks about a fragmentation of 
                                                          
79 He does not problematize this ‘ethnic pride’ in The Corrosion of Character. 
He says a little bit more about these things in The Hidden Injuries of Class. 
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work that makes the work surrounding less intelligible than 
before. “The work is no longer legible to them, in the sense of 
understanding what they are doing.” (1998, 68) As he writes: 
the job no longer requires that they know how to bake bread. 
The computer system often breaks down, and somebody else 
fixes it; if it breaks down, the bakers do not possess the skills 
to intervene and control the process manually. There are 
plenty of waste products as a result of such mishaps. 
Interestingly, Sennett notices that these contemporary workers 
feel personally demeaned by their work even though the 
technical surrounding is smooth. He adds that this feeling is 
not understood by the bakers themselves (ibid.).  
His intention is not to romanticize lost craft. Later on, he 
dedicated an entire book to crafts, where different aspects of 
work as craft were scrutinized. What he rather seems to point 
at is that the seemingly smooth and automated process is 
revealed for what it is when it breaks down and is interrupted: 
the bakers are rendered helpless and their jobs are reduced to 
supervising a predestined process they have little insight into. 
Their own range of action and intervention has been 
minimized. As we saw in chapter 2, many work critics 
(starting from Arendt, continuing with Gorz and Marcuse) 
have critically evaluated the meaning of work when it is 
reduced to maintenance of a process. Sennett explains that the 
workers’ demeanor is not characterized by anger or visible 
alienation. They are indifferent. Over and over again, they told 
Sennett: ‘I’m not really a baker’ – they experienced the job as 
mindless tasks, pushing buttons. There was no attachment to 
the specific occupation, baking. Nonetheless, when asked 
about what they consider important in their work, their reply 
was: being a good worker. Work was still seen as important, 
but Sennett found it hard to pin down what exactly this 
amounted to in their present situation (1998, 70-1). It is this 
difficulty that exemplifies the type of problem that interests 
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me in this chapter, the difficulty of articulating one’s relation 
or attachment to a job, or to employment.  
How should the bakers’ indifference be interpreted? 
Sennett drew the conclusion that the reaction didn’t seem clear 
to the workers themselves. What I find lacking in his 
otherwise useful account of their situation is a reflection on 
what it means to say that a worker is unable to articulate hir 
relation to the job. Of course it wouldn’t make sense to say 
that the worker does not provide a sociological account of hir 
job, and that s/he therefore does not ‘understand’ hir own 
relation to it. Furthermore, I think it is a mistake to think that 
the normal case is that we ‘understand ourselves’, as if this 
understanding were something direct and self-evident and as 
if we were transparent to ourselves.80 Sennett’s promising 
claim is that the present world of work makes us unable to 
understand ourselves. Let me try to flesh out what he says, 
and which questions his analysis leads to. 
As we saw, Sennett registers the user-friendliness of the 
technology in the bakery. 
It is, I came to realize, the very user-friendliness of the bakery that 
may account in part for the confusion the people baking feel 
about themselves as bakers. In all forms of work, from sculpting 
to serving meals, people identify with tasks which challenge 
them, tasks which are difficult. But in this flexible workplace, 
with its polyglot workers coming and going irregularly, radically 
different orders coming in each day, the machinery is the only 
real standard of order, and so has to be easy for anyone, no matter 
who, to operate (1998, 72). 
Elimination of challenge breeds indifference, Sennett argues. 
This is a good observation. Nevertheless, I would like to point 
out that it is just as easy to imagine a case where the 
employees are pleased when new technology has been 
                                                          
80 For an excellent account of this, cf. Winch 2002.  
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brought in that relieves them of some burdensome tasks. The 
question arises: what is it that matters in the example? An 
interesting fact that Sennett noted was that the workers were 
indifferent about their job, but they still cared about getting 
things done. When a machine broke down, or when electricity 
suddenly went off, they were frustrated and angry at the 
system engineers who did not fix a recurring problem. So, as 
in most places, the indifference expressed by the employees is 
not the whole story, there are other feelings and reactions as 
well. Sennett does not say that improved technology must 
have this role. I would say (with Marx): everything hangs on 
the kinds of relations machines are embedded in, and the kinds 
of relations that machines uphold.81  
Sennett claims that it is hard to imagine anyone caring 
about their job if they don’t have a sense of what they do. The 
illuminating point I think he is making is that some types of 
work makes caring impossible: there is nothing to care about. 
Work is nothing but execution as it requires very little in terms 
of trained judgment or context-dependent intervention. The 
job has been drained of everything that can be meaningful for 
the worker. This point, as you see, is quite similar to Weil’s, 
even though her context and mode of writing is very different. 
It is hard to imagine anyone caring about a process that 
appears opaque, for example, when one is only familiar with 
the process in a shallow way, being able to operate it so that 
                                                          
81 In Corrosion of Character, he says nothing about the bakers’ relation to 
technology as a reflection of power relations. One could easily imagine that 
being helpless due to technology can be interpreted in connection with power 
– this is for example what Marcuse and Gorz talk about in their writings: 
machines can become a materialized form of power relation. In his later book 
The Craftsman (2008, 250), Sennett re-visits his example by looking at it from 
the point of view of the division between experts and people who don’t 
possess the knowledge the experts do, and the resentment that may give rise 
to. Here, power relations do emerge. 
341 
 
the desirable results are mostly achieved: one pushes, as it 
were, the right buttons. As he writes: engagement becomes 
shallow when one has very little understanding for what one 
does (1998, 74). An important aspect of the example, I think, 
was this: user-friendliness proved to be a surface 
phenomenon. In many situations, the bakers were rendered 
helpless (of course this is true for most gadgets which are easy 
to use: I have no idea how to fix a mobile phone and it may be 
hard to hunt down people who can).  
I don’t think Sennett is wrong when he says that it is 
important to have ‘a sense of what one does’ in a job. One 
should keep in mind that this seems true for work in a wider 
sense even though the negative contrast, to lack a sense of 
what one does, typically appears in fragmented wage labor. In 
his essays about forms of life, “Two Landscapes of Northern 
Norway” and “Remaking a Form of Life”, the Norwegian 
philosopher Jacob Meløe looks at the way humans, active and 
goal-orientated beings, are able to discern an intelligible 
surrounding. He criticizes detached and positivistic notions of 
what a ‘world’ is. A world is a world only in the sense that 
objects and environments are something we interact with: the 
world is a dwelling-place, it is not primarily observed with a 
disinterested gaze. Meløe writes about the landscapes of 
Northern Norway. The landscape is a landscape because it is 
seen by an active gaze, a gaze shaped by doing. He takes the 
example of the fishing boat.  
A fishing boat, with each of its parts, is an intelligible structure. 
Its intelligibility lies in the work operations that it is designed to 
fit or to serve – perhaps in heavy weather. The more you come to 
learn about what it is to work on board a fishing boat, the more 
intelligible that structure becomes. And as it gains in 
intelligibility, it gains in visibility (1988, 389).  
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Perception is embedded in intelligibility, and intelligibility is 
intertwined with doing: when I learn how to catch fish in 
stormy weather, I learn more about what a good boat is. For 
the fisherman, intelligibility is thus the familiarity s/he has 
with the boat, the sea and various tools. As Meløe writes: “The 
fisherman sees what he sees in terms of what he does” (1988, 
390). This form of dwelling-in-the-world shows the complexity 
of agency: the fisherman could not be regarded as an 
intention-driven subject who acts on raw material. The 
fisherman responds to the boat, the sea and the wind. “When 
the boat is under way, the agent is the-boat-with-its-skipper-
at-the-helm….” (1988, 391) For the fisherman, the sea is no 
mere external working material. This shows a level of ‘having 
a sense of what one is doing’ where intelligibility is connected 
with a form of life, a web of concerns and care. Meløe’s essays 
are propelled by a fear that the forms of life in Northern 
Norway will disappear and this concern also makes it 
important to express what it means that for example fishing is 
immersed in a form of life. Talking about what it means to 
have a sense of what one is doing, talking about intelligibility, 
is thus no mere observational, descriptive task. It is a matter of 
acknowledging what role an activity has within a larger 
context. Or to express the point in other words: to emphasize 
what it means to have certain skills, to have a sense of what 
one is doing, is often tantamount to stressing that the activity 
of which skills form a part is worth upholding, fighting for, 
saving etc. 
In other words, Sennett is on to something very interesting 
when he talks about the damaging effects of no longer having 
a sense of what one is doing. However, I am skeptical when he 
writes that the more understanding about something one has, 
the more one cares about it (2006, 105). Much depends on 
what is meant by ‘understanding’ and I think Sennett doesn’t 
realize this complexity, even though it is clear that 
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understanding, for him, is infused with existential meaning. 
We sometimes talk about understanding in ways that makes it 
synonymous with care. This is a very different language game 
from descriptions of understanding as technical mastery. As I 
said above: care is not an all-or-nothing affair. A job may be 
soul-crushing, and one may feel indifferent about many 
things, but suddenly find oneself frustrated when a specific 
step goes wrong and one finds that this will delay the work of 
one’s colleague. New forms of care appear. It is of course clear 
that this care need not take direct verbal form: most often, it is 
expressed in what people do. Talking about care here also 
depends on these expressions being acknowledged as care 
(something Sennett does not discuss): as I said in chapter 4, 
under a certain description of what a job is, it is very hard to 
take something seriously as forms of genuine care. If a job is 
described as simple and mechanical, it is hard to imagine 
anybody caring about it. As I wrote, such descriptions are 
sometimes offered without an effort to really pay attention to 
the job, and how the job is described by people doing it, or 
which attitudes they express in their work. Thus, the 
helplessness of the bakers is not conspicuous on some levels of 
description. To repeat my argument from the last chapter: if 
the bakers are treated as a resource, as flexible labor power, 
then this aspect will certainly not be appreciated. The bakers 
are then considered as factors in the production process, not as 
people for whom it is important to do the job well. The 
significance of people’s frustration or disaffection is only 
understood given that people’s existential need to engage with 
what they do is acknowledged. This is why it makes sense to 
talk about jobs that have been impoverished or drained of 
meaning.  
For all this, when one reads Sennett, it is sometimes quite 
difficult to see what kind of remarks he is making. Sometimes 
it is as if he is invoking a psychological urge: all humans tend 
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to like to be challenged, and that is simply how we humans 
are wired. At other times, he seems aware that there is far 
more at stake in a discussion about impoverished jobs than 
such a psychological concept of challenge. Again (cf. 4.2) I 
think it is useful to ponder the multiple ways in which we talk 
about meaningfulness. We talk about meaningfulness to signal 
that we understand that something has a purpose (rather than 
it being a random act the intelligibility of which we cannot 
fathom), but in other cases we take a stand when we say that 
something is meaningful. In these cases meaningfulness and 
goodness are not clearly separable. As I said, I don’t think 
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ are exhaustive categories: 
‘meaningfulness’ is immersed in interpersonal quests to make 
sense of life. Even though our lives cannot be said to be caught 
up in a constant state of meaning-crisis we cannot control the 
role such questions have in our lives by saying that in the 
course of everyday life, we must simple do without such 
concerns (cf. 3.9).  
Sennett attends to the complexity of ‘meaning’ when he 
encourages us to think about the example with the bakers as a 
sort of puzzle: he characterizes the bakers as being indifferent, 
but still concerned about doing the job well, as being 
frustrated when the concrete possibility of doing a good job is 
reduced due to automation, lack of technical insight into the 
instruments at hand and a division of labor where some 
employees are reduced to executing a process. To sum up 
what I have wanted to say above: it seems strange to suppose 
that people should have a clear-cut relation to their work, that 
questions about the meaningfulness of their job would be 
equally clear-cut. It is an open question whether Sennett 
presupposes that in a good society, work would constitute a 
stable and intelligible identity – something that, as we saw, 
Gorz and Weeks warns against dreaming of. After all, for most 
people, work is a multidimensional affair – feelings, 
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impressions and thoughts are articulated in relation to specific 
worries or specific challenges – and this is something Sennett 
captures rather well in all of his writings:. In addition to this, 
as I said in chapter 4, when thinking about what makes a job 
meaningful or meaningless, a job should not be understood as 
a strictly defined set of tasks: a job is a wide web of relations 
and situations that we may have a range of different feelings 
about, all of which may have a bearing on how work is 
enjoyed, endured or detested. 
One of the overarching themes in this thesis is to describe 
degradation of work. I have been criticizing writers for 
undermining their own critique by neutralizing or moralizing 
our relations to work. I think this critique can be applied to 
Sennett as well. He provides an interesting analysis of an 
existential predicament, but his concept of fragmentation, 
along with the contrasting image of intelligibility, are 
problematic if they are based on the idea that the more we 
understand about the world, the more we care about it. I 
would also suggest that if this is a valid interpretation, he can 
be charged with moralizing work because what he says seems 
to imply that what is wrong with our society is that work is 
isolated from relations. Work would be good, were it only to 
be integrated into an intelligible network of relations. 
Advertising, baking and computer programming would be 
good work, were it only to be intelligibly inserted into a 
network of relations. Work is presented as a natural totality 
torn apart by the new capitalism. To me, this comes very close 
to the idea of ‘concrete work’ I criticized in chapter 5: abstract 
and concrete are placed against each other, and the concrete 
figures as a promise of relations (as if all relations are good) 
and intelligibility. This idea about intelligibility is the subject 
of my following remarks. As I will go on to show, Sennett’s 
approach takes too little account of care as a fundamental and 
ethical dimension.  
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6.4 Control, intelligibility and insecurity 
Everyday life is defined by contradictions: illusion and truth, 
power and helplessness, the intersection of the sector man 
controls and the sector he does not control (Lefebvre 2008, 27). 
In Corrosion of Character, Sennett looks at how the idea of a 
coherent career in which the individual forms hirself, and in 
which work forms a narrative rather than unrelated fragments 
or episodes, is a symptom of the present world of fragile job 
markets. A career, Sennett writes, enables us to define what 
we are and it also provides us with a sense of mastery and 
responsibility (cf. 1998, 120-1). He also makes a further point: 
the coherent character is no longer a meaningful alternative 
within the new capitalism. I take him to say that what is 
missing from the present world of work is a sense of personal 
authorship connected with long-term commitment and 
loyalty.82 To this perspective he adds a point that was already 
hinted at above: he ties control to intelligibility. Work no 
longer makes up the basis of stable and intelligible life-stories. 
Intelligibility is expressed in the form of narratives; coherent, 
intelligible narratives that can set one straight about one’s life. 
One needs an anchor, something that holds life together (1998, 
26, 30, 2006; 183-4). In several books, Sennett seems tempted 
by the image of work holding life together, making life 
intelligible. In The Craftsman, he writes about ‘linear stories’, for 
example so that one builds one’s life on learning how to do 
one specific thing well. Life in this sense is more than a series 
of random events: Sennett emphasizes training, deepening of 
knowledge and habits that evolve throughout the years as 
                                                          
82 In other books this connection is not so clear. In The Craftsman, Sennett 
describes a certain attitude to crafts as tolerating and even accepting 
temporary lack of control – due to the need to experiment and to renew 
techniques. Lack of control then means a necessary element of not knowing 
exactly how things will turn out (2008, 113-4). 
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features of an integration of work in a life (cf. 2008, 265-7). He 
contends that work in the new capitalism splits up a person’s 
life into fragments with the result that the person has a hard 
time understanding hir place in the world. His main 
aspiration is to show what happens to people – existentially 
speaking – when the need for sustaining life narratives is not 
fulfilled. 
Work in the days of Fordism (mass production and mass 
consumption) may have been hard and soul-crushingly 
boring, but at least it provided workers with a solid identity 
and a feeling that they were in charge of their lives in the 
sense that they could plan ahead (cf. Sennett 2006, 23). This is 
Sennett’s overarching point. Bauman writes: “Work can no 
longer offer the secure axis around which to wrap and fix self-
definitions, identities and life-projects” (Bauman 2000, 139). 
The refrain of my chapter is that it is hard to spell out what 
truly matters in Sennett’s account. I interpreted his primary 
target to be a change that concerns ideals, a change in how 
people think about their lives and their jobs. I will repeat the 
question that I addressed to Weeks in chapter 4: given that one 
describes certain ideals pertaining to work, how are these 
ideals (solidarity, security, predictability, loyalty) to be 
understood, in what sense did people have them? In what 
sense can predictability be said to be an ideal at all? 
To put it crudely, cannot the ideal of loyalty or 
predictability also contribute to ‘an intelligible world’ in a self-
deceptive way? A self-deceptive longing for intelligibility could 
perhaps also be discerned in present longings: remarks about 
‘what works used to be like’ often reveal more about the 
present than the past. The past becomes a projection surface 
for contemporary longings.83 In Sennett’s texts, descriptions of 
                                                          
83 This mournful account of the loss of work often manufactures its own 
idealization of the Worker. Strangleman writes that it is typical that the ‘real 
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a bygone era of secure jobs appear as contrasts to fragmented 
work. One should be careful about what one takes such 
images of past work to say. As Tim Strangleman writes:  
If we cast our net more widely than simply social theory this 
concern could be interpreted as the nostalgia for permanence, the 
search for stability in work, the sense in which permanence is 
‘good’ and that modernity has somehow disrupted an 
equilibrium that should ideally be restored. […] The stability and 
ordered predictability of ‘traditional’ labour is juxtaposed to the 
rootless impermanence of ‘modern’ employment (2007, 88).  
An even more troubling issue that I am not sure what moral 
lesson to draw from is the idea that the new world of work no 
longer provides people with solid identities. The eulogy for 
long-term work easily tips over into nostalgia (even though 
Sennett reminds himself that he wouldn’t like to restore work 
as it was in the old days). It is unclear how the merit of ‘work 
as a coherent life narrative’ should be viewed. 
As we saw in 3.3-4, Sennett also has some understanding of 
the fragility concepts such as dignity and respect are fraught 
with. ‘Real work’ and ‘dignified labor’ are contested concepts. 
As we saw in that chapter, the image of ‘the good worker’ is 
                                                                                                               
proletarian’ is discovered just as they are to become obsolete (2007, 91). Gorz, 
a writer who would not agree with Sennett about the centrality of work, 
criticizes the idea of past work infused with meaning: “Even in the heyday of 
wage-based society, work was never a source of ‘social cohesion’ or 
integration, whatever we might have come to believe from its retrospective 
idealization. The ‘social bond’ it established between people was abstract and 
weak, though it did, admittedly, insert people into the process of social labor, 
into social relations of production, as functionally specialized cogs in the 
machinery.” (Gorz 1999, 55) Other writers attack Sennett directly for making 
the connection between work and character in a way that is at the same time 
inconclusive and nostalgic (Shershow 2005, 47-9). Many writers have set out 
to show that the idea of work as solid identities is an idealization. Skeggs 
(1997), among others, argues that the image of the coherent life story is an 
image that resonates with the middle class, male life. 
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often linked to the ideal of social cohesion in a way that hides 
class differences. In these ways, he detects a considerably 
more complex side of work as a source of identity. Those 
portrayals of work do not evoke the idea that there was once a 
coherent work identity that made people’s lives intelligible in 
an empowering way. In other writings, however, Sennett 
assumes that work can be considered as a potentially solid 
aspect of human life, a fundamental part of an intelligible life 
story. I would say that this reveals a tension about identity, 
work and society within Sennett’s own ideas. But what about 
the ideal about intelligibility, character and control? 
This idea of life as an organic whole or a coherent narrative 
has a long history within the literature on work. The 
fragmentation of work is often paralleled with a fragmentation 
of man – as we saw in chapter 2, this point is made as early as 
in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, and the young Marx 
picks up the thread when he writes about the separation 
between the worker and work when labor power is 
surrendered to the employer. One classic example of the ideal 
of a non-fragmented whole is the formulations in The German 
Ideology where Marx talks about the communist life in which 
all occupations have ceased to exist and in which life is not 
fragmented into specific occupations. In the quote below, 
division of labor is evaluated as a restriction on the multi-
dimensional human being: 
For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each 
man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced 
upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a 
fisherman, or a shepherd or a critical critic, and must remain so if 
he is not to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist 
society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but 
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society 
regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for 
me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the 
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morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize 
after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, 
fisherman, shepherd or critic (Marx & Engels 1972, 53).   
The ideal of a total human being can be traced to several 
traditions: the Hegelian tradition in which Marx partially 
appears is one example where unity and fragmentation are 
central elements in accounts of human development and the 
relation between individuality and the social (cf. Schacht 1970, 
chapter 2). It is important to keep this long tradition in mind 
when reading Sennett, even though his ideal is in one sense 
not at all similar to Marx’s. Sennett idealizes occupations. None 
the less, his thinking can be situated within a tradition that 
celebrates the unbroken life. 
What is also interesting is that Sennett’s ideal of control is 
strongly present in at least some strands of Marxist thinking. 
A central Marxist tenet is the idea that freedom consists in 
power, a progressive, dialectical and more and more conscious 
power over nature (Lefebvre 2008, 171-2). In the same way, a 
very common notion of alienation is that the worker 
surrenders hir control over the product of hir labor to the 
capitalist. As s/he sells hir labor power, s/he has given up the 
control over labor, Marx argues: the worker is dominated by 
an alien power. The idea that once the means of productions 
are owned and controlled by the workers the most significant 
change has taken place can also be traced in Marx’s writings, 
even though other things he says are not easily squared with 
that hope. The idea is that alienation is overcome when the 
means of production have finally been brought under 
collective control (cf. Sayers 2011, 92; 99-100; Schacht 1970, 83, 
85). At least as it is often phrased, this idea seems to imply an 
ideal of rationality. The means of production are to be 
controlled rationally. The primary concern is control, rather 
than what production should be for: “The associated 
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producers must […] govern the human metabolism with 
nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective 
control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power” 
(1991, 959). As we saw in chapter 2, Gorz and Marcuse were 
both critical of this image even though neither succeeded in 
distancing themselves from it. This tenet of Marxism, a 
celebration of control in itself, is troubling, if understandable: 
Marx seeks to formulate an alternative to the dispossession of 
the worker (that wage labor is the only alternative) in 
capitalism.  
Even though Sennett is no Marxist, he also evokes the idea 
of control as a central element of human life and work. What I 
am critical of is the tendency I find in Sennett to treat control 
as a general ideal or as in some sections in Marx, as a goal for 
the society at large. However, I have no problem 
understanding people talking about the lack of control in 
relation to for example changes in the job: ‘powerlessness’ 
may mean that people are now unable to do what they 
perceive to be a good job. Such examples are common when 
talking about skills. In his books, Sennett insists that skills and 
crafts have their home also today, not only in ‘traditional’ 
societies, but a vast array of organizational, ideological and 
economic doctrines and practices threaten these skills: co-
operation is exchanged for competition and there is less 
organizational stability to back up important skills. One of the 
insights to be commended in Sennett’s writings is the 
reminder that it takes time to develop skills. As we saw above, 
it is important for him (as it is for Gaita) that skills, a very 
different concept than talent, can deepen (cf. Sennett 2008, 38-
9). In his book The Culture of the New Capitalism, Sennett argues 
that in many modern organizations, professional knowledge 
in its robust forms of people insisting on doing things the right 
way is treated as more or less hazardous because such 
commitment threatens the ideology of the flexible and 
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innovative organization. The fact that it takes many years for 
knowledge and skills to deepen is not acknowledged. This can 
be a diagnostic remark about a destructive trend, but Sennett 
also emphasizes it as an existential point about what it means 
to learn to do a job well or what it means that a structural 
development in the system of work deters such deepening. 
Young people are seen as replaceable, and easy to deal with: 
older workers have developed an idea about how things are to 
be done, what a good procedure would be, new methods are 
compared with methods used in the past etc. Sennett 
constructs a bleak image of work when he says that in some 
firms, virtue means that the employee easily surrenders to a 
new reality (2006, 98). Commitment to a job and how it is to be 
done well are easily seen as a threat to the slimmed-down 
organization (this erosion of commitment of course stands in 
contrast to the elevation of work as endless commitment and 
self-realization). In this type of organization, dedication to the 
meaning of the job (in its existential, not its contractual sense) 
will look like a hang-up. Even though the book was written in 
2006, Sennett draws the same conclusion as Braverman (cf. 2.5, 
5.4) did in the seventies: the degradation of skills generates 
powerlessness: professional judgment is disregarded.  
I would suggest that control becomes a suspect ideal when 
it is disconnected from other things that are considered 
desirable. Most of the time, Sennett connects control with the 
importance of understanding what one is doing, for example, 
technology and work instruments becoming smoothly user-
friendly but the process often breaking down so that the 
workers are rendered helpless. He is on the right track when 
the bakers’ indifference to their jobs is shown to be linked to 
the lack of control. However, I would argue that this makes 
sense only to the extent we can imagine that somebody, in hir 
own way, cares about the job. As I said above, care is no clear-
cut affair; people disagree about what is worth caring about 
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and which aspects of a job are worth caring about. As I also 
wrote, these disagreements show that care is an ethical and 
existential (rather than merely psychological) concern.  
Without care, a concern about control would be 
unintelligible, or dubious.84 When control in itself is 
emphasized, it tends to become destructive. One can imagine 
cases where control becomes an obsession, a yearning for 
perfection perhaps, that has no grounding in what matters in 
the job. Achieving the perfect result becomes a goal in itself, 
regardless of its meaning (cf. Sennett 2008, 254-7).  
There are cases that clearly illustrate that people make 
different sorts of judgments about control. The computerized 
tool called CAD, a computer program with which the user 
(architects for example) designs graphic interactive 
representations of models, has been evaluated very differently 
in the literature on work. While Sennett praises its practical 
merits in Craftsman – the CAD program instantaneously lets 
architects look at a site or a model from many angles – he also 
asserts that there is a risk attested to by people in the relevant 
field that the program is automatically regarded as superior to 
manual drawing and thinking. The risk he describes is that the 
program impedes the architect’s judgments about texture and 
real buildings. The simulations easily live a life of their own 
that trumps the complexity of reality: heat, noise etc. His 
reasons for articulating this risk are similar to what he says 
about the bakers above: the architects may lose a sense of what 
they are doing in switching from step-by-step and trial and 
error learning, to leaning on models produced by a machine 
(2008, 39-41).  
                                                          
84 Gorz, who as we saw in chapter 2 is at risk of mystifying control, makes a 
valid point when he writes that humanizing work (making the tasks more 
flexible or letting the workers feel that they are part of the decision process) is 
of no value for example if the purpose of the job is shady (1989, 78-80, 83). 
354 
 
A quite different picture of these changes is given in 
Stanley Aronowitz & William DiFazio’s The Jobless Future. 
They take issue with Harry Braverman’s concept of deskilling 
(see chapter 2 & 5) in their description of the introduction of 
the CAD technology. Knowledge has taken the place of skills 
and this makes it difficult to speak about deskilling in the way 
Braverman does. The positive aspect of knowledge is that it 
breaks with the exclusivism of skills (they paint the familiar 
picture of guilds and the desire to keep skills to a limited circle 
of people) (2010, 94-5). The authors visited a New York City 
department of environment protection and transit authority in 
the 80’s, at a point when the CAD program was still new. 
Standard tasks take less time when the program is used. The 
positive side according to some engineers they interviewed is 
that one’s imagination is augmented by the computerized 
models; the programs make the process of visualization easier, 
for example. CAD shifted the load of work onto other tasks: in 
some offices, people were delighted because the job had 
become less tedious (less manual drawing and math). Other 
engineers felt that the program was not used to its full 
potential. The architects disagreed about whether the use of 
CAD would make mistakes more fatal (2010, 110-3, 119). My 
conclusion is that this sort of controversy about skills versus 
knowledge and deskilling will remain, and that they spur 
ever-new accounts of hierarchy, the labor process and social 
relations at the workplace. The question often concerns 
precisely what deskilling means and what good work or a 
sound organization is. Here, control and care are situated 
within everyday job situations. The disagreement and risks 
the authors attend to reveal several aspects of care: caring 
about the real consequences of the job (not merely a perfect 
computer model), caring about getting the job done on due 
time and caring about not making fatal mistakes. 
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Control should not be described as desirable in itself. There 
are cases in which a person is fascinated with having power 
over other people, which can be expressed both as a clinging 
to rules or to arbitrary decrees. This need not be a personal 
quest for power: it is easy to think of examples of how such 
tendencies reflect destructive organizational patterns, 
destructive management styles or economic precarity. In such 
organizations, control can be about preventing people from 
doing a good job. In most cases, however, the emphasis on 
control (also collective control) is related to something being 
considered to be important, as in the CAD example. When 
people are annoyed with inefficient procedures swallowing 
time it is important to stress the difference it makes that 
people have no influence over the work process in the sense 
that they wish that these procedures could be eliminated, had 
they been able to do so. People’s commitment to a job stands 
in relation to the circumstances of the job, organizational 
aspects and the content of the job. It is in connection with such 
circumstances – for example shortage of staff that creates a 
situation in which people must constantly help each other out 
and come to the rescue – that questions about the extent to 
which people care about their jobs arise. Such questions easily 
become infected: think about a group of older employees 
grumbling about their younger colleagues: ‘they just don’t 
care…’ These are the everyday situations that require 
ingenious tactics and improvisation in order for things to get 
done despite the ways in which one has been rendered 
powerless.  
Compare this situation to a case where people see their jobs 
as so meaningless that they no longer care about inefficiencies. 
They accomplish what is minimally expected of them. 
However, subordination or destructive organizational 
relations does not seem to bother them. They are what we 
could call demoralized: they have given up, or have perhaps 
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become cynical about their jobs. This is indifference in a more 
worrying sense than in Sennett’s example. There is a 
difference (which is of course not an absolute one) between 
being frustrated and being unable to fix things and having 
stopped caring as a reaction to having been rendered utterly 
powerless. But, again, it should be remembered that care may 
emerge in unexpected way among people that seem cynical or 
demoralized. Like Lefebvre I would here say that it is 
extremely important that powerlessness should not legitimize 
that people stop caring, for example, a cynical attitude (cf. 
Lefebvre 2008). This dimension is lacking in Kathi Weeks’ 
critique of work (cf. chapter 3): for all her emphasis on hope 
and the future, she does not realize the hazards of cynicism 
with regard to the world of work. It is more fruitful, I think, to 
describe cynicism as the problem, as an expression of 
powerlessness. In a recent interview, Roland Paulsen notes 
that cynicism is often expressed by people who adopt a critical 
attitude towards their own job, the meaninglessness of which 
they are clear about: 
One can absolutely understand the problem about one’s job and 
the system generally, and can be open about how wrong it all is, 
but one continues nonetheless. This is very common in our 
culture: we are very critical, but it is almost as if the critique of 
society, or the realization that one has seen through the system, 
becomes a consolation when on is to uphold the system, so that, 
after all, one can feel that one stands outside of it.85 
Of course powerlessness can in a certain sense be said to be 
one thing that leads to this kind of critical cynicism. I would 
concur with Jennifer Silva: that people develop an attitude of 
mistrust and cynicism is a symptom of a world of precarious 
work and a world in which work is connected with 
                                                          
85 http://www.etc.se/inrikes/att-skapa-mer-jobb-ar-en-absurd-tanke 
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humiliation and submission. Silva interviews young people 
who have learned not to expect loyalty, fairness and 
commitment from the employer – they have hardened 
themselves, she writes (2013, 95). Here I think Sennett would 
agree: he also describes a sense of betrayal and bitterness.  
To sum up the discussion so far: when people talk about 
lack of control and powerlessness, one should not immediately 
assume that they then invoke a general ideal of control. This 
sort of talk is often an expression of exasperation, anxiety: a 
disconcerting reality is evoked and it need not be clear what 
an alternative would be (of course people do often know what 
is missing and they can formulate alternatives). Celebrating 
control as an ideal is dangerous because it evokes either a 
strange image of human beings (the ultimate aim of 
everything we do is power) or a one-sided notion of agency as 
a state of ‘being in control’.  
Sennett offers many valuable descriptions of fragmentation 
of work, like the multi-layered example from the bakery. In 
The Culture of New Capitalism he talks about the results of 
subcontracting and consultant firms commissioned to re-
organize a specific organization. People do not really feel 
accountable for what they do, they are just hired to do a 
specific amount of work that is not that real to them (2006, 55-
7). However, the worry articulated for example through terms 
like ‘corrosion of character’ or ‘social distance’ (Sennett talks 
about how it is increasingly difficult to feel committed or loyal 
to the organization anymore, cf. 2006, 60, 64) fails to take issue 
with the questions I see as fundamental: ethical questions 
about what kind of people we become as employees and what 
relations to others we come to have.  
Arguably, Sennett’s concept of ‘character’ is linked to an 
Aristotelian tradition that has paid attention to other aspects 
of moral life than the prevalent themes in moral philosophy, 
such as utility and principles (cf. MacIntyre 1981) and has 
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thereby offered (comparatively) fresh angles on moral agency. 
A generous characterization of this tradition is that it looks at 
issues related to the moral process of becoming. MacIntyre, for 
example, writes about his concept of a practice:  
So when an institution – a university, say, or a farm, or a hospital 
– is the bearer of a tradition of practice and practices, its common 
life will be partly, but in a centrally important way, constituted by 
a continuous argument as to what a university is and ought to be 
or what good farming is or what good medicine is. Traditions, 
when vital, embody continuities of conflict (1981, 206).  
One could perhaps say that Sennett employs a thin concept of 
character. Even though he aptly points out how people are 
formed by the present system of work – how fears and 
perception of self are generated by this system – the thinness I 
am thinking about is displayed for example in how rarely he 
reflects on what kind of meaning work used to have a few 
generations ago, and what it really means to see loyalty, 
predictability and intelligibility as ideals. Instead, he is content 
with declaring that work meant much for people’s sense of a 
coherent identity. Within that approach, one does not see 
relations of tensions. A dichotomy between the solid and 
security-providing old system of work and the new ideals of 
flexibility and rapid changes is embraced. The major weakness 
of Corrosion of Character is that its argument leans on a 
juxtaposition of flexibility and character. A sound work-based 
character modeled on the world of work in welfare states after 
World War II is thus implicitly assumed. 
My worry is related to a further issue. Even though Sennett 
has written several books about work, I never get clear about 
what according to him is so damaging about fragmented 
work. He is alarmed by the indifference that the people he 
interviews express. One reading in line with what I have said 
above would be that a corrosion of the ability to commit to a 
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job in combination with a stunted understanding of skills and 
trained judgment is fatal. Several writers, among them 
Sennett, have discussed the way the space for an employee’s 
trained judgment is undermined through a division of labor 
that leads to fragmentation. The question remains on what 
level this should be discussed and what kind of worry is 
addressed. In her book Ethics of an Artificial Person, the 
philosopher Elizabeth Wolgast discusses a very fundamental 
aspect of work: a person acts on behalf of somebody else. This 
can be read as yet another version of Gorz’s worry about 
autonomy. I rather think she is critically evaluating a train of 
thought or an attitude that legitimizes a sort of moral division 
of labor in which responsibility is split up among people so 
that we can intelligibly say that responsibility for what 
somebody has done can be transported from one person to 
another. This is an understanding according to which a 
specific task can be defended by referring to the capacity in 
which I act, based on my professional position. This is an 
instance of a job making up, as Sennett said, its own reality. 
Wolgast outlines a system of acting for another that 
“encourages moral frustration and agentless deeds” (1992, 34). 
What happens, she asks, when actions are reduced to 
functions within a specific role – what happens to moral 
judgment if work is thought of as execution conforming to 
strictly defined instructions? The possibility of moral critique 
seems marginal if roles are thought of as unproblematic 
functions according to which moral responsibility is 
distributed. Wolgast attacks the idea that morality is situated 
in a complex system in which we cannot have a perspicuous 
insight into every little detail. This form of moral division of 
responsibility is aggravated in a specific view of institutions as 
making up functions with their given purposes (1992, 72). She 
thus addresses a form of alienated activity where the person 
who acts sees hir actions as somebody else’s, or sees hirself as 
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a part of a larger system s/he has no insight into or that she 
does not ‘need’ to be concerned about. I am aware that these 
questions are situated in a huge discussion about 
responsibility, professionalism and organizations. I can by no 
means enter into that discussion here, but I think, as I said, 
Wolgast’s provocation is crucial to mention as it attends to a 
key aspect of what I have called the neutralization of work, a 
neutralization that Sennett does not respond to adequately 
because his main object of critique is not neutralization, but de-
stabilization, which leads him to the ideal of stability, 
predictability, intelligibility and character. 
Wolgast’s account is clearly related to Sennett’s worry 
about fragmentation, but for her it is not, at least not 
primarily, the person’s character that is corroded, that is, our 
perception of ourselves as people who have a wholesome and 
intelligible life narrative, but, rather, our entire moral world and 
our capacity to act and take responsibility. Sennett’s argument 
is in danger of ending up as a defense of loyalty and 
commitment and thereby eschewing more fundamental 
questions about responsibility and work. A conclusion one is 
tempted to draw from his perspective is that all kinds of 
tightly knit working communities are good. Hence, I would 
argue that Wolgast’s approach radicalizes the question about 
responsibility. “Thus it appears that moral responsibility can’t 
be so easily passed around, can’t be held and transferred like a 
proxy [….]” (1992, 61). Even though I don’t agree with what 
appears to be Wolgast’s general thesis – that acting in the 
name of another is always morally compromised (cf. 1992, 132) 
– she draws our attention to the troubling situations that occur 
when a job contains clear instructions of what is to be done 
and where the moral shadiness of the execution of these 
instructions is defended by references to the task being ‘my 
job’. The moral insulation she talks about is in some cases 
encouraged by organizations, and this is something that no 
361 
 
codex on corporate ethics can solve. Wolgast’s worry about 
occupations appearing to be isolated spheres in which the 
meaning and role of responsibility is displaced can apply to 
lawyers and nurses as well as builders and mechanics.86 
To sum up: in my reading of Sennett, it is the moral hazard 
of fragmentation, an isolation of jobs from their moral 
meaning that is truly worrying. Wolgast’s provocative 
question is what reality our actions are immersed in. She opens 
up for the idea that responsibility is inescapable and that the 
institutionalization of moral simplification is hazardous on 
many levels, which does not primarily concern (as in Sennett) 
control and identity. In the next two sections of the text, I will 
investigate what it means that our sense of what is real may be 
skewed by a world of work. In these two sections, I hope to 
return to some of the central themes of the thesis. Sennett’s 
discussion about fragmentation and fear of obsolescence 
confronts us with what we consider as truly important in life. 
The challenge of such discussions is to articulate the fears 
fragmentation elicits. It is all too easy to discuss these matters 
from a detached point of view. But what would an alternative 
way be? The tangle of existential concerns and structural 
relations resurfaces. 
6.5 Who needs my work?  
In several of his books, Sennett touches on the existential 
difficulties connected with work. What I have said about 
control and having a sense of what one does already hints at 
                                                          
86 For one attempt to tackle the idea that some actions are justified if they are 
performed within a professional role, cf. Applbaum 1999. For a literary 
discussion about moral insulation associated with professionalism, cf. 
Ishiguro’s Remains of the Day (1993). Ishiguro’s novel brilliantly meditates on 
the relation between a sense of responsibility tied to a professional role and 
self-deception and even a sort of annihilation of personal judgment.  
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this. This is also an undercurrent of what I called critique of 
work in chapter 2. Even though Gorz’s, Marcuse’s and 
Sennett’s analyses of the work society are radically different 
from each other, they express a common worry about the role of 
work in our lives. Gorz and Marcuse focus on the distortions 
work gives rise to in how we relate to ourselves and our place 
in society. Marcuse went as far as claiming that work society 
breeds a form of un-reality, an irrational preoccupation with 
administration, productivity, progress and, as the other side of 
the coin, leisure and consumption. Gorz criticized the idea of 
jobs for jobs’ sake and he attacked the division of society in 
which some work a lot while others remain entirely outside 
the range of wage labor. The relations of dependency in this 
type of society are messy and they are often made opaque by 
ideology. According to Gorz, this division makes it harder to 
think straight about what kinds of work are necessary. This 
worry about the role of work for self-understanding is 
foregrounded by how Sennett tackles the issue of superfluity, 
‘the specter of uselessness’ (cf. 2006, chapter 2). What I say 
about superfluity leads up to the points about self-
understanding later on. 
Much of Sennett’s critique boils down to the new regime of 
work having severe deficits in intelligibility. Here, l want to 
probe into how work (as employment) is related to people’s 
ways of understanding their own lives (which, as I said above, 
doesn’t mean that I agree with Sennett’s emphasis on what is 
important for our self-understanding). My example in this 
section is unemployment. I develop Sennett’s reflections about 
the feeling that one has become superfluous as a worker. In 
wage labor, my capacity to work becomes a commodity. This 
was the concept of labor power I unpacked in chapter 5 and as 
I said there, the practice of wage labor in capitalism 
presupposes that workers can become obsolete if the labor 
market no longer ‘needs’ my capacity to work. I have the job 
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as long as the company needs me and then I have to look for 
another. This dependency on the labor market is often made 
invisible so that one starts to think about work as a personal 
achievement. Sennett is on the same wavelength at the end of 
The Corrosion of Character where he talks about the idealization 
of independence: we tend to think about our lives in terms of 
independence and dependence and this affects how we think 
about society and the state – freedom is freedom from 
bureaucratic rigidness; freedom means freedom from 
dependence. A typical feeling when one has become 
unemployed is thus that one is needy and obsolescent both in 
one’s own eyes and in the eyes of society. An equally typical 
social reaction to unemployment is shame, awkwardness and 
silence: in public, one would rather avoid the subject of one’s 
predicament. Sennett says that these are no mere 
psychological reactions, they are intelligible given certain 
political and administrative structures – the destruction of 
welfare nets as one prominent aspect – where suspicion of the 
‘dependent’ stands at the fore. The problematic conceptual 
nexus is the opposition between dependence, seen as 
weakness and parasitism, and independence, viewed as 
initiative and responsibility (1998, 139-40; 2006, 100-1). 
A remarkable observation he makes is that people can no 
longer rely on the skills they have (see above about what 
existential weight Sennett lends to skills). Having skills might 
not be enough to keep a job: if cheaper labor power is found 
elsewhere, or a machine makes the skill superfluous, one’s 
position may be under threat (2006, 84, 86) How does this 
affect people’s self-understanding? A charitable reading of 
Sennett is that he is not developing a psychological theory 
about intelligibility, but rather, that the task is to understand 
the roles work has in our lives. In The Corrosion of Character, 
Sennett mentions a group of former IBM employees who were 
laid off in the middle of the nineties as the company was 
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transforming into a flexible, competition-oriented 
organization. The programmers gather in a café on a regular 
basis, talking about why the company ‘was out to get them’ or 
they declare that the Indians (or someone else) are to blame. It 
is only after a while that they began talking about the job 
itself, what it required, what they could have done differently, 
what they should have done in order to remain in the 
company. Their attitudes and feelings go through several 
changes, and according to Sennett the articulation of feelings 
is one aspect of this change: when he started talking to the 
group, their discussion conjured up the image of themselves 
as powerless victims and their anger focused on the bosses. 
After a while, they turned to analyzing their own behavior, 
and they started to acknowledge how much their work meant 
to them, how much they liked it (this, by the way, can be 
connected with the point I made above about control and 
care). Sennett points out the intelligibility of the angered 
reactions, but the direction the anger took (the bosses, the 
‘Indians’) was confused. The feelings of insecurity, however, 
where shared by many: Sennett notes that people who 
remained employed felt they lived on borrowed time and that 
they survived in their position for no good reason – they felt 
unable to give good reasons for why they could keep the 
position. Good performance didn’t seem to be the explanation 
(1998, 123-9).  
The risk, I think, is that the last stage of their self-
understanding, the stage of self-analysis, is seen as a general 
ideal: the men turn from external blame to introspection, from 
confusion to intelligible life stories. I want to ask: isn’t a 
typical image of failure that the essential or at least 
manageable problem is in me, so that a sharp contrast between 
external and internal is still upheld? Sennett’s conclusion is 
not necessarily that the last stage of self-scrutiny was ideal. 
After all, he says that the programmers are resigned and 
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inward-centered. One of his central observations is that the 
IBM programmers tried to make sense of their failure, rather 
than burying it in awkward silence or resentful outbursts. This 
is also the best I can make of Sennett’s emphasis on narratives: 
he recognizes the difficulties along with the constructive 
changes involved in a shared way of trying to make sense of 
one’s situation. However, I am not convinced that narratives 
as a form, “as a striving for coherence and a solid authorial ‘I’” 
(1998, 134) provide a self-healing cure against the poisonous 
ambiguity of precarity. Drawing on a recent book by the 
sociologist Jennifer Silva (2013) whose analysis bears many 
similarities with Sennett’s, I would rather say that the turn to 
self-help and therapeutic empowerment can be connected 
with the similar issues as the ones Sennett is concerned with: 
an age of insecurity and precarity. Silva investigates how 
feelings of powerlessness are expressed in a language of self-
discovery and a longing for creating one’s own framework of 
life as a way of managing precarity. She interprets the young 
interviewees’ wish to create their own narrative as a symptom 
of abandonment. The quest for ‘identity’ is an expression of a 
certain societal predicament and her conclusion is that this 
leads to detachment from the world, a turn towards the inner. 
I would not be surprised if Sennett would agree with this. My 
point here was that his way of phrasing the role of narratives 
is ambiguous. 
The example encapsulates a noteworthy tension in what it 
means that wage labor is ‘needed’. The programmers were 
frustrated to find that good performance isn’t necessarily 
enough to keep one’s job. Sennett returns to the question of 
indifference and intelligibility:  
“Who needs me?” is a question of character which suffers a 
radical challenge in modern capitalism. The system radiates 
indifference. […] Lack of responsiveness is a logical reaction to the 
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feeling one is not needed (1998, 146, my emphasis). 
Sennett is right when he says that the unclear answer to the 
question ‘who needs me’ breeds indifference, or resentment, at 
least if this means that I start to look at myself as somebody 
who has to persevere and renew myself on the labor market – 
or, referring to what I discussed in connection with the IBM 
example, that the ultimate goal is to find a reassuring life story 
or a personal sense of meaning. The truly damaging side of 
this, Sennett argues, is that being treated as a disposable 
person is connected with a loss of responsibility. This is a 
point where Sennett’s and Wolgast’s arguments intersect. Let 
me spell out the background for this. 
On the level of wage labor (as labor power), there is no 
clear answer to the question ‘who needs me?’ The question 
may appear to be perfectly obvious: when work is wage labor, 
the immediate need for my work is not primarily the needs of 
other human beings, but a company or paying customer that 
needs my hands or my brain power for an hour, two months, 
two years or twenty years. This is what I meant when I have 
talked about abstractions of work: ‘work’, in this sense, 
displaces the necessity of a specific task or the urgency of a 
specific need. As I said in chapter 5, that a commodity is 
useful to somebody (in some, extremely open-ended sense of 
the word) is a mere condition of the most important 
circumstance: that it is in fact sold. The agony in the 
unemployed person’s question of ‘who needs my work’ 
indicates one tension in what I called work as labor power and 
work as a life situation. Even though there are many parallel 
discourses about work and needs, from a labor power 
perspective, the sole determining factor is that the labor market 
buys my capacity to work; all other concepts of need are 
bracketed. When I step into the unemployment office, it simply 
does not matter that there is, regardless of the labor markets, a 
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need for more teachers, better healthcare, better housing or 
road reparations. An example of the paradoxes this engenders 
are the interventions and programs the state creates to activate 
unemployed people. What exactly should these people do? 
One possibility is that the task is meaningless, and serves no 
need at all, remaining a purely formal ‘occupation’, another is 
that these programs turn into a way for a company or state 
organization to get things done with cheap labor power.  
Obviously, a tension appears here between being needed in 
the above abstract sense – as labor power discarded or 
welcomed into the labor market – and being needed in sense 
that an organization (a library, a hospital, railway company) 
needs a person because of evident staff shortages, due to 
which some are overworked, or due to which some important 
tasks are neglected. In the latter case, work is needed regardless 
of what is counted as work on the labor market, regardless of 
the economic relation between supply and demand, and 
regardless of whether any economic gains can be extracted 
from a person’s work. This of course creates extremely 
tangible tensions in the workplace, conflicts even, which 
radicalize questions about the meaning of work, need and 
responsibility: in which sense am I responsible if I am treated 
as a dispensable person? In what way am I obliged to work 
long hours and weekends because the company cannot afford 
more staff? What do I consider important here, loyalty to the 
company or to do a good job when it’s really needed? The 
question will be very different depending on the kind of job 
this overworked person has, if s/he is a teacher, a financial 
analyst, a middle manager for a cleaning company, a bus 
driver or a cook in a small village school. Neglecting some 
tasks will have different meanings in the various cases. Two 
concepts of work clash, and this clash is often surrounded by 
pressure and fear of losing one’s job. It is important to keep 
this kind of example in mind, the unemployed and perhaps 
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over-skilled person’s exasperated question ‘who needs my 
work?’ or the overworked person who ponders on what 
drives hir to work so much, in mind if one found my earlier 
exploration of the tension between abstractions of work and 
work as a life situation mystifying. 
Similar tensions reappear in the idea that we are all in need 
of ‘occupation’ – in an existential sense. In this rhetoric ‘the need 
for an occupation’ oscillates between a psychological need that 
all people in fact have, often ‘backed up’ with empirical 
studies about the correlation between depression and 
unemployment, and a moral exhortation about what each 
person should feel – if they do not, they should be trained to be 
included in the work. When work is disconnected from all 
needs other than the needs of the labor market, ‘an 
occupation’ can, with regard to its content, be anything, but it 
must be possible to relate to the labor market. Employment, 
vocational training or education – preparations – will do, but 
practicing with the local band, helping your mother with the 
accounting or taking part in the Red Cross’ friend service 
network do not count, when ‘occupation’ is understood as 
wage labor.  
I would say that the use of ‘occupation’ above is a real 
abstraction (5.5), an abstraction engraved in our lives: this is 
what work as labor power is. Even so, what I said about the 
need for occupation does not imply that I don’t acknowledge 
that many people are crushed under the weight of 
unemployment. The reasons may be other than overdue bills 
or moralizing discourses about unemployed people.87 People 
                                                          
87 Due to the moralization of work and activation, the multitude of attitudes 
towards unemployment and ‘having an occupation’ is easily forgotten or 
disregarded. Some may worry about finding a long-term job, others think 
more about what activities are meaningful in their lives, regardless of whether 
they are paid for doing it, some are eager to find the next job opportunity and 
have nothing against short-term jobs or having many types of jobs at the same 
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sometimes talk about the need for work in ways that go beyond 
the idea that all forms of work are equally worthy in their 
capacity of work. At this point, the concept of vitality in the 
sense that work can make us attend to the surrounding world, 
may be illuminating. In 4.5, I mentioned the example of 
plumbers who learn to pay attention to certain things from the 
point of view of their jobs and how this cannot be accounted 
for just in terms of factual or practical knowledge (cf. Meløe 
1997) – one could talk about familiarity, a world revealed 
through the plumber’s expertise and experience. The 
plumber’s story opens up a noteworthy perspective on what 
work in a very open-ended sense can be: again, the focus lies 
on what it means to devote oneself to a specific activity. The 
plumber describes her active engagement with the 
requirements and challenges at hand. In this kind of example, 
I think it makes sense to say that work ‘takes us out of 
ourselves’, without this necessarily implying a moralization of 
the above kind. For this reason it is intelligible that we may 
worry about somebody having become too depressed to be 
devoted to anything; it may strike us that this person has lost 
touch with what s/he used to care about. This is not to say that 
‘productive’ activities make up the core of human activity. 
After all, what matters, rather than an invocation of a general 
need for work (which is suspect), is to spell out for what 
purpose, in what context, this need is appealed to and in which 
ways the dimension of work is stressed. This is a difficult issue 
as concepts about inactivity and activity are neutralized and 
moralized. The real tragedy is that the present society is 
ordered in a way so that the system of work gives rise to 
                                                                                                               
time. And also: what people find to be difficult in being unemployed (say, in a 
country like Finland) varies: s/he may miss hir former colleagues, s/he may 
detest the humiliating bureaucracy that s/he is faced with in hir new situation, 
s/he may worry about what others think about hir situation, s/he may worry 
about the economic situation.  
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anxieties about what one should dedicate one’s life to, 
anxieties that can become so tied up with the system of labor 
markets and supply and demand of labor power that the 
question about what is a worthy occupation (regardless of its 
being work) is lost along the way. 
Remember, the overarching theme of this chapter is 
Sennett’s reflection on a loss of a sense of what we do – as 
workers or, as in this example, as unemployed. Loss of activity 
is disconcerting, but what sort of inactivity (if any) is 
unemployment? For people who have always had a job it may 
not be easy to figure out other meaningful activities when 
having become unemployed – a life situation where there is 
much economic and perhaps also social pressure to seek out a 
paid position. This is especially true when the job-seeking 
activity is monitored by the unemployment agency. For many, 
this form of enforced leisure is hard to handle. It is often hard 
to get clear about what kind of loss of activity the unemployed 
person suffers, what kind of life crisis unemployment has 
triggered, and what this crisis reveals. In the Spanish film 
Mondays in the Sun (2002, directed by Fernando León de 
Aranoa), a group of unemployed men hang out in a bar 
owned by a friend. The shipyard for which they all worked 
has been closed down. They feel miserable about their 
situation, experiencing all the free time they have as a burden, 
rather than as a relief from toil or as a chance for self-fulfilling 
leisure. The men in the film are bitter and they hold a grudge 
against the friend or the girlfriend who does have a job. They 
seem reluctant to deal with their anger. None of them has 
much hope about the future. They drink and kill time. The 
man who still shows up at job applications is rejected because 
he is too old or lacks the skills required for the job. The men in 
the film not only felt disappointed with work, they were also 
disaffected with society. The film ties their attitude to the 
representation of work as respectable occupation, as 
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masculine independence and as a source of income. In 
addition to this, there is also something else going on: their 
despair seems to revolve around a lack of a worthwhile 
occupation, in opposition to seeing one’s life drift away, or 
experiencing time as a burden. Although ‘having something 
meaningful to do’ is by no means internally related to paid 
work, I would argue that it misses the point to describe the 
characters’ feeling of desperation or the despair the enforced 
idleness engenders as a mere appendage to the destructive 
ideologies of work even though it is easy to think of typical 
forms of resentment and bitterness. With a slight variation of 
the story, the men in the film could have been employed, 
seeing their lives drift away in a monotonous rhythm of work 
and leisure. Wage labor does not always live up to the 
promise of a meaningful occupation. Wage labor, then, does 
not and could not solve what I have called a fundamental 
question: what is a worthwhile occupation? 
The life situation of being unemployed actualizes questions 
about what work means in one’s life, what kind of 
employment one sees as desirable or which aspects of 
employment one is relieved from when one does not have a 
job. The unemployed person’s feeling that the labor market is 
an external, uncontrollable mechanism, the feeling of no 
longer exercising control over one’s life – these are revealing 
attitudes. When one starts philosophizing about this attitude, 
it is easy to go astray – if one for example takes for granted, as 
Sennett sometimes does, that control is a constitutive ideal. 
Then it might be tempting to once again erect the ideal of 
stable jobs that could occupy the core of a person’s identity. 
The crux is whether wage labor has ever granted such sense of 
being in control of one’s life. Below, I will continue my 
discussion about what promise work bears for us and how 
this can be critically reflected on without resorting to a 
detached, philosophical level of unmasking. 
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II Work and self-deception 
What the system does to the subjugated is to destroy his sense of 
reality (Baldwin 1965).88 
6.6 Paths, orientation, disorientation 
Sennett’s discussion ultimately leads up to the possibility that 
the world of work distorts our sense of what is real. This 
‘sense of what is real’ is what I will focus on below. When 
Sennett looks at the problematic role of work in the new 
capitalism he simultaneously attends to a number of 
disconcerting aspects of how people understand their own 
lives in relation to their jobs: indifference, longing for control 
and respect, or the feeling that one has failed to develop a 
career or the feeling that one hasn’t made something of oneself 
(2003, 46). As we saw, he reflects on the unnerving fear that 
nobody needs my work anymore, that I have become 
superfluous, out of the loop, deadwood. He says that ‘the 
specter of uselessness’ is not a mere specter – it comes to haunt 
people because of how work is organized, how skills are 
evaluated and how the global labor marked is structured 
(2006, 98-99). In what follows, I will try to show why the 
metaphor of ‘specter’ is somewhat misleading. In a 
continuation of the discussion conducted in chapter 3, I deal 
with existential dimensions of the fear of obsolescence that 
cannot merely be ascribed to ideologies of work. These fears 
reside in relations, in life situations, in how we think and feel.  
Attitudes to work – as we saw in connection with Sennett’s 
points about having a sense of what one does: what a person’s 
attitude to hir job/to employment amounts to is a messy affair! 
– are not predestined by structures, but talking about 
structures can shed light on what we are talking about. Sennett 
                                                          
88 http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/03/29/specials/baldwin-dream.html 
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writes about the feeling of humiliation and how it appears in 
experiences of being laid off (the ex-IBM workers’ indignation) 
and in experiences of being treated as ‘deadwood’, too old for 
the challenges of the job. “It could be said that this is just a 
matter of one person’s injured pride, but I think not. The acid 
tone of current discussions of welfare needs, entitlements, and 
safety nets is pervaded by insinuations of parasitism on one 
side met by the rage of the humiliated on the other.” (1998, 
142) One of my aims has been to show that such rage or 
humiliation cannot be countered merely with exhortations to 
think clearly or to take up a more constructive attitude. The 
feeling of humiliation when being made redundant is not just 
a personal feeling; it is a telling reaction. Shame, humiliation 
and indignation are responses to practices that seem to be 
designed to elicit precisely these responses. It is possible to 
say, I think, that the fear of parasitism is built into the system.  
The quote by Sennett reveals how emotional responses 
express the contradictory roles work occupy in our lives. 
However, as I said, such emotions appear in often 
unacknowledged forms. For example the desire to be ‘in 
charge’ of one’s life can appear as a feeling that is difficult to 
put one’s finger on, as several of Sennett’s examples 
demonstrate. He is right that analyzing these emotions is a 
way to elucidate a system of work and how it affects people 
existentially. Sennett and his colleague Jonathan Cobb 
analyzed the wounded feelings of people who ‘have made 
something of themselves’ (cf. 3.8). The people they 
interviewed talked about the feeling of being judged, of never 
really being able to feel safe: the way they described their lives 
revealed a deep sense of vulnerability. They always felt, 
somehow, inadequate. The ‘success story’ of class climbing 
didn’t take away this feeling. Despite their material 
prosperity, and despite the fact that they lead a more 
comfortable life than their parents they felt that they were ‘not 
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in control’ of their lives (1972, 33-4). This example shows that 
it would be a strange reaction to conclude that these people 
with a blue-collar background are simply confused and that 
they should learn to adopt a healthier attitude towards their 
own prosperity. The best aspect of Sennett’s work is that he 
shows that the world of work frequently makes it hard to 
understand our place in the world. That is the reason why I have 
dedicated so much of the chapter to his thinking. As he says in 
Corrosion of Character: “[in] our circumstances, [confusion] is 
an accurate reflection of reality” (1998, 146).  
In my thesis, this theme – the fear of obsolescence – has 
been brought up in almost every chapter, as an undercurrent. 
What I said about the contrast between independence and 
dependence above is precisely one of these fears related to 
work and as was indicated in my example about 
unemployment, it is a fear that appears both with regard to 
ideas about society and ideas about personal life. This fear is 
no mere personal hang-up. One description would be that it 
belongs to the multitude of existential problems people find 
themselves confronted with. However, as I wrote in chapter 5: 
the appearance of work as predicated on the shifting demands 
of the labor market cannot be dissolved simply by clear and 
sober thinking. The conceptual navigation is not easy in this 
area. Let me explain, and I will now take a slightly different 
route than the one taken in the last chapter when I discussed 
real abstractions. Why can’t sober thinking dissolve the idea 
about work as for example individual achievement on the 
labor market?  
There is an on-going discussion of sorts about a similar 
theme. The tradition of communitarianism has challenged 
liberal individualism. This challenge has taken different paths. 
Sean Sayers criticizes one such path he finds in Michael 
Walzer’s thinking. Even though Walzer soundly argues that a 
social dimension cannot have disappeared even in an 
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individualist society, he is wrong, Sayers claims, when he 
contends that individualism can be battled by means of ‘a 
change of consciousness’ (2011, 50). Sayers sides with Marx 
who, as we saw in chapter 5, operated with a very dynamic 
understanding of the atomistic individual and the historical 
situation. The self-interested individual and social 
interdependence are both aspects of this society, Marx argues 
(2011, 52, 58-60).  
To a certain extent, the world of wage labor forces me to 
think like a competing individual on the labor market, to look 
at others as competitors. As I wrote in chapter 5, this kind of 
abstraction of work can be applied to any type of wage labor. 
Imagine this case: I aspire for promotion but I know that my 
colleague is also a good candidate. In this situation, when I am 
in fact struggling to get that promotion (and we’re assuming 
that only one can be promoted), I am immersed in relations of 
competition and it is here unintelligible to say that I could 
simply choose not to think of people as competitors, when I am 
in fact striving for that promotion. This attitude is created and 
upheld by a certain system of work and careers, even though I 
am at the same time personally responsible for how I tackle 
what it means to be employed, or a colleague, how I worry 
about my career moving on too slowly, rather than worrying 
about the concrete tasks at hand, or in what spirit I worry 
about losing my job. One could say that it is when I start to 
regard a career as important in my life that I end up in this 
situation of competition, and that this reveals that I have 
staked out an existential path in my life. I have started to live 
my life in a certain way. Yet this is often intertwined with 
material circumstances that shape my life: I have held a 
position for a while, but suddenly my life is changed; I now 
have two kids and a house mortgage to pay, and it is all-
important to get a position that pays the bills and that 
provides a secure future for me and the kids. This is also an 
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existential path, a path where some things emerge as 
necessities, possibilities or alluring choices. The image I want 
to evoke is precisely the ways in which a world of work binds 
us but not always so that it is easily rendered into a language 
of adaptation, integration or internalization (cf. chapter 2 and 
3). Most of all, it is the perspective from which I speak and the 
attitude internal to that perspective that is different if I describe 
something as a matter of ‘adaptation’, or whether I talk about 
a person who has started to live hir life in a certain way. Step 
by step, I will articulate what this difference consists in.  
It would be wrong to describe for example the fear of 
obsolescence as an illusion in the sense that one could say that 
there is something to see through or dispel. A very strong 
dichotomy would then be posited: reality on the one hand, 
‘how things really are’, and illusions on the other hand.89 Nor 
would I here talk about ‘ideology’ in the sense of an 
intellectual superstructure under which a solid material basis 
of exploitation can be uncovered. Isabelle Stengers and 
Philippe Pignarre try to articulate the difference between 
talking about ideology and blindness and talking about the 
capacity to think, to feel and to see: 
Ideology connects with the image of a screen, of ideas that screen 
out, that block access to the “right point of view”. But the minions 
[….] are not blinded by ideology. It would be better to say, 
                                                          
89 Philosophers and psychologists talk about ‘illusions’ in diverging ways. 
Illusions are often thought to be states of temporary confusion, or a temporary 
distortion, or distortion where one could still talk about the real state of things 
(think about optical illusions). Another example of how ‘illusion’ has been 
used in philosophy is in the critique of religion as an ‘illusion’: “The abolition 
of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real 
happiness.” (Marx 1992a, 244) But for Marx, illusion is not easily counteracted 
with ‘reality’; dispelling illusions can only take place if an entire world that 
breeds illusions is changed. The next sentence goes: “To call on them to give 
up their illusions about their conditions is to call on them to give up a condition 
that requires illusions” (ibid.). 
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borrowing from the vocabulary of sorcery, that they have been 
‘eaten up’, that is to say, that is their very capacity to think and 
feel that has been prey to the operation of capture. To be blinded 
implies that one sees ‘badly’ – something that can be corrected. 
But to be captivated implies that it is the capacity to see itself that 
has been affected (2011, 42-3).  
What I think they get right, even though the language they use 
(sorcery) unwittingly invites the image of a blob that affects 
our capacity to feel and see, and even though they emphasize 
the metaphor of seeing, is the way they put forward the 
contrast between ideology as something that merely ‘screens 
out’90  and a much deeper level of being entangled in something 
– one is ‘captivated’. To express this in my own way: in the 
promotion example above, it could be said that one is not 
blinded by some elusive external power that screens out the 
right point of view (the most important things in life, etc.). It is 
one’s capacity of feeling and experiencing that is affected by 
the relations within a world of work: one’s entire life may be 
shaped by the experience of one’s life as trying to provide for 
a secure future or ‘trying to get ahead’. The aspirations of the 
job become a part of how I live my life. I further agree with the 
way Stengers and Pignarre continue: when one is captivated, 
when one starts treading on a certain path in life, this “gets a 
hold over everything that matters, that makes whoever is 
captured live and think” (2011, 43). So, instead of the (often) 
epistemological language of illusions, they employ a language 
of being situated, being captured; something starts to hold 
sway; something starts to make sense, or even appear to be 
necessary from the place where one is. Raymond Williams 
seems to make a similar point when he writes that hegemony 
cannot be grasped as mere ideological constructions. 
                                                          
90 This view of ideology has been challenged by many, cf. Zizek 2009, Eagleton 
2007. 
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Hegemony “is a whole body of practices and expectations, 
over the whole of living; our senses and assignments of 
energy; our shaping perceptions of ourselves and the world.” 
(quoted in Silva 2013, 98) 
However, demonstrating how rhetorical patterns or 
practices are entrenched in ideology may still be useful. As 
Terry Eagleton shows, one strand in how writers have 
characterized ideology takes experiences, relations and 
practices into account, rather than false or distortive 
representations of reality. In this view, talking about ideology 
is done at the level of tangled social reality and modes of 
feeling: fearing, willing and hoping. Furthermore, the ‘falsity’ 
or ‘distortion’ of ideology need not refer to an epistemological 
rift between ideology and factual reality. ‘Falsity’ can also be a 
way of talking about a skewed reality along with the ways in 
which this reality is legitimized. In this sense, ‘ideology’ is the 
legitimization of an unjust system (cf. 2007, 18-31, 44). 
Stengers and Pignarre remind us of the danger of 
positioning oneself at a level where everything can be 
described as if from the outside, so that we could talk about 
our lives in terms of having ‘a true representation’ of it or 
there being an ideology that ‘screens out’ the right point of 
view. Stengers and Pignarre are far from the language of 
illusions because they want to address and investigate, 
contemplate and ask questions not from a point of view of 
detached denunciation (‘rejecting the system’), but from a 
point of view where one acknowledges fragility, being at risk 
of being captured by for example the fear of obsolescence, 
which, they stress, is not the same as cynically proclaiming: 
we are all caught up in the system. Stengers and Pignarre do 
not offer such an all-out explication. They try out tentative 
descriptions, formulations, images. Their project aspires to 
self-understanding, and they explicitly relate self-
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understanding to political action. The task is, I take it, to 
reflect on where one is.  
I think Stengers and Pignarre would agree that there are 
different scenarios here: somebody starts to take delight in a 
certain path of life, while another bows down to it in 
resignation. Regardless of which scenario we pick out, the 
point is not to put illusions, enchantment on one side and 
clarity, reality and disenchantment on the other. The argument 
comes to this: it is impossible to write and think about the fear 
of obsolescence without reflecting on how one is dependent 
on employment and the specific life situations this 
dependency shapes. These ways of thinking are immersed in 
ways of being captivated, of seeing something as meaningful, 
necessary or ‘the realistic life path’. In this sense, when talking 
about the meaning of work, there is no safe – safe because it is 
supposedly theoretical – perspective. Stengers and Pignarre 
compare the predicament of critique of capitalism to critique 
of gender. There is no safe ground there either, what is needed 
is sensitivity to people’s life stories and lived experience – 
these are not representations we can relate to in a theoretical, 
detached mode. One should thus not hope for an ultimate 
form of  demystifying critique, neutral ground, a five-point 
program or technique for putting oneself in the other’s place – 
the challenge is to learn and be moved by others (2011, 47-8).  
The critical project Stengers and Pignarre sketch goes in 
another direction than opening one’s eyes and revealing what 
subjection is truly like. If one talks about illusions one talks 
about the truth being hidden behind appearances. Our lives 
are then at risk of being reduced to these ‘appearances’. They 
seek to find a language for how capitalism takes a hold on and 
becomes a part of people’s everyday lives (2011, 52). But these 
remarks are situated amidst tensions. To return to a point I 
made in chapter 3: the question ‘how do people internalize the 
work ethic’ may be a problematic instance of trying to reveal 
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what is really going on in a way that assumes that a radical 
critique of work must somehow transcend everyday life by 
occupying a vantage point from which our lives can be 
adequately interrogated. This underscores the need for the 
existential questions with which I ended chapter 3 and 4: what 
is a good occupation? The risk with the project of 
demystification and ideology critique is that our everyday 
lives are understood to be so totally molded by hegemonic 
structures that every attempt to ask what a good occupation is 
seems to be at risk of strengthening the status quo, the existing 
ideologies of work. To describe the future as open-ended and 
impossible to settle, and to remind ourselves of our own 
responsibility in everyday life, is a way to battle an inclination 
very different types of philosophizing tend to inadvertently 
fall prey to: cynicism. Critics of work like Arendt, Marcuse, 
Gorz, Marx and Weeks set out to show in which way a 
radically different world is possible. They urge us to look at 
the present world with new eyes.91 For them, to do this, to 
catch sight of the absurdity of the present system of work, 
requires a sort of distancing, a disidentification with the 
present – to take a step back, to question what seems familiar 
and commonsensical. Such distancing can have the function of 
a much-needed wake-up call. The task is, I think, to identify 
and characterize the ways in which people’s lives are 
dominated and structured by work, without falling into the 
trap of cynicism by attending to everyday life exclusively in 
the spirit of ‘unmasking’. In the end, the endeavor must be to 
understand ourselves and our own difficulties.  
 
                                                          
91 This reflection is inspired by Antony Fredriksson’s article “Är filosofin 
cynisk? Problemet med blacken utifrån.” 
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6.7 Work and reality: Revolutionary Road 
Sennett can be placed within a tradition that criticizes work in 
capitalism for displacing our sense of what is real. This line of 
critique can be found in thinkers as different as (the young) 
Marx, Weil, Marcuse and Weeks. Below, I want to illustrate 
the way in which ‘reality’ is appealed to in everyday 
discussions about the role work plays in people’s lives. The 
setting of the example is the world Sennett describes in terms 
of stable careers, security and long-term planning. What the 
example shows goes against the grain of many of the positive 
connotations that character (work as character-building) and 
security has in Sennett’s texts, especially if these are taken as 
ideals. The example points at the role work as security can 
have in people’s lives, and how it is connected with a sense of 
what is real. I discuss Richard Yates’ novel Revolutionary Road 
(1961) and the way two concepts of reality express an 
existential crisis for the two main characters, a middle class 
couple. The views of work presented in the book are 
embedded in the difficulties two people have with each other 
and the suburban life. The novel deals with the way they 
project their hopes and their fears onto one another, trying to 
formulate a solution to the problem of how they are to live. 
Above, I said that people often disagree about what a proper 
attitude towards work is. Revolutionary Road provides a good 
example of what this kind of disagreement may look like. 
Parallel with a critique of ‘grown-up maturity’ is a questioning 
of the idea that one is to find one’s ‘inner essence’ in 
meaningful activities that match one’s inner potentiality. 
Ultimately, the conflict between the main characters is 
expressed as a conflict about what is real to them, how they 
relate to necessity and hope. Revolutionary Road is a grim tale 
about a discourse (or a number of discourses) about work: 
work as self-realization and work as sacrifice and necessity are 
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placed in relation to each other as two poles that create an 
unhappy dialectic. In chapter 3, this unhappy dialectic was 
hinted at: work as self-realization and work as a societal 
obligation, ‘hard-work’, co-exist as two dominant discourses 
about work. 
The story is set in the mid-fifties. Frank and April have 
settled down in the suburbs. They have kids. Frank works as a 
salesman. He finds his job dull. After a period of difficulties, 
April starts talking about leaving for Paris, a dream they had 
when they were younger, so that Frank could take some time 
off and figure out what he wants to do with his life. Yates 
ironically describes this view as a conventional way of 
thinking – in wealthy, young men in the East, “[when] college 
was over, you could put off going seriously to work until 
you’d spent a few years in a book-lined bachelor flat, with 
intervals of European travel, and when you found your true 
vocation at last it was through a process of informed and 
unhurried selection; just as when you married at last it was to 
solemnize the last and best of your many long, sophisticated 
affairs.” (Yates 2009, 139-40) April does not want him merely 
to refine some artistic talent: he is to find (what she sees as) his 
essence. April could support him for a little while: 
“[….] you’ll be reading and studying and taking long walks and 
thinking. You’ll have time. For the first time in your life you’ll 
have time to find out what it is you want to do, and when you 
find it you’ll have the time and the freedom to start doing it.” […] 
He had a quick disquieting vision of her coming home from a day 
at the office – wearing a Parisian tailored suit, briskly pulling off 
her gloves – coming home and finding him hunched in an egg-
stained bathrobe, on an unmade bed, picking his nose (Yates 2009, 
109).   
The vision of soul-searching nose-picking in an empty Parisian 
apartment frightens Frank. How will he know what to do then, 
in leisure, when he doesn’t know now? Or does he know? What 
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does it even mean to ‘know’, is it a matter of knowing at all? 
For all this, they intend to go through with the plan this time. 
Frank is flattered to be treated as a man with potential, even 
though it requires that he would have to be provided for 
economically by his wife. ‘My God, are artists and writers the 
only people entitled to lives of their own?’ he calls out to his 
colleague Ordway, who wonders what Frank intends to do in 
Paris, will he write books, or what? Frank replies that all he 
wants is to find a job he likes but his problem is that he 
doesn’t know what he likes (Yates 2009, 168-9). Things change 
when Frank is offered promotion and April is pregnant with 
their third child. He gives up the idea of Paris and settles 
down in the role of dependable Breadwinner, justifying the 
change of plans with April’s pregnancy; he has started to 
doubt and regret the whole thing anyway. April is 
disappointed with him.  She wants to have an abortion. She 
thinks he has given up, that he has resigned to a life that they 
never wanted, a life they considered as a temporary solution 
and that something else makes up what is truly important in 
life. Frank retorts with ‘reason’, maturity and realism. He is – 
secretly – relieved: life is back to normal. Only juvenile 
dreamers think that they can do what they want. Real people 
have no choice but to face grim reality; ordinary jobs and a 
solid, no-nonsense marriage, and well, deal with it, Frank’s 
wildest years are through; grim reality might earn you a 
comfortable house. What is more, Frank’s new job is far more 
demanding than the last one; he has started to feel a bit more 
important at the office. That’s certainly something.  
According to April, ‘the present situation’ doesn’t 
necessitate Frank’s actions. Rather, her perception of Frank is 
that he has made a choice, a choice not to go to Paris, a choice 
to stay in the suburb. It is not very clear what April wants (and 
putting it like that, in terms of wanting, is symptomatic of the 
trajectory of their relation). It is not clear why Paris was 
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important for her in the first place, except to relieve a sense of 
guilt; she secretly thinks that her pregnancies forced them into 
the suburban life. She tells herself that she, the woman, 
epitomizes Mediocre Reality and that he, the man, at least has 
a choice to do what he wants. She looks with dread at a life 
with Frank-the-breadwinner, sipping cocktails with boring 
friends. If she were to be the breadwinner, at least the feeling 
of guilt would disappear, she thinks. Frank sees no room for 
choice. It is no paradox to say that from April’s perspective, he 
has chosen not to view his actions as a choice; according to 
her, he has adopted the perspective of resignation. It is 
important that this is someone’s perspective and not a general 
claim. By appealing to ‘the only mature thing to do’, Frank 
makes it clear that it is his understanding of the situation that 
is the responsible, grown-up one and that April’s perspective 
is nothing but a childish desire to run away. He wants them to 
settle down with a sensible conviction that they are no more 
special than anybody else. He takes her to restaurants to look 
at people who have “turned dull jobs to their advantage, who 
had exploited the system without knuckling under to it […].” 
(Yates 2009, 217) All he has to prove is that a salesman doesn’t 
have to be spiritually dead, or wait, that is not how Frank puts 
it; he wants to convince April that a Knox man “can still be 
interesting” (Yates 2009, 219). Because isn’t that what April’s 
dream of Paris is all about, that Frank would grow into an 
‘interesting person’ the way he was in his college years, when 
he excelled in entertaining her with intellectual talk? 
This example sheds light on what it means to describe 
work as an existential path – some things emerge as 
possibilities and necessities, our lives are shaped in a certain 
way that we are not always conscious of and that is rarely the 
result of very clear intentions. This applies to what I wrote 
about in chapter 3: even if people think about their lives in 
terms of control and management (life-family balance) the 
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existential consequences – what life becomes – are open-ended 
and must be open-ended. The idea that one could decide how 
one’s life is to unfold is, I think, unintelligible. Or to express 
the same thing in another way: to imagine that one could do 
this amounts to a form of self-deception. 
Does this mean that one could say that Frank is under an 
illusion concerning necessity and the suburban life, having an 
office job where one gets to feel a wee bit important? Or is it 
April who is stuck in deluded, idealistic dreams that she 
doesn’t even believe in herself? The perspective of the novel 
indicates that they are both so entrenched in the conflict and 
the ensuing bitterness that the only remaining option seems to 
be Romantic Paris, conventional dream as it is, or submitting 
to a comfortable life in which everything proceeds at a 
steadfast pace. Yates’ point seems to be that Frank’s and 
April’s difficulties are expressed not only in Frank’s cynical 
view of his work as a salesman – I call it cynical because Frank 
thinks his work is ‘beneath him’ and he relishes this feeling of 
superiority; after all, he is a man who has the potential to be 
interesting – but also in their momentary dream about a more 
authentic life in Paris. Frank’s cynicism also expresses a 
troubling form of self-contempt. From this perspective, it is 
not surprising that he takes some pleasure in the prospect of 
buying a bigger house as his salary fattens. In fact, this is 
much nicer than living in dreadful leisure in Paris, among 
cockroaches. It all boils down to this: April wants to move to 
Paris for his sake. Frank wants to stay ‘because that’s the 
mature thing to do’. This is, I think, a good illustration of what 
I meant above when I talked about ‘being captured’, that 
treading along a certain existential path means that certain 
possibilities and certain options appears on the horizon, while 
others fade away. That this path is captivating is something 
both April and Frank tries to deal with in their own ways.  
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April holds Frank responsible for his view of work as 
sacrifice. She knows he did not always think about his job this 
way. There are two notions of ‘work as necessity’ at play here, 
differentiated by reactions, and that is one of the reasons I have 
spent so much time on this particular example. Before, Frank 
perceived work as necessary toil, but he didn’t glorify the role 
of Breadwinner, the Family Man who takes his work seriously 
because that is the most mature thing to do. Frank used to 
smirk at the dull routines at Knox, his company. Now he takes 
quiet pleasure in these routines and in some sense he is intent 
on becoming the Knox Man, embracing a life of one necessity 
after the other. Frank always seems to have thought that this is 
what most jobs are like – dull routines – why should he be 
special? Despite his earlier outspoken derision of a bourgeois 
lifestyle, he was not prepared to seriously question why he 
and April are so unhappy, nor was April. The change Frank 
undergoes can be characterized in this way: the expression ‘I 
need this job, it’s a question of money, really’ has taken on a 
new meaning. If the first view of work as necessity is that 
work is something one has to put up with somehow, the 
second view is that work is toil, and toil belongs to the very 
conditions of life, and one should not smirk at this 
predicament, because one cannot flee from it. Every adult 
must make the best of it. As I pointed out in 3.3, such 
distinctions are not steady. From April’s point of view, Frank’s 
appeals to reason and necessity are not earnest ones – this 
whole ‘responsibility deal’ is a charade that, for her, only 
proves that Frank has given up, on everything. It is evident 
that April feels contempt for Frank because he has ‘chickened 
out’, he has settled for comfort, instead of a more uncertain 
and adventurous Parisian life. In feeling contempt for Frank’s 
bowing down to the Knox life, she does not confront her own 
ideas about freedom, her own feelings of guilt and self-
effacement.  
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Yates again ironically dwells on the intense feeling of reality 
that the plan of moving to Paris evokes for Frank and April – 
elation. The twist is of course that it was just an appearance of 
decision, reality and voluntariness (even though putting it this 
way takes us dangerously close to the language of illusion). 
What they want is not real and can never become real – partly, 
because they are so fixated on wanting and ‘knowing what 
one wants’. The loss of reality can be tied to the two notions of 
necessity I detected in the novel. The first one is the image of 
external necessity towards which we, well-educated, forward-
looking careerists as we are, can take a cynical attitude: ‘I 
know I have this job for now, it’s a temporal thing, but you 
know my colleagues, they are just so….stuck.’ We find the other 
use of ‘necessity’ in Frank’s appeals to the mature life to which 
everyone must submit with a business-like matter-of-factness. 
In the first view, necessity is a mere condition of life, a 
condition to be minimized. The other view revers necessity as 
reality, as the place one has finally settled down to after 
having gotten rid of childish illusions and fancies. If traces of 
the first image of necessity can be found in Arendt’s thinking, 
it is the latter view that she rejects: The Human Condition can be 
read as a way of taking issue with the idea that the primary 
dimension of human life consists in ‘getting by’. Revolutionary 
Road brilliantly shows the tensions built around these two 
conceptions of necessity, along with understandings of reality, 
control, maturity and self-realization.  
6.8 Concluding words 
In my thesis I have discussed various ideas about freedom, 
necessity and work. In Revolutionary Road, these concepts 
reflect the dystopia conjured up by critical theory, an unhappy 
dialectic: people are crushed in the secure relations of wage 
labor, but they also fear freedom from it. Should one cling to 
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the dream of freedom and endless potentiality or should one 
opt for an unhappy, secure life? The images of freedom and 
the ordered life seem to be connected in the book as attitudes 
that strengthen each other and express the two main 
characters’ fears and inability to see other possibilities, other 
ways of relating to each other as spouses, human beings, 
lovers, providers. As we saw in chapter 2, Marcuse’s writings 
highlight a kind of existential deadlock: work is repulsive, but 
when leisure becomes the shadow of work it provides no 
solace either; we abhor work in capitalism, but we also fear 
freedom from it. His own solution might not be satisfactory, 
but the question is striking when it appears not as a 
generalized idea about ‘our predicament’, but, rather, as one 
existential path that is intelligible given a system revolving 
around wage labor.  
Revolutionary Road latches onto a classical dichotomy 
between freedom and necessity, where work is either an 
expression of the free personality (or free expressions of 
creativity) or work is placed among social obligations to 
society or as the individual’s and society’s way of ‘getting by’. 
As I’ve shown in this thesis (especially chapters 1-2), both the 
concepts of necessity and freedom are sometimes neutralized 
so that the existential stakes in talking about freedom and 
necessity disappear from view. In the novel, ideas about 
freedom and necessity are symptoms of existential problems 
and these are revealing of a culture in which a destructive 
dichotomy I have touched on throughout the thesis figures. 
Either work is neutralized as necessary toil, Necessity to 
which all people must submit as responsible adults and 
members of society, or work is moralized as personal self-
fulfillment where I am to realize my personal potentials. 
Revolutionary Road illustrates the damaging impasse such a 
dichotomy entails on an existentially speaking.  
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I have talked about two roles tensions can have. On the one 
hand, the example expresses the destructive side of tensions: 
this is what Sennett talks about when he talks about the loss of 
a sense of what one does. On the other hand, as I wrote in the 
Introduction, tensions can be a lever: by articulating the 
ambiguous roles wage labor has, we also simultaneously 
reflect on what work could be or what work should be. If 
ambivalent ideas about work and necessity (or work and 
freedom), along with the practices in which these ideas 
operate, are articulated, it is also possible to get a hold of 
possibilities and avenues of change, or at least to acknowledge 
the urgency of such avenues of change. How such tensions are 
articulated will have a bearing on how we think about for 
example full employment, ‘jobs for life’, a general income, and 
the role of labor power in capitalism. One of the challenges is 
to discern when it is relevant to talk about work as a life 
situation or when it is important to attend to the dynamics of 
labor power. The challenge is also, as I have said in this last 
section, to navigate between talking about work from a 
perspective of demystification and ideology critique, and 
talking about work as immersed in existential problems. This 
shift is important for understanding what it means to criticize 
work. After all, critique of work is not constricted to academic 
papers and conferences. Ultimately, I would say that critique 
of work is worthless if it is not anchored in interpersonal 
relations. This marks the limitation of a perspective of 
demystification or ideology critique. We do not – or, rather, 
should not – relate to each other as bearers of ‘rhetoric’ or 
‘ideology’. The task has therefore been to emphasize the 
constant shift of levels that a discussion about the role of work 
requires. 
The connection between a critical discussion of work and 
more positive remarks also re-introduces the challenge to 
think about what a good life is, what is important in life, what 
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makes life worth living. My own aspiration has not been to 
define or prescribe what work, ideally, should be or what a 
good life ‘should contain’. One of my aims has rather been to 
look at the different ways in which the question of work and 
the good life is posed in the face of neutralizations of work as 
an activity to which one must simply submit or as a 
commodity one has no choice but to sell, or in the face of 
moralizations of work as the core of life, as the ultimate aim, 
or as creativity and personal self-realization. In this way, I 
have approached the roles of work in our lives through 
ambiguities, disagreement, controversies and tensions.   
  
391 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this thesis, the task has been to open up the discussion of 
work to contestation and to remind ourselves about the forms 
of contestations that already exist: these contestations alert us 
to fundamental questions: What is good work? What do we 
consider to be worthwhile activities? What destructive roles 
can work have? Is employment for all really the most 
important social issue? The main aim of this thesis has been to 
repoliticize the discussion about work. Repoliticization here 
means to highlight entanglement, tensions and struggles over 
our everyday lives. Such repoliticization is urgent because of 
the tendency to neutralize work so that wage labor is seen as a 
commodity on the market or so that work is seen as an 
entirely personal project of self-realization. Closely connected 
with this attempt to highlight the controversies surrounding 
work is, for me, the importance of attending to work from a 
perspective of change that is irreducible to societal trends. 
This is change in the sense of ethical and existential concerns 
about the future. Worries about fragmentation of work and 
colonization of our lives by work could be seen in this light: 
the worry is future-orientated. Contestations in relation to 
work are frequently seen in people’s reactions to the changes 
in work and employment. The challenge is, as I have pointed 
out, to radicalize these worries so that they really address and 
question the status quo, rather than neutralizing work for 
example so that work is seen as a sphere of economic 
rationality to be limited or so that the answer is seen as a 
resurrection of a society in which people identify as workers. 
At the same time, by looking at these controversies I hope 
to have critically assessed consensus about work, what I 
talked about as ‘clichés’ in the Introduction, in politics and 
everyday life. I want to suggest that the consensus about work 
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we see all around us can be understood as a response to 
critique and contestation. Such ‘consensus’ is therefore not at 
all the bare fact of people agreeing: the critical writers I have 
discussed show the processes and changes in thinking by 
which something comes to seem necessary. I talked about the 
moralization and neutralization of work to paint the contours 
of this very unstable, yet widespread, consensus: all of us 
must work, society needs our work, work is every adult’s 
responsibility. Let me take three (often interrelated) examples 
of such consensus that are both prevalent and continuously 
challenged. 
(1) The idea that work, in general, contributes to the wealth 
of society is often invoked when employment or jobs figure as 
the aim that cannot be criticized. In Finland this argument has 
been evoked in relation to the fur industry, new mining 
projects and the expansion of nuclear power. ‘People get their 
incomes from these jobs!’ is then a way to legitimize a certain 
position (the fur industry should be legal) and simultaneously 
a way to dismiss critique (the fur industry is ethically 
problematic).  
(2) The ideal of job-creation (in, say, Finland) is embraced 
by all mainstream parties in the Finnish parliament as a general 
interest of the state: before every election, parties from the left to 
the right offer their own programs on how to battle 
unemployment. When politicians talk about unemployment it 
is done in a language of minimization. At the same time, there 
seems to be a consensus among mainstream economists about 
the impossibility of eliminating unemployment within this 
economic system – unemployment is structural. These 
economists’ theorizing about what a ‘necessary’ level of 
unemployment is runs side by side with politicians who 
compete with each other about which economic policy will 
generate the greatest number of jobs and best eliminate 
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unemployment.92 The constant appeal to job creation is also, as 
I have shown, challenged by critical writers who talk about 
work in a very different way than mainstream economists. 
Weeks (chapter 3) and Gorz (chapter 2) are two such critics 
who reject the idea that the aim of society is to maximize the 
number of jobs, but they also strongly oppose a society in 
which some people, for structural reasons, are thrown out of 
the system. Their conclusion is that the present ideology of 
‘job-creation’ leans on a schizophrenic idea about jobs: the 
minimization of unemployment is dressed in a language of 
help and self-help, but the ideology of job-creation is also 
dependent on fear tactics that make people more dependent 
on wage labor (e.g. workfare programs). These writers stress 
that the ideology and reality of scarcity of job ultimately 
weaken the bargaining position of the workers.  
(3) It is often said that work is a shared burden. Russell 
Muirhead, among others, argues that there is an eternal 
tension of work and life. Work furthers social purposes and 
contributes to the common good but it is not always what we 
deserve as individuals, it is not always intrinsically 
interesting, he claims. “Society in every age need certain 
things done that are not fulfilling to do.” (2004, 170) Muirhead 
suggests that the problem with work is not a mere problem of 
capitalism and the fragmentation of work instilled by the 
capitalist system of work. The problem goes deeper, he says: 
It is not simply capitalism but the nature of work that issues in a 
basic and recurring problem: what the work society needs its 
members to do is not always (and perhaps is only rarely) aligned 
with the full powers we bear as human beings, or for that matter 
with the particular tendencies we possess as individuals. This 
tension is true not only for societies devoted to productivity but 
also for those devoted to piety, or self-defense, or personal liberty 
                                                          
92 For an overview of which tensions this gives rise to, cf. Weman 2013.  
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or some mix of these and other goods. Social fit, or the alignment 
between individual talent and social need, and personal fit, the 
alignment between work and an individual’s best purposes, are 
not easily satisfied simultaneously (2004, 159). 
The problem with such generalized conceptions of work that 
simply must be done, for all Muirhead’s sensitivity to problems 
of work, is that they risk lumping together very different 
kinds of work under the heading of ‘the burden of work’. 
Housework is lumped together with the monotony of the 
assembly line and the toil of picking salad. In chapter 1 we 
saw Arendt’s version of this image of primordial, pre-political 
necessity. Strangely, she also advances a critique of that idea: 
in this society, a jobholder’s society, the concern of society is 
now precisely to govern the shared burden of labor. She sees 
that as a dangerous levelling of activities that makes all 
activities seem alike and that ties all activities to society in the 
same way. In chapters 2, 3 and 4, I provided several examples 
of attempts to make more meticulous distinctions within the 
concept of work. One such example is the rhetoric of hard 
work that, according to Kathi Weeks, gives rise to incessant 
distinctions between who earns recognition as a responsible, 
hard-working citizen, and who doesn’t. A noteworthy 
instance of such elastic distinctions is the present debate about 
the skyrocketing bonuses of CEO’s. Bonuses are frequently 
defended by invoking the CEO’s hard work and the heavy 
burden s/he carries. On the one hand, this rhetoric of burdens 
puts the CEO on a par with all other workers: s/he works, like 
everybody else, and hir responsibility is an exceptional one 
but basically, s/he should have the same right as ‘anybody 
else’ to get rich by working. On the other hand, hir special 
privilege (the skyrocketing bonus) is legitimized by 
suggesting that s/he is not a worker like everybody else: hir 
position does not contribute to the shared burden, but, rather, 
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hir position is a precondition for there to be a shared burden of 
work. In other words: as a job-creating CEO of a big company, 
s/he must be considered an exception. But when the 
discussion is turned around like this, work is no longer 
depicted as a burden, but, rather, a gift from or an opportunity 
offered by the company. 
My aim has not been to resolve tensions. Instead, I think it 
is good to re-articulate present worries. This was one of the 
primary aspirations in all the chapters: my reading of Arendt, 
Marcuse, Gorz, Weeks, Gaita, Marx and Sennett was aimed at 
this project of re-articulation. Their worries (to sum up rather 
crudely) involved fragmentation of work, dependency on 
wage labor, an expansion of the jobholder society, the 
expansion of commodification and, lastly, an impoverishment 
of the language of work that does not enable us to see how 
work can deepen. I have tied all of these worries to the 
importance of keeping in mind the open-ended character of 
the concept of work. Let me, one last time, give an example. 
Scott Shershow, an author with critical views on work, was 
constantly asked who will see to it that we will take 
responsibility for the shared burden of work in a society 
where work no longer is seen as a primary duty or a primary 
social bond: 
I am asked, for example: in the coming community for which you 
argue, who will pick up the garbage? Who will care for the 
children and nurse the sick? Even in the most extravagant fantasy 
of a technoparadise, who will mind the machines? I am always at 
first tempted to reply with equal simplicity and to say merely: 
now you’re talking! For such questions, of course, will not end 
but, rather, begin, as though for the first time, precisely when we 
have released ourselves from our self-imposed lives of hard labor, 
and when work no longer appears without question as the only 
possible human vocation and the absolute figure of self-
fulfillment (2005, 7). 
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The conceptual moves we make with ‘work’ and related 
concepts reveal how we understand what we are doing. 
Shershow talks about a future in which it is important to talk 
about what is needed, which activities communities truly 
needs to get done, rather than, as critical writers argue that it 
is now (cf. chapter 1, 2), necessity is understood through what 
we see as possible within the economic relations of wage 
labor. A connected point has been to show the political 
dangers of generalizing work in terms of a common obligation 
or an eternal predicament. One such generalization is that 
work, all work, attends to ‘society’s needs’. I have pointed to 
the danger of such a purportedly neutral image of what 
society needs. My argument has been that such neutralization 
of society’s needs brings with it a neutralization of work as 
wage labor: all jobs are seen as responding to needs. I would 
agree with Read who writes: 
What is foreclosed by such a conception [of society’s needs] is not 
only history (as a history of production, consumption, and 
distribution) but also the differences that this history inscribes at 
the center of social existence, differences of hierarchy, conflict, 
and separation – differences of class (2003, 50). 
Throughout, I have tried to show how disconcerting 
neutralizations about the concept of work can also be traced in 
critical texts about work. I started the thesis with a lengthy 
discussion of Arendt’s concept of labor and necessity. In 
chapter 2 I reflected on problematic ways of conceptualizing 
work as domination. Chapter 3 dealt with my misgivings 
about a critical vocabulary that stresses internalization. In 
chapter 2 and 4 I wrestled with a neutralizing account of 
functionality. Lastly, chapter 6 grappled with an analysis of 
fragmentation, that risks entrenching a longing for an 
intelligible work-centered society. I have argued that such 
neutralizations are hazardous as they compromise the 
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acuteness of the concerns that drive the authors. My main 
suggestion has been that the stakes of the concerns are lost: the 
worries – What is so damaging about fragmentation? Why is it 
important to give an alternative to the language of 
professionalism? – are drowned in neutralizing accounts. To 
illustrate a way that the stakes can be brought back into view, 
in chapter 5 I talked about the conflict and tension between 
work as labor power and work as a life situation. 
‘Work as a life-situation’ may seem tantalizingly obscure, 
but I have tried to show why it is spurious to posit a general, 
trans-historical concept of ‘good work’ or ‘real work’ 
(especially, cf. chapter 3, 4 and 5). To turn to such a general 
concept on a philosophical level would be, I think, of very 
little help and sometimes it is positively dangerous to do so, as 
Weeks shows in her critical account of the often hidden 
hierarchies such normative concepts bring with them. The 
thesis thus contains no attempt to formulate the core of 
meaningful and good work. My intention was instead to trace 
how existential and political concerns about good work are 
easily trivialized or repressed. I think Shershow is right, then, 
when he writes that critical analyses of work invite us to re-
think necessity in the sense that we scrutinize the world in 
which we already live. As I argued in chapter 4, the question 
about good work is rooted in praxis, in relations. I challenged 
Gaita’s remarks about a vocation because they tempt us to 
make a categorical contrast between what is external and 
internal to a job. Instead, I wanted to look at how the concern 
about good work arises within our jobs and our relations.  
In several chapters, my aim was to highlight the acuteness 
of the question of what good work is. This acuteness is lost not 
only when work is treated as an eternal essence, but it is also 
lost when individualization and privatization of work and 
employment take the place of an interpersonal quest for 
meaningful occupations. An extreme expression of a distance 
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from such a quest is when work is strictly defined according to 
the needs of the labor market. If the language of competition, 
supply and demand takes over, meaningfulness can be 
nothing more than a private hunt for a fulfilling job. I referred 
to Göran Torrkulla and his challenge of what we dare to think: 
do we dare to think that we are worth more than badly paid 
and/or meaningless jobs? I think what his contention involves 
is far more than a privatized wish for a personally fulfilling 
job. This is a question about the relation between work, 
meaning and life – our lives, the lives we share. When work is 
individualized into a contract or a career, or when it is 
normalized as a commodity, strict limits are set on how the 
world concerns us in work. Torrkulla’s challenge invokes 
responsibility in an ethically open-ended sense. I argued that 
Sennett’s critique of the fragmentation of work, a critique that 
brought out how fragmentation implies a loss of care, can be 
extended to a critique of the relation between work and the 
world that our jobs maintain, form and create. The same could 
be said about Marcuse’s and Gorz’s approach. Their 
indictment of ‘work society’ draws our attention to alarming 
aspects but their worry about freedom gives too little room for 
questions about responsibility. I have suggested that work 
have the role of bracketing and holding fundamental concerns 
in human life at bay. The idea about ceaseless economic 
growth is perhaps the most damaging form that takes. For all 
my critique of her ideas about necessity, I agree with Arendt 
that the structure of such bracketing needs to be revealed so 
that other possibilities are disclosed. Like her, I think that 
some conceptions of work and society inhibit critical reflection 
on what is truly important. In this way, Arendt’s philosophical 
proposal is indispensable: "What I propose, therefore, is very 
simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing" 
(1998, 5).  
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Svensk sammanfattning 
Mitt avhandlingsprojekt tar avstamp från det samförstånd 
som lönearbetet tycks omges av. I den politiska retoriken 
florerar tal om arbete och arbetslivet, och målet är att så 
många som möjligt ska jobba så länge som möjligt i 
arbetslivet. Utmaningen som framställs är att skapa fler jobb 
och att minimera arbetslösheten. Utbildning, hälsa och 
fritidsintressen beskrivs ofta i arbetsrelaterade termer: det 
centrala är att få ett jobb och att orka jobba. På ett mera 
existentiellt plan framhålls lönearbete som en möjlighet till 
personlig utveckling: arbete är kreativitet och 
självförverkligande. I avhandlingen pekar jag på hur 
samförstånd av det här slaget samexisterar med och står i 
relation till olika typer av spänningar som omfattar 
lönearbetets roll i samhället och i våra liv. 
Jag diskuterar flera kritiska texter om arbete som på olika 
sätt utmanar grundläggande synsätt och som också artikulerar 
egna ståndpunkter kring alternativa sätt att tänka kring 
arbetets existentiella och samhälleliga mening. Mitt eget 
projekt går ut på att genom dessa texter ta fasta på de olika 
sätt på vilka arbete neutraliseras: arbetet behandlas som en 
resurs som är samhälleligt värdefull oberoende av dess 
innehåll, syften eller de livsomständigheter arbetet är 
förbundet med. Detta neutraliserande, som också tar sig 
formen av moraliserande av typen ”allt arbete är värdefullt”, 
kan utmanas. Genom en sådan neutralisering förskjuts 
befintliga spänningar och kontroverser kring arbete och 
arbetslivet. Det finns en mängd debatter om olika yrken och 
näringar: pälsindustrin, gruvnäringen och köttindustrin är tre 
sådana exempel. Arbetslivet och arbetets roll ifrågasätts i 
samtal och debatter om nedskärningar, uppsägningar och 
utbrändhet. Det som sker när arbete neutraliseras är att 
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sysselsättning framstår som ett mål i sig, samhällets och det 
enskilda livets primära uppgift. 
I avhandlingen använder jag mig av ett flertal kritiska 
texter från olika tanketraditioner (jag går bl.a. i dialog med 
Hannah Arendt, André Gorz, Karl Marx, Simone Weil och 
Richard Sennett) som verktyg för att komma till större klarhet 
kring neutralisering av arbete – jag visar också hur flera av 
skribenterna själva reproducerar ett neutraliserande av arbete 
trots att deras övergripande projekt går emot just denna 
tendens. Diskussionen i avhandlingen syftar ytterst till att visa 
hur neutraliseringen av arbete och lönearbete i synnerhet gör 
att moraliska och politiska frågor – frågor som hela tiden ställs 
i samhälleliga debatter och personliga samtal – avvisas eller 
kommer till uttryck endast genom att vissa grundantaganden 
om arbetets roll godkänns. Neutralisering av arbete såsom 
exempelvis påståendet att ”allt arbete är värdefullt” eller 
beskrivningar av arbete såsom arbetskraft på en marknad 
styrd av utbud och efterfrågan glider undan det slags 
utbredda oro som finns både i enskilda människors liv och i 
samhället: vad är gott arbete? Vad är ett bra samhälle? På 
vilka sätt är vi beroende av arbete och arbetsmarknaden? 
Vilket syfte tjänar lönearbetet? Vilken är relationen mellan det 
arbete vi gör och grundläggande mänskliga behov? 
Med andra ord försöker jag genom att ta fasta på 
neutralisering av arbete också visa på vilket sätt det är viktigt 
att få fram arbetet som moraliskt och politiskt förankrat. Jag 
vill visa att den självklarhet genom vilken vi talar om jobb 
som sysselsättning och personligt självförverkligande lever 
sida vid sida med en mängd spänningar kring arbetets mening 
och syften. Dessa spänningar döljs när arbete ikläs rollen av 
gemensamt samhälleligt intresse eller den enskildes 
stimulerande jobb.  
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